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The driving ambition of this thesis lies in identifying and disclosing distinct and divergent 
examples of 20th century American long poems. This task will be carried out with a particular 
focus on stressing the idiosyncrasies of these practices rather than merely revising previous 
attempts at constructing a lineage or history of the American long poem. What is crucially at 
stake in this proposed critical movement is a distinction between  ‘dŚĞ>ŽŶŐWŽĞŵ ?ĂƐĂŶ
object of literary history ĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽĂŶ ‘ĂĐƚŽĨĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚŝŶƋƵŝƌǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶďĞ
comprehended in and on its own terms. In this task, I employ three key terms: Idiosyncrasy, 
Extension and Inquiry, which together frame my project as a disclosure of how poetic texts 
extend idiosyncratically over significant length, breadth and depth. 
  /ŶĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐ ‘ŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐǇ ?/ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?
perception, intersubjectivity ?  namely, the questions which are proposed and explored by 
phenomenology. In this regard, my methodology is informed by a phenomenological 
taxonomy, developed from the writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Martin Heidegger, 
Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida. The grouping of poets featured in this thesis are all 
American writers who have published extended works since the 1950s, and each is 
associated to varying extents with schools of avant-garde, post-DŽĚĞƌŶŝƐƚŽƌ ‘EĞǁ ?ƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?
'ĞŽƌŐĞKƉƉĞŶŚĂƐďĞĞŶƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐĂŶ ‘KďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƐƚ ?ƉŽĞƚĂŶĚŝƐŽĨƚĞŶĚŝƐĐussed alongside his 
ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌŝĞƐƵŬŽĨƐŬǇ ?>ŽƌŝŶĞEŝĞĚĞĐŬĞƌĂŶĚŚĂƌůĞƐZĞǌŶŝŬŽĨĨ ?:ĂŵĞƐ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĐůŽƐĞ
ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚ&ƌĂŶŬK ?,ĂƌĂ ?ĂƌďĂƌĂ'ƵĞƐƚĂŶĚ:ŽŚŶƐŚďĞƌǇůŽĐĂƚĞŚŝŵĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞEĞǁ
York School in the 1950s; Robin Blaser was instrumental in many of the publications and 
events which surrounded the San Francisco Renaissance; Lyn Hejinian, Susan Howe and Leslie 
Scalapino all published poems and works of poetics in L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E school 
publications in the 1970s-80s; and Rachel Blau DuPlessis has worked since the 1970s with 
both Language and Objectivist poetics, though her sustained interest in and engagement 
ǁŝƚŚ ‘ƚŚĞůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ ?ĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞƐŚĞƌĂƐĂůĞĂĚŝŶŐĨŝŐƵƌĞŝŶƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚ
poetics in her own right. In each of these readings, significant efforts are made to discuss 
ĞĂĐŚƉŽĞƚŽƵƚƐŝĚĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůƉůĂĐĞǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ƐĐŚŽŽů ?Žƌ ‘ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?dŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ
of this is to seek access to the idiosyncrasies of poets and their works as opposed to merely 
relying on generalised reckonings. In this manner, the specific ways in which individual poets 
extend their poetics into substantial inquiries will be made apparent using the terms 
employed by the poets themselves. 
  It is my intention for this thesis to stand as an opening of the ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨ ‘dŚĞ
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ>ŽŶŐWŽĞŵ ?ƚŽĐŽŵƉůĞǆĂŶĚĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŝŶƉŽĞƚƌǇ ?ǁŝƚŚĂ
view to framing 20th century American poetics as being particularly oriented towards carrying 
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1   Coming to terms with the American long poem  Introduction 
 
Introduction ?  Critical Models of the American Long Poem ?   




In 2013, Rachel Blau DuPlessis finished her 40-year work Drafts, an extensive poetic project 
which takes as one of its major objects of interest the history of the long poem in America, 
and furthermore makes the claim that the long poem is the dominant form of 20th century 
ƉŽĞƚŝĐŝŶƋƵŝƌǇ ?,ĞƌǁŽƌŬĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐWĞƚĞƌDŝĚĚůĞƚŽŶ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ
continueƐƚŽƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƚŚĞƉĞĂŬŽĨƉŽĞƚŝĐĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŶƉ ) ? ‘WŽĞƚŝĐĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?ŝŶ
this context is not intended to imply a hierarchy wherein bigger equals better, but rather, it 
gestures at the fact that American poetics, which arguably began the 20th century with an 
intense focus on compression in the hands of Ezra Pound and his contemporaries, has 
successfully developed a variety of procedures for carrying out extended inquiry through the 
long poem form. Pound exemplifies this movement; known at first for his involvement in 
/ŵĂŐŝƐŵĂŶĚsŽƌƚŝĐŝƐŵ ?ŚŝƐǁŽƌŬďĞŐĂŶŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐƚŽƉƵƌƐƵĞǁŚĂƚŚĞĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ĞƉŝĐ ?
ambitions, becoming larger, longer and more sustained in The Cantos. 
  It would be wrong, however, to characterise the American long poem by virtue of one 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨŝƚƐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ĂŶĚŝƚŝƐƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂŶĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ
framing of extended poetics which does not rely on narratives of influence or tradition. The 
ways in which American poets arrived at their models of poetic extension differ vastly and 
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cannot merely be contained within such narratives. The reasons for this are twofold: firstly, 
as the critical discourse surrounding them suggests, it is unclear what actually constitutes 
 ‘ƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ ? ?ĂŶĚƐĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ?ǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐĚŽĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ ‘ƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ
ůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ ?ƌĞůǇŽŶƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƚŝĐƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐĂŶĚƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽŐĂŝŶƚŚĞ
ĚĞƐŝŐŶĂƚŝŽŶ ‘ůŽŶŐ ? ?tŚĂƚ/ŵĞĂŶďǇƚŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǁŝĚĞǀĂƌŝĞƚǇŽĨůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵƐǁŚŝĐŚŚĂǀĞ
been composed since the 1950s ?  in the work of The New York School, The San Francisco 
Renaissance, The Deep Image Poets, The Objectivists, Black Mountain Poets and 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Poets, among others ?  can be rewardingly discussed in and on their own 
idiosyncratic terms of extension, rather than based on any single and disingenuously cohesive 
model. In this regard, the major ambition of this thesis lies in identifying and disclosing 
distinct and divergent examples of American long poem forms, with a particular focus on 
stressing the idiosyncrasies of these practices rather than merely revising previous attempts 
at constructing a lineage or history of the American long poem. What is crucially at stake in 
this proposed critical movement is a distinction between literary history as an external order 
imposed in hindsight as opposed to a desire to engage with long poems as their composers 
conceived of them. These are obviously not mutually exclusive options, but, as will be 
demonstrated throughout this introduction, there has been a strong trend in critical works 
on American long poems to overemphasise the role of influence in determining subsequent 
poetic forms. However, before these issues can be discussed in detail, it is necessary first to 
address the two claims I have presented concerning the present critical status of the 
American long poem: (1) its lack of clear definition as a term and (2) the necessity of 
articulating the long poem in terms of its capacity for extended poetic inquiry. 
  There have been a variety of responses to this first problem of definition. For many 
critics, the American long poem is an historical form with its origins in the classic epic mode. 
In this regard, Burton Hatlen writes: 
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The long poem arrived in North America carrying a heavy weight of 
associations. The august lineage that passes from Homer through Virgil and 
Dante to Milton and Wordsworth has meant that whenever an American poet 
has chosen the long poem form, that choice has had cultural and even 
political implications.      (Hatlen 2004, 489) 
,ĞƌĞ ?,ĂƚůĞŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐƚŚĞůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵĂƐ ‘ĂƌƌŝǀŝŶŐ ?ĨƌŽŵĂEuropean lineage of writers, before 
undergoing a transformation into a specifically American form in the work of Henry 
Wadsworth Longfellow, Joel Barlow, Walt Whitman, Emily Dickinson and Herman Melville in 
the 19th century. This notion of the American long poem as taking place within the confines 
of a linear tradition is supported by Stephen Fender, Thomas Gardner and Rosenthal and 
Gall, all of whom argue that the American long poem begins in earnest with the work of Walt 
Whitman in the mid-19th Century. In contrast to this, however, Margaret Dickie describes the 
American long poem as a fundamentally modernist invention, inaugurated in the works of 
Ezra Pound, T.S Eliot, William Carlos Williams and Hart Crane: 
The long poem was to be a new experiment not only with form but also with 
poetry as a public language. The poets declared that their long poems were to 
be celebrations of the city, models for good government, values and visions by 
which to live. Openly didactic, the poets set out to teach not necessarily 
difficult lessons, but simple precepts that required new and complex forms of 
expression responsive to the conditions of the modern world.   (Dickie, 8) 
In arguing that the American long poem as we now recognise it began roughly a century ago 
rather than, as Hatlen argues, in Classical literature, Dickie underscores the sense in which 
the American long poem is an inherently experimental form. However, the notable omissions 
ŝŶŝĐŬŝĞ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ? >ĂŶŐƐƚŽŶ,ƵŐŚĞƐ ?ƐMontage of a Dream Deferred ?DĞůǀŝŶdŽůƐŽŶ ?s 
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Harlem Gallery ?, ? ?ƐHelen in Egypt and Trilogy ?DŝŶĂ>ŽǇ ?ƐSongs To Johannes, Gertrude 
^ƚĞŝŶ ?ƐTender Buttons and Stanzas In Meditation ?  serve to undermine her thesis. Whilst her 
conception of the American long poem as a fairly recent activity is a liberating gesture, the 
lack of any poets who were not white, middle-class men paints an entirely inaccurate picture. 
If, as Dickie seems to suggest, we are to envisage the American long poem as a wide variety 
of fundamentally modern textual strategies, we must necessarily also bear witness to the 
diversity of poets engaging with extended poetic practice.  
   More recent works of criticism on the American long poem have begun to 
acknowledge the plethora of works which merit discussion in terms of their methods of 
ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ ?/ŶĂůĞĐƚƵƌĞĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ ‘'ĞŶƌĞWƌŽďůĞŵƐ ? ?ZĂĐŚĞůůĂƵƵWůĞƐƐŝƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĞƚŚĞƐŝƐ
ƚŚĂƚ “ƚŽƵƐĞĂŐĞŶƌĞ ? The Long Poem ?  or a historical entity ?   ‘ƚŚĞ ? ?ƚŚŽƌ ? ?ƐƚĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ
ůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ ? ?with any hopes of achieving a genre definition is a doomed undertaking, 
ĚŽŽŵĞĚƚŽďĞƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚďǇƉůĞƚŚŽƌĂ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŶƉ ). DuPlessis articulates a concern prevalent 
throughout the criticism of American long poems; namely that genre definitions or historical 
models are insufficient in coming to terms with the specific acts of extension which 
ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵƐ ?:ŽƐĞƉŚŽŶƚĞ ?Ɛ ‘^ĞƌŝĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ>ŽŶŐ
WŽĞŵ ?ůŽĐĂƚĞƐƚŚŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶƚŚĞŵŝƐĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƚƌŝŶƐŝĐŝŶƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘>ŽŶŐWŽĞŵ ?ŝƚƐĞůĨ ?,Ğ
ǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ ?ƚ ?ŚĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚǇůŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĂƉƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ ?ƌĞĨĞƌƐŽŶůǇƚŽ
volume, and says nothing about the form or the content of the work ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). Conte here 
gestures at the fact that the quantities involved in long poems differ so vastly from work to 






poem? Is it literal or metaphorical, or a more or less implicit proper name (a 
ĚŝƐĂǀŽǁĞĚĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƌĞĂůůǇŵĞĂŶƐ ‘ŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƐƚ ?Žƌ ‘ǁŽƌůĚ-
ĞŶĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŶŐ ? ) ? ?ĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚĞǀĞƌŽĨƚŚĞƐĞďĞƐƚĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŽĨƚŚŝƐ
ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ?ŝƐŝƚƚŚĞŶĂǀĂůƵĞ ? Q ?ŽƌĂĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ? Q ?Žƌa metonym for some 
extended poetic theory?      (Middleton, np) 
DŝĚĚůĞƚŽŶ ?ƐƌĂŶŐĞŽĨĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶƐŚĞƌĞŐĞƐƚƵƌĞƐĂƚďŽƚŚƚŚĞŝŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂĐǇŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌŵĂŶĚ
ƐŽŵĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞǁĂǇƐŽĨĞŶƚƌǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨƉŽĞƚŝĐ ‘ůĞŶŐƚŚ ? ?/ƚŝƐthe intention of this 
thesis tŽŵŽǀĞďĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ ?ďǇŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ
characterising what are referred to as long poems as acts of extended poetic inquiry. 
Discussing the long poem through its practices of extension allows these works to be framed 
within the terms individual poets use during the process of composition. Specifically, then, 
the poetries of extension which will undergo explication in this thesis will be characterised as 
idiosyncratic, and understood as individual acts of poetic experimentation.  
  The desire for a critical vision which emphasises the difference rather than the 
ƐŝŵŝůŝƚƵĚĞŽĨĂĐƚƐŽĨƉŽĞƚŝĐĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶĨŝŶĚƐŝƚƐũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ ?ƚŽƵƐĞƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ƚĞƌŵ ?ƚŚĞ
 ‘ƉůĞƚŚŽƌĂ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞƐƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐan long poem to 
generic classification. This can be demonstrated with reference to the fact that American 
poets in the last fifty years have used a vast array of terms to refer to their acts of poetic 
extension, few of which can be understood simply in terms of their length or historical 
ƉƌĞĐĞĚĞŶƚƐ ?dŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵŝƐĂŶ “ŝŶĨŝŶŝƚĞĂƌĐŚŝǀĞ ? ?^ƵƐĂŶ,ŽǁĞ ) ?Ă “ŐƌĂŶĚĐŽůůĂŐĞ ?
ĂŶĚĂŶ “ŽƉĞŶĨŝĞůĚ ? ?ZŽďĞƌƚƵŶĐĂŶ ) ? “ĂůŽŶŐǁŽŶĚĞƌ ? ?ĞƌƌǇŵĂŶ ) ? “ƵŶĚŽŶĞďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ?
 ?ŚĂƌůĞƐKůƐŽŶ ) ? “ĂƌĞƐƚůĞƐƐƐƵƌĨĂĐĞ ? ?:ĂŵĞƐ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ) ?ĂŶĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ “ŽĨďĞŝŶŐŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ?
 ?'ĞŽƌŐĞKƉƉĞŶ ) ?ĂŶ “ůƉŚĂďĞƚ ? ?ZŽŶ^ŝůůŝŵĂŶ ) ?Ă “ĨůƵŝd far-ŽĨĨŐŽŝŶŐ ? ?>ĂŶŐƐƚŽŶ,ƵŐŚĞƐ ) ?Ă
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ƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨ ‘ƌĂĨƚƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘&ŽůĚƐ ? ?ZĂĐŚĞůůĂƵƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ) ?Ă “ůŽŽŵ ? ?ZŽďĞƌƚ<ĞůůǇ ) ?ĂŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŽĨ
 ‘ƌŝǀĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĨůŽǁƐ ? ?:ŽŚŶƐŚďĞƌǇ ) ?ĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨ ‘KĐĐƵƌƌŝŶŐ ? ?>ĞƐůŝĞ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ) ?Ă “ĐŽŵƉƵůƐŝŽŶ
ƚŽƌĞƉĞĂƚ ? ?:ŽŚŶdĂŐŐĂƌƚ ) ?Ă setting of foundations (Ronald Johnson), a Diary (John Cage; 
Bernadette Mayer; William Carlos Williams), a series of letters (Thomas McGrath; Lyn 
,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?KůƐŽŶ )ŽƌƐŽŶŐƐ ?ŵŝƌŝĂƌĂŬĂ ?KůƐŽŶ ?ĞƌƌǇŵĂŶ ) ?Ă ‘ĞƐĐĞŶƚ ? ?ůŝĐĞEŽƚůĞǇ ) ?Ă
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨ ‘ĂďƐŽƌƉƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŚĂƌůĞƐĞƌŶƐƚĞŝŶ )ĂŶĚĂ ‘Wƌ ĐƚŝĐĞŽĨKƵƚƐŝĚĞ ? ?ZŽďŝŶůĂƐĞƌ ?:ĂĐŬ
^ƉŝĐĞƌ ) ?dŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘dŚĞ>ŽŶŐWŽĞŵ ?ŝƐŝŶƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚŝŶŚŽůĚŝŶŐƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞƐĞĚŝƐƉĂƌĂƚĞ
activities, and a more developed, site-specific means of reading is required in order to 
understand how acts of extension function in the terms that their composers develop for the 
ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƉůĞƚŚŽƌĂ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵďĞŐƐ
the question ?  ŝĨ ‘ĚŽŽŵ ?ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞƐƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽŵĂŬĞƚŚĞƐ ǁŽƌŬƐĐŽŚĞƌĞŝnto a 
genre or historical lineage, how then might we come to terms with the American long poem 
without oversimplifying or undermining its idiosyncratic site-specific instances of poetic 
extension? 
  The kind of oversimplification against which this thesis seeks to establish its argument 
ĐĂŶďĞǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĞĚŝŶƵƌƚŽŶ,ĂƚůĞŶ ?ƐĞŶƚƌǇŽŶ ‘dŚĞ>ŽŶŐWŽĞŵ ?ŝŶƚŚĞOxford Encyclopaedia of 
American Literature. Hatlen cites such a plethora of activities, influences, traditions and 
lineages that the compositional scope of the American long poem becomes lost in a series of 
subcategorizations. Whilst this is determined somewhat by the fact that an encyclopaedia 
entry has to deal in compression and comprehension, it can still be reasonably contested that 
Hatlen fails to attend to the ways in which poems extend, opting instead to characterise the 
 ‘ůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ ?ďǇǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨŝƚƐƐŝǌĞĂŶĚĞǀĞŶŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶĂůůǇďǇŝƚƐƉĂŐĞĐŽƵŶƚ ?,ĂƚůĞŶƋƵŽƚĞƐƚŚĞƐĞ
frequently throughout the piece though at no point does he state what the minimum 
requirements might be. Furthermore, the subcategories into which he divides the American 
long poem display a great deal of overlap and seem to suggest that such categorisations 
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ĐĂŶŶŽƚƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇĚĞĨŝŶĞƚŚĞƉŽĞŵƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ?&Žƌ,ĂƚůĞŶ ?tŚŝƚŵĂŶŝƐ “ĐůĞĂƌůǇƚŚĞ
proƚŽƚǇƉĞŽĨĂůůůĂƚĞƌŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐĞƌŝĂůƉŽĞŵƐ ? ?3), and it is from this position that he suggests 
ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞŝƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽtŚŝƚŵĂŶ ?WŽƵŶĚĂŶĚKůƐŽŶ ?,ĂƚůĞŶ ?Ɛ
ƐƵďĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐĂƌĞ PdŚĞ ‘DŽĐŬƉŝĐ ? ?ƚŚĞ ‘>ŽŶŐWŽĞŵĂƐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇWŽƌƚƌĂŝƚ ? ?ƚŚĞ ‘^ĞƌŝĂů>ŽŶŐ
WŽĞŵ ? ?ƚŚĞůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘WŽƵŶĚŝƌĐůĞ ? ?ƚŚĞ ‘DĞĚŝƚĂƚŝǀ >ŽŶŐWŽĞŵ ? ?ƚŚĞ ‘KďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƐƚ
ůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ ? ? ‘>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞtƌŝƚŝŶŐ ? ? ‘KůƐŽŶĂŶĚ,ŝƐ,ĞŝƌƐ ? ?ůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵƐŽĨ ‘DĂŐŝĐ ?DǇƚŚĂŶĚZŝƚƵĂů ?
ĂŶĚ ‘DĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵWŽĞƚƐ ? ?ĞƐƉŝƚĞƌĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐƚŽĂŶŝŵƉƌĞƐƐŝǀĞůy varied field of poets in this 
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?ƚŚĞŝƌŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐŽĨĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶĂƌĞƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚŽďƐĐƵƌĞĚďǇ,ĂƚůĞŶ ?ƐĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽ
neatly pose them as discrete lineages beginning in Whitman. This overemphasis on the 
historicity of the form undermines the idiosyncratic procedures American poets have 
developed throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. For example, whilst it is indeed the case 
that Charles Olson influenced a number of poets working with long poems these 
relationships themselves are subject to significant disputes which destabilize the sense in 
ǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ?ĐĂŶďĞĐŽŚĞƌĞŶƚůǇƌĞĂĚŝŶƚŚĞůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ ?^ƵƐĂŶ,ŽǁĞ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?
ĐĞůĞďƌĂƚĞƐKůƐŽŶ ?ƐĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŵĞŶƚƐǁŝƚŚƉĂŐĞ-space and the inclusion of archival material, but 
has serious reservations concerning his treatment of the female figure in his work.  
  Of course, it is important to remember that the object and formal constraints of 
,ĂƚůĞŶ ?ƐĞŶĐǇĐůŽƉĂĞĚŝĂĞŶƚƌǇŝƐ ?ĂƐƵWůĞƐƐŝƐĐŽŶƚĞŶĚƐ ? “ĚŽŽŵĞĚƚŽďĞƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚďǇ
ƉůĞƚŚŽƌĂ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŶƉ ) ?ĂŶĚĂƐƐƵĐŚƚŚĞƚĂsk he undertakes is both difficult and bound to 
provoke dissent. What is at stake in this dissent is a desire to retain the wide variety of 
idiosyncratic practices which constitute the history of the long poem in America. This is not 
to say necessarily that history and idiosyncrasy are at odds, but rather that studies of the long 
poem are compelled to weigh the balance between the advantages of close-reading and of 
contextualising. This is a question peculiar to works of extended poetics by virtue of the fact 
that the close-reading of long poems is itself a substantial task, owing to their size, 
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complexity and length, and seeking to characterise large texts by virtue of their smaller parts 
runs the risk of obscuring their wider ambitions. It is precisely for this reason that my 
argument suggests that long poems are best read in their own terms of extension, with a 
view to disclosing the idiosyncratic ways in which extended poetic forms have been utilised 
as modes of inquiry. It is necessary before moving towards a fuller explanation of this 
methodology to outline the critical positions against which this thesis will present its own 
terms of inquiry. 
 
Critical Models of the American Long Poem 
Every long poem will defeat its creator.  
(Dickie, 15) 
 
As indicated, the critical discourse surrounding American long poems is also subject to the 
 ‘ƉůĞƚŚŽƌĂ ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐĂƐĂ ‘ĚŽŽŵ ?ƚŽŐĞŶƌĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵŚĂƐďĞĞŶ
described variously as a  “ŵŽŶƐƚƌŽƐŝƚǇ ? (Williams  ? ? ? ? ?ŶƉ ) ?Ă “ŶŽďůĞĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ? (D. Allen, 79) and 
Ă “ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚǁŚŽůĞ ? (McHale 2004, 3), whilst Peter Middleton writes that the long poem is a 
 “ĨŝĞůĚƚŚĂƚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚůĞŶĚŝƚƐĞůĨƚŽĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇƚĂŬĞƐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞŽĨƚŚŝƐĂďƐĞŶĐĞŽĨ
ĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶǇĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐ ? ?Diddleton, np). dŚŝƐ ‘ĂďƐĞŶĐĞŽĨĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?
underscores the extent to which the composition of a long poem involves idiosyncratic acts 
of extension, wherein various structural and formal procedures are performed on the text. 
This variety of practices necessarily requires a variety of reading strategies. This is a central 
ĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨƌŝĂŶDĐ,ĂůĞ ?ƐƚŚĞƐŝƐŝŶThe Obligation Towards The Difficult Whole: Postmodernist 
Long Poems ?,ĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “ ? ?ĂĐŚĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ ?ƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ ?ŝŵƉůŝĞƐĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐŝƐŽĨǁŚĂƚ
conƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐƚŚĞ ‘ǁŚŽůĞ ? ?ŚŽǁŝƚƐƉĂƌƚƐĂƌĞĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚ ?ǁŚĂƚůŝĞƐŝŶƐŝĚĞƚŚĂƚƉƌĞƐƵŵĞĚǁŚŽůĞ
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ĂŶĚǁŚĂƚŽƵƚƐŝĚĞŝƚ ? ?DĐ,ĂůĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). In this conception of the long poem, reading the 
 ‘ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚǁŚŽůĞ ?ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐŽƉĞŶŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐĞƐƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƐƚƌŝĐƚĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐ ?dŚis resistance to 
closure is complicated further by the editorial concerns involved in the composition of long 
poems ? “^ŽŵĞůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵƐĚŽŶ ?ƚĞǀĞŶŚĂǀĞĂ ‘ǁŚŽůĞ ?ŝŶĂŶǇŽďǀŝ ƵƐƐĞŶƐĞ ?ƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞ
added to, had sections removed and there is no definitive edition ? ?DŝĚĚůĞƚŽŶ ?ŶƉ ). 
Furthermore, there are practical matters involved in the production and reading of extended 
ǁŽƌŬƐ ?ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞ “ĞǆƉĞŶƐŝǀĞƚŽƉƌŝŶƚ ?ƚƌŝĐŬǇƚŽŚĂŶĚůĞĚŝŐŝƚĂůůǇ ?ƚŽŽůŽŶŐƚŽďĞƌĞĂĚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌ
entirety at poetry readings; too big for anthŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ?ŵƵĐŚƚŽŽďŝŐĨŽƌůŝƚƚůĞŵĂŐĂǌŝŶĞƐ ? Q ? ?
almost always too long to teach within the constraints of a timetable; exorbitantly 
ĚĞŵĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨĂƌĞĂĚĞƌ ?ƐƚŝŵĞ ?ĂŶĚƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐďĂƌĞůǇƌĞĂĚďůĞƵŶƚŝůĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƐĐŚŽůĂƌůǇ
labours have provided guides and critical readings ? ?Ibid., np). If individual long poems display 
such a plenum of idiosyncratic features which define the contours of the work, how then can 
any cohesion be sought in a genre which brings these radically disparate works together?  
  It is Peter MŝĚĚůĞƚŽŶ ?ƐĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂŶƐǁĞƌƚŽƚŚŝƐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶůŝĞƐŝŶ ‘ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ? ?,ŝƐ
 ? ? ? ?ĞƐƐĂǇ ‘dŚĞ>ŽŶŐŝŶŐKĨdŚĞ>ŽŶŐWŽĞŵ ?ŝƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƌĞĐĞŶƚƐƵŵŵĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ
critical field of long poems. He writes:  
If when reading the debates around long poems one rarely experiences a 
triumphalist tone, it may be partly because in practice the long poem is also 
marked by failure to the point where it could be said that failure is constitutive 
of the long poem.        (2010, np) 
DŝĚĚůĞƚŽŶ ?ƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ?ŽĨ the long poem gestures towards both its teleological 
difficulties and its structural cohesion. Whilst failure is certainly associated with the fact that 
a variety of long poems have supposedly outlived their writers (Olson, Zukofsky, Carlos 
Williams, Pound), Middleton also seems to be inviting failure himself by adopting too strict a 
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definition of what constitutes the long poem. This is a concern prevalent in the work of Lyn 
Keller, whose Forms of Expansion: Recent Long Poems By Women argues against this 
conception of the long poem. Her work presents a model of inquiry into extended poetics 
ǁŚŝĐŚĚĞǀĞůŽƉƐĂǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵĂƐŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĞĨĨŽƌƚƐŽĨ “ĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶ ? ?^ŚĞ
ǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůŵŽĚĞůƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ ?ƚĞŶĚƚŽ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĂƐůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵs only works 
ǁŚŝĐŚĨŝƚĂƐŝŶŐůĞƉĂƚƚĞƌŶďĂƐĞĚŽŶĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŐĞŶĞƌŝĐƉƌĞĐĞĚĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). What the 
criticism of long poems requires in order to circumvent this critical rather than compositional 
failure is a means of reading which maintains the sense of the extended poem as an 
ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞĨŽƌǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ?ŝƐŽŶůǇĂŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶ ?ĞƐƉŝƚĞ
DŝĚĚůĞƚŽŶ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽĐŝƌĐƵŵŶĂǀŝŐĂƚĞƚŚĞŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŚŝƐƉƌŽĐůĂŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ? ?Ɛƚŝůů
there remains a sense of the critic as having already determined what a successful long poem 
might look like, and holding existing examples of the form against this Platonic ideal. This 
sense of the critic as judge of the long poem is inhibiting, and this thesis will seek to develop 
a stance antithĞƚŝĐĂůƚŽDŝĚĚůĞƚŽŶ ?Ɛ ? ‘&ĂŝůƵƌĞ ? ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚ ?ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞƐŶŽƚƚŚĞĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ
which constitute the American long poem but rather critical views of the long poem which 
deterministically pre-conceive its limits. This, however, still leaves a vital question 
unanswered: How do we know a work of poetic extension when we see one? There are of 
course a number of nominal factors involved ?  for example, if a poet describes a work as a 
 ‘ůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ ? ?ƚŚŝƐĐĂŶĂĐƚĂƐĂŶŝŶŝƚŝĂůŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?/ĨŝƚŝƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐĂ ‘ƐĞƌŝĞƐ ? ?Ă ‘ďŽŽŬ-ůĞŶŐƚŚ ?
ǁŽƌŬ ?ĂŶ ‘ĞƉŝĐ ? ?Ă ‘ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ?ŽƌĂ ‘ƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞ ? ?ǁĞĐĂŶĂƐƐƵŵĞƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐĂůƐŽůŝŬĞůǇƚŽďĞĂƉŽĞŵ
which deals with extension. Foremost, however, the American long poem, as this thesis will 
argue, is concerned with establishing modes of poetic inquiry. In this sense, what qualifies a 
long poem, in the context of American poets of the late 20th century, is a capacity ?  both 
spatial and in terms of ambition ?  to carry out sustained inquiry. This is not to construct an 
artificial distinction between short poems as uninquiring and long poems as inquiring, but 
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rather to gesture towards the fact that extension in the American long poem is always 
related to a desire to carry out a task, be it an explicit theoretical task, as in the example of 
OppĞŶ ?Ɛ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ? ?ŽƌƚŽƌĞĐŽƌĚŽŶĞ ?ƐƚĞŵƉŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ?ĂƐŝŶƚŚĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨ:ĂŵĞƐ
^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?Ɛ ‘dŚĞDŽƌŶŝŶŐŽĨdŚĞWŽĞŵ ? ?ŽƌĞǀĞŶ ?ĂƐŝŶƚŚĞ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨZĂĐŚĞůůĂƵƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?
Drafts, to write a long poem about long poems. 
  /ŶƚŚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚ ?DŝĚĚůĞƚŽŶ ?ƐĂƌŐument is notable elsewhere for the emphasis it places 
ŽŶƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨĐŽŵŝŶŐƚŽƚĞƌŵƐǁŝƚŚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵƐ ?,ĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “/Ĩanything can 
happen in a long poem, reading may require induction into the peculiar practices of a specific 
ůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ ? ?Ibid.). dŚĞƐĞ ‘ƉĞĐƵůŝĂƌƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ? ?ŽƌǁŚĂƚƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐǁŝůůƚĞƌŵŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐŝĞƐ ?
characterise individual works of poetic extension. In the process of arriving at his thesis, 
Middleton considers the conclusions reached by the critics of the long poem which precede 
him. It is worth bearing witness to this in order to more firmly establish the discourse with 
ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐǁŝůůďĞĞŶŐĂŐŝŶŐ ?/ŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?DŝĚĚůĞƚŽŶƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽsŝŶĐĞŶƚ^ŚĞƌƌǇ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?
ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ‘ƵƌƌĞŶƚƌŝƚŝĐĂůDŽĚĞƐŽĨdŚĞ>ŽŶŐWŽĞŵĂŶĚĂǀŝĚ:ŽŶĞƐ ?ƐThe Anathemata ? ?
^ŚĞƌƌǇ ?ƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞŝƐǁƌŝƚƚĞŶŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽZŽƐĞŶƚŚĂůĂŶĚ'Ăůů ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?ďŽŽŬThe Modern Poetic 
Sequence, ǁŚŝĐŚĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ƉŽĞƚƐƐƵƌŵŽƵŶƚƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵĚĞĨŝŶĞĚďǇWŽĞ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ “ůŽŶŐ
ƉŽĞŵŝƐĂĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƚĞƌŵƐ ? ?ďǇǁƌŝƚŝŶŐůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵƐĂƐƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐŽĨƐŚŽƌƚůǇƌŝĐƐ ?
sacrificing overall structure for the sake of momentary intensity (Sherry, 239). The Modern 
Poetic Sequence has received significant attention as an impressively comprehensive work ?  
and, as a result of its attempted comprehension, it has also received criticism (Conte; Keller; 
Middleton) for its univocal take on 20th century long poems. Gall and ZŽƐĞŶƚŚĂů ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵŝƐĂůǁĂǇƐĂ ‘ƉŽĞƚŝĐƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞ ? ?ĚĞĨŝŶ ĚďǇŝƚƐ ‘ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?ŝƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶĂ
ƚŚĞƐŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŝƐĂŵĞƚŚŽĚĚĞƌŝǀĞĚĨƌŽŵtŚŝƚŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ‘ŵƵůƚŝƚƵĚŝŶŽƵƐ ?ŵŽĚĞů ?ƐǁŝƚŚ,ĂƚůĞŶ ?Ɛ
account of the American long poem, they contest tŚĂƚ ‘^ŽŶŐŽĨDǇƐĞůĨ ?ŽĨĨĞƌƐ “ĂŶĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂů
ĐĞŶƚƌĞĞŶĞƌŐŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ? ? ? ? ) ?ĂŶĚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŝƐĂƚǁŽƌŬŝŶƚŚĞůŽŶŐ
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ƉŽĞŵƐƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚŝŶtŚŝƚŵĂŶ ?ƐǁĂŬĞ ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĞǇĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĂĐŚŐƌŽƵƉŝŶŐŽĨƉŽĞŵƐ ?  
 ‘dŚĞDŽĚĞƌŶ^ĞƋƵĞŶĐĞ ? ? ‘WŽĞƚƌǇŽĨWƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůWƌĞƐƐƵƌ  ? ? ‘DĞĚŝƚĂƚŝǀĞDŽĚĞƐ ? ?
 ‘ŽŶĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů ?ĂŶĚ ‘WŽƐƚ-Confessional ?  ŝŶƚĞƌŵƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚĨƌŽŵtŚŝƚŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ‘^ŽŶŐŽĨDǇƐĞůĨ ? ?
Rosenthal and Gall are not alone in proposing this lineage. Thomas Gardner in Finding 
Ourselves In Whitman writes: 
Whitman ?ƐŵŽĚĞů ? one adopted by an impressively elaborated sequence of 
modern and contemporary poets ?  ŚĂƐƚǁŽƉĂƌƚƐ PtŚŝƚŵĂŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝŶĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ
a self-portrait, and his attempt to understand that portrait as representative 
of his age.       (Gardner, 3) 
In his own work, Gardner argues that John Berryman, Theodore Roethke, Robert Duncan, 
:ŽŚŶƐŚďĞƌǇĂŶĚ:ĂŵĞƐDĞƌƌŝůůĂůůĚĞǀĞůŽƉƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵƐ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŵŽĚĞůtŚŝƚŵĂŶ
establishes in his lifelong Leaves of Grass. Stephen Fender is another critic who reads the 
American long poem in this manner. He writes: 
ǀĞŶ ‘ŽƉĞŶ-ĞŶĚĞĚ ?ŐŝǀĞƐƚŽŽƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚĞĚĂƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵŝŶƚŚĞ
tŚŝƚŵĂŶƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ? Q ?d ?^ůŝŽƚ ?,ĂƌƚƌĂŶĞ ?ǌƌĂWŽƵŶĚ ?tĂůůĂĐĞ^ƚĞǀĞŶƐĂŶĚ
William Carlos Williams all belong to this tradition, whatever their differences.   
        (Fender, vii) 
It is my not my intention to argue that Rosenthal and Gall, Fender and Gardner are wrong in 
emphasising the importance of Whitman in the history of American Long Poems ?  however, 
it is crucial to underscore the fact that whilst this tradition can be proposed, it is another 
matter to claim that subsequent acts of extension themselves are explicitly determined by an 
earlier figure like Whitman. As such, this dominant history of the long poem overlooks the 
 ‘ƉůĞƚŚŽƌĂ ?ŽĨ activities which characterise the long poem.  
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  To counter this notion of the long poem as depending on pre-existing models of 
ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ ?DŝĚĚůĞƚŽŶƚƵƌŶƐƚŽƌŝĂŶDĐ,ĂůĞ ?ƐƚŚĞƐŝƐŝŶThe Obligation Towards The Difficult 
Whole. McHale proposes a notion of tŚĞůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵǁŚŝĐŚ “ƌĞƐŝƐƚ ?Ɛ ?ƌƵƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŝŶǀŽŬĞ
conceptual explanation that amounts to a setting aside of what is said in the poem and 
treating it as an overall aesthetic paradigm, while retaining our commitment to line by line 
ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?DŝĚĚůĞƚŽŶ ?np). Whilst this thesis will present close-readings of acts of 
extension, it is important to underscore the risk involved in characterising long-form poems 
by their small-ƐĐĂůĞĚĞƚĂŝůƐ ?ůůĞŶŝĐŬĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞƐƚŚŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ P “ƌŝƚŝĐƐŚĂǀĞĨŽƌƚŽŽůŽŶŐďĞĞŶ
unchallenged when they dismiss long poems by quoting from their lesser parts ?  offering 
ƚŚĞƐĞ ?ƵŶĨĂŝƌůǇ ?ĂƐĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĞŵĂƐĂǁŚŽůĞ ? ? ? ? ). These two impulses ?  
characterising the long poem by virtue of its precedents or performing close-readings on its 
individual parts ?  situate the critic of the long poem in a tenuous position.  
  ƐŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚ ?ŝƚŝƐƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƚŽĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ ?ĐĂŶďĞ
rewardingly discussed in terms of extended poetics. The list of texts which might qualify as 
works of poetic extension in America in the 20th and 21st centuries and merit critical attention 
is far too numerous to include here in full, but can be gestured at with reference to the poets 
ǁŚŽƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŝŶƌĞĐĞŶƚĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůǁŽƌŬƐŽŶůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵƐ ?>ǇŶ<ĞůůĞƌ ?ƐForms of Expansion 
reads the work of Susan Howe, Rachel Blau DuPlessis, Rita Dove, Sharon Doubiago and 
ĞǀĞƌůǇĂŚůĞŶ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚ:ŽƐĞƉŚŽŶƚĞ ?ƐUnending Design: Forms of Postmodern Poetry focuses 
on Robert Creeley, Paul Blackburn, John Ashbery, Lorine Neidecker and Robert Duncan and 
ƌŝĂŶDĐ,ĂůĞ ?ƐThe Obligation Towards The Difficult Whole: Postmodern Long Poems brings 
together Melvin Tolson, James Merrill, Edward Dorn, Geoffrey Hill, Thomas McGrath and 
Bruce Andrews. In each of these examples, efforts are made by the critic to cover a span of 
poetic styles in order to underscore the extent to which acts of poetic extension are not 
ůŝŵŝƚĞĚƚŽĂŶǇŽŶĞĂŐĞ ?ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽƌ ‘ƐĐŚŽŽů ?ŽĨƉĞƚƐ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚĂůůĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞƚŚĞůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ
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in America after the 1950s as being concerned with experimentation. Furthermore, these 
ǁŽƌŬƐďĞĂƌǁŝƚŶĞƐƐƚŽĂĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƐĞĞŬƚŽƐƵďũĞĐƚĂ
ǀĂƌŝĞƚǇŽĨƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐďĞŶĞĂƚŚƚŚĞĂƵƐƉŝĐĞƐŽĨŽŶĞŐĞŶĞƌŝĐĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇŽƌĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶ ?:ŽƐĞƉŚŽŶƚĞ ?Ɛ
ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ‘dŚĞ^ŵŽŽƚŚĂŶĚdŚĞ^ƚƌŝĂƚĞĚ P Compositional Texture in the MoĚĞƌŶ>ŽŶŐWŽĞŵ ?
ĨƌĂŵĞƐƚŚŝƐĚĞƐŝƌĞ ?ĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ “ŵĂŶǇƐƚƵĚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŵŽĚĞƌŶůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƉƌŽďůĞŵs 
ŽĨŐĞŶƌĞ ?ĂŶĚĂƐƐƵĐŚŚĞǁŝƐŚĞƐƚŽ “ƐƵƐƉĞŶĚƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨŐĞŶƌĞŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨŵĂŬŝŶŐƐŽŵĞ
qualitative distinctions based on compositional method and poetic texture ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). This 
thesis will seek to adopt a methodology which circumvents delimiting questions of generic 
qualification in favour of site-ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƌĞĂĚŝŶŐƐŽĨ ‘ĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂůŵĞƚŚŽĚ ? ?ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇŝŶ
terms of the idiosyncrasy of these methods. In this regard, perhaps the most informative 
work to date on the relationship between American long poems, idiosyncrasy and 
phenomenology is WĞƚĞƌĂŬĞƌ ?ƐObdurate Brilliance: Exteriority in the Modern Long Poem. 
Baker offers a critical model in which the poetic voices of long poems are figured in terms of 
ĞǆƚĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?ĂŬĞƌ ?Ɛ ‘ǆƚĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ?ŝƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚŝŶ>ĞǀŝŶƐŝĂŶƚĞƌŵƐ ?  “dŚĞ
philosophy of Levinas claims that an ethical stance, open to the address of the truly other, 
ǁŝůůŬĞĞƉĨĂŝƚŚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽƌĞƐŝƐƚ ? Q ?ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ? ? Q ?dŚŝƐŽƉĞŶŶĞƐƐƚŽ the other he terms 
exteriority ? ? ? ). ,ŝƐƌĂŶŐĞŽĨƉŽĞƚƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐ “ƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƉŽĞƚƐǌƌĂWŽƵŶĚ ?ŚĂƌůĞƐKůƐŽŶ ?
Gertrude Stein, Louis Zukofsky, John Ashbery, Michael Palmer, Clark Coolidge, and 
ĞƌŶĂĚĞƚƚĞDĂǇĞƌ “ ? ? ) ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?ĐĂƌƌŝĞĚŽƵƚĂƚƚŚĞ^ĂŝŶƚ-John Perse Foundation, 
ďĞŐŝŶƐǁŝƚŚĨŝǀĞĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƐŽŶWĞƌƐĞ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĂŵŽƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ
between the late French intersubjective phenomenologies of Emmanuel Levinas, Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty and Jacques Derrida. In particular, Baker characterises the modern long poem 
ĂƐďĞŝŶŐǁƌŝƚƚĞŶ “ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŝŶƚĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ? Q ?ŝŶĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽƌĞŽƌŝĞŶƚƚŚĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨŵŽĚĞƌŶůŽŶŐ




American long poems but also to perform critique on these works in a manner which does 
ŶŽƚĚŽ “ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŽ “ƚŚĞƚƌƵůǇŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?ĂŬĞƌ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚĂƐƐƵĐŚĚĞĨĞŶĚƐƚŚĞŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐŝĞƐ
of works by virtue of an ethical necessity. This ethical necessity lies in regarding the poets 
ĂŶĚƉŽĞŵƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂƐ ‘ĞǆƚĞƌŝŽƌ ? ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚ ?ŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞŵŽĚĞƌŶůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ
turns deliberately outward in order to address the experience of others, at the same time 
inviting the reader into the process of making sense out of the text. The exteriority of the 
modern long poem is one form of ethical practice ŝŶŽƵƌƚŝŵĞ ? ? ? ). In this argument, Baker 
highlights the specific sense in which the long poem involves a prolonged and sustained 
ĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƚĞǆƚ ?ĂŶĚĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞƐƚŚĞƌĞĂĚĞƌŝŶ ‘ĞǆƚĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞůŽŶŐ
ƉŽĞŵ ?ŝŶĂŬĞƌ ?ƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?ĂƌƚŝĐulates. Furthermore, he argues that the 20th century long poem 
displays a similar theoretical progression to that which takes place in continental philosophy. 
&ŽƌĂŬĞƌ ?ƚŚŝƐŝƐƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝƚǇŝŶĞƚŚŝĐĂůĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚŝƐ “ďĞǇŽŶĚĂŶǇƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨ
infůƵĞŶĐĞ ? ? ? ) ?,ĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
This view of the ethical subject of poetry based on an outward orientation 
runs parallel to the view of the subject in the philosophy and critical theory of 
the twentieth century. (Ibid.) 
As indicated, of particular importance to Baker are phenomenological theorists for their 
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƐŽĨƚŚĞĞƚŚŝĐĂůĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?ĂŬĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐ
a generative meeting of two distinctly ethical practices which brave the contradictions and 
aporias of articulating ƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ĂŬĞƌ ?ƐŽǀĞƌĂƌĐŚŝŶŐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐƚŚĞ
 ‘ĞǆƚĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ?ǁŝƚŚǁŚŝĐŚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵƐĂƌĞŽĐĐƵƉŝĞĚĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƚŽŽǀĞƌ-
generalise the specific ethical stances developed in these works. This thesis intends to 
ƌĞŽƌŝĞŶƚĂŬĞƌ ?s argument towards characterising the phenomenological themes of a variety 
ŽĨƉŽĞƚƐǁŽƌŬŝŶŐŝŶŵĞƌŝĐĂŝŶƚŚĞůĂƐƚĨŝĨƚǇǇĞĂƌƐ ?ǁŝƚŚĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ƉůĞƚŚŽƌĂ ?
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and alterity which characterises American extended poetics. It is necessary now to present 
the frame in which my argument will take place, and articulate the phenomenological 





Idiosyncrasy, Phenomenology and Extended Poetics 
Concentrating 
On stretching the theoretic elastic of your conceptions 
Till the extent is adequate 
To the hooking on 
Of any ?  or all 
Forms of creative idiosyncrasy   
(Mina Loy, 20) 
 
In her introduction to the 2009 anthology of contemporary poetry, American Hybrid, Cole 
Swensen writes that 
American poetry finds itself at a moment when idiosyncrasy rules to such a 
degree and differences are so numerous that distinct factions are hard, even 
impossible, to pin down. Instead, we find a thriving centre of alterity, of 
writings and writers that have inherited and adapted traits developed by 
everyone from the Romantics through the Modernists to the various avant-
ŐĂƌĚĞƐ ?ƚŚĞŽŶĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚƐ ?ůůĞŶ ?ƐŵĂƌŐŝŶƐ ?ĂŶĚĨŝ ĂůůǇƚŽ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞƉŽĞƚƌǇ
and the New Formalists.       (2009, i) 
For some critics, the ŶŽƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ “ŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐǇƌƵůĞƐ ?ŵŝŐŚƚƉƌŽǀŽŬĞĂĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽ “ƉŝŶĚŽǁŶ ?
ƚŚĞƐĞǁŽƌŬƐŝŶƚŽ “ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĨĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚ ?ƚŚĞƚĂƐŬŽĨĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐǇĂƐĂ
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meaningful term in the study of poetics sets itself against more conventional conceptions of 
poetry as occurring within the bounds of lineage and tradition. A focus on idiosyncrasy can be 
witnessed in a number of the existing critical works on American long poems, though not 
articulated as such because each critic has other preoccupations ?  McHaůĞ ?ƐĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƚŚĞ
ƉŽƐƚŵŽĚĞƌŶĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ŽŶƚĞ ?ƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚĞǆƚƵƌĞŝŶ “ƚŚĞƐŵŽŽƚŚĂŶĚƐƚƌŝĂƚĞĚ ? ?<ĞůůĞƌ ?Ɛ
ŝŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽŶĂĨĞŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĞĂƉƉƌĂŝƐĂů ?ĂŬĞƌ ?ƐŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚ ‘ĞǆƚĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ? ?dŚĞƚĂƐŬŽĨƚŚŝƐ
thesis then lies in emphasising idiosyncrasy as a means not only of coming to terms with 
works of poetic extension but also underscoring the phenomenological themes in these 
poems. By this I mean that the question of idiosyncrasy in poetry is an inherently 
intersubjective one. As Peter Baker has indicated, intersubjectivity is integral to the American 
long poem not only because of the natural situation in which meaning is constituted between 
subjectivities but also because the American long poem displays a recurring concern with the 
articulation of being-with-others. This is a constitutive effect of the long poem because, as 
the long poem takes an extended interaction with to comprehend, it develops an implicit 
ethics in the idiosyncratic way in which the text is extended.  
  At this point, it is necessary to explain how 20th century phenomenology articulates 
intersubjectivity. After the initial important developments in methodology by the likes of 
Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-WŽŶƚǇǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ ? spatial, 
sexual, temporal ?  ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ? Q ?ƚĂŬŝŶŐƵƉĂŶĚĂƐƐƵŵŝŶŐŝƚƐ ‘ĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚƵƌŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŵŝŶƚŽ
the dimensions of its being, such that a relatively precise analysis of each of them in fact has 
ƚŽĚŽǁŝƚŚƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŝƚƐĞůĨ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). tŚĂƚŝƐĂƚƐƚĂŬĞŝƐĂŵŝƐĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵ “ƚŚĞ
world [as] a mass without gaps, a system of colours across which the receding perspective, 
the outlines, angles, and curves are inscribed like lines of force; the spatial structure 
ǀŝďƌĂƚ ?ŝŶŐ ?ĂƐŝƚŝƐĨŽƌŵĞĚ ? ?Cézanne ?ƐŽƵďƚ65). dŚĞƉƌŝŵĂĐǇŽĨƚŚŝƐ ‘ĨŽƌĐĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ




subjectivities. We are largely aware in the happening of our being that there is a similar 
experience of embedded perspective in a world by all other subjects. This notion of 
phenomenology as starting out from a pre-conceptual basis is, for Merleau-Ponty, essential 
in coming to an understanding of the relationship between self and world. In The 
Phenomenology of Perception, he writes: 
I am the absolute source, my existence does not come from my antecedents, 
from my physical and social environment; it goes toward them and sustains 
them. It is me who makes exist for myself (and therefore exist in the sole 
sense that the word can have for me) the tradition that I choose to take up or 
ƚŚŝƐŚŽƌŝǌŽŶǁŚŽƐĞĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞĨƌŽŵŵĞǁŽƵůĚĐŽůůĂƉƐĞ ? Q ?ŝĨ/ǁĞƌĞŶŽƚƚŚĞƌĞƚŽ
traverse it with my gaze. (Ibid. 56-7) 
ThŝƐ ‘ƚĂŬŝŶŐƵƉ ?ŝƐŶŽƚƐŽŵƵĐŚĂĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽĐůĂŝŵƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂƐĂƉĂƌƚŽĨĂ
tradition but rather a directive that those who do must explicitly regard themselves as such. 
By foregrounding the constituting-subject who is responsible for the conceptions and 
articulations they arrive at, phenomenology seeks to ground investigation in a radical 
contingency which regards objects at hand as dependent for their immediate reality on the 
perceiving subject. Merleau-WŽŶƚǇĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐƚŚĞƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ‘ĞǀĞŶƚ ? P
When an event is considered at close quarters, at the moment when it is lived 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ?ĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐƐĞĞŵƐƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽĐŚĂŶĐĞ PŽŶĞŵĂŶ ?ƐĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŽŵĞůƵĐŬǇ
encounter, some local circumstance or other appears to have been decisive. 
But chance happenings offset each other, and then this dust of facts 
coalesces, outlines a certain way of taking a position in relation to the human 
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situation, an event whose contours are defined and about which we can 
speak. (Ibid., 66) 
&ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚŝƐŵŽĚĞů ?ƚŚĞ “ůƵĐŬǇĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ ?ŵŝŐŚƚĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƚŚĞǁĂǇŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ
ůĞĂĚƐƚŽŽƵƌĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƉŽĞƚŝĐƚĞǆƚĂƐĂ ‘ůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ ? ?dŚŝƐ “ĚƵƐƚŽĨĨĂĐƚƐĐŽĂůĞƐĐ ?ŝŶŐ ? ?
would therefore be our conception ?  and Merleau-WŽŶƚǇ ?ƐƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ĚƵƐƚ ?ƐĞĞŵƐ
additionally fitting in that it suggests the text as something with a surface that can be 
unsettled by intervention, in which finger prints can linger and be seen by others. As such, 
Merleau-WŽŶƚǇĚĞǀĞůŽƉƐĂƐĞŶƐĞŝŶŚŝƐůĂƚĞƌǁŽƌŬŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĐŚĂŝƐŵŝĐ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ
subject and objects of perception: 
What there is then are not things first identical with themselves, that would 
then offer themselves to the seer, nor is there a seer who is first empty and 
who, afterward, would open himself to them ? but something to which we 
could not be closer than by palpating it with our look, things we could not 
ĚƌĞĂŵŽĨƐĞĞŝŶŐ ‘ĂůůŶĂŬĞĚ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞŐĂǌĞŝƚƐĞůĨĞŶǀĞůŽƉƐƚŚĞŵ ?ĐůŽƚŚĞƐ
them with its own flesh.     ? ‘dŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌƚǁŝŶŝŶŐ ?dŚĞŚŝĂƐŵ ? ? ? ? ) 
Merleau-WŽŶƚǇ ?ƐŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĨůĞƐŚ ?ŝŶǁŚŝch both self and world are embedded establishes 
an indeterminate situation in which it is difficult to decide where one ends and the other 
begins. Merleau-Ponty arrives at this point in his philosophy as a result of his earlier 
investigations into Husserlian intentionality. Intersubjectivity requires this sense of proximity, 
and indeed Emmanuel Levinas goes on to develop Merleau-WŽŶƚǇ ?ƐƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇŝŶƚŽĂŶ
open ethical relation with the absolutely Other. These conceptions of intersubjectivity will act 
as the grounding on which this thesis will develop. It is necessary, however, to underscore 
ƚŚĞĞƚŚŝĐĂůĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇĂƐĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞĚďǇ>ĞǀŝŶĂƐ ?ƐǁĞŚĂǀĞƐĞĞŶ ?ĂŬĞƌ ?Ɛ
thesis seeks to establish a sense of the long poem as an inherently intersubjective and ethical 
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practice. He articulates this in terms of the relationship between the writer of the long poem 
and its readers: 
The modern long poem, often through experimental strategies, works to 
break down the identification of the poetic speaker ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉŽĞƚ ?ĂƵƚŚŽƌ ? ? Q ?
As readers, our ethical response is thus engaged, as we are confronted with 
works in which the very structure of intersubjectivity is worked out in the 
disposition of their textual strategies. (Peter Baker, 177) 
dŚĞ ‘ĞƚŚŝĐĂůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ?ŚĞƌĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐĂŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐǁĂǇƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ
ŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŝƐ ‘ǁŽƌŬĞĚŽƵƚ ? ?/ĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐǇĂŶĚŝ ƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇĂƌĞŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇĂƚŽĚĚƐ
in this argument. Idiosyncrasy is not a measure of interiority, of how successfully the critic 
can frame the personal or psychobiographical aspects of the work. It is, rather, intended to 
articulate the particular stances adopted by individual poets. In stressing this intertwining of 
terms, it is essential to underscore the extent to which intersubjectivity, concerned as it is 
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞKƚŚĞƌ ?ĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞĐŽŵĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůŝƐĞĚ ?dŚŝƐŝƐĂƉƌŝŵĂƌǇƚĞŶĞƚŽĨ>ĞǀŝŶĂƐ ?
phenomenology, which he discusses in terms of the Other and the Same. In Totality and 
Infinity, he writes: 
ĐĂůůŝŶŐŝŶƚŽƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ ? Q ? is brought about by the other. We 
name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the 
Other ethics. The strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my 
thoughts and my possessions, is precisely accomplished as a calling into 
question of my spontaneity, as ethics. (1999a, 43) 
>ĞǀŝŶĂƐ ?ǁŽƌŬƐĞĞŬƐƚŽĂůůŽǁƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƚŽƌĞŵĂŝŶĂďƐŽůƵƚĞůǇŽƚŚĞƌ ?dŚŝƐƚĂƐŬƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐƚŚĞ
ƉŽůĂƌŝƚŝĞƐŽĨ ‘ƐĂŵĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌ ?ŝŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌĐĂŶŶŽƚĞƚŚŝĐĂůůǇďĞĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶĚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ
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terms of the former ?/ŶĂŬĞƌ ?ƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?ƚŚŝƐĞǆƚĞŶĚƐƚŽĞŶĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŶŽƚŽŶůǇŽƵƌŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ
with other subjectivities but also our encounters with texts, and the subjectivities they frame. 
Specifically, the long poem sustains subjectivity by virtue of the compositional decisions 
which constitute poetic extension. To read a variety of long poems in terms of their 
ƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝƚŝĞƐŝƐĂƐƐƵĐŚĂŶĂĐƚŽĨ ‘ŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚ ?>ĞǀŝŶĂƐǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
The neutralization of the other who becomes a theme or an object ?  
appearing, that is, taking its place in the light ?  is precisely his reduction to 
the same. (Ibid.) 
The methodology at work throughout the thesis thus seeks to avoid assimilating the poets 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌƉŽĞŵƐŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƐĂŵĞ ? ?ĂŶĚŝŶƐƚĞĂĚƌĞĂĚƐƚŚĞŵďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶterms as 
developed in their extended poems. 
  It could be argued, however, that this sense of the idiosyncratic in poetry risks 
overstating the peculiarity of a given work. Justin Lawler, in his 1999 study of British poet 
Gerard Manley Hopkins, contends that reading poetry in terms of idiosyncrasy causes three 
ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ P ? ? ) “ ?d ?ŚĞƵŶŝŶŝƚŝĂƚĞĚƌĞĂĚĞƌ ? Q ?ƐŝŵƉůǇƌĞĨƵƐĞƐƚŽƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĞƉŽĞŵƐĂƚ
Ăůů ?ĂŶĚĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ “ĐĂŶŶŽƚŚĞĂƌƚŚĞƉŽĞƚƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŚŝƐŽǁŶǀŽŝĐĞ ? ?>ĂǁůĞƌ ? ? ) ? ? ? ) “ƚŚĞ
preoccupation with idiosyncrasy encourages academicians to ferret out the most arcane and 
exotic readings of the poetry, on the specious grounds that if the text is acknowlegdly awry, 
ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞůŝĐĞŶƐĞĚƚŽďĞĂƐŬĞǁ ? ?Ibid. ) ?ĂŶĚ ? ? )ƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶ 
idiosyncrasy inhibits the open-minded novice reader from drawing on his own intellectual 
ĂŶĚŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝǀĞƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ? ?Ibid. ) ?>ĂǁůĞƌ ?ƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ ‘ŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐǇ ?ŝƐƉŝƚĐŚĞĚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ
peculiarity more so than subjective particularity. He wishes to correct works on Hopkins 
ǁŚŝĐŚĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞŚŝŵĂƐŽĚĚŽƌƵŶƵƐƵĂů ?tŚŝůƐƚǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚďĞǁĂƌǇŽĨƚĂŬŝŶŐ>ĂǁůĞƌ ?Ɛ
comments out of context, his argument serves to illuminate the very reasons why 
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idiosyncrasy is such an important question in the criticism of long poems specifically. Lawler 
ĐŽŶƚĞŶĚƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƉƌŽďůĞŵŝŶƚŚĂƚĂ ‘ƉƌĞŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐǇ ?ůĞĂĚƐƚŽ ‘ĂƐŬĞǁ ?
critical interpretations which emphasise the strangeness of poetic forms rather than their 
similarities. As has been indicated at length already, the range of works which can be 
discussed as developing poetic extension is broad and varied enough to merit, if not 
necessitate, an intense focus on the specific procedures at work for individual poets. This is 
not to misrepresent the poetic activity of the late 20th century as taking place in a 
fragmented and solitary fashion ?  indeed, many of the poets who receive attention in this 
thesis can be characterised in terms of their friendships and dialogues with others. Rather, it 
is to insist on the importance of bearing witness to these specific activities rather than 
generalising them into an order implicit with hierarchies, margins and, as we have seen, the 
 ‘ĚŽŽŵĞĚ ?ĂƵƐƉŝĐĞƐŽĨƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĂŶĚĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ? 
  dŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚĂƌĞǁĂƌĚŝŶŐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉĐĂŶ be constructed between the 
discourses of phenomenology and American long poems will take two forms: (1) as a 
methodological guide and (2) as a taxonomy of terms which allow access to questions of 
subjectivity and intersubjectivity as explored and manifested by works of poetic extension. 
The most significant advantages of adopting the terms of phenomenology ?  as manifested in 
the diverse and interrelated writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Martin Heidegger and 
Emmanuel Levinas ?  is that the study of poetics is offered as means of engaging seriously 
with the implications of subjectivity in experimental poetic practice. Most importantly, 
however, phenomenology offers a sustained interrogation and explication of the workings of 
intersubjectivity. Long poems disclose certain stances and attitudes towards Others and The 
Other in their extensions. Besides the terms used by the poets themselves, 
phenomenological discourse allows us not only a means of discussing subjectivity but also 
extension as it occurs between subjects. In this regard, it can be argued that the late 20th 
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century American long poem is overwhelmingly concerned with being-with-others, and as 
such questions of proximity, intimacy, exteriority, expansion and intertwining recur 
throughout and across a variety of disparate poetic projects. To address this plethora of 
ŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƚŚĞŵĞƐ ?ŝƚŝƐĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞƚŽƌĞƐŝƐƚĂĚŽƉƚŝŶŐĂŶǇŽŶĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ‘ŵŽĚĞ ?Žƌ ‘ŵŽĚĞů ?
of phenomenological inquiry as an authoritative account.  
 
Acts of Extended Inquiry 
As indicated, this thesis will engage with a variety of phenomenological texts throughout its 
reading of individual works of poetic extension. This will take place, however, as and when 
their relevance becomes apparent in the course of individual chapters. For example, George 
KƉƉĞŶ ?ǁŚŽƐĞ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ?ŽƉĞŶƐƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?ĞŶŐĂŐĞĚŝŶŚŝƐƉŽĞŵƐĂŶĚƉƌŽƐĞǁŝƚŚ
the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Whilst it would not be completely accurate to 
characterise Oppen as a Heideggerian poet, he adopts and adapts the terms of HĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?Ɛ
ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ŵŽƐƚŶŽƚĂďůǇ ‘ďĞŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞ ? ?KƉƉĞŶ ĐĂŶ ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚ ?ďĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ
rewardingly alongside Heideggerian phenomenology, even outside of the auspices of a 
phenomenological critical methodology like that of the present thesis.  As indicated, James 
^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ŽŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌŚĂŶĚ ?ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĞŶŐĂŐĞǁŝƚŚƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůƚĞǆƚƐŽƌĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŝŶ
an explicit way, and as such discussing him in phenomenological terms runs the risk of 
misappropriating his work. These risks are discussed at length in Chapter Three, which 
focuses on James Schuyler, but for now this example serves to underscore the fact that in 
each of these instances, it is necessary to remain aware of the specific relationships between 
the poet and the philosophy, rather than imposing an external model of phenomenological 
inquiry which is somehow equally weighted between the poets. It is precisely these 
differences in extent which go towards constituting idiosyncrasy as a critical measure. What 
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is at stake in maintaining these distinctions is not repeating the same mistakes prevalent 
throughout past works of criticism of long poems, namely, as has been discussed in detail 
ĂůƌĞĂĚǇ ?ƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞǁŚŝĐŚƐĞĞŬƐƚŽ ‘ĂƵƚŚĞŶƚŝĐĂƚĞ ?ƐŽŵĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ
long poem whilst overlooking others. This is not to say, however, that critical narratives are in 
and of themselves bad or misleading, but rather that such narratives absolutely must be 
foregrounded as narratives and not as a matter of incontrovertible historical record. In this 
regard, the loose narrative which this thesis will articulate is based on a desire to present 
extended poetics in America in their heterogeneous plethora. Beginning with George 
KƉƉĞŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?ǁŽƌŬOf Being Numerous and ending with Rachel Blau DuPlesƐŝƐ ?Drafts, 
finished in 2013, the seven poets featured in this thesis represent diversity foremost in their 
radically disparate varieties of poetic inquiry. They remain thematically and philosophically 
united, however, in their shared ambitions to articulate and elucidate questions and 
problems of intersubjectivity. My narrative, then, seeks to tell a story of the American long 
poem as being not only conceivable in terms of idiosyncrasy and extension, but also crucially 
and constitutively concerned with being-with-others. It is not appropriate to the materials at 
hand to seek to justify this narrative by virtue of historical detail, except where such details 
illuminate the workings of intersubjectivity in a particular act of poetic extension. For 
example, LǇŶ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĂŶĚ>ĞƐůŝĞ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ?ƐĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝǀĞůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵSight, which occupies 
Chapter Five, can be rewardingly read in the light of their correspondence throughout the 
period of composition, and in this instance this epistolary relationship features heavily in my 
ƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ ?KŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌŚĂŶĚ ?ƉĂƐƚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐŽĨZŽďŝŶůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐImage-Nations have relied 
heavily on his relationship to San Francisco Renaissance poetics, and efforts have been made 
ŝŶŚĂƉƚĞƌ&ŽƵƌƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐǇǁŚŝůƐƚƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞously deferring to his 




in these observations is the fact that it is always first and foremost an idiosyncratic matter 
whether or not it is appropriate to discuss a certain poet in a certain light, and this thesis, 
whilst certainly aware of the narrative it is proposing, seeks to remain true to this principle. 
My narrative ?  that the American long poem in the 20th century can be better understood as 
a series of acts of extended inquiry ?  seeks to emphasise the fact that the history of 
experimental poetry cannot be understood merely in narrative terms. Instead, I seek to 
propose something of a phenomenological narrative, which is to say, a framework based on 
my own readings in and of American poetics which brings together a variety of poets rarely 
discussed alongside one another. The purpose of this is not merely to subvert convention or 
articulate dissent towards a tradition, but is rather intended to bear witness to extended 
poetics in America as a series of acts of extended inquiry.  
  This thesis will present six examples of poetic extension composed in America in the 
last sixty years by virtue of a variety of figures known foremost for their association with the 
 ‘ƐĐŚŽŽůƐ ?ŽĨdŚĞEĞǁWŽĞƚƌǇ ?/ƚŝƐŶŽƚŵǇŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƚŚĞƉŽĞƚƐĂƐ ‘ďĞůŽŶŐŝŶŐ ?ƚŽƚŚĞŝƌ
groupings other than in instances when the act of extension itself arises from collaboration 
ĂŶĚƉŽĞƚŝĐĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐǁĞǁŝůůƐĞĞŝŶŚĂƉƚĞƌ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞƐZŽďŝŶůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ
ŽĨ ‘ĨƌŝĞŶĚƐŚŝƉ ?ǁŝƚŚ:ĂĐŬ^ƉŝĐĞƌĂŶĚZŽďĞƌƚƵŶĐĂŶ ?ŽƌŝŶŚĂƉƚĞƌ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐƚŚĞ
epistolary relationship that constitutes Lyn Hejinian and LĞƐůŝĞ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ?ƐĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚǁŽƌŬ
Sight.  
  The grouping of poets featured in this thesis are all American poets who published 
extended works since the 1950s, and each is associated to varying extents with schools of 
avant-garde, post-DŽĚĞƌŶŝƐƚŽƌ ‘EĞǁ ?poetics. George Oppen has been regarded as an 
 ‘KďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƐƚ ?ƉŽĞƚĂŶĚŝƐŽĨƚĞŶĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚĂůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞŚŝƐĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌŝĞƐƵŬŽĨƐŬǇ ?>ŽƌŝŶĞ
EŝĞĚĞĐŬĞƌĂŶĚŚĂƌůĞƐZĞǌŶŝŬŽĨĨ ?:ĂŵĞƐ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĐůŽƐĞĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚ&ƌĂŶŬK ?,ĂƌĂ ?
Barbara Guest and John Ashbery locate him among the New York School in the 1950s; Robin 
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Blaser was instrumental in many of the publications and events which surrounded the San 
Francisco Renaissance; Lyn Hejinian, Susan Howe and Leslie Scalapino all published poems 
and works of poetics in L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E school publications in the 1970s-80s; Rachel Blau 
DuPlessis has worked since the 1970s with both Language and Objectivist poetics, though her 
ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĞĚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶĂŶĚĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚ ‘ƚŚĞůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ ?ĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞƐŚĞƌĂƐĂůĞĂĚŝŶŐ
figure in the discourse of extended poetics in her own right. 
  In each of these cases, efforts have been made in each chapter to isolate the poets 
from their groupings; which is to say, I seek to develop the terms with which I discuss each 
poet from the poet themselves and not from the poetic school with which they are 
associated. This has variable consequences; for Susan Howe, who worked alongside but 
rarely under the explicit auspices of the L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E school, general critical 
discussions of Language Poetry arĞůĞƐƐƵƐĞĨƵůƚŚĂŶƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƌĞĂĚŝŶŐƐŽĨĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ,ŽǁĞ ?Ɛ
own work. For Robin Blaser, however, whose life and texts are often entwined with the lives 
of the San Francisco Renaissance poets Robert Duncan and Jack Spicer, it might appear more 
difficult to idĞŶƚŝĨǇ ‘ŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐǇ ?ǁŚĞŶŚĞŚŝŵƐĞůĨŝŶƐŝƐƚƐŽŶƚŚĞŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĐŽŵŵƵŶĂůŝƚǇŽĨ
poetry.  
  /ŶŵŽƐƚĐĂƐĞƐ ?ƚŚŝƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŝƐĂƐƐŝƐƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞƉŽĞƚƐ ?ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌ
ǁŽƌŬƐĂƐ ‘ůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵƐ ?Žƌ ‘ƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ ? ?ĂŶĚŽĨƚĞŶǁƌŝƚŝŶŐĂƚůĞŶŐƚŚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨ 
extended composition.  Each chapter will start out with the same ambition to frame the key 
terms of each extended work, though where the investigation goes following this is 
dependent entirely on the poems themselves and what they demand of the reader. 
 
  It is necessary now, before moving on to the chapters themselves, to outline the 
themes and formal interests of each of the poets who occupy this study. The opening chapter 
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ƐĞĞŬƐƚŽĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĂƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŽĨ'ĞŽƌŐĞKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐOf Being Numerous  ? ? ? ? ? ) ?KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐŵĂũor 
serial poem is concerned with numerousness both on the page and in the intersubjective 
world. He seeks to create an analogue in his poem between serial poetics and being-with-
ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?/ŶĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝŶŐƚŚŝƐŐƌŽƵŶĚ ?KƉƉĞŶǁŽƌŬƐ ‘ƚŚƌƵ ?DĂƌƚŝŶ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?Ɛǁƌŝƚings to arrive 
ĂƚĂŶŝĚŝŽŵǁŚŝĐŚŝƐŶŽƚďĞŚŽůĚĞŶƚŽƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐŝƚƐŽǁŶƚĂǆŽŶŽŵǇ “ŽĨ
ďĞŝŶŐŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ? ?
  dŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚĐŚĂƉƚĞƌŽĨƚŚŝƐƐƚƵĚǇƌĞĂĚƐ:ĂŵĞƐ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐThe Morning of the Poem, A 
Few Days and Hymn To Life, all of which are consistently grounded in an introspective and 
self-correcting poet-ƐƉĞĂŬĞƌ ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĚŝĂƌŝƐƚŝĐŵĞĚŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐƚĂŬĞƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨ
ĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĚĂŝůǇ ? ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƉƌŽǆŝŵŝƚǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ƉĞŽƉůĞĂŶĚŽďũĞĐƚƐǁŚŝĐŚƉŽƉƵůĂƚĞŚŝƐ
life establishes an empathic poetics.  
  dŚĞƚŚŝƌĚĐŚĂƉƚĞƌŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚZŽďŝŶůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐImage-Nation and The Holy Forest. 
ŐĂŝŶ ?ĂƐŝŶŵǇƌĞĂĚŝŶŐƐŽĨKƉƉĞŶĂŶĚ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĨĞĂƚƵƌĞŽĨůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ
poetic extension is intersubjectivity as a means of extension. By thŝƐ/ŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚůĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ
works extend by virtue of the lives they seek to communicate with, and as such a 
ĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĐŚŝĂƐŵŝĐ ?ŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƋƵŽƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚĞǆƚƵĂůĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚŝŽŶĐŽŵĞƐƚŽ
ƚŚĞĨŽƌĞ ?^ƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ ?ůĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ ‘ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŽĨŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ?ƐĞĞŬƐ to work towards what transcends 
ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?KŶĞƐƵĐŚƚƌĂŶƐĐĞŶĚĞŶĐĞŝƐĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚŝŶůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŵƉts to 
ĨŽƌĞŐƌŽƵŶĚ ‘ĨƌŝĞŶĚƐŚŝƉ ?ĂƐƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐƵƉŽŶǁŚŝĐŚŚŝƐƉŽĞƚƌǇĚĞǀĞůŽƉƐ ? 
  dŚĞĨŽƵƌƚŚĐŚĂƉƚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞƐƚƵĚǇƐĞĞŬƐƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉ^ƵƐĂŶ,ŽǁĞ ?s account of historical 
tyranny and American phenomenology. The former is disclosed at length in The Birthmark, a 
ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĞƐƐĂǇƐǁŚŝĐŚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚĂƚŝǀĞŚŝƐƚŽƌǇĂƐŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŶŐĂ
series of margins and marginal figures whose recoveƌǇŝƚŝƐƚŚĞƉŽĞƚ ?ƐĞƚŚŝĐĂůĚƵƚǇƚŽƉĞƌĨŽƌŵ ?
In her trilogy of extended poems Pierce-Arrow, one such recovery is performed on the life of 
logician and philosopher Charles Sanders Pierce, who is notable for developing a form of 
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phenomenology in 19th century America. In the writing of this work, Howe visited both 
WŝĞƌĐĞ ?ƐĂŶĚĚŵƵŶĚ,ƵƐƐĞƌů ?ƐĂƌĐŚŝǀĞƐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƚŚĞŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐŽĨŚĞƌƉŽĞŵƐ
first-hand. It is a ĐƌƵĐŝĂůĨĞĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƚŚĂƚ the archive is home to the marginal, and 
she labours to give articulation to these margins. 
  The fifth chapter conducts a reading of two poets ?  Lyn Hejinian and Leslie Scalapino. 
Their collaborative extended work Sight is a long poem which extends on epistolary 
principles. It is a work the ambitions of which are deceptively simple: to enumerate vision 
and its implications in poetry. Their shared sense of the primary role of sight and vision in 
perceptual experience leads to a meditative dialogue which is constantly in a state of being 
re-envisioned. In this regard, this chapter challenges the way in which my sense of 
 ‘ŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐǇ ?ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĂƚby addressing two poets at the same time it is more difficult 
to make clear arguments concerning subjectivity and perception. The fact, however, that the 
work is so thoroughly one of collaboration, and that the alternating instalments are 
designated as being written by either Hejinian or Scalapino, allows a clear conception of the 
individual efforts which together constitute the epistolary serial form of the work. 
 ZĂĐŚĞůůĂƵƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?Drafts stands as the sixth and final chapter of the work. Her 30-
year project, completed in 2013, encompasses a dizzying array of long-poem forms through 
ƚŚĞƚǁŽƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐŽĨ ‘ĚƌĂĨƚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĨŽůĚŝŶŐ ? ?DǇĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƐeeks to frame Drafts as a work of 
poetic extension concerned first and foremost with the act of poetic extension itself. 
ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐǇůŝĞƐůĂƌŐĞůǇŝŶŚĞƌǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽĞŶŐĂŐĞǁŝƚŚƐĞƌŝĂůŝƚǇŽŶĂĨĂƌůĂƌŐĞƌ
scale than that of her close friend and mentor, George Oppen, in that rather than bringing 
together small discrete units of poetry, DuPlessis brings together 114 long poems into one 
larger structure. It is in this sense arguably the first work of poetic meta-extension, a long 
poem about long pŽĞŵƐǁŚŝĐŚĚĞŶŝĞƐƚŚĂƚĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇĚĞĨŝŶĞƐ ‘ƚŚĞůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ ? ?&Žƌ
this reason, ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?Drafts also acts as a bridge to the conclusion of this thesis. The main 
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reasons for this lie in her position as a scholar of long poems and as a composer of the first 
major 21st century American long poem. From the vantage point of having read Drafts, the 
mid to late-twentieth century American long poem can be witnessed not merely as a series 
of poetic traditions and histories, but of individual acts of formal manipulation, structural 






 Finding a word for ourselves    George Oppen 
 
I write of things 
Endless, endless, 
innumerable 








George Oppen is notable among poets working in the 20th century for developing a serial 
poetry concerned with an ethics of sincerity. Seriality for Oppen is not merely an 
organisational principle; it can also be put to use to evoke the contingent and ambulatory 
ŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?KĨƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ'ĞŽƌŐĞKƉƉĞŶ ?ZŽďĞƌƚƌĞĞůĞǇǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “KŶĞďĞŐŝŶƐƚŽ
ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƚŚŝƐĂĐƚŝǀĞ ?ƌĞƐƚůĞƐƐŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ?ŽĨƚĞŶďƌŽŽĚŝŶŐŝŶŝƚƐƉƌĞŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶ ? Q ?ƚƌĂĐŬŝŶŐ
and retracking an implacable ground of apparent consequences ? ?KƉƉĞŶ ?002, 4). This 
ĞǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞŝƐƵƐĞĨƵůŝŶŽƵƚůŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐŽĨǁŚĂƚ/ǁŝůůďĞ
arguing are his phenomenological poetics. In his works of poetic extension ?  Discrete Series, 
 ‘ZŽƵƚĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ? ? KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐǀŽŝĐĞǁŽƌks through questions of 
intersubjectivity and being-in-the-world from a stance which embraces the contingency of 
ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?/ŶŚŝƐƚŚŝƌĚĚĂǇďŽŽŬ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐǁƌŝƚƚĞŶƉĂƌĂůůĞůƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐ
EƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ? ?KƉƉĞŶǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “/ĐĂŶƐĞĞŶŽƚŚŝŶŐĂƚĂůů except that one encounters the thing. 
ŶĚ ?ŝƚŝƐŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞŶŽƚƚŽƐĂǇ ?ĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƐŽŶĞƐĞůĨ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). This grounding in the 
subjectivity of perception is a pervasive theme throughout his work. This is not to say, 
ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĂƚKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐŝƐŵĞƌĞůǇ subjective; rather, the inquiry at the heart of his 
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work is oriented towards determining how numerous subjectivities can co-exist ethically.  
  In this light, describing Oppen as a phenomenological poet could be construed as a 
problematic claim, in that it might serve to misrepresent the relationship between 
philosophy and poetry evident in his writing. This claim can be somewhat justified in the light 
ŽĨĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐKƉƉĞŶĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ?KŶĞƐƵĐŚĞǆĂŵƉůĞĐĂŶďĞĨŽƵŶĚŝŶ> ?^ĞŵďŽ ?ƐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ 
 “ǁŚĞŶKƉƉĞŶƉƵƚƉĞŶƚŽƉĂƉĞƌĂŐĂŝŶ ?ŝƚǁĂƐ ? Q ?ĂƐĂŶǆŝƐƚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƐƚ ?ŶŽƚĂƐĂ^ŽĐŝĂůŝƐƚ ?
(Dembo 1969a, 137). Whilst it is not my intention to argue the case for Oppen as an 
ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚŝĂůƉŽĞƚ ?ĞŵďŽƵƐĞĨƵůůǇŐĞƐƚƵƌĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐare highly 
informed by existential and phenomenological philosophy, though never in a prescriptive 
manner. The crucial difference between existentialism as Oppen understood it and 
phenomenology lies in the fact that the former seeks to outline a certain attitude towards 
the world whereas the latter merely seeks to clearly and intensely determine what 
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐƚŚŝƐ ‘ǁŽƌůĚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƉůĂĐĞ ?ƐƌŝĐ,ŽĨĨŵĂŶǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “KƉƉĞŶĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚŚŝƐ
ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƐŵ ? Q ?ďĞŐĂŶĂŶĚĞŶĚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞďĞůŝĞĨthat existence precedes 
essence, or, as Oppen writes elsewhere, that we "get born into the thing, we just find 
ourselves here and we are as we are" (2008, 169). Oppen tellingly positions himself against 
Jean-Paul Sartre, offering a critique of what he percĞŝǀĞƐĂƐƚŚĞŵŝƐĂŶƚŚƌŽƉǇŽĨƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ ?Ɛ
work ?   ?DǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞǁŝƚŚ^ĂƌƚƌĞŝƐƚŚĂƚ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚŝŶƚŚĞůĂƐƚĚŝƐůŝŬĞƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ? ?ĞŵďŽ
1969a, 140). Oppen criticism has rewardingly engaged with phenomenological ideas and 
texts seriously ?  For example, Marjorie Perloff writes that Oppen is cŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚ “ƚŚĞ
ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇŽĨƚŚĞŵŝŶĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ďďǇ^ŚĂƉŝƌŽƚŚƚKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐŝƐĂ “ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
ǁŽƌůĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ĂŶĚDŝĐŚĂĞů,ĞůůĞƌĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐĂ “ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƉŽĞƚŝĐƐǁŚŝĐŚĞǀŽůǀĞƐ
[...] to the more subtle complexities of language-in-the-world, of the holds on thought of the 
ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐŝƐĂƉŽĞƚƌǇŽĨƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?ŽĨďĞŝŶŐĂůǁĂǇƐ-already caught up 
in the goings-on of what he perceives to be the actual.  
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  This chapter will seek to conduct a readiŶŐŽĨKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐǁŝƚŚĂǀŝĞǁŽĨ
underscoring the dialogue in his work between poetry and phenomenology, with particular 
ĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƐĞƌŝĂůǁŽƌŬ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ? ?/ŶĐĂƌƌǇŝŶŐŽƵƚƚŚŝƐƚĂƐŬ ?ŝƚŝƐ
necessary first to frame curiosity throƵŐŚƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐŽĨKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐŝŐŚƚ ?
Following this, the relationship Oppen constructs between serial form and intersubjectivity 
will be discussed, before moving towards concluding. This chapter will seek to disclose the 
idiosyncratic terms of OpƉĞŶ ?ƐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ĂƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞĚƌŝǀĞŶďǇƚŚĞĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƚŽ “ ?ĨŝŶĚ ?ĂǁŽƌĚ
ĨŽƌŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? 
 
KƉƉĞŶ ?Ɛ ‘ĐƚƵĂůŶĞƐƐ ? 
First, however, it is necessary to dwell on the use to which Oppen put his readings in 
ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?KƉƉĞŶǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚŚŝƐƋƵŽƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ “ĂƌĞ not allusions; they are thefts ? ?KƉƉĞŶ
2007, 380). KŶĞĐĂŶƚĂŬĞĨƌŽŵƚŚŝƐƚŚĂƚKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƵƐĞŽĨĞŵďĞĚĚĞĚƋƵŽƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ
those of philosophical figures such as Martin Heidegger, Jacques Maritain, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and Søren Kierkegaard, are not intended to assemble an explicit philosophical 
tradition so much as appropriate a taxonomy through which a poetics responsive to 
ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĐĂŶďĞĐŽŵƉŽƐĞĚ ?^ƚĞƉŚĞŶŽƉĞǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƵƐĞŽĨŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐĚŝƐƉůĂǇƐ “Ă
social ethos in which the poem is created out of conversations with others ?  including the 
ƉŽĞƚŚŝŵƐĞůĨ ? ?KƉƉĞŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ǁŚŝůƐƚDŝĐŚĂĞůĂǀŝĚƐŽŶĞǆƚĞŶĚƐƚŚŝƐƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƚŽĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞ
 ‘ĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨďĞŝŶŐŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ P “dŚĞƉŽĞŵŝƐŵĂĚĞƵƉ
from extensive quotation from correspondence, conversations, books, and news articles to 
ŐŝǀĞǀŝǀŝĚĨŽƌŵƚŽƚŚĞƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞĚďǇƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?Ɛƚŝ ůĞ ? ?Ibid., xxv). KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƚĞǆƚƵĂů
materials, especially those he notated first in his Daybooks ?ĂƌĞŶŽƚĂ ‘ƌĞƉĞƌƚŽŝƌĞ ? ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ
way that he never forcefully put forward a prescribed method or system of poetics. Oppen 
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ĂƚƚĞƐƚƐƚŽƚŚŝƐĨĂĐƚ PŚĞ “ĚŽ ?ĞƐ ?ŶŽƚĐĂƌĞĨŽƌƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?). Cope expands on this aspect 
ŽĨKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ P 
Oppen was highly suspicious of Pound's egoistic and didactic use of poetry, 
which he felt should not be used to 'prescribe an opinion or idea, but to 
record the process of thinking it.'       (Oppen 2007, 20) 
KƉƉĞŶŝƐƵŶŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶWŽƵŶĚ ?Ɛ “ƉŽĞƚŝĐƐŽĨŶŽƐƚĂůŐŝĂ ? ?,ĞůůĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? )Žƌ ?ƚŽƵƐĞKƉƉĞŶ ?Ɛ
own phrase, his  “Žrganisation of the world around a character ? ?KƉƉĞŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). The 
double-ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨ ‘ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ?ŚĞƌĞĐĂŶďĞƋƵŝƚĞĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞůǇĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚĂƚƚŚĞǀŽŝĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ
Cantos ĂŶĚWŽƵŶĚ ?ƐŝĚĞŽŐƌĂŵŵĂƚŝĐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽĨĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?/ŶďŽƚŚĐĂƐĞƐ ?ƚŚĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞŽĨ
what OppĞŶĐĂůůƐ “WŽƵŶĚ ?ƐĞŐŽƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ŝƐĂƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĨĂŝůƵƌĞŝŶŝƚƐ “ĚƌŝǀĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƚŚĞ
establishment of an authoritative and didactic voice ? ?,ŽĨĨŵĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). This leads Hoffman 
ƚŽĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĂƚ “Oppen's unique compositional process [is] meant to achieve [an] openness 
and ambiguity of meaning that, unlike Pound's Cantos, resists the cloƐƵƌĞŽĨĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ?(Ibid. 
8). tŚĂƚŵĂŬĞƐKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƌĞũĞĐƚĐůŽƐƵƌĞŝŶƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞƐĞŶƐĞŝƐŝƚƐƐĞƌŝĂů
organisation, in which the terms of the series together form the whole. In this regard, Alan 
Golding writes: 
Narrative, Oppen has said, with its implications of an ordered universe 
apprehensible in a unified work of art, runs counter to his feeling that poetic 
form is local and temporary and that meaning is constructed disjunctively out 
of momentary insights.      (Ibid., 229-30) 
KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽ ‘ƚŚĞĐůŽƐƵƌĞŽĨĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ?ĐŽŵĞƐĨƌŽŵŚŝƐƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƉŽĞƚ-speaker as 
ƚŚĞĨŝŐƵƌĞǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƉĂƚŝĞŶƚůǇ ‘ƚŚƌƵ ?ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞƚŽƉƌĞƐ ŶƚƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŝŶ ‘ŵŽŵĞŶƚĂƌǇŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐ ? ?
 ‘dŚƌƵ ?ŝƐĂƐŝŐŶĂƚƵƌĞƚĞƌŵŝŶKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƉŽĞƚƌǇ ? it appears throughout his Collected Poems but 
ŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŝŶ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ? ?ĂŶĚƐĞĞŵƐƚŽĚŝƐƉůĂǇŽŶĂƐŵĂůůƐĐĂůĞƚŚĞĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶ
ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚƌƵ ?ŚŝƐƉŽetics. It is necessary to explore the significance that KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ
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ŽĨ ‘ƚŚƌƵ ?ŽǀĞƌ ‘ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ?ĞǀŽŬĞƐ PŝŶĂƐƵƉĞƌĨŝĐŝĂůƐĞŶƐĞ ?ŝƚŝƐŵĞƌĞůǇĂŶŽƌƚŚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶǀĂƌŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?
ďƵƚŝŶKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐŚĂŶĚƐŝƚĐĂƌƌŝĞƐĂůƐŽƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƐŽĨďŽƚŚƚĞůĞŽůŽŐǇ ?  of being thru ?  and of a 
route, of having to get to meaning thru things.  Grammatically the word is condensed, the 
ƐƵƉĞƌĨůƵŽƵƐůĞƚƚĞƌƐŽĨ ‘ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ? ?ƚŚĞƵŶƐŽƵŶĚĞĚŽ ?ŐĂŶĚŚ )ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĐƵƚƚŚƌƵ ?ŽŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŽ
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĂƐĞŶƐĞŽĨŝŵŵĂŶĞŶĐĞĂŶĚŝŵŵĞĚŝĂĐǇ ?dŚŝƐǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚƌƵ ? ?Ănd the poetic stance it 
ŝŵƉůŝĞƐ ?ĞĐŚŽĞƐĂƋƵŽƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌKƉƉĞŶƌĞĐŽƌĚƐŝŶĂǇďŽŽŬ/// P “Man creates not 
being, but the there of being-there ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐ ). /Ŷ'ĞƌŵĂŶ ?,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?Ɛ
ƚĞƌŵĨŽƌŚƵŵĂŶĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐŝƐ ‘ĂƐĞŝŶ ? ?ĂĐŽŵƉŽƵŶĚǁŽƌĚǁŚŝĐŚďƌŝŶŐƐƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ‘ĂƐ ?
 ?ƚŚĂƚŽƌƚŚĞƌĞ )ĂŶĚ ‘^ĞŝŶ ? ?ĞŝŶŐ ) ?ĂŶĚƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇŐĞƐƚƵƌĞƐĂƚƚŚĞƚŚĞƌĞ-ness of being. It is 
,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞůĨ-ĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞŶĞƐƐ ?ŽĨŚƵŵĂŶƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŝƐŝƚƐĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐ
characteristic. In this regard, ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?Ɛ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ŝƐĂĚĞŝĐƚŝĐƚĞƌŵ ? ‘dŚĞƌĞ ?ŚĂƐƚŽĚŽǁŝƚŚ
ůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚůŽĐĂƚŝŶŐ ?ďŽƚŚŽĨǁŚŝĐŚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŽŶĞ ?ƐŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽĂǁŽƌůĚ ?/ƚŝƐĨƌŽŵ
this position that Oppen locates sites of meaning ?  the shipwreck, the city of corporations, 
the killing fields, the world of stoops, the poem itself ?  ĂŶĚŵŽǀĞƐ ‘ƚŚƌƵ ? them to his sense of 
ĐůĂƌŝƚǇ ?ŽĨƐŝŶĐĞƌŝƚǇ ? ‘dŚĞƌĞŶĞƐƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘dŚƌƵŶĞƐƐ ?Ăƌ  ŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐŝŶKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?
foremost in the sense that both are concerned with addressing deixis as fundamental to 
ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?/ŶKƉƉĞŶ ?Ɛ ‘WƐĂůŵ ? ?ĨŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĞƉŽĞƚŝĐǀŽŝĐĞĞǀŽŬĞƐ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞŶĞƐƐ ?ŝŶ
ƚŚĞ “ƐŵĂůůŶŽƵŶƐ ?ĐƌǇŝŶŐĨĂŝƚŚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐ ‘ƚŚƌƵŶĞƐƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝǀĞŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ
from the mere existence of the deer ?   “ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞ ƚŚĞƌĞ ? ? ?ibid.) ?  to their eyes and teeth, 
ǁŚŝĐŚŐĞƚƚŽƚŚĞůŝƚĞƌĂůĂŶĚŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌŝĐĂů “ƌŽŽƚƐŽĨŝƚ ? ?ibid. ) ?dŚĞ ‘ŝƚ ?ŚĞƌĞƌĞĨĞƌƐŶŽƚŽŶůǇƚŽ
ƚŚĞŐƌĂƐƐŽĨƚŚĞ “ƐŵĂůůďĞĂƵƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĨŽƌĞƐƚ ?ďƵƚƚŽƚŚĞƐŝƚĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚŝƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƵŶĨŽůĚƐ ?
the grounding of the scene. There is an implicit relation between this forest and the way it 
ƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇĚŝƐĐůŽƐĞƐĂŶĚŽďƐĐƵƌĞƐƚŚĞůŝĨĞǁŝƚŚŝŶĂŶĚKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůŽĨ
ƉŽĞƚƌǇ ?KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƉŽĞŵƐ ?ůŝŬĞƚŚĞĨŽƌĞƐƚŽĨ ‘WƐĂůŵ ? ?ƐĞĞŬƚŽƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƚŚŝŶŐƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞŶĞƐƐ ? ?
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ƚŚŽƵŐŚƐƵďũĞĐƚĂůǁĂǇƐƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ƚŚƌƵŶĞƐƐ ?ŽĨƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚ ? ‘ƚŚĞƌĞŶĞƐƐ ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘ƚŚƌƵŶĞƐƐ ?ĂƌĞďƌŽƵŐŚƚƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ĂƐďŽƚŚƐŝŐŚƚĂŶĚƐŝƚĞ P 
      Their paths 
Nibbled thru the fields, the leaves that shade them 
Hang in the distances 
Of sun        (Ibid., 99) 
dŚĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶƚŽďĞŵĂĚĞŚĞƌĞŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĚĞĞƌ ?ƐƉĂƚŚƐĂƌĞŶŽƚŵĞƌĞůǇĂŵĞĂŶƐŽĨŵŽǀŝŶŐ
 ‘ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ?ƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚƐďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌ ?ĨŽƌKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƚĂŶĚĂƐĂĨŝŐƵƌĞ ‘ƚŚƌƵ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞĚĞĞƌĂƌĞďŽƚŚ
manifested and witnessed. In Of Being Numerous a similar working thru can be witnessed, 
though the object of perception ?  human numerousness and its correlatives ?  is more 
elusive than ƚŚĞ “ǁŝůĚĚĞĞƌ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌƉŽĞŵ ? 
  It would be a mistake, however, to label Oppen as an explicitly Heideggerian poet. 
dŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚŚŝƐǁŽƌŬ ?KƉƉĞŶĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽƌĞĂĚ ‘ƚŚƌƵ ? ? in the contingent, immanent sense of 
the term discussed above ?  his materials, never taking a statement as the final matter of 
fact, as the state of things. Forrest Gander assists in this reading: 
It might be said that [Heidegger] becomes more absorbed with Being, 
ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐĞĚ ?ƚŚĂŶǁŝƚŚďĞŝŶŐƐŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?ƵƚŝŶKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐŽĞƵǀƌĞ ?being 
remains writ insistently small. It is evidenced in small words, in the small 
marvels of the commonplace.     (Gander, np) 
It is a crucial and pertinent distinction that Oppen engages with Heidegger but does not 
merely adopt his terms unreservedly ?  this would be antithetical to the operations of his 
poetics. Peter Nicholls writes that  “ ?KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ?ǁĂƐwritten while [Oppen] was 
ƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). /ŶƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞ ?the situation in 
which a thing openly projects its thingness ?  finds articulation in  ‘dŚĞKƌŝŐŝŶKĨdŚĞtŽƌŬKĨ
ƌƚ ? ?,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
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sĂŶ'ŽŐŚ ?ƐƉĂŝŶting [of a pair of peasant shoes] is the disclosure of what the 
equipment, the pair of peasant shoes, is in truth. This entity emerges into the 
unconcealedness of its being. The Greeks called the unconcealedness of being 
aletheia ?tĞƐĂǇ ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚŝŶŬlittle enough in using this word. If there 
occurs in the work a disclosure of a particular being, disclosing what and how 
it is, then there is here an occurring, a happening of truth at work.       
        (Heidegger 2010, 35) 
dŚŝƐ ‘ĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞ ? ? ŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ŚĂƉƉĞŶŝŶŐŽĨƚƌƵƚŚĂƚǁŽƌŬ ? ?is an idea complimentary to both 
KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐǁĂǇŽĨƐĞĞŝŶŐĂŶĚŚŝƐƐĞƌŝĂůŝƚǇ ?dŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƚĞŶƐĞ ‘ŚĂƉƉĞŶŝŶŐ ?ŝŶǀŽŬĞƐƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŝŶ
which disclosure is a contingent occurrence, and furthermore is reliant on the act of 
ǁŝƚŶĞƐƐŝŶŐ ?KƉƉĞŶ ?Ɛ desire to bear witness is the basis of his poetics, and it is from this desire 
that his poetry extends. 
  KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶŝƐƚŚƵƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶĂƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŽƉƚŝĐƐ ?ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚŝŶŐƚŽƐĞĞƚŚĞƚŚŝŶŐ
clearly ?   ‘ƚŚƌƵ ?ďƵƚŶŽƚĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů ?ŝŶ
Oppen evokes not interiority or solipsism but anecdote and empiricism. It is also in this way 
that Oppen presents a poetry which compliments phenomenological analyses of sight and 
 ‘ĂĐƚƵĂůŶĞƐƐ ? ?DŝĐŚĂĞůĂǀŝĚƐŽŶǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚKƉƉĞŶ ?Ɛ ƐƚĂŶĐĞ “is not a passive looking onto the 
world but a means of touching that invests the world with particular, site-ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƐ ?
(Oppen 2003, i). /ŶƚŚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚ ? ‘ƐŝŐŚƚ ?ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐĂĐƌƵĐŝĂůŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐǇŽĨKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ? it 
is, for Oppen, the way to truth. In concerning himself and his poetic agency with that which is 
true ?  that is, that that is ?  Oppen develops not a philosophical framework but instead a 
ƚƵƌŶƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ‘ƚŚĞĂĐƚƵĂů ? ?,ĞĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ P 
I am not speaking of a philosophic naivete, I am not speaking of kicking the 
rock and saying By God, Sir, that's here, and certainly I'm not speaking of any 
remarkable philosophic sophistication. I am thinking of actualness. 
         (Oppen 2007, 49) 
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/ƚŝƐĐƌƵĐŝĂůƚŽƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐ ‘ĂĐƚƵĂů ? ‘ďĞŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞ ?ŝƐĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚůǇŝŶĂƐƚĂƚĞŽĨ
numerousness: and, furthermore, it is also true for Oppen that theƌĞŝƐ “ŶŽƚƚƌƵƚŚďƵƚĞĂĐŚ
other ? ?KƉƉĞŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). dŚŝƐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞƐKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐŝĚĞĂŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞĂĐƚƵĂů ? ?ĂŶĚďƌŝŶŐƐ
us to what is really at stake ŝŶ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ? PƚŚĂƚŝƐ ?ƚŚĞĂĐƚƵĂů ?that that is, is at once 
singular and numerous: 
There are things  
tĞůŝǀĞĂŵŽŶŐ ‘ĂŶĚƚŽƐĞĞƚŚĞŵ 
/ƐƚŽŬŶŽǁŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ?     (Oppen 2003, 163) 
KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐŽƉĞŶŝŶŐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚĐŽŶƚĂŝŶƐƚŚĞĂŵďŝŐƵŽƵƐůǇƐŽƵƌĐĞĚƐƉĞĞĐŚof another. The effect 
ŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ ‘ǁĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƋƵŽƚĂƚŝŽŶŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐƚŚĞƉŽĞƚŝĐǀŽŝĐĞŝŶĂŶĂŵďŝŐƵŽƵƐ
ƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ĂƚŽŶĐĞĂƚĂĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞďĂƌĞƐƚĚĞƚĂŝů ?ĂŶĚƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇ
engaging intersubjectively, in both content and address.  The quotation which splits the voice 
ŚĂůĨǁĂǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚůŝŶĞĨŝŶŝƐŚĞƐƚŚĞƐƉĞĂŬĞƌ ?ƐƉŚƌĂƐĞ ?ĐŽŵƉůŝŵĞŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘tĞ ?ǁŝƚŚ
 ‘KƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ?ďŽƚŚƚĞƌŵƐďĞŝŶŐǀŽŝĐĞĚĨƌŽŵĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ?ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŶŐĂŵƵƚƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨ
condition. Furthermore, the evenly ǁĂǇŝƚŝƐƋƵĂŶƚŝĨŝĂďůǇ ‘ďĂůĂŶĐĞĚ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞǁŽƌĚƐŽĨƚŚĞ
ƉŽĞƚŝĐǀŽŝĐĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ƐŽƉĞŶŝŶŐĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶĂƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ ‘ŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ? ?ǁŝƚŚ
KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐǀŽŝĐĞƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŝŶĚŝĂůŽŐƵĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞǀŽŝĐĞƐŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? 
  To return to ƌĞĞůĞǇ ?ƐƌĞŵĂƌŬĂƚƚŚĞŽƵƚƐĞƚŽĨƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƚ ƌŵ “ƉƌĞŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶ ?
ŝƐƵƐĞĨƵůŝŶƵŶĚĞƌƐĐŽƌŝŶŐKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽĂŶŽƉĞŶƉŽĞƚŝĐƐǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƚŽƚŚĞ
ǀŝĐŝƐƐŝƚƵĚĞƐŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞĂĐƚƵĂů ?ŝŶƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?/ƚŝƐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽƐƚƌĞƐƐƚŚĂƚ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚ
committed to the disclosure of exŝƐƚĞŶƚŝĂůŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ?KƉƉĞŶǁƌŝƚĞƐ ?ŝŶ ‘^ƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚKŶ
WŽĞƚŝĐƐ ? ?ƚŚĂƚĂƐĂƉŽĞƚ ?ŚĞ “ĐĂŶŶŽƚŚŽƉĞƚŽƉƌĞƐĐƌŝďĞ" (2007, 47). The arrangement of 
syntactic fragments, especially in his extended poetic works, is the act itself of the disclosure 
of meaning, not the employment of any rehearsed or predetermined register. Oppen wrote 
in a letter to his sister that  “WŽĞƚƌǇŚĂƐƚŽďĞƉƌŽƚĞĂn, the meaning must begin there ?
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(Quoted in Heller 2004, 70). dŚŝƐ ‘ƉƌŽƚĞĂŶ ?ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐĐŽŵŝŶŐƚŽĂŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐof 
thĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚĂŶĚŚŝƐŽƌŚĞƌ ‘ĂĐƚƵĂů ? ?/ƚŝƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽƚƵƌŶƚŽKƉƉĞŶ ?Ɛ
ƚĞƌŵƐĨŽƌĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ?ŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŽĨǁŚŝĐŚŝƐ ‘ĐƵƌŝŽƐŝƚǇ ? ?
 
Consciousness and Curiosity 
Marjorie Perloff ǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚKƉƉĞŶ ?Ɛ “ƉŽĞƚŝĐƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŵŝŵĞƐƚŚĞĨŝƚƐĂŶĚƐƚĂƌƚƐďǇŵĞĂŶƐŽĨ
ǁŚŝĐŚŚŝƐĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐĐŽŵĞƐƚŽƚĞƌŵƐǁŝƚŚŝƚƐŶĞǁĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). tŚŝůƐƚWĞƌůŽĨĨ ?Ɛ
ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŝƐƵƐĞĨƵůŝŶďƌŝŶŐŝŶŐĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĞǆƉůŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƉŽĞƚics 
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ ?ƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ŵŝŵĞ ?ŝƐƉĞƌŚĂƉƐŝŶĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞ ?KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƐĞƌŝĂůƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞ
evokes or, more precisely, inaugurates perception in its sparse diction and the space it allows 
for individual terms to resonate. Whilst his processes of disclosure enact consciousness, they 
ĚŽŶŽƚƐĞĞŬƚŽ ‘ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵ ?ŝƚ ?dŚŝƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶŝƐ ?ĂƐKƉƉĞŶƚĞƌŵƐŝƚ ? ?ƚŚĞůŝŶĞďetween histrionics 
and openness" (2007, 24). WĞƌůŽĨĨ ?ƐĞƐƚŝŵĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐďĞĐĂƵƐĞKƉƉĞŶ ?Ɛ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐ
EƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ? ?ĨŽƌĂůůŝƚƐƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůŐƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ in figures of perception, is not a work of mimesis. 
WĞƌůŽĨĨ ?ƐƌĞĂĚŝŶŐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐƌĞŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ PKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĚŽĞƐŶŽƚ ‘ŵŝŵĞ
ĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƐĞĞŬŝŶŐƚŽĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞůǇƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌŝƚĚŝƐĐůŽƐĞƐ
the process of thought itself in the midst of perceptual encounters. This is a nuance Oppen 
ŚŝŵƐĞůĨƵŶĚĞƌƐĐŽƌĞƐŝŶŚŝƐĞƐƐĂǇ ‘dŚĞDŝŶĚ ?ƐKǁŶWůĂĐĞ ? P 
The distinction between a poem that shows confidence in itself and in its 
materials, and on the other hand a performance, a speech by the poet, is the 
distinction between poetry and histrionics. (Oppen 2007, 32) 
/ŶŚŝƐƌĞǀŝĞǁ ‘dŚƌĞĞWŽĞƚƐ ? ?KƉƉĞŶŶĂŵĞƐ'ŝŶƐďĞƌŐĂƐŽŶĞƐƵĐŚƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĞƌ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚŶŽƚ
necessarily in a dismissive way: "This is declamatory form: to quarrel with that is simply to 
quarrel with the heart of his work" (Ibid., 23). /ŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ?ƚŚĞŚĞĂƌƚŽĨKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝƐ
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resolutely non-declamatory ?  ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĚŝƐƉůĂǇƐĂŶĂĐƚŝǀĞĂgency, stressed in 
the predominantly present tense of his work, wherein bearing witness takes precedent over 
argumentation or pedagogy.  
  KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞĚŝƐƉůĂǇƐĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐďǇǁŚŝĐŚ ?ƚŽĂĚŽƉƚWĞƌůŽĨĨ ?ƐƉŚƌĂƐĞ ?
 “ĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐĐŽŵĞƐƚŽƚĞƌŵƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?dŚĞƐƚĂŶĐĞĐƵŵƵůĂƚŝǀĞůǇĂĚŽƉƚĞĚŝŶKƉƉĞŶ ?Ɛ ‘KĨ
ĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ?ƐŚŽǁƐĂǀŽŝĐĞĂĐƚŝǀĞůǇĚĞĂůŝŶŐŶot only with language but with the ethical 
implications constitutive of being a language-using subject. Gander takes this sense of 
KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐŽƉĞŶŶĞƐƐƚŽƌĞůĂƚĞŚŝŵƚŽDĞƌůĞĂƵ-Ponty: 
KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐǁŽƌĚƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŽĞŵĞƌŐĞĨƌŽŵĂƐƚĂŶĐĞƚŚĂƚĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƐ
perception as a product of a participatory relationship with the world, a 
relationship that closely aligns his poetics with the phenomenology of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty.       (Gander, n.p) 
dŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ ‘ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐƉĞƌǀĂƐŝǀĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ŶŽƚŽŶůǇŝŶ his frequent 
quotation of friends and philosophers but also in his wider poetic ambitioŶƚŽ “ĨŝŶĚĂǁŽƌĚ
for ourselves ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). Merleau-WŽŶƚǇ ?ƐƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇĞŶǀŝƐĂŐĞƐ “ĂƌĞƚƵƌŶƚŽƚŚĞ
ƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?ǁŚĞƌĞŝŶƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚŝƐŝŶ ?ĐŽŶƚĂĐƚǁŝƚh the language [he is] speaking ?
(1964, 85). dŚŝƐ ‘ĐŽŶƚĂĐƚ ?ŝƐŚĞůĚĂƐďĞŝŶŐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĨƌŽŵ “ƚŚĞƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌ ?ǁŚŽ ?
see language in the past. They consider the long history of a language, with all the random 
factors and all the shifts of meaning that havĞĨŝŶĂůůǇŵĂĚĞŝƚǁŚĂƚŝƚŝƐƚŽĚĂǇ ? ?Ibid.). For 
Merleau-WŽŶƚǇ ?ƚŚŝƐůŽŐŝĐŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůǇĂƌƌŝǀĞƐĂƚĂŶŝŵƉĂƐƐĞ P“/ƚďĞĐŽŵĞƐŝŶĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝďůĞƚŚĂƚ
a language which is the result of so many accidents can signify anything whatsoever 
ƵŶĞƋƵŝǀŽĐĂůůǇ ?(Ibid., 85). HŝƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ?ĂƐĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚŝŶ ‘/ŶĚŝƌĞĐƚ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞĂŶĚdŚĞsŽŝĐĞƐŽĨ
^ŝůĞŶĐĞ ? ?ŝƐƚŽĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞŽĨůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ “ŵŽƌĞůŝŬĞĂƐŽƌƚ ĨďĞŝŶŐƚŚĂŶĂŵĞĂŶƐ ? ?Ibid., 43) in 




ƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚĨŽƌƚŚĞƉĂŝŶƚĞƌĂŶĚǁŽƌĚƐĨŽƌƚŚĞƉŽĞƚ ? ?Ibid. 52). Merleau-Ponty concludes, 
ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐŽĨƐƉĞĞĐŚ ?ůŝŬĞƚŚŽƐĞŽĨƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƚŚĞ
ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐ ) ?ĂůǁĂǇƐĞǆĐĞĞĚŝƚƐƉƌĞŵŝƐĞƐ ? ?Ibid., 91), and acknowledges the extent 
ƚŽǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞƚƵƌŶƚŽƚŚĞƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?ǁŝll always be exceeded by the plenum which 
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?Ɛ ‘ĐŽŶƚĂĐƚ ?ǁŝƚŚŝƚ ? 
   In a similar manner to Merleau-WŽŶƚǇ ?ƐĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽ ‘ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞ ?ŝŶĂŶĚǁŝƚŚůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?
KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨďĞŝŶŐĂůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ-using subject is to adopt a stance 
ŽĨ ‘ĐƵƌŝŽƐŝƚǇ ? ?dŚĞĐůŽƐŝŶŐŐĞƐƚƵƌĞŽĨ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ?ƚĂŬĞƐƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨĂƉĂƐƐĂŐĞĨƌŽŵ
tĂůƚtŚŝƚŵĂŶ ?ƐŵĞƌŝĐĂŶŝǀŝůtĂƌĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶĐĞĞŶĚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ĐƵƌŝŽƵƐ Q ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
Oppen isolates from the main body of the section with a line-break (Oppen 2003, 188). Zack 
&ŝŶĐŚĂƌŐƵĞƐĨƌŽŵƚŚŝƐƚŚĂƚKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞŝƐ “Ăperceptual poetic practice of being 
curious ? ?&ŝŶĐŚ ?ŶƉ ). dŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƉŽĞƚŝĐĂŶĚ ‘ĐƵƌŝŽƐŝƚǇ ?ŝƐĞǆƉůŽƌĞĚďǇ>ǇŶ
Hejinian, who writes in The Language Of Inquiry: 
The term curious, ũƵƐƚĂƐŝƚŶĂŵĞƐďŽƚŚĂƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? “ŵĂƌŬĞĚďǇ
ĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞĂŶĚůĞĂƌŶ ?ŽƌďǇ “ŝŶƋƵŝƐŝƚŝǀĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ? ?
ŶŽƐŝŶĞƐƐ )ĂŶĚĂĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƐŽŵĞŽďũĞĐƚ ? “ĞǆĐŝƚŝŶŐĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĂƐƐƚƌĂŶŐĞ ?ŶŽǀĞů
or ƵŶĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ ? ) ?ŝƚĂůƐŽŶĂŵĞƐĂŶŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶĐƵƌŝŽƵƐƐƵďũĞĐƚĂŶĚ
curious object, an interaction within the terms of curiosity. (Hejinian 2000, 
350-1) 
dŚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶŝƐŽĨƚĞŶƚŚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶǁĞĨŝŶĚKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐǀŽŝĐĞŝŶ PĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƚŚŝŶŐƐ
of his immediate perception in their particularity ? which is to say, as curiosities. Hejinian 
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĐƵƌŝŽƐŝƚǇ ?ŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐĂƌĞĐĞƉƚŝǀŝƚǇďĞƚǁĞĞŶƐƵďũĞĐƚĂŶĚŽďũĞĐƚ ?ƐŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ
ƌĞĐŝƉƌŽĐĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶŝŶ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?ƐBeing and Time: 
The basic state of sight shows itself in a peculiar tendency-of-Being which 
belongs to everydayness- ƚŚĞƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ‘ƐĞĞŝŶŐ ? ?tĞĚĞƐŝŐŶĂƚĞƚŚŝƐ
ƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇďǇƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ƵƌŝŽƐŝƚǇ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐĂůůǇŝƐŶŽƚĐŽŶĨŝŶĞĚƚŽ
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seeing, but expressed the tendency towards a peculiar way of letting the 
world be encountered by us in perception. (1962, 214) 
dŚĞĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞƐǁŚŝĐŚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƉŽĞŵƐĐĂŶ
ĂƌŐƵĂďůǇďĞƌĞĂĚĂƐŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐŽĨ “ůĞƚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚďĞĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĞĚďǇƵƐ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞŝŶ ‘ƚŚĞ
ƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƐĞĞŝŶŐ ?ŝƐĂŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨŚƵŵĂŶĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?KƉƉĞŶ ?Ɛ ‘ĐƵƌŝŽƵƐ ?
ƉůĂĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌĚŝƚƐĞůĨĂƚƚŚĞǀĞƌǇĞŶĚŽĨ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ?ĐůŽƐĞƐƚŚĞƉŽĞŵǁŝƚŚĂ
ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŐĞƐƚƵƌĞŽĨŽƉĞŶŝŶŐ ?ĂƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ?dŚĞ ‘ĐƵƌŝŽƵƐ ?ǁŽƌld Heidegger invokes is 
a place of constant revelation: 
Curiosity is everywhere and nowhere. This mode of Being-in-the-world reveals 
a new kind of Being of everyday Dasein ?  a kind in which Dasein is constantly 
uprooting itself. (Ibid., 217) 
Everyday curiousness is not dependent on specific sites of meaning ?  rather, it is the 
 ‘ĞǀĞƌǇǁŚĞƌĞĂŶĚŶŽǁŚĞƌĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ǁŽƌůĚ ? ?dŚĞ ‘ĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚƵƉƌŽŽƚŝŶŐ ?ŽĨĐƵƌŝŽƐŝƚǇŝƐĞǀŽĐĂƚŝǀĞŽĨ
the necessary contingency with which human subjectivity encounters its perceptions, which 
is to say, Heideggerian curiosity is a matter of tracing and retracing meaning and its flux 
rather than grasping as static any one perception as indicative of determinate form. For 
KƉƉĞŶ ? ‘ĐƵƌŝŽƐŝƚǇ ?ŝƐĂĨŝŐƵƌĞĨŽƌŵĂŶ ?ƐĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚ ŚŝƐǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐKƉƉĞn comments in an 
ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚ> ?^ĞŵďŽ ? “Men are curious, and at the end of a very long poem, I couldn't 
find anything more positive to say than that" (1989, 186). This might at first appear a 
pessimistic response; however, curiosity establishes a reciprocal relationship between 
subject and object, and is an ethical gesture, particularly in the existential situation of 
numerousness. Curiosity for Oppen is a means of witnessing which foremost involves an 
openness towards things encountered. This is distinct from a mode of witnessing which 
might seek to make perceptions cohere in a recognisable form of order. This conception of 
KƉƉĞŶ ?Ɛ ‘ĐƵƌŝŽƵƐ ?ƐƚĂŶĐĞǁŝůůďĞĐŽŵĞĂƌĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚĨŝŐƵƌĞŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?Ɛ
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indicated at the outset, I will now turn to reading Oppen in three ways: first, it is necessary to 
ĨƌĂŵĞĐƵƌŝŽƐŝƚǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐŽĨKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐŝŐŚƚ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ
ŚŝƐŝĚĞĂŽĨ ‘ĂĐƚƵĂůŶĞƐƐ ? ?^ĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ?ƚŚĞĨŽĐƵƐǁŝůůƐŚŝĨƚ ƚŽƚŚĞƐĞƌŝĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐŽĨOf Being 
Numerous, ǁŝƚŚĂǀŝĞǁƚŽĞǆƉůŝĐĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐĞƌŝĂůŝƚǇǁŽƌŬƐĂƐĂŶĂŶĂůŽŐƵĞ
ĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƌĞǀĂŝůŝŶŐĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?&ŝŶĂůůǇ ?KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐĐŽŵƉůĞǆĚŝĂůŽŐƵĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
numerousness and singularity will be considered, with particular reference to language the 
ƉƌŽďůĞŵŽĨ “ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐĂǁŽƌĚĨŽƌŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). 
 
 
The thing seen each day:  Seeing 
^ĞĞŝŶŐŝƐKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐŵĞĂŶƐŽĨ ‘ĐŽŵŝŶŐƚŽƚĞƌŵƐ ?ǁŝƚŚƌĞĂůŝƚǇ. He writes in his essay on 
subjectivity in poetry ?   ‘dŚĞDŝŶĚ ?ƐKǁŶWůĂĐĞ ? ? ƚŚĂƚ “The image is encountered, not found; 
ŝƚŝƐĂŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĞƚ ?ƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞĂĐƚŽĨ ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƚŝƐĂƚĞƐƚŽĨƐŝŶĐĞƌŝƚǇ ?ĂƚĞƐƚ
of conviction, the rare poetic quality of truthfulness ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). For Oppen, seeing is not a 
passive act; we are by necessity curious witnesses. The poem is constitutive of the encounter 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉŽĞƚĂŶĚƚŚŝŶŐ ?dŚĞŽƉĞŶŝŶŐŽĨƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŽĨ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ? ?ďǇǁĂǇŽĨ
undisclosed quotation, attests to this idea: 
 ‘/ŶƚŚĞƐĞĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶƐŝƚŝƐƉƌĞƐƵŵĞĚƚŚĂƚĂŶĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐŝŶŐ 
subject is one occasion of a sensitive reaction to an actual 
ǁŽƌůĚ ? ?      (2003, 169) 
dŚĞŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇKƉƉĞŶŐĞƐƚƵƌĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐŚĞƌĞĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐŝŶŐƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?ĂƐĂŶ
 ‘ŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶ ? ?ĂĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚĂŐĂŝŶƵŶĚĞƌƐĐŽƌĞƐƚŚĞ ƐĞŶƐĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝǀĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ
is, for Oppen, a matter of curious encountering. This is a profoundly phenomenological 
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articulation of vision and sight, and can be clarified with reference to Maurice Merleau-
WŽŶƚǇ ?Ɛcommitment to a similar conception of seeing:  
We see the things themselves, the world is what we see: formulae of this kind 
express a faith common to the natural man and the philosopher ? the 
ŵŽŵĞŶƚŚĞŽƉĞŶƐŚŝƐĞǇĞƐ ? ? Q ?tŚĂƚŝƐƐƚƌĂŶŐĞĂďŽƵƚƚŚŝƐĨĂŝƚŚŝƐƚŚĂƚŝĨǁĞ
seek to articulate it into theses or statements, if we ask ourselves what is this 
we, what seeing is, and what thing or world is, we enter into a labyrinth of 
difficulties and contradictions.     
          (1968, 1) 
Here, Merleau-Ponty expresses what is for him a fundamental aspect of phenomenology; 
that seeing is an ĂĐƚŽĨƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶǁĞŚĂǀĞ ‘ĨĂŝƚŚ ?ŝŶ ?ďƵƚƌĂƌĞůǇĂƌĞ ďůĞƚŽĞǆƉůŝĐĂƚĞ ?
Furthermore, the questions Merleau-Ponty poses ?  tŚĂƚŝƐ ‘ƚŚŝŶŐ ? ? ‘ǁŽƌůĚ ?Žƌ ‘ǁĞ ? ?tŚĂƚŝƐ
seeing? ?  ĂƌĞĂůůƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐǁŚŝĐŚĐŝƌĐƵůĂƚĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚKƉƉĞŶ ?Ɛ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ? ?ŽƚŚ
Oppen and Merleau-WŽŶƚǇĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŵŵĂŶĞŶƚĨŽƌŵƐŽĨĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?KƉƉĞŶ ?Ɛ
ĚĞƐŝƌĞĨŽƌĂƉŽĞƚŝĐƐŽĨ ‘ĂĐƚƵĂůŶĞƐƐ ?ŚĂƐŵƵĐŚƚŽĚŽǁŝƚŚƐĞĞŬŝŶŐƚŽĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŝƚƐĞůĨ
rather than formally arranged perceptions. Merleau-Ponty expands on this sense of 
ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚƵĂůĨĂŝƚŚ ?ŝŶǀŽŬŝŶŐKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐĨŝŐƵƌĞŽĨ ‘ĂĐƚƵĂůŶĞƐƐ ? P 
If I see an ashtray ŝŶƚŚĞĨƵůůƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ ‘ƐĞĞ ?, then there must be an 
ashtray over there, and I cannot repress this affirmation. To see is to see 
something. To see red is to see an actually existing red. 
       (2012,  ? ? ? ?ƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐ ) 
dŚĞĂĨĨŝƌŵĂƚŝǀĞƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĂĐƚƵĂů ?ŝƐĂƉƌĞ-ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐďĞŝŶŐ
ĞŵďĞĚĚĞĚŝŶĂǁŽƌůĚ ?dŚĂƚŽďũĞĐƚƐĂƌĞƚĂĐƚŝůĞĂŶĚŽƵƌƐĞŶƐĞƐĂƌĞƚƌŝŐŐĞƌĞĚŝƐĂŶ ‘ĂĐƚƵĂů ?
ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ‘ĐƚƵĂůŶĞƐƐ ?ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŝŵƉůǇ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĂƚŽŶĞ ?ƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĂůŝƐƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌ
it is a more immediate sense of being among things. Hoffman writes: "Oppen's truths are 
necessarily provisional and might at any time be rejected or re-envisioned" (2008, np). That is 
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ƚŽƐĂǇ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚƚŚĞƉŽĞƚŝĐĨŽƌŵŽĨ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ?ĞǀŽŬĞƐƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŝƚƐ
processes of serial organisation, the perceptions disclosed in the individual sections are 
ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂƐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐŽĨKƉƉĞŶ ?Ɛ ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂƐŝůůƵƐŽƌǇĂŶĚĐŽntradictory evidence 
ŽĨĂŶƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇ ‘ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶĂů ?ǁŽƌůĚ ?Oppen presents a return to seeing as the inaugural 
gesture of the poetics with which he was involved: 
Modern American Poetry begins with the determination to find the image, the 
thing encountered, the thing seen each day whose meaning has become the 
meaning and colour of our lives. Verse, which had become a rhetoric of 
exaggeration, of inflation, was to the modernists a skill of accuracy, of 
precision, a test of truth.     (2007, 30) 
KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƐƐŵent here of the context in and from which he was writing is useful in moving 
towards a clearer understanding of the relationship between seeing and the other major 
ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐŽĨKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƐĞƌŝĂůƉŽĞŵƐ ? KŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĐƵƌƌŝŶŐŵŽƚŝĨƐŽĨ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ?ŝƐƚŚĞ
ƉƌĞǀĂŝůŝŶŐƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞƚŚŝŶŐƐĞĞŶĞĂĐŚĚĂǇ ?ŽƌǁŚĂƚKƉƉĞŶƚĞƌŵƐ “dŚĂƚǁŚŝĐŚŽŶĞ
cannot/ Not see ? ? ? ? ? ). In section 36 of the poem, he writes: 
Tho the world 
Is the obvious, the seen 
And unforeseeable, 
That which one cannot 
Not see 
Which the first eyes 
Saw ?  
For us 
Also each 
Man or woman 
Near is knowledge   (2003, 185) 
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The closing line here gestures at a phenomenologically-oriented epistemology: that is, that 
 ‘ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?ŝƐĂŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨƉƌŽǆŝŵŝƚǇƚŽ ‘ƚŚĞŽďǀŝŽƵƐ ? ?dŚŝƐ ‘ŽďǀŝŽƵƐ ?ŝƐĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞ
ƐĞĞŶ ?ĂŶĚƵŶĨŽƌĞƐĞĞĂďůĞ ? ?ƚŚĂƚǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĂĐƚƵĂůĂŶĚĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚĂůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞƚŚĂƚǁŚŝĐŚŝƐ
ŝŶĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĂďůĞ ? ‘KďǀŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ?ŝƐĂŬŝŶƚŽ ‘ĂĐƚƵĂůŶĞƐƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĂƚŝƚŵĂŬĞƐƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇĂǁŝƚŶĞƐƐ
ĨĂĐĞĚǁŝƚŚ “ƚŚĂƚǁŚŝĐŚŽŶĞĐĂŶŶŽƚ ?ŶŽƚƐĞĞ ? ?KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐǁƌŝƚĞƐŝŶ ‘^ƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚKŶWŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?ƚŚĂƚ
the  “ŝŵage is the moment of conviction ? ?KƉƉĞŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). ^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ?ŝŶ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ? ?
ŚĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐ “ ?ƚ ?ŚĞĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇŽĨĨĂĐƚ ?ĂƐ “ĂƉĂƌoxysm of emotion/ Now as always ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
166). dŽƚŚŝŶŬŽĨKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂůǁŽƌůd as paroxysms ?  bursts of 
meaning ?  adds to the sense in which they are themselves only contingent. This is an 
ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĂƚĐĂƉƚƵƌŝŶŐ “ƚŚĞŵŽŵĞŶƚŽĨĐŽŶǀŝĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚŝƐĂƉƉĞĂƌƐŝŶKƉƉĞŶ ?
ƉŽĞŵ ‘dŚĞ,ŝůůƐ ? P
That this is I, 
not mine, which wakes 
To where the present 
Sun pours in the present, to the air perhaps 
Of love and of conviction.      (2003, 75) 
dŚĞ ‘ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ? ?Ɛ ?ƵŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ƉŽƵƌƐŝŶƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ?ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐĂƐĂĨŝŐƵƌĞŽĨĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŝĐĂŶĚůŝƚĞƌĂů
ŝůůƵŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘/ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŵŝŶĞ ?ůŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞŽǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ
implied in the latter; Oppen figures subjectivity here as curiously witnessing the world, rather 
ƚŚĂŶĂƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ŵŽŵĞŶƚŽĨĐŽŶǀŝĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƚƐĞůĨ ?^ŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƚŚĂƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŽƉĞŶƐƚŚĞ
stanza is not a preparation fŽƌĂŶĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌĂŶĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƚŚŝƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
ĨŽůůŽǁƐŝƚ ?ĂŐĂŝŶ ?ƚŚĞƐĞĂƌĞƚŚĞ “dŚĞƐŵĂůůŶŽƵŶƐ ?ƌǇŝŶŐĨĂŝƚŚ ?ŽĨ ‘WƐĂůŵ ? ? “dŚĞǇǁŚŽĂƌĞ
ƚŚĞƌĞ ? ? “dŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƚŚĞƌĞ ? ? ?Ibid. 99)). Although these small nouns are deictic and 
ambiguous, their use is in disclosing things ?ŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨ ‘dŚĞ,ŝůůƐ ?ƚŚĞ ‘/ ? ?ŝŶ ‘WƐĂůŵ ?ƚŚĞ
deer ?  without interfering with their presentation in the poem. Furthermore, the 
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ŚŽŵŽƉŚŽŶŝĐ ‘/ ? ?ĞǇĞ )ƵŶĚĞƌƐĐŽƌĞƐƚŚĞǀŝƐƵĂůĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ? ?ƚŚŝƐŝƐŵĞĂŶŝŶŐǁŚŝĐŚŝƐ
 “ĂŶŝŶƐƚĂŶƚŝŶƚŚĞĞǇĞ ? ?KƉƉĞŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). 
  KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƉŽĞƚƌǇŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŶŐĂŶĚŽƉĞŶŝŶŐĂƐŝƚĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚŝŶŐƐĐĂŶ
be disclosed, in which seeing can occur in the poem. Heller relates this ambition to the 
ŽƉĞŶŶĞƐƐŽĨKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƉŽĞƚƌǇ P 
Seeing precedes verbalization and therefore offers an opportunity for an open 
response to the world. This opportunity is, of course, hedged round with all 
ŽŶĞ ?ƐĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĞĚƌĞĨůĞǆĞƐ ?ƚŚĞŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŽĨǁŚŝĐŚƚŚe poet must work through 
ƚŽĂƌƌŝǀĞĂƚĂƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĂů ?/ƚŝƐŝŶƚŚŝƐ ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ?ƚŚĂƚKƉƉĞŶ ?Ɛ
poetics, though concerned with ambiguity and paradox, strive for clarity that 
is both immediate and complex.   (Heller 2004, 79) 
dŚĞƉŚƌĂƐĞ ‘ĐŽŵŝŶŐƚŽƚĞƌŵƐ ?ŝƐŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůůǇƉŽůǇƐĞŵŝĐ PŝƚŝƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?ĞƐ )ŽĨ
seeing that Oppen finds the materials of his poetry. It is, however, also the case that the 
visual is the way of coming to poetic and philosophical terms. Many of the figures Oppen 
uses to elaborate sight establish an intrinsic link between philosophical language and the 
ƚĂǆŽŶŽŵǇŽĨƐĞĞŝŶŐ ?/ŶĂĚŽƉƚŝŶŐƐƵĐŚƚĞƌŵƐĂƐ ‘ǀŝƐŝŽŶ ? ? ‘ĐůĂƌŝƚǇ ? ? ‘ƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ǁŝƚŶĞƐƐ ?
(Oppen 2003, 163-188), the act of seeing is itself given philosophical grounding based on the 
fact that it is a primary point of contact with the world. The existential situation of being-as-
ǁŝƚŶĞƐƐŽĐĐƵƌƐǁŚĞŶ “ƚŚĞŬŶŽǁŶĂŶĚƵŶŬŶŽǁŶ ? ? ?ƚ ?ŽƵĐŚ ? ?Ibid., 182- ? )ŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ŝŵĂŐĞĂƐƚŚĞ
ŵŽŵĞŶƚŽĨĐŽŶǀŝĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?dŚŝƐŵŽŵĞŶƚŽĨĐŽŶƚĂĐƚďĞƚǁĞĞn known and unknown makes 
witnessing an ethical event ?  by bearing witness, one carries the conviction of actualness. A 
further complication of this to which I will now turn is the fact that consciousness, in 
phenomenology and for Oppen, is always held in relation to other subjects, whose sense of 




An unmanageable pantheon: Numerousness and Seriality 
KŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚĂŶĚƉƌĞƐƐŝŶŐŵŽƚŝĨƐŝŶ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ?ŝƐƚŚĂƚǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƚŝƚůĞ
announces: Numerousness. The title itself ?  ĂŶĚŝƚƐĐƵƌŝŽƵƐƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ ‘KĨ ? ? is 
ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝǀĞŽĨƚŚĞůĂƌŐĞƌĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?/ŶKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐNew Collected Poems there are at 
ůĞĂƐƚ ? ? ?ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐŝŶ ? ? ?ƉĂŐĞƐŽĨůŝŶĞƐŝŶƉŽĞŵƐǁŚŝĐŚďĞŐŝŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ ‘ŽĨ ? ? ? ?Žf which 
ĂƉƉĞĂƌŝŶƚŚĞ ? ?ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ? ?dŚŝƐƌĂŝƐĞƐƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?  what is the 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĂƉƉĞĂůŽĨ ‘ŽĨ ?ƚŽKƉƉĞŶ ?dŚĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶĨ ‘ŽĨ ?ŝƐ P  “Ğxpressing the relationship 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂƉĂƌƚĂŶĚĂǁŚŽůĞ ? ?OED). From the initial opening gesture of the title onwards, the 
ǁŽƌĚŚŽůĚƐĂƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞĚƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞŬŶŝƚŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ƐĨŽƌŵ PƚŚĞƐĐĂƚƚĞƌĞĚ ‘ƌĞĨƌĂŝŶ ?ŽĨ ‘ŽĨ ?
throughout codes the poem with a greater sense of the interrelations between the individual 
sections rather than merely their numeric ordering. In this sense, the relation between the 
ƉĂƌƚƐĂŶĚƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞŽĨ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ?ŐĞƐƚƵƌĞƐĂƚ ƚŚĞĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƐƵďũĞĐƚĂŶĚ
ǁŽƌůĚ ?dŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?KƉƉĞŶǁƌŝƚĞƐ ‘ŽĨĂŶŝŶĨŝŶŝƚĞƐĞƌŝĞƐ ? ? ‘ŽĨƚŚĞŵŝŶĞƌĂůĨĂĐƚ ? ? ‘ŽĨƚŚĞ
ƐŝŶŐƵůĂƌ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŽĨ ĚĂǇƐ ? ?dŚĞĂĐĐƵŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐĨŝŐƵƌĞĂĚĚƐƚŽƚŚĞƐŶƐĞŽĨĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶĐǇƚŚĞ
ƐĞƌŝĂůĨŽƌŵĂŶĚƚŚĞĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶ ‘ƐĞĞŝŶŐ ?ĐƌĞĂƚĞ ?ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞĂůǁĂǇƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐ ‘ŽĨ ?
something, and this of-ness constitutes a primordial contact between the experience of the 
ƚŚŝŶŐĂŶĚƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚŝƚŝƐ ‘ŽĨ ? ?dŚŝƐ ‘ƐŵĂůůǁŽƌĚ ?ŝƐĂŶŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƚŝĐŵĞĂŶƐŽĨĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶĨŽƌ
Oppen; not only does it often begin lines, spurring his articulations of perception, but it also 
ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶƐĂƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶǁŚĞƌĞŝŶ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ?ŝƐĂƐŝƚĞŽĨŽf-ness, an open encounter in 
which final conclusions ?  ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐǁŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ?ŽĨďĞŝŶŐŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ?ŵŝŐŚƚďĞ ?  are 
ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽ ‘ŽĨ-ŶĞƐƐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇ ?ƚŚĞŝƌŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶŽƚŚĞƌ
ŽďũĞĐƚƐŽĨĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐǁŚŝĐŚĨŽƌŵƚŚĞ ‘ƉĂƌƚƐ ?ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ‘ǁŚŽůĞ ? ? 
  The title establishes the poem as an open investigation, taking into consideration 
ŵƵůƚŝƉůĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƐ ‘ŽĨďĞŝŶŐŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ? ?ǇůĞĂǀŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĂƚƚĞƌ ‘ŽĨďĞŝŶŐŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ?
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open to a variety of referents Oppen establishes at the outset the kind of open serial 
ƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞǁŝƚŚǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƉŽĞŵƉƌŽĐĞĞĚƐ ?ZĂĐŚĞůůĂƵƵWůĞƐƐŝƐǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “^ĞƌŝĂůŝƚǇ ?Ɛ
vectored, oblique argument and modular construction [is] the central mode of modern, late 
modern and contemporary practice ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŶƉ ). This modulation will become an important 
trope in what follows in suggesting how hermeneutics cannot fully take place without the 
interpenetrative perspective of intersubjectivity. It is in this sense that I mean to argue that 
seriality is an analogue for intersubjectivity.  
  /ŶĂŶŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞƐĞŶƐĞ ?ƐĞƌŝĂůŝƚǇĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞƐŽƵƌƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ƐĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ ?
KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƌŝŐŽƌŽƵƐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐŽĨŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐŝƚƐĞůĨĞǆƚĞŶĚƐƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ PƚŚĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ
and ideas grow, the more  “detours and cul-de-ƐĂĐƐ ? ? Q ?ŚĞƐŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƌĞǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƐ ? ?,ĞůůĞƌ
2004, 1) are embarked upon. As Joseph Conte writes:   
The series is an ongoing process of accumulation. In contrast to the epic 
demand for completion, the series remains essentially and deliberately 
incomplete. (1992, 39) 
The lack of completion is a subversion of epic narrativity, the desire for coherence. But 
coherence and clarity are not the same thing: an ambiguous object of perception can be 
ĐůĞĂƌůǇƐĞĞŶďƵƚŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚŽƌĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ ?/ƚŝƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽƚƵƌŶƚŽKƉƉĞŶ ?Ɛ
earlier work Discrete Series in order to outline his own conception of the meaning of seriality. 
/ŶĂ ? ? ? ?ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ?KƉƉĞŶƐƉĞĂŬƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚĞƐ ƌŝĞƐ ? P 
A pure mathematical series would be one in which each term is derived from 
the preceding term by a rule. A discrete series is a series of terms each of 
which his empirically derived, each one of which is empirically true. (Dembo 
132) 
dŚĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶŵĂĚĞŚĞƌĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂ ‘ƉƵƌĞŵĂƚŚĞŵĂƚŝĐĂůƐĞƌŝĞƐ ?ĂŶĚĂ ‘ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚĞƐĞƌŝĞƐ ?ŝƐ
significant in that it underscoƌĞƐƚŚĞ ‘ĞŵƉŝƌŝĐŝƐŵ ?ƵƉŽŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌŝƐďĂƐĞĚ ?dŚŝƐ
empiricism distinguishes seriality as a process which does not proceed according to a rule, 
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but instead involves a direct encounter with each of the terms in the series. As such, to 
describe a poem as serial is not merely a formal measure, but also announces a concern with 
a phenomenologically-ŽƌŝĞŶƚĞĚŵŽĚĞŽĨƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?/ŶKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ƚŚŝƐĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽĐƌĞĂƚĞĂ
ƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨƚĞƌŵƐĞĂĐŚŽĨǁŚŝĐŚŝƐ ‘ĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůůǇĚĞƌŝǀĞĚ ?ŝƐŵĂĚĞŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚŝŶƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚhis 
poetry is overwhelmingly concerned with encounters between the poetic voice and specific 
objects and events. The temporal implications of seriality are therefore that the individual 
terms in the series stand in relation to the other without hierarchy. Narrative is eschewed in 
ĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨǁŚĂƚŽŶƚĞĐĂůůƐ ‘ŵŽĚƵůĂƌĨŽƌŵ ? ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƌĞĐƵƌƌŝŶŐŵŽƚŝĨƐ ?ƚŚĞŵĞƐĂŶĚƚĂǆŽŶŽŵǇ
ŚŽůĚƚŚĞǁŽƌŬƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌĂĐƌŽƐƐŝƚƐƉĂƌƚƐ ?ƐŽŶƚĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “dŚĞƐĞƌŝĞƐƌĞƐŝƐƚƐĂƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƚŝĐŽƌ
determinate ordering of its materials, preferring constant change and even accident, a 
protean shape and an aleatory method ? ? ? ? ). This has the effect of making the individual 
terms in the series equivocal to each other rather than held in a more conventional 
chronological linearity. As such, early in ŝƐĐƌĞƚĞ^ĞƌŝĞƐ ?KƉƉĞŶǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “&ƌŽŵƚŚŝƐĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ
ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐƚŽǁĂƌĚǇŽƵ ? ?ƚŝŵĞŝƐƌĞĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ? ?KƉƉĞŶ ? ? ? ? ?   ). dŚĞ ‘ƌĞĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?ŝŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ
ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐƚŚĞǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ ‘ĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶƚŚŝŶŬŝŐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?^ƉĂƚŝĂůůǇĂŶĚ
ƚĞŵƉŽƌĂůůǇ ? ‘ƌĞĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?ŝƐĂŵŽǀĞment away. For Oppen, the distance between the perceiving 
subject and an object of perception is of vital importance in that these distances themselves 
can be said to shape or contour the encounter.   
  Temporal distance, however, is not necessarily a problem of memory. Later in the 
same section of Discrete Series, Oppen writes of the shared temporalities the subject 
necessarily finds itself ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶ P “dŚĞƉƵůƐĞĐƵŵƵůĂƚĞƐĂƉĂƐƚ ? and your pulse separate 
doubly ? ?KƉƉĞŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). The separation in question here might be taken to mean that the 




a bracketing of so-called Objective time. This is not the only instance within the poem of 
Oppen offering a conception of temporality. In the following section, he writes: 
People everywhere, time and the work 
 pauseless: 
one moves between reading and re-reading, 
The shape is a moment.      (Oppen 2003, 25) 
KƉƉĞŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐƚŚĞƉůĞŶƵŵŽĨ ‘ƉĂƵƐĞůĞƐƐ ?ǁŽƌŬĂƐĂŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚďĞƚǁĞĞŶƌĞĂĚŝŶŐĂŶĚƌĞ-
reading, and despite the feeling that these lines might refer to a busy metropolis, they also 
appear to evoke the subjectivity of temporality. This is to say, if time is viewed as a pauseless 
series of moments, and these moments themselves involve a process of constant re-reading, 
ƚŚĞŶƚŝŵĞŝƐ ‘ƐĞƌŝĂů ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞŽĨŝƚƐƉĂƌƚƐŝƐŶŽƚ
immediately clear. 
   Again, OƉƉĞŶĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶƚŽĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞƚŚŝƐŝŶ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ? ‘ƚŚƌƵ ?ŚŝƐĨŝŐƵƌĞŽĨ
ƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ “ƚŚĞŬŶŽǁŶĂŶĚƵŶŬŶŽǁŶ ? ?dŚŝƐKƉƉĞŶĂƚƚĞƐƚƐƚŽŝŶ^ĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŽĨŚŝƐ
ůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ ?ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŚŝƐĚĞƐŝƌĞĨŽƌ ‘ĐůĂƌŝƚǇ ? P
Clarity 
In the sense of transparence, 
/ĚŽŶ ?ƚŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚŵƵĐŚĐĂŶďĞĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ ? 
Clarity in the sense of silence.    (2003, 175) 
dŚĞƚŚŝƌĚůŝŶĞƐĞĞŵƐƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŚĞĂĐƚŽĨĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞĂƚŚĂŶĚ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ
 ‘ĐůĂƌŝƚǇ ?ĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶĐĞ ?ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐĂƉŽůǇƐĞŵic figure in which clearness and 
ŝŶǀŝƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĂƌĞĞŶƚǁŝŶĞĚ ?dŚŝƐĨŝŐƵƌĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚďĞŝŶŐĂďůĞƚŽƐĞĞ ‘ƚŚƌƵ ?ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŐŝǀĞƐ
ĐůĂƌŝƚǇ ?^ƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ ?ƚŚĞƐĞƌŝĂůĨŽƌŵŽĨKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƉŽĞŵĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶĂƐĂŶĂĐƚŽĨ
 ‘ĐůĂƌŝƚǇ ?ŝŶƚŚĂƚŝƚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐĂƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶǁŚĞƌĞŝŶ ?ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽŵĂŬĞĂ ‘ǁŚŽůĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƚĞǆƚ ?ƚŚĞ
ƌĞĂĚĞƌŵƵƐƚƌĞĂĚ ‘ƚŚƌƵ ?ĞĂĐŚƚĞƌŵŝŶƚŚĞƐĞƌŝĞƐ ?ŽŶƚĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐƚŚŝƐƐĞƌŝĂůĨŽƌŵĂƐ ‘ŵŽĚƵůĂƌ ? P
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[I]ndividual elements are both discontinuous and capable of recombination, 
distinguish[ing] it from the thematic development or narrative progression 
that characterises other types of the long poem. The series resists a 
systematic or determinate ordering of its materials, preferring constant 
change and even accident, a protean shape and an aleatory method. (Conte 
1992, 38) 
ZĞĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĐĐƵƌƐŝŶ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞĞŝŶŐŽĨĂƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐďƌŝĐŬ ?^ĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚ
21), the subway (Sections 17 and 20) or, perhaps most prominently, shipwreck (sections 6, 7, 
 ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ) ?KƉƉĞŶ ? ? ? ? ) ?dŚĞƉŽĞŵŝƐ ‘ƉƌŽƚĞĂŶ ?ŶŽƚŽnly in its procedures of disclosing 
ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽŝŶƚŚĞǁĂǇŝƚƐĨŽƌŵŚŽůĚƐƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ?KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞĂůůŽǁƐƚŚĞ
ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ?ƚŽŽĐĐƵƌƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶƚĂĐĐƌƵĂůĂƌŽƵŶĚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚĞƌŵƐ ?  
actualness, clarity, numerousness ?  each of which is disclosed discretely as the inquiry 
proceeds in series. It follows that historical narratives too, invested as they are in histrionic 
ƉƌĞĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚĐŽŶƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞƌĂǁĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶƚǀŝĐŝƐƐŝƚƵĚĞƐŽĨƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ?ĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞ ‘ƌĞĂĚǇĂƚ
ŚĂŶĚ ? ?/ƚŝƐŶŽƚĂĐĂƐĞŽĨĂƌŐƵŝŶŐŚŽǁƚŚĞŵǇƌŝĂĚŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐŽĨĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ‘Ĩŝƚ ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌ
disclosing them as they appear ?    ‘ĂƐ ?ŚĞƌĞŵĞĂŶƚďŽƚŚŝŶŝƚƐƚĞŵƉŽƌĂůĂŶĚƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝǀĞ
ƐĞŶƐĞƐ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚ ?ŽƉĞĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐƚŚĂƚKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ƌĞƐŝƐƚĞĚĚƌĂŵĂƚŝĐŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞĂƌĐƐĂƐ
much as it refused traditional modes of exposition and argumentation. He sought discrete 
moments of clarity, sincerity, epiphany and vision ?   ‘ůǇƌŝĐǀĂůƵĂďůĞƐ ? ? ?KƉƉĞŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ). 
  TŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŶĞƚŚŝĐĂůĐŚĂƌŐĞƚŽƚŚŝƐǁƌŝƚŝŶŐĂƐ ‘ůǇƌŝĐǀĂůƵĂďůĞƐ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐ
thesŝƐŽƌƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĚĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?,ĂŶŶĂŚƌĞŶĚƚ ?ƐThe Origins of Totalitarianism invokes the 
relationship between the form and content of didactic statements:  
Ideological thinking orders facts into an absolutely logical procedure which 
starts from an axiomatically accepted premise, deducing everything else from 
it. The deduction may proceed logically or dialectically; in either case, it 
involves a consistent process of argumentation which, because it thinks in 
terms of a process, is supposed to be able to comprehend the movement of 
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ƚŚĞƐƵƉƌĂŚƵŵĂŶ ?ŶĂƚƵƌĂůŽƌŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ? ? Q ?KŶĐĞŝƚŚĂƐĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚŝƚƐ
premise, its point of departure, experiences no longer interfere with 
ideological thinking, nor can it be taught by reality. (1985, 471)  
To write within terms which exclude one ?ƐďĞŝŶŐ “ƚĂƵŐŚƚďǇƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ?ŝƐĂŶĂĐƚŽĨĐůŽƐƵƌĞ ?
KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĨŽƌƚŚĞŚŽƌƌŽƌƐŽĨƚŽƚĂůŝƚĂƌŝĂŶŝƐŵƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ? W
 “dŚĞĂŝƌŽĨĂƚƌŽĐŝƚǇ ? Q ? ? ?ƉůƵŵĞŽĨƐŵŽŬĞ ?ǀŝƐŝďůĞĂƚĂ distance/ In which people burn ?
(2003, 173) ?  underscores the fact that his poem is engaged in the world not only in a 
phenomenological but also a profoundly ethical sense. Further than this, what I am 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐĂƐKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůǀŝƐŝŽŶŝƐŝƚƐĞůĨŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚůǇĞƚŚŝĐĂů ?ďǇǀŝƌƚƵĞŽf its 
desire to articulate the act of witnessing. ^ĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŽĨ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ? ?ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚ
ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐŽǁŶĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨǁĂƌ ?ĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞƐƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨĞƚŚŝĐĂů
 ‘ĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? P 
I cannot even now 
Altogether disengage myself 
From those men 
With whom I stood in emplacements, in mess tents, 
In hospitals and sheds and hid in the gullies 
Of blasted roads in a ruined country, 
Among them many men 
More capable than I ?      (2003, 171) 
dŚĞǀĞƌď ‘ĚŝƐĞŶŐĂŐĞ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶǀŽŬĞƐĂŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝĚŝŽŵ ?ŝƐƉŽŝŶƚĞĚ ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐŶŽƚŽŶůǇKƉƉĞŶ ?Ɛ
engagement with the world in a phenomenological sense but in the sense of combat against 
ĂŶĚĐĂŵĂƌĂĚĞƌŝĞǁŝƚŚŽƚŚĞƌƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐ ?/ƚǁŽƵůĚďĞǁƌŽŶŐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŽŝŶƐŝƐƚƚŚĂƚKƉƉĞŶ ?Ɛ
poetics is one purely of numerousness; it neceƐƐĂƌŝůǇĚǁĞůůƐŽŶŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ?ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚĞ ?
ƐŝŶŐƵůĂƌŝƚǇ ?KƉƉĞŶǁƌŝƚĞƐĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞŝŶ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ? P “tĞĂƌĞŶŽƚĐŽĞǀĂů ?tŝƚŚĂ
locality/ But we imagine others are,// We encounter them ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). As such, it is 
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ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇŶŽǁƚŽĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐĞǀŽĐĂƚŝons of intersubjectivity against his figures of 
singularity.  
 
Intersubjectivity & Singularity 
IŶKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĞƌŝĂůŝƚǇǁŽƌŬƐĂƐĂŶĂŶĂůŽŐƵĞĨŽƌŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?ďƵƚƚŚŝƐĚŽĞƐŶŽƚ
ƉƌĞĐůƵĚĞƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƐŝŶŐƵůĂƌŝƚǇ ?Žƌ ‘ƚŚĞĨŝŐƵƌĞŽĨ ƐŚŝƉǁƌĞĐŬ ? ?ŝƐĂƉressing concern 
throughout the work. WĞƚĞƌEŝĐŚŽůůƐĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞƐKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŝŶ
ĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŝĐƚĞƌŵƐ P “ŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐŝƐƚŚĞĐƌƵĐŝĂůĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶǇƐĞůĨ-ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?
(2007, 87). KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐŵĞĚŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞƐŝŶŐƵůĂƌŝŶ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ?ĂƌĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇŽĨƚĞŶŐŝǀĞǁĂǇƚŽƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶŐ ‘ƐŚŝƉǁƌĞĐŬĞĚ ? ?
ĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵƐŽĐŝĞƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞŝŵŵĂŶĞŶƚĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?Kƌ ?ƚŽƵƐĞKƉƉĞŶ ?Ɛ
ƉŚƌĂƐĞ P “dŚĞŝƐŽůĂƚĞĚŵĂŶŝƐĚĞĂĚ ?ŚŝƐǁŽƌůĚĂƌŽƵŶĚŚŝŵĞǆŚĂƵƐƚĞĚ ?ŶĚŚĞĨĂŝůƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
168) Nicholls continues:  
dŚĞ ‘ƐŚŝƉǁƌĞĐŬŽĨƚŚĞƐŝŶŐƵůĂƌ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨďĞŝŶŐŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ?ĂƌĞŶŽƚ
antithetical options, as might first be thought, but are rather mutually 
implicated possibilities.     (Nicholls 2007, 97-98) 
dŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ ‘ŵƵƚƵĂůŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĞǀŽŬĞƐƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞĂŶĂůŽŐƵĞŽĨKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƐĞƌŝĂůĨŽƌŵ ?
and furthermore underscores the sense in which the meaning of being numerous cannot be 
held merely as a dialectical opposition between self and other. Rather, numerousness is an 
ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚŝĂůĨĂĐƚ ?ũƵƐƚĂƐ ?ŝŶ ‘ƚŚĞĨŝŐƵƌĞŽĨƐŚŝƉǁƌĞĐŬ ? ?ƐŝŶŐƵůĂƌŝƚǇĐĂŶďĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚĂƐƐƵĐŚ ? 
  KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐŵŽƐƚƉƌĞǀĂůĞŶƚĨŝŐƵƌĞŽĨƐŝŶŐƵůĂƌŝƚǇŝŶ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ?ŝƐZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ
Crusoe ? P “ƌƵƐŽĞ ? ?tĞƐĂǇǁĂƐ ? ‘ZĞƐĐƵĞĚ ? ? ?^ŽǁĞŚĂǀĞĐŚŽƐĞŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). Crusoe 
represents the site of shipwreck, but also closure  W before having any empirical evidence of 
there being dangers on the island, Crusoe puts his literal guard up, establishing a private 
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ground and effectively colonising his ĂƌĞĂ ?ƌƵƐŽĞ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞthings he encounters also 
ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚƐĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚŝĂůƐŝŶŐƵůĂƌŝƚǇ ?dŚĞŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐĂƚƌƵƐŽĞ ?ƐĚŝƐƉŽƐĂůĂƌĞŵŽƐƚĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇƐĞĞŶ
ŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨŶĞŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨǁŚĂƚŚĞĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶǁŚĂƚŚĞĚŽĞƐ ?
Furthermore, the items he retrieves from the shipwreck itself he sees as gifts from God, 
immediately interposing a deliberate metaphysic between himself and the thing. It is in this 
sense that the reality Crusoe inhabits on the island is only superficially singular. By this I mean 
that, though he has ended up in a situation wherein he and things are not impeded by the 
intersubjectivity of societal existence, still Crusoe chooses the meaning of his singularity ?  it 
is to have been castaway by God, from the world. Oppen discloses thŝƐůŽŐŝĐĂƐĂŶ ‘ŽďƐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?
in the 7th section:  
Obsessed, bewildered 
By the shipwreck 
Of the singular 
We have chosen the meaning 
Of being numerous.     (2003, 166) 
One will be bewildered by the bind of singularity and numerousness if one seeks resolution, a 
ƐƚĂƚŝĐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨŽƵƌĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ? ‘KďƐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ďĞǁŝůĚĞƌŵĞŶƚ ?
ƐĞĞŵƚŽŚĂǀĞĞĐŚŽĞƐŝŶ ‘ĐƵƌŝŽƐŝƚǇ ? ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚĂĐƵƌŝŽƵƐŝŶƋƵŝƌǇ ?ŽƉĞŶƚŽƚŚĞǀŝĐŝƐƐŝƚƵĚĞƐ
of the phenomenal world, is still fraught with existential difficultiĞƐǁŚŝĐŚŵŝŐŚƚ ‘ŽďƐĞƐƐ ?Žƌ
 ‘ďĞǁŝůĚĞƌ ?ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨďĞŝŶŐŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐƌĞŵĂŝŶƐƵŶĐůĞĂƌŝŶƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ
in an explicitly stated sense ?  rather, this meaning is itself necessarily deferred, for to 
conclude would predetermine the individuals who together constitute numerousness. In a 
complimentary fashion, Merleau-Ponty writes of the meaning of being numerous in the 
ƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ “ƚĂŬŝŶŐƵƉŽĨƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŝŶŵǇŽǁŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) P 
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The phenomenological world is not pure being, but the sense which shows 
through at the intersection of my experiences, and at the intersection of my 
experiences and those of others, by their engaging each other like gears ?   
this world is therefore inseparable from the subjectivity and from the 
intersubjectivity which find their unity through the taking up of my past 
experiences in my present experiences.  (Ibid., 67) 
Merleau-WŽŶƚǇ ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚ ‘ŝŶƐĞƉĂƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ŽĨƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?ŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇĂŶĚǁŽƌůĚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞ
ŝŶƚĞƌƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŵǇĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ?ĞǀŽŬĞƐƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŽƵƌƉŚĞnomenal engagements 
occur en masse ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇĂƐ “ĂƉĂƌŽǆǇƐŵ ?ŝŶƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ (Oppen 2003, 166). 
KŶĞĐĂŶŶŽƚ ?ƚŽƵƐĞKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƉŚƌĂƐĞ ? “ĂůƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌĚŝƐĞŶŐĂŐĞ ?ƚŚĞƐĞƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƐĞůĨ ?ǁŽƌůĚ
and others; each reciprocally frames the conditions of the other. Furthermore, this notion of 
 “ƚĂŬŝŶŐƵƉ ?ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?ďŽƚŚƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĂŶĚŽĨƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ?ŶŽƚŽŶůǇƵŶĚĞƌƐĐŽƌĞƐƚŚĞƌŽůĞĂŐĞŶĐǇ
plays in the construction of meaning but also the ambiguity in which the experience of the 
other necessarily remains. This ambiguity is the major focus of ŵŵĂŶƵĞů>ĞǀŝŶĂƐ ?
phenomenology. His is perhaps the most explicitly concerned with being-with-others, with 
the ethical complexities of intersubjectivity. He writes: 
If the relationship with the other involves more than relationships with 
mystery, it is because one has accosted the other in everyday life where the 
solitude and fundamental alterity of the other are already veiled by decency. 
One is for the other what the other is for oneself; there is no exceptional place 
for the subject.    (Levinas 1999a, 89) 
dŚĞĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůƉůĂĐĞĨŽƌƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?ĞĐŚŽĞƐKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚ
ŐĞƐƚƵƌĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚƌƵĞƐŚŝƉǁƌĞĐŬ ?>ĞǀŝŶĂƐ ?ĞǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞďŝŶĚďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
 ‘ŽŶĞƐĞůĨ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌ ?ĂƐďĞŝŶŐďĂƐĞĚŽŶĂ ‘Ĩor-ŶĞƐƐ ?ƌĂŝƐĞƐƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨŚŽǁƚŚŝƐƌĞĐŝƉƌŽĐĂů




 ? Q ?tŚĂƚǁĞƐĞĞŝƐƚŚĞƌĞ 
Find a word for ourselves 
Or we will have nothing, neither faith nor will  (2003, 189) 
KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞ ‘ǁĞ-ŶĞƐƐ ?ŝƐƐƚĂƚĞĚŝŶĂďƐŽůƵƚĞƚĞƌŵƐ ? ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŝƚ ‘ǁĞǁŝůůŚĂǀĞ
ŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ ? ?dŚĞƉƌĞĐĞĚŝŶŐůŝŶĞŝƐĂƚŽŶĐĞĂƐƚƌĂŝŐŚƚĨŽƌǁĂƌĚƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ ‘ĂĐƚƵĂůŶĞƐƐ ?ĂŶĚĂŶ
insistence on the necessarily intersubjective nature of this actuĂůŶĞƐƐ ?ĞǀŽŬĞĚďǇKƉƉĞŶ ?Ɛ
there. To attempt to think and articulate  ‘tĞ-ŶĞƐƐ ?ŝƐŶŽƚ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂƵƚŽƉŝĂŶŶŽƚŝŽŶ ? it is 
ĂŶĞƚŚŝĐĂůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚŝĂůĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨďĞŝŶŐŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ?/ŶƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐ
EƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ? ?KƉƉĞŶǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
We are pressed, pressed on each other, 
We will be told at once 
Of anything that happens      (Ibid., 165) 
The use of the first person collective here is notably insistent. This is a tense passage, a sense 
ĞǀŽŬĞĚďǇƚŚĞƉƌĞƐƐŝŶŐƌĞƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨďŽƚŚ ‘tĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƉƌĞƐƐĞĚ ? ?ƚŚĞůatter verb seeming to at 
ŽŶĐĞĨĂůƚĞƌĂŶĚƌĞŝƚĞƌĂƚĞ ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĞƉŽůǇƐĞŵǇŽĨ  ‘ƉƌĞƐƐĞĚ ? ? in the sense of a literal 
closeness and an urgency, a need or demand to come to terms with ?  serves to underscore 
the constancy of this situation. In this regard, Levinas continues: 
The Other as Other is not only an alter ego: the Other is what I myself am not. 
The Other is this, not because of the Other's character, or physiognomy, or 
ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇ ?ďƵƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞKƚŚĞƌ ?ƐǀĞƌǇĂůƚĞƌŝƚǇ ? ? Q ?/ƚĐĂŶďĞƐĂŝĚƚŚĂƚ
intersubjective space is not symmetrical. The exteriority of the other is not 
simply due to the space that separates what remains identical through the 
concept, nor is it due to any difference the concept would manifest through 
spatial exteriority. The relationship with alterity is neither spatial nor 
conceptual.           
         (1999a, 89-90) 
 59 
 
tĞĂƌĞƉƌĞƐƐĞĚŽŶĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ?ďƵƚƚŚŝƐŝƐŶŽƚĂŵĞĞƚŝŶŐŽĨĞƋƵŝǀŽĐĂůĨŽƌĐĞƐ ?dŚĞ ‘ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?
between self and other is based on alterity, a total difference. For Levinas, this has nothing to 
ĚŽǁŝƚŚ ‘ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ? ? ‘ƉŚǇƐŝŽŐŶŽŵǇ ?Žƌ ‘ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇ ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĞďƌƵƚĞĨĂĐƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌ
ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚŝĂůŽƚŚĞƌŶĞƐƐ ?ƚŚĞŝƌďĞŝŶŐǁŚĂƚ “/ŵǇƐĞůĨĂŵŶŽƚ ? ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ƚŚŝƐƉƌĞƐƐŽĨ
ŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŝƐ “ŶŽƚƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐĂů ? ?ŽǁŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞĂďƐŽůƵƚe alterity of the other. Oppen 
ƉŚƌĂƐĞƐƚŚŝƐŝŶƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚĞƌŵƐŝŶƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŽĨ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ? P 
           It is not 
  precisely a question of profundity but a different order of expe- 
  rience. One would have to tell what happens in a life, what  
  choices present themselves, what the world is for us, what hap- 
  pens in time, what thought is in the course of a life and there- 
  fore what art is, and the isolation of the actual  (2003, 180) 
dŚĞ ‘ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŽƌĚĞƌ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞ ‘ƚŽůĚ ? ?ŝŶďŽƚŚƚŚe epistemic sense and in terms 
ŽĨĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ƚŚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĞƐ ‘ƚŚĞŝƐŽůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĂĐƚƵĂů ? ?
ƵŶĚĞƌƐĐŽƌĞƐƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ĂĐƚƵĂůŶĞƐƐ ?ŝƐĂƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƚŽ
ƚƌĂŶƐĐĞŶĚƚŚŝƐ ?ƚŽĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌ “ǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚŝƐĨŽƌƵƐ ? ?ŽƌƚŽ “ĨŝŶĚĂǁŽƌĚĨŽƌŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ?ŝƐ
ǁŚĂƚĚƌŝǀĞƐƚŚĞŝŶƋƵŝƌǇŽĨ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ? ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚŝƐŝƐŶŽƚƚŽƐĂǇƚŚĂƚKƉƉĞŶĨĞĞůƐŚŝƐ
ambition can be achieved. Rather, it is in remaining curious towards the actualness of others 
that the search for a  ‘ǁŽƌĚĨŽƌŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐ ?ĐĂŶďĞƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĞĚ.  
 
Conclusion 
WĂƵůEĂǇůŽƌĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ?ĨƌŽŵOf Being Numerous is 
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞ “ǁŽƌĚŝƐƚŽŽƐĂĐƌĞĚŽƌƚŽŽĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ĂŶĚƚŚŝƐ ‘ĚĂŶŐĞƌ ?ŝƐƌĞůĂƚĞĚŶŽƚ
only to the anthropocentrism the term evokes but also the homogenisation it performs in its 
ĚĞŶŽƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?KƉƉĞŶ ?Ɛ ‘ǁŽƌĚĨŽƌŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ?  ‘ǁĞ ? ? is used carefully in his work, in a manner 
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which suggests a desire to avoid appropriation. This desire is, as this chapter has sought to 
demonstrate, phenomenological, in the sense that its major concern is the relation between 
ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĂƚǁŚŝĐŚŝƚŝƐŶŽƚ ?ƚŚĞKƚŚĞƌ ?ǇǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚƌƵ ?KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƚĞƌŵƐŽĨĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ ?
it has been poƐƐŝďůĞƚŽĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚƉŽĞƚŝĐƐĞƌŝĂůŝƚǇ ?ĐŽŵƉŽƐĞĚĨƌŽŵĂƐƚĂŶĐĞŽĨ ‘ĐƵƌŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ?
ĂŶĚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚ ‘ŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ? ?ĐĂŶĞǆƚĞŶĚƚŚĞƚĞǆƚďǇǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨĂŶĂŶĂůŽŐƵĞ
ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚďĞƚǁĞĞŶŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƚĞǆƚ ?ƐƉĂƌƚƐ ?dŚĞ
idiosyncrasy ŽĨKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ?ĐĂŶďĞǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĞĚŝŶ
ƚŚĞ ‘ĐƵƌŝŽƵƐ ?ŵŽĚĞůŝƚŽĨĨĞƌƐĨŽƌƉŽĞƚŝĐinquiry, where curiosity indicates a stance receptive 
not only to existential numerousness but also to the vicissitudes of perception. It is in this 
ŵĂŶŶĞƌƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŽĨ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ?ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐŽĨĂŶŝŶƚĞƌƌĞůĂƚĞĚŬŶŝƚŽĨ
perceptual anecdotes, direct philosophical iŶƋƵŝƌǇ ? ‘ůǇƌŝĐǀĂůƵĂďůĞƐ ? ? ‘ƉĂƌŽǆǇƐŵƐŽĨĞŵŽƚŝŽŶ ?
and quotations of the words of others. The text responds to the poet ?ƐĂĐƚƵĂůŶĞƐƐďƵƚĂůƐŽƚŽ






3  A Restless Surface     James Schuyler 
 
/ĐĂŶ ?ƚŐĞƚŽǀĞƌ 
how it all works in together 




If Oppen's idiosyncrasies arise from his serial investigations of the first-person collective 
pronoun "We", James Schuyler can be seen to traverse similar issues of intersubjectivity from 
a more explicitly finite subject position. Schuyler's works of poetic extension constitute a 
 ‘ĨƌĂŵŝŶŐ ?ŽĨĂƐĞůĨ-critical and self-reflexive 'I'. /ŶĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ “ƌĞƐƚůĞƐƐƐƵƌĨĂĐĞ ? ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )ŽĨďŽƚŚ ‘ůŝĨĞ ?ĂŶĚƚĞǆƚ ?ŚĞ “ĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ?ƚŚĞƌĂŶĚŽŵƚƌŝǀŝĂůŝƚŝĞƐŽĨĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ
without either loading them with significance, or making them seem mere illustrations of 
chaos and contingency ? ?&ŽƌĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). Schuyler illuminates processes as they are perceived 
by the subject ?  his attention is attuned to, for example, the way colours shift before the 
senses, ĚĞŶǇŝŶŐŶŽŵŝŶĂůƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ůŝŬĞ “ƚŚĞďůƵĞůŽŽŬŝŶŐƉŝŶŬ ?ŽĨ ‘&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ
 ? ? ? ? ? ? )&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐǁƌŝƚŝŶŐĨŽƌĞŐƌŽƵŶĚƐŝƚƐŽǁŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶďǇ
reflecting throughout on the particularity of certain words and phrasings in their contingently 
ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƐ ?,ŝƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĚŝƐƉůĂǇƐ ?ĂƐĂŶŝĞů<ĂƚǌǁƌŝƚĞƐ ?ĂŶ “ŽƉĞŶŶĞƐƐƚŽƚŚĞ
alterity of what is beyond him and beyond subjectivity ? ?<Ăƚǌ ? ? ? ). This is not to say, 
ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĂƚ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌǁŽƌŬƐƚŽŵĂŬĞůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ‘ƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶƚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞmanner which, for 
example, I have argued Oppen does; rather, Schuyler frames subjectivity in order to reveal 
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the process by which it is constituted in language.  
  ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌǁŝůůƐĞĞŬƚŽĚŝƐĐůŽƐĞ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƚŝĐŵĞĂŶƐŽĨƉŽĞƚŝĐ
extensiŽŶŝŶ ‘dŚĞƌǇƐƚĂů>ŝƚŚŝƵŵ ? ? ‘dŚĞDŽƌŶŝŶŐŽĨdŚĞWŽĞŵ ? ? ‘,ǇŵŶdŽ>ŝĨĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘&Ğǁ
ĂǇƐ ? ?&ŝƌƐƚ ?/ǁŝůůĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞŚŝƐĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽĞǀŽŬĞ “ƚŚĞƌĞƐƚůĞƐƐƐƵƌĨĂĐĞ ?ŽĨ “ƚŚĞǁŚĂƚŽĨǁŚŝĐŚ
you arĞĂƉĂƌƚ ? (Schuyler 1995, 223; Ibid., 105). &Žƌ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ? “ƚŚĞǁŚĂƚ of which you are 
ƉĂƌƚ ?ƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽ ‘ůŝĨĞ ?ĂŶĚŝƚƐ ‘ƚŽƚĂůŝƚǇŽĨĚĂǇƐ ? ?^ĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ?/ǁŝůůĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞƚŚĞǁĂǇƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ
^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƐŽĨƉŽĞƚŝĐĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶĂƌĞƉƌŽĨŽƵŶĚůǇƚĞŵƉŽƌĂů ?ǁŝƚŚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽŚŝƐĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞ
diaries and the diaristic structures of his texts. Thirdly, and by way of conclusion, I will argue 
that his framing of subjectivity articulates a distinct form of empathic exchange. His is, as will 
ďĞĞǆƉůŽƌĞĚ ?Ă ‘ůŽĐĂůĞŵƉĂƚŚǇ ?ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚďǇƉƌŽǆŝŵŝƚǇ ?ĂƚĞƌŵǁŚŝĐŚǁŝůůďĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ
with reference to Emmanuel Levinas.  As such, what this chapter seeks to add to critical 
discourse concerning Schuyler is a developed sense of the relationship between Schuyler and 
phenomenology, a discourse which is notably absent from his work but which, I will argue, he 
ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƐƚŽŝŶĂƉƌŽĨŽƵŶĚƐĞŶƐĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŚŝƐĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ‘ůŝĨĞ ? ?
 
 
Life and Phenomenology 
ĞĨŽƌĞďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐƚŽƌĞĂĚ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?ŝƚŝƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĨŝƌƐƚƚŽĂƐŬĂŶĚĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŚĞ
question: How do we approach a poet philosophically if the poet hiŵƐĞůĨĚŽĞƐŶŽƚ ‘ƌĞĂĚ ?
philosophy in his work? Overlooking this question risks alienating Schuyler from the 
discussion at hand. Unlike the other poets featured in this thesis, Schuyler did not engage 
explicitly with phenomenology in his work or his limited writings on his own work. The 
ƐŽƵƌĐĞƐŚĞĐŝƚĞƐ ?ĂƐŝŶ ‘dŚĞ&ĂƵƌĞĂůůĂĚĞ ? ?ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚŽĨĂĐŽƚĞƌŝĞŽĨĨƌŝĞŶĚƐ ?&ƌĂŶŬK ?,ĂƌĂ ?:ŽŚŶ
Ashbery and Ron Padgett) as well as diarists (Sir Thomas Browne, Rev. Francis Kilvert and 
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Madame de la Tour du Pin), French poets (most notably Rimbaud) and art criticism. My 
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌŝƐƚŽĂĚŽƉƚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐŽĨ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚƌǇŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĨƌĂŵĞŚŝƐ
compositional process in a manner which does not alienate his poetics from his poems. This, 
however, does not in itself constitute a case for reading Schuyler as a phenomenological 
ƉŽĞƚ ?tŚĂƚŝƐĂƚƐƚĂŬĞŝŶƚŚŝƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŝƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐĂƐĞŶƐĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚƌǇ
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉƐŝƚƐŽǁŶƚĞƌŵƐĨŽƌĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŶŐ ‘ůŝĨĞ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂĚŽƉƚŝŶŐƚŚŽƐĞŽĨĂƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ĂƐ
Oppen can be ƐĞĞŶƚŽǁŝƚŚ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?Ɛ ‘ĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ďĞŝŶŐ ? ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?Ɛ ‘ůŝĨĞ ? ?ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?
ŝƐŶŽƚŵĞĂŶƚĂƐĂĨŝŐƵƌĞĨŽƌ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ?Žƌ ‘ƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ? ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨŚŝƐ
living. The contrast here lies in the fact that Schuyler addresses his obsĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚ ‘ůŝĨĞ ?
to life itself, rather than to a body of thought which might estrange the poet from this lived 
experience and the things and people that are proximate to him. 
  This desire to articulate life takes the form of both short and extended poems. An 
example of the formeƌĐĂŶďĞĨŽƵŶĚŝŶ ‘EĂŵĞĂǇ ?(1995, 236-8). Schuyler opens the poem 
ďǇŐĞƐƚƵƌŝŶŐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐǁŚĂƚŝƐĨƌĂŵĞĚďǇ “ĚĂsŝŶĐŝ ?ƐƉĂŝŶƚŝŶŐŽĨ ?dŚĞsŝƌŐŝŶ ?ďĞĨŽƌĞŵŽǀŝŶŐ
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ‘ďĞĂƵƚǇ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŶĂŵĞƐ “DĂƌǇ ?:ĞƐƵƐĂŶĚ^ƚ ?ŶŶĞ ?ƚŽƚŚĞbeauty of what appears 
outside the window nearby. Schuyler writes: 
     The sun shines 
Here and out the window I see green, green 
Cut into myriad shapes, a bare-foot- 
Caressing carpet of fresh-mown grass (a 
Gift from Persia, courtesy of D. Kermani), 
Green chopped into various leaves: walnut, maple, 
WƌŝǀĞƚ ?^ŽůŽŵŽŶ ?Ɛ-seal, needles of spruce: 
Green with evening sunlight on it, 
Green going deep into penetrable shade:   (1995, 236) 
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dŚĞǁŝŶĚŽǁĨƌĂŵĞƐƚŚĞƐĞ ‘ŵǇƌŝĂĚƐŚĂƉĞƐ ? ?ĂŶĚ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌƚƌĞĂƚƐƚŚĞ ‘ŐƌĞĞŶ ?ŚĞƉĞƌĐeives as 
one might colour in a painting ?  ŝƚŝƐŐƌĞĞŶ “ĐŚŽƉƉĞĚŝŶƚŽǀĂƌŝŽƵƐůĞĂǀĞƐ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶďĞŝŶŐ
ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐůĞĂǀĞƐƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶ ‘ŐƌĞĞŶŶĞƐƐ ? ?dŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨĨƌĂŵŝŶŐƚĂŬĞƐƉůĂĐĞŝŶĂ
variety of ways ?  ĨŝƌƐƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐƚŚĞĂůůƵƐŝŽŶƚŽĂsŝŶĐŝ ?ƐƉĂŝŶƚŝŶg, then the window-frame, 
ĨŽůůŽǁĞĚďǇƚŚĞ ‘ĨƌĂŵĞ ?ƚŚĞƉŽĞŵĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐĂƐŝƚƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐŝƚƐƉŽƌƚƌĂŝƚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞůĨ-reflecting 
ƉŽĞƚŝĐǀŽŝĐĞ ?dŚĞ ‘ĨƌĂŵĞ ?ŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽƚƐŽŵƵĐŚƚŚĞůŝƚ ƌĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨĚĞůŝŵŝƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĐĂŶǀĂƐǁŝƚŚ
certain specific dimensions but rather what occurs in this process ?  ƚŚĞ ‘ĨƌĂŵŝŶŐ ?ŽĨ ‘ůŝĨĞ ? ?
ƐŝŵŝůĂƌƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĐĂŶďĞǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŽƉĞŶŝŶŐƉĂŐĞƐŽĨ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƉŽĞŵ ‘Morning 
of the Poem ?: 
  The truth, the absolute 
Of feeling, of knowing what you know, that is 
  the poem, like 
The house for sale buried in a luxuriance of 
  overgrown foundation planting 
Across the street upon this hill (taxus, 
 contoneaster), the doctor has more 
WĂƚŝĞŶƚƐŝŶƵĨĨĂůŽ PŚĞŵŽǀĞĚƚŚĞƌĞ P/ ?ĚƌĂƚŚĞƌ 
  stay here and starve, well, 
^ŽƌƚŽĨƐƚĂƌǀĞ ? Q ?  (1995, 262) 
^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƐĂƐŝŵŝůĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶŚŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĞŵĂƐ “ŬŶŽǁŝŶŐǁŚĂƚǇŽƵ
ŬŶŽǁ ?ĂŶĚǁŚĂƚŝƐďĞǇŽŶĚŚŝƐǁŝŶĚŽǁĨƌĂŵĞ ? in this instance, a house for sale across the 
ƐƚƌĞĞƚ ?ĂďĂŶĚŽŶĞĚďǇŝƚƐƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐŽǁŶĞƌ ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽ ‘ƐƚĂǇŚĞƌĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƐŽƌƚŽĨƐƚĂƌǀĞ ?
ŝƐĞƋƵŝǀŽĐĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚ ‘ŬŶŽǁŝŶŐǁŚĂƚǇŽƵŬŶŽǁ ? ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐďŽƚŚĂĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞ
and comfort in the subject position of looking out the window, of seeing what is in being 
framed ? ‘dŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ŝƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂƐďĞŝŶŐĂ ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ?ĂŬŝŶƚo the simple act of looking out the 




art criticism, and in particular the aspects of contemporary art which appealed most to him. 
/Ŷ ‘ŶƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ&ĂŝƌĨŝĞůĚWŽƌƚĞƌ ?ƐWĂŝŶƚŝŶŐƐ ? ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌƐĞĞƐŝŶWŽƌƚĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ “ĂŶƵŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐ
instinctive feeling for what specifically are his natural subjects: the people and places he 
ŬŶŽǁƐďĞƐƚ ? (1998, 13). He continues: 
It is doubtful that he would paint well a subject with which he was not well 
acquainted, if only by way of a prototype. He once said to a painter who was 
thinking about moving away from a familiar landscape to an unknown one: 
"Any place becomes interesting when you get to know it ?. (1998, 13) 
^ŽƚŽŽŝŶ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬǁĞĐĂŶƐĞĞĂĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽƌĞŵĂŝŶƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŶƚƐŽĨŚŝƐ
ůŝĨĞŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽ “ŐĞƚƚŽŬŶŽǁŝƚ ? ?KŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐŽĨ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĂƌƚ
criticism is that he knew most of the painters he was writing about, and was close enough 
with them that the reviews themselves are populated with anecdotes and personal details 
ǁŚŝĐŚĞǀŽŬĞƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƉĂŝŶƚŝŶŐǁĂƐĐŽŵƉŽƐĞĚ ?/Ŷ ‘ƉƉĞĂƌĂŶĐĞĂŶĚZĞĂůŝƚǇ ? ?ĨŽƌ
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌǁƌŝƚĞƐŽĨWŽƌƚĞƌĂŶĚŚŝƐ ‘ŐƌŽƵƉ ? P “ŽǁĚĞŶ ?ĂƐŚ ?<ŽĞŚůĞƌ ?ƵƌĐŬŚĂƌĚƚ ?
Button, Katz, Porter know the fogs and water of Maine and/or Sausalito: the new reality that 
abstract painters create they find already there, in changing light and weather: in seeing ?
(Ibid., 52). /ŶĂůŝŬĞǁŝƐĞŵĂŶŶĞƌ ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐŽǁŶ ‘ŶĞǁƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ?ŝƐĨŽƵŶĚĂůƌĞĂĚǇthere, in the 
 ‘ƌĞƐƚůĞƐƐƐƵƌĨĂĐĞ ?ŽĨůŝĨĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽ ‘ƐĞĞ ?ŝ ǁŚĂƚĚƌŝǀĞƐƚŚĞĂĐƚŽĨƉŽĞƚŝĐĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶ
both his shorter and extended works. 
  /ĨƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐĨƌŽŵǁŚŝĐŚ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐůŽŶŐĞƌĂŶĚƐŚŽƌƚĞƌƉŽĞŵƐĂƌĞĐŽŵƉŽƐĞĚĂƌĞ
similar, how then might we explain the act of extension itself? The difference between the 
ƐƚĂŶĐĞƐĂĚŽƉƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞƉŽĞƚŝĐǀŽŝĐĞŝŶ ‘EĂŵĞĂǇ ?ĂŶĚ ‘,ǇŵŶdŽ>ŝĨĞ ?ůŝĞs in the fact that 
ƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌƵŶĚĞƌŐŽĞƐƐŚŝĨƚƐŝŶƚŽŶĞĂŶĚŵŽŽĚƚŚĞůŽŶŐĞƌ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞŵĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐĨŽƌ ? 
which is to say, it is a matter of Schuyler framing and reframing the day as his subject position 
necessarily modulates over the course of time. There is a sense, real or not, that many of 
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^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞŵƐĐŽƵůĚďĞ ‘ĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚ ?ŝŶƚŽůŽŶŐĞƌƉŽĞŵƐ ?ďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ
adopted and terms circulated remain consistent across the formal range of his texts. The 
purpose of underscoring the close relĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƐŚŽƌƚĞƌǁŽƌŬƐĂŶĚŚŝƐ
ĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚǁŽƌŬƐŝƐƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐĂƌĞůĂƌŐĞůǇĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚ
ƌĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐŽĨůĞŶŐƚŚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞǁŚĂƚǁĞĨŝŶĚŝŶ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐCollected Poems is a 
variety of differently sƵƐƚĂŝŶĞĚ ‘ĨƌĂŵŝŶŐƐ ?ŽĨ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ůŝĨĞ ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐƚŽƐĂǇ ?ƚŚĞ
ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐŽĨ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ‘EĂŵĞĂǇ ?ĂŶĚ ‘,ǇŵŶƚŽ>ŝĨĞ ?ŚĂǀĞƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƐŽƵƌĐĞŝŶ
 ‘ůŝĨĞ ? ?ďƵƚƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŝŶůĞŶŐƚŚŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌǁŝƐŚĞĚƚŽďĞar 
ǁŝƚŶĞƐƐŶŽƚŽŶůǇƚŽƚŚŝƐ ‘ůŝĨĞ ?ďƵƚƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨ  ‘ůŝǀŝŶŐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƚƐĞůĨŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐĨŽƌ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ
ƚŚĞĂĐƚŽĨƉŽĞƚŝĐĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ŽŶĞĐĂŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚƌǇĂƐ ‘ĨƌĂŵŝŶŐ ?ůŝĨĞ ?
ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉŽĞŵƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŶŐƚŚŝƐ ‘ĨƌĂŵĞ ? ?dŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĨƌĂŵĞ ?ĐĂŶďĞ
ĞǆƚƌĂĐƚĞĚĨƌŽŵ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƌǇŽŶƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨǁƌŝƚŝŶŐĂŶĞĂƌůǇƉŽĞŵ ? ‘&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? P 
The poem turned out to be laborious and flat, and looking out the window I 
saw that something marvellous was happening to the light, transforming 
everything. It then occurred to me that this happened more often than not (a 
ďĞĂƵƚŝĨƵůƐƵŶƐĞƚ/ŵĞĂŶ )ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐ ‘ĂĚĂǇůŝŬĞĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚ/ƉƵƚ
down as a title. The rest of the poem popped out of its own accord. Or so it 
seems now.       (Schuyler 1999, 3) 
The fact that for Schuyler, the process of composition was compelled by the realisation that 
ƚŚĞƉŽĞŵĨƌĂŵĞĚ “ĂĚĂǇůŝŬĞĂŶŽƚŚĞƌŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?ĂŶĚĂƐƐƵĐŚŚĂƐƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůƚŽƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ‘ůŝĨĞ ? ?
establishes the relationship between the act of wrŝƚŝŶŐƉŽĞƚƌǇĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ĚĂǇ ? ?dŚĞǁŝŶĚŽǁ ?
ǁŚŝĐŚĨƌĂŵĞƐĂƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŽŶƚŚĞĚĂǇ ? ‘ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵƐĞǀ ƌǇƚŚŝŶŐ ?ďǇǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨƚŚĞǁĂǇŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ
ŝƚŚŽůĚƐƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞƐƚůĞƐƐƐƵƌĨĂĐĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĚĂŝůǇǁŝƚŚŝŶĂĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ŝŶŚŝƐ ‘WŽĞƚ
ĂŶĚWĂŝŶƚĞƌKǀĞƌƚƵƌĞ ? ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ƉŽĞƚƐĨĂĐĞƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ ?ĂƐĂƌƚŝƐƚƐ ? ?ĂŶĚ
ƉĂŝŶƚŝŶŐƐŚŽǁƐƚŚĞǁĂǇ ?ŽƌƉŽƐƐŝďůĞǁĂǇƐ ? ‘tƌŝƚŝŶŐůŝŬĞƉĂŝŶƚŝŶŐ ?ŚĂƐŶŽƚŚŝŶŐƚŽĚŽǁŝƚŚŝƚ ?
(Allen 1960, 256). dŚĂƚ ‘ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐůŝŬĞƉĂŝŶƚŝŶŐ ?ŝƐƵŶĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞƚŽ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƐƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŝn 
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which it is the formal properties of art rather than the techniques themselves which Schuyler 
seeks to emulate in his work. 
  dŚŝƐĨŝŐƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĨƌĂŵĞ ?ǁŝůůďĞĐŽŵĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨƚŚŝƐ
chapter. The purpose of introducing it at this point is to ground the subsequent remarks on a 
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĂƐƉĞƌĨŽƌŵŝŶŐƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŽĨƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƌĞĐŽƵƌƐĞ
ƚŽŝƚƐƚĞƌŵƐŽƌĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐŽĨůŝĨĞĚŽŶŽƚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƚŚĞ
intervention of phenomenology, because Schuyler himself approaches similar questions of 
perception without an external framework.  The corollary of these observations is that 
further justification is required in employing phenomenological discourse alongside 
^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚƌǇ ?/ŶƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?/ǁŝůůƐĞĞŬƚŽĚŝƐĐƵƐƐ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨ
 ‘ĨƌĂŵŝŶŐ ?ůŝĨĞĂŶĚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ ‘ƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚĞ ?ůŽĐĂůĞŵƉĂƚŚǇǁŝƚŚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽDĞƌůĞĂƵ-Ponty 
and Levinas respectively, the intention being to develop a sense of a phenomenological 
Schuyler ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŚŝƐŽǁŶ ‘ĨƌĂŵĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚĞƌŵƐ ? 
 
^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?Ɛ&ƌĂŵĞƐ 
Raphael Allison comments that  “ ?ŝ ?ƚŚĂƐďĞĐŽŵĞĂǆŝŽŵĂƚŝĐŝŶĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƌǇŽŶ:ĂŵĞƐ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ
to call him a poet who celebrates everyday experiences and ordinary things ? ?ůůŝƐŽŶ ? ? ? ). 
Many of the aspects ŽĨ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚƌǇǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůĐŽŵŵŽŶƉůĂĐĞƐ ?  that, for 
example, Schuyler is a poet who accurately and joyously observes particulars in quotidian 
contexts ?  ĂƌŝƐĞĨƌŽŵ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ‘ůŝĨĞ ? ?Whilst these are certainly not 
entirely incŽƌƌĞĐƚŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚĞǇĨĂŝůƚŽƚĂŬĞŝŶƚŽĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?Ɛ
poetics as a self-reflexive framing of a perceiving subject. As indicated, tŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ĨƌĂŵŝŶŐ ?ǁŝůů




of poetic extension enact a framing of both quotidian incidences and of the poet-subject 
ŚŝŵƐĞůĨ ?dŚĞƚĞƌŵĐĂƉƚƵƌĞƐƚŚĞŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐǇŽĨ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚetic: it is pitched towards the 
ǀŝƐƵĂů ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚŵƵĐŚŽĨ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐůŝĨĞǁĂƐƐƉĞŶƚůŽŽŬŝŶŐĂƚĨƌĂŵĞĚ
things: the world through the window and the painting in the frame. One such example can 
ďĞƐĞĞŶŝŶ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?Ɛ ‘&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? P 
I can't get over 
how it all works in together 
like a woman who just came to her window 
and stands there filling it 
jogging her baby in her arms. 
She's so far off.   (Schuyler 1995, 4) 
,ĞƌĞ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐůǇƌŝĐƌĞĂĚƐĂƐĂũŽǇŽƵƐĂƉƉƌĂŝƐĂůŽĨůŝĨĞ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂƐůůŝƐŽŶĂƌŐƵĞƐ ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?Ɛ
ƉŽĞƚƌǇŝƐĂůƐŽ “ĚĞĞƉůǇƐĐĞƉƚŝĐĂůŽĨƚŚĞĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇĂŶĚŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĐĞůĞďƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐŽŶůǇŚĂůĨƚŚĞ
story ? ? ? ? ? ). dŚŝƐƐĐĞƉƚŝĐŝƐŵŝƐĞǀŝĚĞŶƚŚĞƌĞŝŶƚŚĞĂŵďŝŐƵŝƚǇŽĨ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƉŚƌĂƐĞ “/ĐĂŶ ?ƚŐĞƚ
ŽǀĞƌ ? ?/ƚĚƌĂǁƐŽƵƌĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽf things ?  not only amazement but also the 
ŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŝƚƐĞůĨ ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐ ?ŚŽǁŽŶĞƌĞĂůůǇĐĂŶ ?ƚŐĞƚŽǀĞƌ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ ‘ĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐ ?
 “ŚŽǁŝƚĂůůǁŽƌŬƐŝŶƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ? ?WĂƵůĂƵƐĐŚĂƚǌĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŝƐ “ĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ
order and structure for a sequence of seemingly unregulated events ? ? ? ? ? ). Daniel Katz 
offers a means of coming to terms with this:  “dŚĞƉƌĞǀĂŝůŝŶŐƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇŽĨ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝƐƚŽ
ĚĞŶǇƚŚĂƚĂ ‘ůŝƚĞƌĂůĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶ ?ĐĂŶĞǀĞƌĞǆŝƐƚŽƵƚƐŝĚĞĂŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŽĨĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶƐ ?
differentiationƐĂŶĚĚŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ). dŚŝƐŝƐĞǀŝĚĞŶƚŝŶ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ “EŽƚ
knowing/ a name for something proves nothing ? ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). Together, this sense of 
a restless structure holding together restless language can be seen to characterise the way in 
ǁŚŝĐŚ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚƌǇĞǆƚĞŶĚƐ ? 
  In this regard, the phrase  “/ĐĂŶ ?ƚŐĞƚŽǀĞƌ ?ĨƌŽŵ ‘&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ?ƐĞĞŵƐƚŽƌĞĨĞƌƚŽƚŚĞ
aporetic situatioŶŽĨĂƚƚĞŵƉƚŝŶŐƚŽĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞǁŽŵĂŶĂŶĚŚĞƌďĂďǇĂƌĞ “ƐŽ
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ĨĂƌŽĨĨ ? ?ĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉŽĞƚŝĐǀŽŝĐĞďǇƚŚĞǀĞƌǇĂĐƚŽĨĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞƐĞĞŵŝŶŐůǇ
innocuous closing phrase ?   “/ƚ ?ƐĂĚĂǇůŝŬĞĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌ ? ? ends the poem with a further 
ambiguous use of an idiomatic locution which simultaneously celebrates the quotidian whilst 
ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ “ŐĞƚŽǀĞƌ ?ŚŽǁŝƚĂůůǁŽƌŬƐŝŶƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ?ŝƐƚŚĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ
 “ƚŚĞĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇ ?ĂŶĚĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇ ?dŚĞ ‘ĚĂǇ ?ŝŶ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?  a constant temporal reference and 
ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů ‘ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚŚŝƐǁŽƌŬ ? ŝƐĨƌĂŵĞĚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚĂ ‘ĚĂǇ ?ŝƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĂƐĂ
specific type of human endeavour rather than merely an ongoing present.  David Herd 
ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƐƚŚŝƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚƵĂůŽƉĞŶŶĞƐƐŝŶ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞ ?ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ůŝĨĞ ?ĂƐŬĞǇ
ƚŽ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ P 
In the process and experience of composing, Schuyler opened his writing up; 
ƚŽŽƚŚĞƌǀŽŝĐĞƐ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽ ?ĂƐŚĞǁĂƐĂďůĞƚŽĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚůǇƉƵƚŝƚŝŶ ‘^ůŽǁůǇ ?ƚŽ ‘ƚŚĞ
ǁŚĂƚŽĨǁŚŝĐŚǇŽƵĂƌĞĂƉĂƌƚ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞ ‘ƚŚĞǁŚĂƚ ?ǁĂƐ ? Ɛ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌĐĂůůĞĚŝƚ ?
 ‘ůŝĨĞ ? ? ĂƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĨƌŽŵĂZŽŵĂŶƚŝĐ ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ? ?Žƌ ?ƐĂǇ ?ĨƌŽŵĂ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌĞĂŶ
ƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ ‘ďĞŝŶŐ ? ? and with which he understood himself to be continuous. 
       (Herd 2007, 168) 
Herd suggests here an idea of process which is both  “ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐ ?ĂŶĚǇĞƚ-to-be 
ƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚ ?,ŝƐƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉŚƌĂƐĞ “ƚŚĞǁŚĂƚŽĨǁŚŝĐŚǇŽƵĂƌĞƉĂƌƚ ?ŝƐ
ĂƉƚ ?ŚĞƌĞ ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐƚĞĞƌƐĨƌŽŵĨŽƌŵĂůůǇĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚŝŶŐ “ƚŚĞǁŚĂƚ ?ĂƐĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐŽƚŚĞƌ
ƚŚĂŶŐĞƐƚƵƌĞĚĂƚďǇĚĞŝĐƚŝĐŶŽƵŶƐ ?,ĞƌĚ ?ƐƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƐ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐŽǁŶĞƋƵŝǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
 “ƚŚĞǁŚĂƚŽĨǁŚŝĐŚǇŽƵĂƌĞĂƉĂƌƚ ?ĂƐ ‘ůŝĨĞ ? ?/ŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚŝŶŐƚŽŝůůƵŵŝŶĂƚĞ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?Ɛ
ŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƚŝĐŵĞĂŶƐŽĨĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ ?ŝƚŝƐĐƌƵĐŝĂůƚŽĐŽŵĞƚŽĂŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?Ɛ ‘ůŝĨĞ ? ?
which is his phenomenal site of meaning. In this regard, Merleau-Ponty writes: 
/ĂŵŶŽƚĂ ‘ůŝǀŝŶŐďĞŝŶŐ ? ?Ă ‘ŵĂŶ ? ?ŶŽƌĞǀĞŶĂ ‘ĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞ Ɛ ? ?ƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐĂůůŽĨ
the characteristics that zoology, social anatomy and inductive psychology 
acknowledge in these products of nature or history. Rather, I am the absolute 
source. My existence does not come from my antecedents, nor from my 
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physical or social surroundings; it moves out towards them and sustains them. 
      (Merleau-Ponty 2012, lxxii) 
Ɛ ‘ƚŚĞĂďƐŽůƵƚĞƐŽƵƌĐĞ ?ƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚĐĂŶďĞ said to be self-consciously aware of his or her 
investment of meaning in particular perceptive phenomena, be that an object, a person, a 
judgement, an opinion or a word. The immanent experience of life, however, commonly 
transcends this phenomenological perspective ?  ǁĞ ‘ŵĞƌĞůǇ ?ůŝǀĞ ? and whilst it cannot 
strictly be denied that our window onto life is our own subjectivity, it can be counter-argued 
ƚŚĂƚůŝĨĞŝƐŶ ?ƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇĂůǁĂǇƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚĂƐĂŶĞŵĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƐĞůĨĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ĂďƐŽůƵƚĞ
ƐŽƵƌĐĞ ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐ ƚŽƐĂǇƚŚĂƚ ‘ůŝĨĞ ?ƐĞĞŵƐƚŽŚĂǀĞĂůŝĨĞŝƚƐĞůĨ ?ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞƚŽŽƵƌƐ ?ZĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ
ƐĞĞŬŝŶŐƚŽĚĞĐŝĚĞƚŚĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌƐŽĨǁŚĂƚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐ ‘ƐĞůĨ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ůŝĨĞ ? ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ
ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞƐĂĐŚŝĂƐŵŝĐƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ůŝĨĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƐĞůĨ ?ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ^ĐŚƵyler 
ǁƌŝƚĞƐŝŶ ‘,ǇŵŶƚŽ>ŝĨĞ ? P
       ? Q ? each day is subjective and there is a totality of days 
As there are as many to live it. The day lives us and in exchange 
We it.        (Schuyler 1995, 215) 
dŚĞ ‘ƚŽƚĂůŝƚǇŽĨĚĂǇƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ ‘ůŝĨĞ ?ůŝǀĞƵƐ ?ǁŚŝch is to say, we are an object of life as 
ŵƵĐŚĂƐŝƚŝƐŽƵƌŽďũĞĐƚŽĨŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?tŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŵĞĂŶƐĨŽƌ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŝƐƚŚĂƚũƵƐƚĂƐ
ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƐĞůĨĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞƐůŝĨĞĂƚůĂƌŐĞ ?ƐŽǁƌŝƚŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚůŝĨĞĂŶĚŝƚƐ “ƚŽƚĂůŝƚǇŽĨĚĂǇƐ ?
reveals the self. The poet-speaker in Schuyler is situated in this liminal site ?  and as such the 
ƚĞƌŵƐ ‘ůŝĨĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĚĂǇ ?ĂƌĞĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůŝŶĐŽŵŝŶŐƚŽĂŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚing ŽĨ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƚŝĐ
means of extension. LĂƚĞƌŝŶ ‘,ǇŵŶƚŽ>ŝĨĞ ? ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
   Time brings us into bloom and we wait, busy, but wait 
For the unforced flow of words and intercourse and sleep and dreams 
In which the past seems to portend the future which is just more 
Daily life.       (Schuyler 1995, 215) 
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^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƐĞĞŵŝŶŐůǇĂŶƚŝ-climactic conclusion ?   “ũƵƐƚŵŽƌĞ ?ĂŝůǇůŝĨĞ ? ?should rather be 
read as a gesture towards the importance of the diurnal as a measure for Schuyler. As such, 
ŝŶƚŚĞĂĐƚŽĨǁƌŝƚŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚŚŝƐĚĂǇƐĂŶĚĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŶŐ ‘ĚĂŝůŝŶĞƐƐ ? ?Schuyler can be said to present 
propositions about life whilst acknowledging the finite subjectivities responsible for such 
propositions. Though he only rarely reflected publicly on his own work, he comments in his 
 ‘>ĞƚƚĞƌƚŽDŝƐƐĂƚŝĞ ? P
In the past I have declined to comment on my own work: because, it seems to 
me, a poem is what it is; because a poem is itself a definition, and to try to 
redefine it is to be apt to falsify it; and because the author is the person least 
able to consider his work objectively.    (Schuyler 1999, 3) 
dŚĂƚĂƚĞǆƚ ‘ŝƐǁŚĂƚŝƚŝƐ ? Q ?ĂĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐƌĞǀĞĂůŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĂƚŝƚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐĂƐƚƌŽŶŐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝƚǇ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƉŽĞŵĂŶĚ ‘ůŝĨĞ ? ?dŚĂƚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇ PƚŽŝŶƐŝƐƚŽŶƚŚĞůĂĐŬŽĨĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ůŝĨĞ ?
and a poem about life is to not valorise the poetic. It is to underscore the fundamentally 
phenomenological nature of the poetic; and, in turn, the poetic nature of phenomenology. In 
ƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞ ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ?ŐƌŽƵŶĚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝƚǇďĞƚǁĞĞŶůŝĨĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƚĞǆƚ ?ŝƐĂ
framing of the event of articulation. ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĚŝƐƉůĂǇƐĂŶŽƚŝŽn of the text as having an 
ability to frame questions of subjectivity. In this regard ?ŝŶ ‘dŚĞŽŐtĂŶƚƐ,ŝƐŝŶŶĞƌ ? ?
Schuyler writes: 
The sky is pitiless. I beg 
your pardon? OK then 
the sky is pitted. The yard 
is sand and laced with roots 
afloat on rock encasing fire. 
You think so do you. No. 
zĞƐ ?ŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁ ?ŚĞĐŬŽŶĞ ? 
Forget all you ever knew.      (Schuyler 1995, 113) 
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The poetic voice here self-interrogates and interrupts its own act of articulation, redressing 
ŝƚƐŽǁŶĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐŬǇĂƐ ‘ƉŝƚŝůĞƐƐ ?ƚŽ ‘ƉŝƚƚĞĚ ? ?dŚĞĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝǀĞĐůĂŝŵ ? “ĨŽƌŐĞƚĂůůǇŽƵ
ĞǀĞƌŬŶĞǁ ? ? underscores the sense in which the present moment bears upon subjective 
experience, making determination an inherently polysemic task. This present is filled with 
affirmations, negations and ambiguity ?   “EŽ ? ?zĞƐ ?ŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁ ? ? ?and as such articulating it 
ŝƐƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽƚŚĞǀŝĐŝƐƐŝƚƵĚĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶƚƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ?dŚĞ ‘ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?ƚŚŝƐƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ
to articulating this present appears ŝŶ ‘dŚĞDŽƌŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞWŽĞŵ ? P
tŚĂƚ ?ƐƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?
No innate love of 
Words, no sense of 
How the thing said 
Is in the words, how 
The words are themselves 
dŚĞƚŚŝŶŐƐĂŝĚ ? Q ?       (Schuyler 1995, 268) 
dŚŝƐƌĞĐĂůůƐ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?Ɛ ‘>ĞƚƚĞƌdŽDŝƐƐĂƚŝĞ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ “ŝƐǁŚĂƚŝƚŝƐ ? ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?Ɛstates 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? ůŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƌĞďĞŝŶŐŶŽ “ŝŶŶĂƚĞůŽǀĞŽĨǁŽƌĚƐ ? ?ŽƌĂĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚ
ŚŽůĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ ?ƚ ?ŚĞǁŽƌĚƐĂƌĞƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ?ƚ ?ŚĞƚŚŝŶŐƐĂŝĚ ? ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌƐĞĞŵƐƚŽďĞŐĞƐƚƵƌŝŶŐ
ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂƐĞŶƐĞŽĨůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞǁŚĞƌĞŝŶůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞŝƚƐĞůĨŝŶĂƵŐƵƌĂƚĞƐ ‘ƚŚĞƚŚŝŶŐ ? ? which is to say, 
where perception is textual. This sense of perception and the text as being subject to similar 
ǀŝĐŝƐƐŝƚƵĚĞƐŝƐĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚŝŶ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƉŚƌĂƐĞ ‘ĂƌĞƐƚůĞƐƐƐƵƌĨĂĐĞ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƌĞƐƚůĞƐƐŶĞƐƐŝŶ
question refers not only to the contingency of perception but also to the contingencies of 






dŚĞ ‘ZĞƐƚůĞƐƐ^ƵƌĨĂĐĞ ?ŽĨ ‘dŚĞĂǇ ? 
ƐŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚ ?ŽŶĞŽĨ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚǁŽƌŬƐŝƐ ‘,ǇŵŶƚŽ>ŝĨĞ ? ?ĂůŽŶŐůǇƌŝĐĂůƉŽĞŵ
ǁŚŝĐŚƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐŽŶƚŚĞƉĂƐƐĂŐĞŽĨŵŽŶƚŚƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌĞĨĨĞĐƚŽŶ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚ
moods. dŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨ ‘,ǇŵŶdŽ>ŝĨĞ ? ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
              In 
A dishpan the soap powder dissolves under a turned on faucet and 
Makes foam, just like the waves that crash ashore at the foot 
Of the street. A restless surface. Chewing, and spitting sand and 
Small white pebbles, clam shells with a sheen or chalky white. 
A horseshoe crab: primeval.      (Schuyler 1995, 223) 
The phrase itself ?   ‘ƌĞƐƚůĞƐƐƐƵƌĨĂĐĞ ? ? stands out among a dense series of clauses on either 
ƐŝĚĞ ?dŚŝƐƌĞƐƚůĞƐƐŶĞƐƐŝƐŽŶĞŽĨĚŝƐũƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŝŶŵĂŶǇƐĞŶƐĞƐ ?^ƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůůǇ ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚ
poems deviate in a seemingly aleatoric fashion between the observed and the reflective.  
tŝůůŝĂŵtĂƚŬŝŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐƚŚŝƐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĂƐ “ĂŶŽŶŐŽŝŶŐƉĂƌĞŶƚŚĞƚŝĐĂůƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ
interruptions, negotiating between the two forces of the poem, the general and the specific ?
(2001, 88). tĂƚŬŝŶƐ ?ƉŚƌĂƐŝŶŐŝƐĂƉƚ P^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĚĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞparenthetical and interruptions 
of interruptions, suggesting that the ontology of his poetry is shifting ?  ĂƐ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “
story/ Not told: so much not understood, a sight, an insight, and you pass on ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). 
tŚŝůƐƚ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝƚŝƐƚƌƵĞƚŚĂƚ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƚŽŶĞŵŽǀĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚŝŶŐƐŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ
and specifically, to make this distinction risks misunderstanding the modulation at work in his 
texts as dialectical ratheƌƚŚĂŶĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶƚ ?dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂůǁĂǇƐƚŚĞ “ŶŽƚƚŽůĚ ?ĂŶĚ “ŶŽƚ
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ ? ? These are not, however, a dialectical opposition. As has been argued, 
^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?and in particular that of his works of poetic extension ?  is always already 
taking place within the further formal restlessness of his framing of the event of writing. It is 
necessary ƚŽĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƐĞƚǁŽŽǀĞƌůĂƉƉŝŶŐ ‘ƌĞƐƚůĞƐƐƐƵƌĨĂĐĞƐ ?ŽĨƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ
 74 
 
text, for the purpose of marking the latter as being a compositional effect and the former as 
ĂƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞƐĞ ‘ƌĞƐƚůĞƐƐƐƵƌĨĂĐĞƐ ?ŽǀĞƌůĂƉďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞƚĞǆƚŝƐĂ
ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨůŝĨĞ ?ũƵƐƚĂƐůŝĨĞďĞĐŽŵĞƐĂĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨŝƚŝŶ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?
  As indicated, tŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƉĞƌĐĞƉƚƵĂů ‘ƌĞƐƚůĞƐƐŶĞƐƐ ?ŝŶ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌĐan be articulated in 
phenomenological terms. As Merleau-Ponty writes, ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ “ŝƐĂŶĞǀĞƌ-renewed 
experience of its own beginning that consists wholly in the description of this beginning ?
(2012, lxxviii). &Žƌ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƚŚŝƐ ‘ĞǀĞƌ-ƌĞŶĞǁĞĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ? takes place within the site of the 
everyday, and he articulates this contingency in his texts with disjunctive self-reflection. This 
is particularly true of his works of extension, which, by virtue of the fact that they frame 
multiple and contradictory peƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ?ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂŶ ‘ĞǀĞƌ-ƌĞŶĞǁĞĚ ?ĐŽŶƚĂĐƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĚĂŝůǇ
which necessarily modulates as the day progresses. Schuyler's first-person poetic voice is at 
once deeply subjective in the sense that it acknowledges its temporal and perspectival 
finitude, whilst being an object in the sense that it is manifested by the text itself. This view 
of Schuyler is developed by Watkin: 
The poet must attend at each turn, not merely as to how his observing and 
inscribing point of view relates to the things he is observing and writing about, 
but also how this process itself is not only changing the nature of the things 
being written about, but how the very act of writing is a thing in itself. (66)  
^ƵƉĞƌĨŝĐŝĂůůǇ ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ‘ŝŶƐĐƌŝďĞƐ ?ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŝŶŚ ƐƚĞǆƚƐďǇǁƌŝƚŝŶŐĂůŵost exclusively from 
the first person perspective of the poet-subject, but additionally ?ŚĞ ‘ĨƌĂŵĞƐ ?ƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚďǇ
opening his poems to authorial digression, self-critique or editing which remains in the text. 
DŽƐƚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇ ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĂĐƚƐŽĨĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶthis revelation of subjectivity over a 
space and duration which allows for multiple shifts and modulations in tone, as well as 
ƌĞĐƵƌƌŝŶŐŵŽƚŝĨƐĂŶĚƚŚĞĂĐĐƌƵĂůŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĞƚŝĐǀŽŝĐĞ ?Ɛ ‘ƌĞƐƚůĞƐƐƐƵƌĨĂĐĞ ? ? 
   ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĨƌĂŵŝŶŐŽĨƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŝŶƚƵƌŶĨƌĂŵĞƐƚŚĞĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞ
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ŝƐŽŶůǇĞǀĞƌ “ĂƌĞƐƚůĞƐƐsurface ?ƚŽ  “ƚŚĞǁŚĂƚŽĨǁŚŝĐŚǁĞĂƌĞƉĂƌƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶďĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƵƚĞĚ ?
ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚƵƉŽŶ ?ŝŶůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŝƐĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ?ƚŽƵƐĞ
Merleau-WŽŶƚǇ ?ƐƉŚƌĂƐĞ ? “ƚŚĞǀŝďƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƉƉĞĂƌĂŶĐĞƐǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŚĞĐƌĂĚůĞŽĨƚŚŝŶŐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
68), and as such the forms ? textual and temporal ?  Schuyler composes to articulate this in 
ŚŝƐƚĞǆƚƐƵŶĚĞƌŐŽĂůŝŬĞǁŝƐĞ ‘ǀŝďƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽƌƌĞƐƚůĞƐƐŶĞƐƐ ?dŚĞĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŝŶ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?Ɛ
ůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵƐŝƐƚŚĞ ‘ĚĂǇ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ?Ă ‘ƌĞƐƚůĞƐƐƐƵƌĨĂĐĞ ?ŝƚƐĞůĨ ŝƐďŽƚŚĂŶĞǀĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞƉŽet-ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?Ɛ
life and a manifestation of that life.  
  ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?Ɛ “ĂĐŚĚĂǇŝƐƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )ŝŶ ‘,ǇŵŶdŽ>ŝĨĞ ?ŝŶǀŽŬĞƐĂƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ
revelation. dŚŝƐ ‘ƌĞǀĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ? is achieved in a sensitivity to the minutiae of the diurnal. This is 
evinced in the pasƐĂŐĞƋƵŽƚĞĚĞĂƌůŝĞƌ ? “/ŶĂĚŝƐŚƉĂŶ Q ? )ĨƌŽŵ ‘,ǇŵŶƚŽ>ŝĨĞ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚĚĞǀĞůŽƉƐĂ
motif of dish washing that stands in tension between its place as a quotidian observation and 
a meditation on the substance of the daily. Whilst in places the poetic voice adopts a 
stance ?   “dŚĞƚƌƵƚŚŝƐ ?dŚĂƚĂůůƚŚĞƐĞŚŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚƚĂƐŬƐĂŶĚĚĂŝůǇǁŽƌŬ[...] ĂƌĞďĞĂƵƚŝĨƵů ?
(1995, 218) ?  these moments of reflection and self-interrogation are themselves, for 
Schuyler, the truth of his everyday. Kaufman describes this situation in Schuyler as an 
 “ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽƐĞĞŬƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚŝŶĂĚĂǇŽƌƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨĚĂǇƐƚŚĂƚĐĂŶŶĞǀĞƌƋƵŝƚĞĞŶĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝƚ ?
(Kaufman, np). dŚŝƐĐĂŶďĞǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĞĚĂŐĂŝŶŝŶ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶĚŝƐŚ-washing earlier in 
 ‘,ǇŵŶdŽ>ŝĨĞ ? P 
                                                       Attune yourself to what is happening 
Now, the little wet things, like washing up the lunch dishes. Bubbles 
Rise, rinse and it is done. Let the dishes air dry, the way 
You let your hair after a shampoo. All evaporates, water, time, the 
Happy moment and- harder to believe- the unhappy.  (Ibid. 219) 
^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌĂƐŬƐƵƐĂŶĚŚŝŵƐĞůĨƚŽ ‘ĂƚƚƵŶĞ ?ƚŽ “ǁŚĂƚŝƐŚĂƉƉĞŶŝŶŐ ?EŽǁ ? ?ĂƉŚƌĂƐĞƚŚĞĚĞŝǆŝƐŽĨ
ǁŚŝĐŚĞĐŚŽĞƐ ‘ƚŚĞǁŚĂƚŽĨǁŚŝĐŚǇŽƵĂƌĞĂƉĂƌƚ ?ŽĨ ‘^ůŽǁůǇ ? ?Ibid. 105). The gesture itself is 
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polysemic; it suggĞƐƚƐŶŽƚŽŶůǇƚŚĂƚ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐǀŽŝĐĞŝƐ ‘ĂƚƚƵŶĞĚ ?ƚŽƚŚĞĂĐƚŽĨ
composing its immediate perceptions, but also that there is something to discovered or 
learnt from a daily routine. This simple process of dishwashing is described briefly, but 
provokes ĂŶĚĞǆƚĞŶĚƐŝŶƚŽĂŵĞĚŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞƚƌĂŶƐŝĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘Ăůů ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐůŝĨĞ ?
dŚŝƐďĂƚŚĞƚŝĐƐŚŝĨƚŝŶƚŽŶĞ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽ ‘ĂƚƚƵŶĞ ?ƚŽ ‘ƚŚĞůŝƚƚůĞǁĞƚƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?ŽĨůŝĨĞůĞĂĚƐƚŽĂ
ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ ‘ĂůůĞǀĂƉŽƌĂƚĞƐ ? ?ĞǀŽŬĞƐĂŶĂŶĂůŽŐŽƵƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĨůŽǁ ?ŽĨůŝĨĞĞǀĂƉŽƌĂƚŝŶŐŝŶ
ŝƚƐ ‘ŵŽŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?/ŶƚŚŝƐŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĞĨƌĂŵŝŶŐŽĨĂĚĂŝůǇƚ ƐŬďĞĐŽŵĞƐĂƐŝƚĞŽĨƌĞǀĞůĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ
ǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ůŝĨĞ ?ŝƚƐĞůĨŝƐĂůƐŽĨƌĂŵĞĚ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚ ?<ĂƵĨŵĂŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?Ɛ  ‘ĚĂǇ ?ĂƐ
 “ƐĞƌǀ ?ŝŶŐ ?ĂƐƚŚĞďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚŽĨ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞǁŚŝůĞŝƚŝƐĂůƐŽƚŚĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŝƚƐĞůĨ ?
(np). dŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶŶĞƌ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŽƵƚĞƌ ?ŽĨ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?Ɛǁ ŝƚŝŶŐƵŶĚĞƌƐĐŽƌĞƐƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚŚŝƐ
poems are both articulations and ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ‘ůŝĨĞ ? ?
  This revelation of the life in the daily occurs not only in the carrying out of routine 
ƚĂƐŬƐďƵƚĂůƐŽŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶĐŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞůŝǀĞĚĚĂǇ ?>ĂƚĞƌŝŶ ‘,ǇŵŶƚŽ>ŝĨĞ ? ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
 ? Q] A bird shits on my window ledge. Rain will wash it off 
Or a storm will chip it loose. Life, I do not understand.   (1995, 223) 
The tone ambiguously hangs between marvel and grim resignation at having his window 
ůĞĚŐĞƐŚĂƚŽŶ ?ĞŝƚŚĞƌƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŽĨǁŚŝĐŚŵĂŬĞƐ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝǀĞƌĞŵĂƌŬĐŽŵĞĚŝĐŝŶŝƚƐ
ĞǆĂƐƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĚĂŝůǇ ?ŝŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚŽĨǁĂƚĐŚŝŶŐƚŚĞďŝƌĚŝƐĂƐŵƵĐŚƚŚĞ ‘ǁŚĂƚŽĨǁŚŝĐŚ
ǇŽƵĂƌĞĂƉĂƌƚ ?ĂƐƚŚĞĂĐƚŽĨĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŚĞƉŽĞŵĨƌĂŵĞƐ ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐ
seemingly conclusive passage is embedded in a ten-page poem which elsewhere contains 
contrary estimations of life underscores the sense in whŝĐŚƚŚĞƉŽĞƚŝĐǀŽŝĐĞŝƐ ‘ĂƚƚƵŶĞĚƚŽ
ǁŚĂƚŝƐŚĂƉƉĞŶŝŶŐ ? ?Ŷ ?Žǁ ?ĂŶĚĂƐƐƵĐŚƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƐƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚůǇƚŽůŝĨĞĂƐŝƚĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐƚŽůŝǀĞŚŝŵ ?
ĂŶĚŚĞŝƚ ?dŚŝƐŝƐƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŽŶŐŽŝŶŐƌĞǀĞůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŝŶ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚ
poems ?  by framing events and multiple contrary perspectives from a consistently sustained 
poetic voice the text extends by virtue of the life it continues to manifest.  
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  dŚĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĚĂǇŝŶ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝƐŽĨƚĞŶĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĞĚǁŝƚŚŝŶůĂƌŐĞƌŽƌĚĞƌƐ ?
most commonly in seasons and months ?dŚŝƐĐĂŶďĞĚŝƐƉůĂǇĞĚǁŝƚŚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?Ɛ
ĞǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ‘DĂƌĐŚ ? ? ‘Ɖƌŝů ?ĂŶĚ ‘DĂǇ ?ŝŶ ‘,ǇŵŶƚŽ>ŝĨĞ ? ? ‘DĂǇ ?ŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĂĐƚƐĂƐĂŶ
example of how Schuyler articulates the experience of a temporal event which occurs over a 
significant span. ThiƐŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĨƌŽŵ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?Ɛ ‘ĚĂǇ ?ƚŽŚŝƐ ‘DĂǇ ?ŝƐŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐƚŚŝƐ
ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?Ɛ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ ?ŝĨ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐǇŝƐůŽĐĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŝƚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĚĂǇ ? ?
then the way in which he situates these days within the larger measure of a month can be 
seen as a temporal means of poetic extension. In this manner, temporality acts as a further 
ĨƌĂŵĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞŚĞůĚ ? 
 
dĞŵƉŽƌĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?Ɛ ‘DŽŶƚŚƐ ? 
ƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚ ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞŵƐĨƌĂŵĞƚĞŵƉŽƌĂůŝƚǇĂƐĂŶŽŶƚŽůogical restlessness. His 
aesthetic of the commingling particulars of dailiness echoes Merleau-WŽŶƚǇ ?ƐĨŝŐƵƌĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ
 “dŝŵĞŝƐŶĞŝƚŚĞƌĂƌĞĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŶŽƌĂŶĂĐƚƵĂůƐƵĐĐĞƐ ŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ/ĐŽƵůĚůŝŵŝƚŵǇƐĞůĨƐŝŵƉůǇƚŽ
recording. It is born of my relation with things ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). Temporality is, as Kaufman 
writĞƐ ? “^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐŐƌĞĂƚƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?(np). The fact that his longer poems are all articulations 
taking place from the finite perspective of the poet reflecting on the process at hand makes 
ƚŚĞŵ ‘ĞǀĞŶƚƐ ?ǁŝƚŚĂƚĞŵƉŽƌĂůŝƚǇďŽƚŚƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĂŶĚŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƐĂƌĞŽĨƚĞŶ
directly concerned with the particular evidence of objective time (growth, the seasons, the 
weather, natural cycles, the day, the month) but these are only ever given in the texts 





Chance happenings offset each other, and then this dust of facts coalesces, 
outlines a certain way of taking a position in relation to the human situation, 
an event whose contours are defined and about which we can speak. 
         (2012, 66) 
dŚŝƐƐĞĞŵƐƚƌƵĞŽĨ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĨƌĂŵŝŶŐŽĨƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŝŶŚŝƐǁŽƌŬƐŽĨƉŽĞƚŝĐĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ ? in the 
sense that the proximity his texts develops across their span with the poet-subject itself 
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐĂŶĞǀĞŶƚ ?dŚĞ ‘ĐŽŶƚŽƵƌƐ ?ŽĨ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞŝŶĐůƵĚĞŶŽƚŽŶůǇƚŚĞůŝǀĞĚĞǀĞŶƚƐ
he describes but also the very event of describing these events. By framing the events of 
friendship, love, longing, desire and care, Schuyler exposes empathy as a temporal process, 
an active event which must take place in the poem, rather than merely be projected as a 
ƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚ ?tŚĂƚ>ĞǀŝŶĂƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐĂƐƚŚĞ “ĚŝƐƚƵƌďĂŶĐĞŽĨ ? Q ?ƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌĂďůĞƚŝŵĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ
ƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶŝŶƚŚĞƌĞƐƚůĞƐƐƚĞŵƉŽƌĂůƐƵƌĨĂĐĞŝŶ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?
This ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞƐ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?Ɛ idiosyncratic poetic extension in that, whilst he writes within the 
ƵŶŝƚƐŽĨ ‘ĚĂǇƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŵŽŶƚŚƐ ?, the range of temporalities invoked with reference to events 
which have occurred in the past or which are soon to occur creates a sense in which 
ƚĞŵƉŽƌĂůĚƵƌĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŝƚƐĞůĨƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĚŝŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƐǁŚŝĐŚƉŽƉƵůĂƚĞ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƚĞǆƚƐ ?
This suggests a sense of temporality as textual; which is to say that it functions through a 
series of signifiers, including objective indications like the setting of the sun or human need 
ĨŽƌƐůĞĞƉ ?ĂŶĚĂƐƐƵĐŚŝƚƐĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĂƚĞǆƚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐĂ ‘ĨƌĂŵŝŶŐ ?ŽĨƚŝŵĞ ? 
   ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐůĂƐƚůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ ‘&ĞǁĂǇƐ ?ĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶƚŽƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ
ƚĞŵƉŽƌĂůŝƚǇĂƐŝƚƐĞůĨďĞŝŶŐƚĞǆƚƵĂů ?dŚĞƉŽĞŵŽƐƚĞŶƐŝďůǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐƚŚĞĚĞĂƚŚŽĨ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?Ɛ
mother, but the revelation of this fact ?   “ƚŚĞǁĞĂƌǇũŽƵƌŶĞǇĚŽŶĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? only occurs 
in the tightened closing lines of the poem. Prior to this, the reader is confronted with a 
ǀĂƌŝĞƚǇŽĨŵĞĚŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞƉŚƌĂƐĞ ‘&ĞǁĂǇƐ ? P
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[A few days] are all we have. So count them as they pass. They pass 
  too quickly 
KƵƚŽĨďƌĞĂƚŚ PĚŽŶ ?ƚĚǁĞůůŽn the grave, which yawns for 
  one and all.       (1995, 354) 
 A few days: how to celebrate them? 
  /ƚ ?ƐƚŽĚĂǇ/ǁĂŶƚ 
to memorialize but how can I? What is there to it? 
  Cold coffee and 
a ham-salad sandwich?       (Ibid., 356) 
       There is 
   No place to put  
anything. These squandered minutes, hours, days. A few days, spend  
  them riotously.         (Ibid., 357) 
The first of these passages, which opens the poem, might suggest at first a fairly sentimental 
reflection on time and life. This sense of sentiment, however, gives way to Schuyler 
addressing the particulars of the day: travel, reported conversations, observations of 
landscapes, flowers and animals. The second passage quoted above then cuts short these 
meditations, making explicitly synonymous the regularity of the day with the problem how to 
ĐĞůĞďƌĂƚĞ ‘>ŝĨĞ ? in the poem. The third reflection, which advises to spend life riotously exhibits 
a variation in thought from the opening passage. The structural effect is that as the poet-
subject articulates both life and reflections on these articulations the thought process alters. 
dŚĂƚƚŚĞƉŽĞŵĞŶĚƐǁŝƚŚƐƉĞĂŬĞƌ ?ƐďĞƌĞĂǀĞŵĞŶƚƐŚŽǁƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƚĞŵƉŽƌĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞ
poem is one of having sat down to write a poem the overarching subject of which ?  
bereavement ?  exerts a cumulative ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞŽŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚƐĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚ ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?Ɛ
ĞƋƵŝǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ůŝĨĞ ?ǁŝƚŚ ‘ĂĨĞǁĚĂǇƐ ?ŐŝǀĞƐǁĂǇďǇƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ƐĞŶĚƚŽĂŶĞŵďĞĚĚĞĚƉŚŽŶĞ
call in which the news is broken. The poem in this regard is a contingent elegy, a self-reflexive 
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articulation of grief. Again, underscored throughout by Schuyler is the overwhelming 
significance of paying attention to the particularity of the daily. He writes: 
Tomorrow is another day, but no better than today if 
  you only realise it. 
>Ğƚ ?ƐůŽǀĞƚŽĚĂǇ ?ƚŚĞǁŚĂƚǁĞŚĂǀĞŶŽǁ ?ƚŚŝƐĚĂǇ ?ŶŽƚ 
  today or tomorrow or  
yesterday, but this passing moment, that will 
  not come again.  
Now tomorrow is today, the day before labor day, 
  1979.        (1995, 362) 
 ‘dŚĞǁŚĂƚǁĞŚĂǀĞŶŽǁ ?ŝƐďŽƚŚĂƚĞŵporal and an existential statement; in fact, those two 
adjectives are almost indistinct from each other in this context. As suggested earlier, 
^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞĚĂǇ ?ŝƐŽĨƚĞŶĨƌĂŵĞĚǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨŝƚƐƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŵŽŶƚŚ ?
This is frequently the case in his extended works, where the passage of time between 
seasons is marked for Schuyler by the weather and the effect this has on his mood and tone. 
/Ŷ ‘,ǇŵŶdŽ>ŝĨĞ ? ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞƐDĂƌĐŚ P 
After snowball time, a month, March, of fits and starts, winds, 
Rain, spring hints and wintry arrears. The weather pays its check, 
ůŝŬĞƋƵĂƌƌĞůůŝŶŐŝŶĂ ?ŚŽƚĞů ? “/ǁŽŶ ?ƚƋƵĂƌƌĞůĂďŽƵƚŝƚ ?ďƵƚ/ŵĂĚĞ 
EŽůŽĐĂůĐĂůůƐ ? ?      (Ibid., 215-216) 
dŚĞ ‘ĨŝƚƐĂŶĚƐƚĂƌƚƐ ?ŽĨƐŚŽƌƚƉĂƌĂƚĂĐƚŝĐĐůĂƵƐĞƐĞǀŽŬĞŶŽƚŽŶůǇ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ
month but the days which constitute it, distinguished by the weather they bear witness to. 
There are no quarrels, as Schuyler voices it, because the season is ambiguous, a commingling 
ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ƐƉƌŝŶŐŚŝŶƚƐĂŶĚǁŝŶƚƌǇĂƌƌĞĂƌƐ ?ďůƵƌ the clarity of the relation between March as a 
ĨŝǆĞĚŶŽƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĂƐĂƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶĂů ‘ƌĞƐƚůĞƐƐƐƵƌĨĂĐĞ ? ?ĂƌůŝĞƌŝŶƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
   The turning of the globe is not so real to us 
As the seasons turning and the days that rise out of early gray 
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 W The world is all cut outs then ?  and slip or step steadily down 
The slopes of our lives where the emotions and needs sprout. 
        (Ibid. 215) 
dŚĞ ‘ƌĞĂůŶĞƐƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĂƐŽŶƐŚĞƌĞůŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĂŶĚ ‘ĚĂǇƐ ?ĂƌĞƚŚĞƐŝƚĞƐǁŚĞƌĞ
 “ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚŶĞĞĚƐ ƐƉƌŽƵƚ ? ?ŵŽƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚŶĞĞĚƐ ? the content of the daily ?  are as such 
ŵŽƌĞ ‘ƌĞĂů ?ƚŚĂŶ ‘ƚŚĞƚƵƌŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞŐůŽďĞ ? ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞĚĂǇŝƐůŝǀĞĚĂŶĚƚŚĞƚƵƌŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞ
globe is not. This is a notably phenomenological perspective in the sense that Schuyler bears 
wŝƚŶĞƐƐƚŽ ‘ůŝĨĞ ? ? and the act of poetic extension ?  as an ongoing project which is 
perpetually beginning, in the same manner that days are lived in succession and constitute a 
recurring determination of what ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞƐƚŚĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĚĂǇ ? ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌfurther 
distinguishes March with reference to April  
    And if you thought March was bad 
Consider April, early April, wet snow falling into blue squills 
That underneath a beach make an illusory lake, a haze of blue 
With depth to it. That is like pain, ordinary household pain, 
Like piles, or bumping against a hernia.   (Ibid., 217) 
tŚĂƚŵŝŐŚƚďĞĂŶĂůůƵƐŝŽŶƚŽůŝŽƚ ?Ɛ ‘dŚĞtĂƐƚĞ>ĂŶĚ ?ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞƐƚŚĞƚŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌďǇ
reimagining the cruelty of April as being akin to the pain of piles. This does not dominate the 
passage, however ?  ŝƚƐƚĂŶĚƐƌĂƚŚĞƌŝŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚƚŽ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĞĂƌůŝĞƌĞǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨDĂƌĐŚŝŶ
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ‘ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇŚŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚƉĂŝŶ ?ĞǀŽŬĞĚ ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƐƉĞĂŬĞƌƚĞůůƐƵƐŚĞŚĂƐ
suffered a hernia earlier in the poem (Ibid. 214)) marks the month as a sensation rather than 
through its formal denotations. This sense of the month as a manifestation of the poet-
ƐƉĞĂŬĞƌ ?ƐŵŽŽĚŝƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚŝŶ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚDĂǇ P 
Thank you, May, for these warm stirrings. Life 
Goes on, it seems, though in all sorts of places ? nursing 
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Homes ? it is drawing to a close. Abstractions and generalities: 
Grass and blue depths into which the evening star seems set.     (1995, 223) 
 ‘tĂƌŵƐƚŝƌƌŝŶŐƐ ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĞ ‘ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌĂŶĚ ‘ůŝĨĞ ? ?ĂŶĚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ
ƵŶĚĞƌƐĐŽƌĞƐƚŚĞƉŽĞƚŝĐǀŽŝĐĞ ?ƐƐĞůĨ-ĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐďǇĂůůŽǁŝŶŐ ‘ƐƚŝƌƌŝŶŐ ?ƚŽŵĞĂŶďŽƚŚƚŚĞ
desire to articulate and those articulations themselves. The exchange ?   in the sense of 
dialogue ?  ǁŚŝĐŚƚĂŬĞƐƉůĂĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƐƉĞĂŬĞƌĂŶĚ ‘DĂǇ ?ĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƚĞŵƉŽƌĂůĨŝŐƵƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ
 ?DĂƌĐŚĂŶĚƉƌŝů ? ‘>ŝĨĞ ? ?ƚŚĞĚĂǇ ?ƚŚĞƐĞĂƐŽŶƐ )ŝƐƚŚĞĚƌ ǀŝŶŐŝŵƉĞƚƵƐŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ? ‘,ǇŵŶƚŽ
>ŝĨĞ ?ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƐǁŝƚŚĂĚŝĂůŽŐƵĞǁŝƚŚDĂǇŝƚƐĞůĨ P 
DĂǇŵƵƚƚĞƌƐ ? ‘tŚǇĂƐŬƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?Žƌ ? ‘tŚĂƚĂƌĞƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐǇŽƵǁŝƐŚƚŽ
ĂƐŬ ? ?         (Ibid., 223) 
The questions May asks are themselves concerned with the poet-ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŚŝƐ
world, and effect a kind of paradox, first questioning the need to ask questions before 
inviting further questions. This oscillation captures the stance we frequently find Schuyler 
ĂĚŽƉƚŝŶŐ PŚĞŚĂƐĂĚĞƐŝƌĞŶŽƚƚŽƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŽĐŽŵŵŝƚƚŽ “ƚŚĞƉƵƌĞƉůĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨƐŝŵƉůǇůŽŽŬŝŶŐ ?
(1995, 220), but he finds life ? here in the form of May ?  prompting him to question. 
Merleau-Ponty articulates a similar compositional aporia with reference to Paul Cézanne, 
ǁŚŽ ?ŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ ?ĚĞƐŝƌĞĚŶŽƚƚŽŚĂǀĞƚŽ “choose between feeling and thought, as if he were 
deciding between chaos and order. He did not want to separate the stable things which we 
see and the shifting ways in which they appear; he wanted to depict matter as it takes on 
form, the birth of order through spontaneous organisation ? ?DĞƌůĞĂƵ-Ponty 2003, 69). In a 
similar manner, Schuyler seeks to articulate this instability, this restless surface, and to bear 
ǁŝƚŶĞƐƐƚŽ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƚŚĞĚĂǇŽƌƚŚĞŵŽŶƚŚĂƐ ‘ƐƉŽŶƚĂŶĞŽƵƐŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂƐĂ
totality. This is not to say, however, that the revelation ŽĨƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŝŶ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝƐ
consistently maintained; rather, the acts of composition the poems frame adhere to an 
internal logic of contingency, in which digression is difficult to define as such because of the 
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 ‘ĚŝŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ?ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĞŵitself. Emmanuel Levinas, to whom I will shortly turn in 
ŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĚŝƐĐƵƐƐ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚĞ ? ?ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞƐƚŚŝƐŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇĨŽƌĚŝŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ
as a form of transcendence. He writes: 
dŽĐŽŶƚĂŝŶŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶŽŶĞ ?ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŵĞĂŶƚŽĞŵďƌĂĐĞŽƌto 
encompass the totality of being in thought, or, at least, to be able to account 
for it after the fact by the inward play of constitutive thought. To contain 
ŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶŽŶĞ ?ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇŝƐƚŽƐŚĂƚƚĞƌĂƚĞǀĞƌǇŵŽŵĞŶƚ ŚĞĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬŽĨĂ
content that is thought, to cross the barriers of immanence. (1999a, 27) 
^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ‘ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶƐŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶŚŝƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ?ŝŶŚŝƐĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƉŽĞƚŝĐƐďǇƐĞĞŬŝŶŐƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉĂ
mode of address which can articulate proximity not only with the phenomena of the month 
or of the day, but also wiƚŚƚŚĞůŝǀĞƐŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?dŚŝƐŝƐŶŽƚƚŽƐĂǇƚŚĂƚ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚƌǇ
ƐƵĐĐĞĞĚƐĂƚƚŚĞƚĂƐŬŽĨ “ĐƌŽƐƐ ?ŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐŽĨŝŵŵĂŶĞŶĐĞ ? ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŽŐĞƐƚƵƌĞĂƚƚŚĞ
ĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐŽĨ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƚŝĐŵĞĂŶƐŽĨĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ
can ďĞĨŽƵŶĚŝŶŚŝƐĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƚŽĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞ ?ĂƐ<ĂƚǌǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? “ǁŚĂƚŝƐďĞǇond him and beyond 
subjectivity ? ? ? ? ? ). 
 
Empathy & Proximity 
^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?Ɛ ‘ŵƉĂƚŚǇĂŶĚEĞǁzĞĂƌ ?ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞƐĞŵƉĂƚŚǇ ƌŽƵŐŚĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚ
encounters around the heavy snowfall of the season. It opens with an epigram from Claude 
Lévi-Strauss P “ŶŽƚŝŽŶůŝŬĞƚŚĂƚŽĨĞŵƉĂƚŚǇŝŶƐƉŝƌĞƐŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĚŝƐƚƌƵƐƚŝŶƵƐ, because it 
connotes a further dose of irrationalism and mysticism ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). This sense of empathy as 
ŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐ ‘ŵǇƐƚŝĐŝƐŵ ?ŝƐĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ĨƚĞƌĚ ƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐƚŚĞŝŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚĞ
weather ?ǁŚŝĐŚ “ŝƐŶ ?ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ?ƐŶŽǁŝŶŐ ?ƐůĞĞƚŝŶŐ ?ƐůƵƐŚŝŶŐ ? ?ǇĞƚŝƚ ŝƐĚŽŝŶŐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ? ? 
^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “dŽůŽŽŬŽƵƚ a window is to sense/ wet feet ? ?ibid.). Schuyler comes to 
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terms with the world outside the window, populated by other subjectivities like his own, 
through an empathic attempt to understand what it is like to be outside. This extends 
^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞǁĞĂƚŚĞƌƚŽŝŶĐůƵĚĞĂƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝƚŚĂƐŽŶ
an imagined Other. The following line self-ĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐůǇƐŚŝĨƚƐƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ƐĨŽĐƵƐ ?  “ŶŽǁƚŽ
infuse/the garage with a subjective state ? ? and furthermore gestures towards Lévi-Strauss ?
ƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ ‘ŝƌƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵĂŶĚŵǇƐƚŝĐŝƐŵ ?ŝŶŝƚƐĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽ  ‘ŝŶĨƵƐĞ ?ĂƐŝŐŚƚǁŝƚŚ ‘ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? ?dŚĞ
 ‘ĞŵƉĂƚŚŝĐ ?ŝƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚůĂƚĞƌŝŶƚŚĞƉŽĞŵǁŚĞŶ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “EĞǁǇĞĂƌŝƐŶĞĂƌůǇŚĞƌĞ ?
and who, knowing hŝŵƐĞůĨ ?ǁŽƵůĚ ?ĞŶĚĂŶŐĞƌŚŝƐĚĞƐŝƌĞƐ ?ƌĞƐŽůǀŝŶŐƚŚĞŵ ?ŝŶĂĨŽƌŵƵůĂ ? ? ?Ibid. 
78) dŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ƐĐůŽƐĞ ?ĂǀĞƌďĂůĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞƚĂŬĞƐƉůĂĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?Ɛ/ĂŶĚĂŶ
unknown Other: 
 “ƐŶŽǁƉŝĐƚƵƌĞ ? ?ǇŽƵ 
said, under the clung-to 
ĞůŵƐ ? “ǁŽƌƚŚƉĂŝŶƚŝŶŐ ? ?/ 
said  “dŚĞǁĞĂƚŚĞƌŽƉĞƌĂƚŽƌ 
ƐĂŝĚ ? ‘dƵƌŶŝŶŐƚŽŵŽƌƌŽǁ 
ƚŽďŝƚƚĞƌĐŽůĚ ? ? ? “dŚĞŶ 
the wind will veer round 
to the north and blow 
ĂůůŽĨŝƚĚŽǁŶ ? ?DĂǇďĞ/ 
thought it will get cold 
some other way. You 
as usual were right. 
It did and has. Night 
and snow and the threads of life 
for once seen as they are, 
in ropes like roots.    (Ibid. 79) 
>ĞǀŝŶĂƐ ?ƉŚƌĂƐĞ “ƚŚĞŽŶĞ-for-the-ŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?>ĞǀŝŶĂƐ ? ? ? ?ď ? ? ? )ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚŽƵƌ
being axiomatically signifies, not only in the sense of revealing a subjectivity but in revealing 
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how subjectivity itself is encountered by others. This is a profoundly ethical phenomenology 
by virtue of the fact that the site for all meaning and thought is itself constituted of the 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘^ĂŵĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘dŚĞKƚŚĞƌ ? ?Ɛ>ĞǀŝŶĂƐǁƌŝƚĞƐ ?ƚŚŝƐrelation involves both the 
risk of endangering the self and of totalising the other: 
The absolutely other is the Other. He and I do not form a number. The 
ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ/ƐĂǇ ‘ǇŽƵ ?Žƌ ‘ǁĞ ?ŝƐŶŽƚĂƉůƵƌĂůŽĨƚŚĞ ‘/ ? ?/ ?ǇŽƵ ? these 
are not individuals of a common concept. Neither possession nor the unity of 
number nor the unity of concept link me to the Stranger, the Stranger who 
disturbs the being at home with oneself. But Stranger also means the free 
one. Over him I have no power. He escapes my grasp by an essential 
dimension even if I have him at my disposal. He is not wholly in my site.  
       (Levinas 1999a, 39) 
dŚĞƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ‘ƐŝƚĞ ?ĂƐƐƵĐŚŵĂƌŬƐƚŚĞĂŵďŝŐƵŽƵƐƉŽŝŶƚĂƚǁŚŝĐŚ^ĂŵĞĂŶĚKƚŚĞƌ
ŵĞĞƚŝŶ ‘ƵŶĐŽŵŵŽŶ ?ƚĞƌŵƐ ?dŚĞĚŽƵďůĞďŝŶĚƚŚŝƐĞĨfects ?  wherein our subjectivity is 
absolutely subject to the plural world, whilst the Stranger is subject to our meeting with 
him ?  ŝƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌďǇ>ĞǀŝŶĂƐǁŝƚŚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ƐŝƚĞ ?ĂƐĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?,ĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P
 “ŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞǀĞƌǇĨĂĐƚƚŚat it maintains the distance between me and the Other 
 ? Q ?ĐĂŶŶŽƚƌĞŶŽƵŶĐĞƚŚĞĞŐŽŝƐŵŽĨŝƚƐĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞǀĞƌǇĨĂĐƚŽĨďĞŝŶŐŝŶĂĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶ
consists in recognising in the Other a right over this egoism ? ?Ibid. 40). In this figure, engaging 
with the ǁŽƌĚƐĂŶĚŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐĂƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚ ?ƚŚŝƐKƚŚĞƌŚĂƐ
to articulate its own sense of subjectivity. 
  Merleau-WŽŶƚǇ ?ƐŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇĂƐĂůǁĂǇƐďĞŝŶŐĞŶƚĂŶŐůĞĚ “ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐǁŝƚŚŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚ>ĞǀŝŶĂƐ ?ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇĂƐ ‘ŽŶĞ-for-the-ŽƚŚĞƌ ?
ĂƌĞĂƐƐƵĐŚƵƐĞĨƵůŵĞĂŶƐŽĨĐŽŵŝŶŐƚŽƚĞƌŵƐǁŝƚŚ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?dŚŝƐŝƐ
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƚƌƵĞŽĨ ‘dŚĞDŽƌŶŝŶŐKĨdŚĞWŽĞŵ ? ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?-303), which at various times 
directly addresses a number of YŽƵ ?Ɛ ? family members, poets, artists, friends. In these 
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examples, it is the particularity of the relation which characterises Schuyler ?Ɛ empathic 
ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?/ŶƚŚĞ ‘ŶŶĞƵŶŶ ?ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘dŚĞDŽƌŶŝŶŐKĨdŚĞWŽĞŵ ? ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ
quotes a letter from his recently bereaved friend Anne, followed by his reflections: 
     ? Q ?/ŬŶŽǁŚŽǁŚĂƌƌŽǁŝŶŐŝƚŵƵƐƚ 
 ŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĨŽƌǇŽƵ ?ďƵƚ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚ/ ?ŵŶŽƚŵƵĐŚŽĨ 
ŵǇƐƚŝĐ ?/ ?ŵƐƵƌĞŝŶƚŚĂƚůĂƐƚůŽŶŐŚĂŶĚĐůĂƐƉŚĞŐĂǀĞǇŽƵ 
  something: not just love, the electric flow of his failing 
Power: a gentle charge: and in exchange took with him from your 
 physical grip all that you felt for him all those 
Years, condensed in a red pulsation.    (1995, 299) 
Schuyler ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐ ?ŝŶĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨĐŽŵƉůŝŵĞŶƚĂƌǇĐůĂƵƐĞƐĨŽƌŵĞĚŝŶƚŽĂ ‘ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?ďǇƚŚĞ
ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝǀĞĐŽůŽŶƐ ? “ƚŚĞĞůĞĐƚƌŝĐĨůŽǁŽĨ ? Q ?ƉŽǁĞƌ ? ?ĂƉŚƌĂƐĞƌĞŵŝŶŝƐĐĞŶƚŽĨtŚŝƚŵĂŶ and 
 ‘,ǇŵŶdŽ>ŝĨĞ ?Ɛ ? ‘ŶĞƌŐǇ ? ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐŶŽƚŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽďĞ ‘ŵǇƐƚŝĐŝƐŵ ? ?ĂƉŚƌĂƐĞǁŚŝĐŚƌĞĐĂůůƐƚŚĞ
ĞƉŝŐƌĂŵƚŽ ‘ŵƉĂƚŚǇĂƚEĞǁzĞĂƌ ?ĂĚŽƉƚĞĚĨƌŽŵLévi-Strauss, but rather has to do with the 
act of articulation itself. The passage is caught in a tension between the empathy being 
ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚĂŶĚƚŚĞŝŶĂĚĞƋƵĂĐǇŽĨƚŚĞŵĞĚŝƵŵ ?ůĞĂǀŝŶŐ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌƚŽĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞ “ǇĞƐ ? ?/ǁŝƐŚ/
ŚĂĚďĞĞŶǁŝƚŚǇŽƵ ? ?Ibid.), a phrase which addresses the significance of the encounter over 
ŝƚƐŝŶƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞƚĞǆƚ ?dŚŝƐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƌĞǀĞĂůƐĂ ŽŐŝĐǁŚĞƌĞŝŶ ?ĨŽƌ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚ-subject, 
the encounter occurs in the text itself, in his articulation of it as an event. In a certain sense, 
this bereaveŵĞŶƚŝƐƚĞǆƚƵĂů ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ƚŚĞƉŚƌĂƐĞƐ ‘ƚŽƵĐŚ ? ? ‘ŚĂŶĚĐůĂƐƉ ? ? ‘ĂƌĞĚƉƵůƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ‘ǇŽƵƌ
ƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůŐƌŝƉ ? ? ‘ĐŽŶĚĞŶƐĞĚ ?ĂŶĚ ?ŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ? ‘ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐ  ?ƵŶĚĞƌƐĐŽƌĞƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚ
^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌǁŝƐŚĞƐŚŝƐƚĞǆƚƵĂůĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƐƚŽďĞ ‘ƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚĞ ?ƚŽƚŚĞĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƐƚŚĞǇĚetail. In this 
ƌĞŐĂƌĚ ?ŝƚŝƐƵƐĞĨƵůƚŽƚƵƌŶƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ>ĞǀŝŶĂƐ ?ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐŽŶ ‘ƉƌŽǆŝŵŝƚǇ ? ?/ŶOtherwise Than Being, 
he writes: 
Proximity is to be described as extending the subject in its very subjectivity, 
ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐďŽƚŚĂƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉĂŶĚĂƚĞƌŵŽĨƚŚŝƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ? ? Q ?Ɛ
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signification, the-one-for-the-other, proximity is not a configuration produced 
in the soul. It is an immediacy older than the abstractness of nature. Nor is it 
fusion; it is contact with the other.  (1999b, 86) 
This immanent sense of the proximate illuminates the meeting with the Other as occurring in 
ĂƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂůƐŝƚĞ ‘ŽůĚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚŶĞƐƐŽĨŶĂƚƵƌĞ ? ?Levinas here seems to be 
ŐĞƐƚƵƌŝŶŐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞ ‘ĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĂƚŽĐĐƵƌƐŝŶƚŚĞĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŽĐĞŶƚƌŝĐĚĞƐŝŐŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ
ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚĂƐ ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ? ?dŚŝƐĂŶĂůŽŐƵĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐĂƐĞŶƐĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƉƌŽǆŝŵŝƚǇďĞĂƌƐ
witness to a transcendental being. This is not, however, a Heideggerian sense of Being, 
ǁŚŝĐŚ ?ĂƐ>ĞǀŝŶĂƐǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? “ĂĨĨŝƌŵ ?Ɛ ?ƚŚĞƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇŽĨBeing over existent ?ĂŶĚ ?ĂƐƐƵĐŚ ? “ĂůƌĞĂĚǇ
decides the essence of philosophy ? ? ? ? ? ?Ă ? ? ? ). dŚĞƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ>ĞǀŝŶĂƐƉĞƌĨŽƌŵƐŽŶ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?Ɛ
Being and Time helps distinguish his conception of Being as being concerned first and 
foremost with the ƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚĞ “ĞƚŚŝĐĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?Ibid.). As Levinas writes: 
Proximity, immediacy, is to enjoy or suffer by the other. But I can enjoy and 
suffer by the other only because I am-for-the-other, am signification, because 
the contact with skin is still a proximity of a face, a responsibility, an obsession 
with the other, being-one-for-the-other, which is the very birth of signification 
beyond being. (1999b, 90) 
dŚĞ ‘ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚ  ‘ŽďƐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞƐŽƵƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚĞŽƚŚĞƌŝƐƚŚĞ
 ‘ǀĞƌǇďŝƌƚŚŽĨƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶďĞǇŽŶĚďĞŝŶŐ ? ?>ĞǀŝŶĂƐĚŝĨĨĞƌƐĨƌŽŵ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌŝŶƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐ
fundamentally the relations between beings, in the sense of existents, as opposed to a 
totalising BĞŝŶŐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚůĞƐƐĞƌďĞŝŶŐƐƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞ ?WƌŽǆŝŵŝƚǇĂƐƐƵĐŚŝƐĞǀŽŬĞĚŝŶ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?Ɛ
ƉŽĞƚŝĐƐŝŶŚŝƐŽŶŐŽŝŶŐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶǁŝƚŚ ‘ůŝĨĞ ?ĂƐĂƐĞƌŝ ƐŽĨĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƐĂŶĚĞǀĞŶƚƐĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚ
by being-one-for-the-ŽƚŚĞƌ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŝŶ ‘dŚĞDŽƌŶŝŶŐKĨdŚĞWŽĞŵ ?ƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶd person 
 ‘zŽƵ ?ƐŚŝĨƚƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ŝŵƉůǇŝŶŐƚŚĞĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŽĨǀĂƌŝŽƵƐƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƉŽĞƚ
himself. Schuyler reflects on this: 
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  When you read this poem you will have to decide 
 tŚŝĐŚŽĨƚŚĞ “ǇŽƵƐ ?ĂƌĞ “ǇŽƵ ? ?/ƚŚŝŶŬǇŽƵǁŝůůŚĂǀĞŶŽƚƌŽƵďůĞ ? 
  as you rise from your chair and take up your 
Brush again and scrub in some green, that particular green, 
  ǁŚŽƐĞŶĂŵĞ/ĐĂŶ ?ƚƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌ ?   (1995, 294) 
dŚŝƐŐĞƐƚƵƌĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŝƚǇŝƐŝƌŽŶŝĐŝŶŝƚƐƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĚĞŝĐƚŝĐ ‘ǇŽƵ ? ?ŝƚƐĞůĨ
without referent, evokes through its address a sense of the particular. The closing line echoes 
ƚŚŝƐĂŵďŝŐƵŝƚǇŝŶŝƚƐŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽŶĂŵĞ ‘ƚŚĂƚƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŐƌĞĞŶ ? ?dŚŝƐĂŵďŝŐƵŝƚǇ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĞǀŽŬĞƐ
ƉƌŽǆŝŵŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŝƚǇ ?ŝŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŚĂƐďĞĞŶǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĞĚďǇďŽƚŚƚŚĞ ‘/ ?
ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘zŽƵ ? ?ĂŶĚďǇĨŽƌŐĞƚƚŝŶŐŝƚƐŶĂŵĞ ? rather than, for example, adopting a simile ?  but 
ůĞĂǀŝŶŐƚŚŝƐŽŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌƌĞĨƵƐĞƐƚŽĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞƚŚĞKƚŚĞƌ ?ƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?
ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚĞǀŽŬŝŶŐƚŚĞŐƌĞĞŶƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ‘ƚŚĂƚ-ŶĞƐƐ ? ?dŚis kind of deixis is used throughout 
^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?Ɛ interactions with Others in his work, and furthermore establishes a sense of the 
ƚĞŵƉŽƌĂůŝŶŚŝƐĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƉŽĞŵƐǁŚŝĐŚƐĞĞŬƐƚŽĞǀŽŬĞďƵƚŶŽƚĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞƚŚĞƚĞŵƉŽƌĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ?
of Others. Again, Levinas phrases thŝƐĂƐĂŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨ ‘ƉƌŽǆŝŵŝƚǇ ? P
WƌŽǆŝŵŝƚǇ ?ƐƵƉƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐŽĨ Q ?ŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐ ?
opens the distance of a diachrony without a common present, where 
difference is the past that cannot be caught up with, an unimaginable future, 
the non-representable status of the neighbour behind which I am late and 
obsessed by the neighbour. This difference is my non-indifference to the 
other. Proximity is a disturbance of the rememberable time. (1999b, 89) 
dŚŝƐ “ŶŽŶ-ŝŶĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ?ŝƐďĂƐĞĚ ŝŶĂ ‘ĚŝĂĐŚƌŽŶǇǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĂĐŽŵŵŽŶƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ? ?
ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇ ?ŽŶĞ ?ƐƌĞĐĞƉƚŝǀŝƚǇƚŽƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌestablishes a sense of the temporal in which the 
 “ƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌĂďůĞ ?ŝƐĚŝƐƚƵƌďĞĚďǇƉƌŽǆŝŵŝƚǇ ? /Ŷ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŽĨƚĞŶĞǆƚĞŶĚƚŽ
encompass past memories when provoked by present perception, the texts frequently refer 
to the past with reference to the articulations of others. This is particularly the case of his last 






Life as a continuous snack 
I wish it 
were lunch time. I wish I had 
an appetite. The day agrees 
with me better than it did, or, 
better, I agree with it.    
      (Poem (the day gets slowly started) 
 
/ǁŽƵůĚůŝŬĞƚŽĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞďǇĚǁĞůůŝŶŐŽŶ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĞŶse ŽĨ “ůŝĨĞĂƐĂĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐƐŶĂĐŬ ? (1995, 
357). Herd writes of the lip-ƐŵĂĐŬŝŶŐŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐŵĨŽƌůŝĨĞ ?ĂĚŽƉƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ƚĞƌŵ ‘ƌĞůŝƐŚŝŶŐ ?ƚŽĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞŚŝƐ poetics. For Schuyler, the act of enjoying eating has a 
fundamental relation to life. Levinas articulates a similar stance towards the relation between 
ƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ŶŽƵƌŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ? ?/ŶTotality and Infinity ?ŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “tĞůŝǀĞĨƌŽŵ “ŐŽŽĚ
ƐŽƵƉ ? ?Ăŝƌ ?ůŝŐŚƚ ?ƐƉĞĐƚĂĐůĞƐ ?ǁŽƌŬ ?ŝĚĞĂƐ ?ƐůĞĞƉ ?ĞƚĐ QdŚĞƐĞĂƌĞŶŽƚŽďũĞĐƚƐŽĨƌĞƉresentations. 
We live from them ? ? ? ? ? ?Ă ? ? ? ? ). dŚŝƐ ‘ůŝǀ ?ŝŶŐ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŵ ?ŝƐĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚďǇ>ĞǀŝŶĂƐĂƐ
 ‘ŶũŽǇŵĞŶƚ ? P
Enjoyment is precisely this way the act nourishes itself with its own activity. To 
live from bread is therefore neither to represent bread to oneself nor to act 
ŽŶŝƚŶŽƌƚŽĂĐƚďǇŵĞĂŶƐŽĨŝƚ ?dŽďĞƐƵƌĞ ?ŝƚŝƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽĞĂƌŶŽŶĞ ?ƐďƌĞĂĚ ?
ĂŶĚŝƚŝƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽŶŽƵƌŝƐŚŽŶĞƐĞůĨŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĞĂƌŶŽŶĞ ?ƐďƌĞĂĚ ?ƚŚƵƐƚhe 
bread I eat is also that with which I earn my bread and my life. (1999a, 111) 
Levinas articulates a self-ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ ‘ůŝĨĞ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞŝŶ “ůŝĨĞ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶǁ ƚŚƚŚĞǀĞƌǇ
conditions of its life becomes the nourisŚŵĞŶƚĂŶĚĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĂƚůŝĨĞ ? (Ibid., 112). We can 
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ƐĞĞĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌƉƌŽĐĞƐƐƚĂŬŝŶŐƉůĂĐĞŝŶ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƌĞǀĞůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?  and, despite the 
fact that he was often destitute throughout his life and relied on the hospitality and financial 
assistance of friends to live, the poet-subject of hŝƐĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚǁŽƌŬƐĐĂŶďĞƐĂŝĚƚŽ ‘ĞĂƌŶŝƚƐ
ďƌĞĂĚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĂĐƚŽĨĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŝƌĐƵůĂƌŝƚǇ>ĞǀŝŶĂƐĞǀŽŬĞƐ ?  
 “ƚŚĞďƌĞĂĚ/ĞĂƚŝƐĂůƐŽƚŚĂƚǁŝƚŚǁŚŝĐŚ/ĞĂƌŶŵǇďƌĞĂĚĂŶĚŵǇůŝĨĞ ? ? the act of composition 
is generative. This can certaŝŶůǇďĞǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĞĚŝŶ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĐĐƵƌƐĂƐ
the subject continutes to compose itself in the text. As such, it is necessary to remind 
ourselves of the three idiosyncratic features I sought to address in the course of this chapter. 
SchuylĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŚĂƐďĞĞŶĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞƌĚŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨŝƚƐ ‘ƌĞƐƚůĞƐƐƐƵƌĨĂĐĞ ?ŽĨ ‘ůŝĨĞ ?
ĂŶĚŝƚƐ ‘ĚĂǇƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŵŽŶƚŚƐ ?ŝƚŚĂƐĂůƐŽďĞĞŶĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĚŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌŽǆŝŵŝƚǇ ?
of social relations and local empathic exchanges and the temporal questions these raise. To 
ƌĞĂĚ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĨŽƵƌǁŽƌŬƐŽĨĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƉŽĞƚŝĐƐĂůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌŝƐƚŽǁŝƚŶĞƐƐƚŚĞ
revelation of a consistently articulated subjectivity, albeit one prone to digressions and self-
interrogation, which seeks a receptivity with the proximity of the things, people and events of 
ŚŝƐůŝĨĞ ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐƚĞǆƚs not only articulate a finite perspective upon life but also frame it. 
>ĞǀŝŶĂƐŽĨĨĞƌƐƵƐĂŵĞĂŶƐŽĨĐŽŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐŽŶƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?ƐĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƉŽĞƚŝĐƐĂƐďĞŝŶŐ
characterised foremoƐƚďǇŝƚƐĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĂŶĚ ‘ƌĞůŝƐŚ ?ůŝĨĞ P 
Life is love of life, a relation with contents that are not my being but more dear 
than my being: thinking, eating, sleeping, reading, working, warming oneself in 
the sun. Distinct from my substance but constituting it, these contents reflect 
the worth of my life. (Ibid. 112) 
dŚĞ ‘ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚƐ ?ŽĨůŝĨĞƚŚĂƚŐŝǀĞŝƚŝƚƐǁŽƌƚŚ ?ĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚ^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌďĞĂƌƐǁŝƚŶĞƐƐƚŽŝŶŚŝƐƉŽĞŵƐ ?
involve an engagement which underscores the sense in which life is a continuous activity. 
^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞƐƚŚŝƐŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐƐŶĂĐŬƐ ?ŽĨŚŝƐ ‘ĚĂǇƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŵŽŶƚŚƐ ? ?ƚŚĞĂƌƌĂŶŐĞĚ
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and extended commingling of which constitute both the idiosyncrasy of his poetic extension 





4      The Practice of Outside          Robin Blaser 
        
 
Here, in an endless narration, you, dear reader, are visible in a nexus 





Oppen, Schuyler and Robin Blaser are all poets for whom questions of how to live in a world 
with others take foremost importance in their extended poetries. For Blaser, more so than 
for Schuyler or Oppen, his close personal and poetic relationships with what he calls his 
 ‘ĐŽƚĞƌŝĞ ?ŝƐŝŶŵĂŶǇǁĂǇƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝǀĞŽĨŚŝƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?,ŝƐƉŽĞƚƌǇŝƐseriously concerned with 
friendship. In this regard, dĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐǇŽĨůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐŽĨĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŝƐ
somewhat complicated by the extent to which his poetry circulates terms developed as a 
ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůůǇ ?ůĂƐĞƌĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƐƚŚŝƐŚŝŵƐĞůĨŝŶ ‘dŚĞ&ŝƌĞ ?ǁŚĞŶŚĞ
ǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “/Ŷ^ĂŶ&ƌĂŶƐŝƐĐŽ ?/ǁĂƐƚŝĞĚƚŽƚǁŽŽƚŚĞƌƉŽĞƚƐǁŚŽ ?ŝƚǁĂƐŵǇƐƵƉĞƌƐƚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ǁƌŽƚĞŵǇ
ƉŽĞŵƐĨŽƌŵĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?ď ? ? ). For Blaser, this is not merely a superstition; it is fundamentally 
ƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚŽĨ “dŚĞZĞĐŽǀĞƌǇŽĨdŚĞWƵďůŝĐtŽƌůĚ ? ?Ibid. 64), a phrase he adopts 
ĨƌŽŵ,ĂŶŶĂŚƌĞŶĚƚ ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝ ŚƌĞŶĚƚ ?DĂƵƌŝĐĞDĞƌůĞĂƵ-
Ponty and Giorgio Agamben throughout his 30-year work of poetic extension Image-Nations 
furthermore grants his poetics access to a variety of discourses on the intersubjective, and 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐĐŽƌĞƐƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚƌǇŽĨĨĞƌƐĂƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĞĚinquiry into the fact that 
 “ƚŚe Other is present and primary to our speaking ? ?Ibid., 32). 
  ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌǁŝůůƐĞĞŬƚŽĚŝƐĐůŽƐĞƚŚĞŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐŝĞƐŽĨůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐ
ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŝŶ ‘/ŵĂŐĞ-EĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?dŚŝƐǁŝůůďĞĐĂƌƌŝĞĚŽƵƚǁŝƚŚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽ ŚƌĞĞƚĞƌŵƐǁŚŝĐŚ
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ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚƌǇ ?&ŝƌƐƚ ?/ǁŝůůĂĚĚƌĞƐƐůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ ‘ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ? ?ďŽƚŚŝŶŚŝƐĞƐƐĂǇ
ŽŶ:ĂĐŬ^ƉŝĐĞƌ ?ƐCollected Book Poems  ‘dŚĞWƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŽĨKƵƚƐŝĚĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?ď ? ? ? ? )ĂŶĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ
the individual sections of Image-Nations ?^ĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ?ůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƐĞƌŝĂůŵĞƚŚŽĚŽĨĂƌƌĂŶŐĞment ?  
in which the parts of his extended work appear in numerous volumes across and amidst 
ƐŚŽƌƚĞƌƉŽĞŵƐŽƵƚƐŝĚĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĨƌĂŵĞ ?ŽĨ ‘/ŵĂŐĞ-EĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? will be discussed in terms of its 
ǀĂƌŝĞƚŝĞƐŽĨ ‘ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĂŶĚǁŚĂƚůĂƐĞƌĐĂůůƐƚŚĞ ‘ĨŽůĚŝŶŐ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶŝƚƐƉarts. Finally, and by 
ǁĂǇŽĨĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ?/ǁŝůůƐĞĞŬƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉĂƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĐŚŝĂƐŵŝĐ ?ŝŶůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚƌǇ ?ǁŝƚŚ
specific reference to his own writings on the term and Merleau-WŽŶƚǇ ?ƐŝŶThe Visible and The 
Invisible. The chiasm ?  ƚŚĞ “ƌĞĐŝƉƌŽĐĂůŝŶƐĞƌƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŝŶƚǁŝŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞŽŶĞŝŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ?
(Merleau-Ponty 1997, 138) ?  will offer a means by which I can bring together the 





Exteriority ? that which is outside ?  ŝƐĂƉƌĞǀĂŝůŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĞŝŶůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚƌǇ ?/Ŷ ‘ŶĞĐĚŽƚĞ ? ?Ă
ƉŽĞŵĨƌŽŵ ‘WĞůůDĞůů ? ?he articulates the movement language compels in the meeting 
between Self and Other: 
what did I think language 
did, as I grew up    well,  
it pulled me into 
 
and out-of, upwards-of  
and downwards-of, the 
side-by-side, serpentine friendship    (2006a, 274) 
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ůĂƐĞƌůŽĐĂƚĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĨŝŐƵƌĞŽĨ “ƐĞƌƉĞŶƚŝŶĞĨƌŝĞŶĚƐŚŝƉ ? “ĂƉƵůů ? “ŝŶƚŽĂŶĚ ?ŽƵƚ-of, upwards-of/ 
and downwards-ŽĨ ?ƚŚĞ ‘/ ? ?dŚĞƐĞƐƚĂŶĐĞƐĂƌĞƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĂůďut also indicative of orientation ?  
ƚŚĞƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚƵƐĞŽĨ ‘ŽĨ ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐ ?ĂƐŝƚĚŽĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ ǁŽƌŬŽĨ'ĞŽƌŐĞKƉƉĞŶ1, the singular 
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨĂƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚŝŶŐƐĂƐĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ. This is held in 
opposition to a conception of objects being accessible in and of themselves, somehow 
independent to the witnessing subject ?dŚĞ ‘ƐĞƌƉĞŶƚŝŶĞ ? ?ƚŚĂƚǁŚŝĐŚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĨŽůůŽǁĂ
straight path, is evoked in the relation between these movements ?  and it is important to 
note at the outset, particularly in ƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵƐImage-Nation and The 
Truth Is Laughter ?ƚŚĂƚ ‘ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?ŝƐĂŬĞǇƚĞƌŵĂŶĚŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŝŶŚŝƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?Ɛ^ĐŽƚƚWŽƵŶĚ
ǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? “ƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƐǇŶƚĂǆĂŶĚƐƉĂĐŝŶŐƐ ? Q ?ŝƐŶŽƚĂďƵŝůĚ-up of accumulated 
significance, but a mere setting in motion ? ?EŝĐŚŽůůƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). The most significant of these 
 “ƐĞƚƚŝŶŐŝŶŵŽƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ? ?ŝŶůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞKƚŚĞƌ ?ůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĐĞŝŶƚŚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚĐĂŶ
be understood in the terms of Emmanuel Levinas. The latter writes in Totality and Infinity: 
 
Speech first founds community by giving, by presenting the phenomenon as 
given; and it gives by thematising. The given is the work of a sentence. In the 
sentence the apparition loses its phenomenality in being fixed as a theme; in 
contrast to tŚĞƐŝůĞŶƚǁŽƌůĚ ?ĂŵďŝŐƵŝƚǇŝŶĨŝŶŝƚĞůǇŵĂŐŶŝĨŝĞĚ ? Q ?/ƚĚĞĨŝŶĞƐ ?
(2013, 98-99) 
Levinas proposes a conception of language as simultaneously giving and arresting the given. 
He does not present this as a problem, but rather establishes this as the founding of 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ŐŝǀĞŶ ?ŝƐƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽĂĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ‘ŐŝǀŝŶŐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŽĐĐƵƌƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
                                                          
1 dŚĞƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝƚŝĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐĂŶĚKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƐĞƌŝĂůůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶŐĞƐƚƵƌĞĚĂƚďǇŶĚƌĞǁDŽƐƐŝŶŝŶ
 ‘ZĞĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐdŚĞWƵďůŝĐtŽƌůĚ ? ?Even On Sunday. Ed. Miriam Nichols) but have not been fully explored or 
explicated. In particular, Mossin is interested in the mutual attention each poet pays to the functioning of 
communality in the face of the struggles of the late 1960s, particularly the Vietnam War ?  though far more 
importantly, so far as I am concerned, both poets work in a serial form as a direct result of their reading of and 
investigations into a variety of philosophies and phenomenologies.  
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ƚŚĞKƚŚĞƌĂŶĚƚŚĞƐĞůĨ ?dŚĞƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚǁŽƌůĚ ?ĨŝŐƵƌĞĚĂƐ ‘ĂŵďŝŐƵŝƚǇŝŶĨŝŶŝƚĞůǇŵĂŐŶŝĨŝĞĚ ? ?ŝƐ
 ‘ŐŝǀĞŶ ?ďǇǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ŵĂŬŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶůĂnguage use a 
ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůůǇŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?ůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐŝƐŽĨ ‘ĨƌŝĞŶĚƐŚŝƉ ?ŶŽƚŵĞƌĞůǇŝŶƚŚĞ
sense of his acknowledgment of the importance of poetic coterie but in a far more 
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝǀĞůǇŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŵĂŶŶĞƌ ?/ŶůĂƐĞƌ ?ĂƐŝŶ >ĞǀŝŶĂƐ ? “ƚŚĞƉƌŝŵĂĐǇŽĨƚŚĞĞƚŚŝĐĂů ?
(Ibid. ? ? ? )ĂƌŝƐĞƐĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨ “ƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉŽĨŵĂŶƚŽŵĂŶ ?ďĞŝŶŐ “ĂŶŝƌƌĞĚƵĐŝďůĞ
structure upon which all the other structures rest ? ?Ibid.). 
  dŚŝƐŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƐĞŶƐĞŽĨůŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐ ‘ĐŽŵŵƵŶĂůŝƐŵ ?ŝƐ ?ĂƐƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌǁŝůůĂƌŐue, the 
ŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƚŝĐƉŽĞƚŝĐĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ ?/Ŷ ƚŚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚ ?'ĞŽƌŐŝŽŐĂŵďĞŶ ?Ă
philosopher Blaser engaged with seriously towards the end of his life, is illuminating in 
seeking to come to terms with the political implications of intersubjective thought. In 
particular, he offers a LevinaƐŝĂŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨǁŚĂƚŝƚŵĞĂŶƐƚŽďĞĂ ‘ĨƌŝĞŶĚ ? P
  
KŶĞĐŽƵůĚƐĂǇƚŚĂƚ ‘ĨƌŝĞŶĚ ?ŝƐĂŶĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚŝĂůĂŶĚŶŽƚĂĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĐĂů ?ƵƚƚŚŝƐ
existential ? which, as such, cannot be conceptualised ? is still infused with an 
intensity that charges it with something like political potentiality. (2009, 35) 
It is useful to lead with such a conception of friendship as it underscores the extent to which 
what constitutes Self and Other ?   ‘DĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘DǇ&ƌŝĞŶĚ ? ? for Blaser is a contingency wherein 
each pole of a friendship defines and shapes the contours of the other. This imperative sense 
ŽĨƚŚĞKƚŚĞƌĂƐŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŶŐĂŶĚĐŽŵƉĞůůŝŶŐǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ ‘ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ŝƐĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚďǇůĂƐĞƌŝŶ ‘dŚĞ
^ƚĂĚŝƵŵ/ŶdŚĞDŝƌƌŽƌ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽDĞƌůĞĂƵ-Ponty on several occasions ?  in 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?ƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞŵŝŶĚŝƐŽŶůǇƚŚĞďŽĚǇ ?ƐŝŶǀŝƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ?ĂƐĂĐŽƌŽůůĂƌǇ ?
 “ ?ǁ ?ĞĂƌĞŶĞǀĞƌŝŶƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐ ? (Blaser 2006b, 31). Miriam Nichols draws 
ĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐĂĨĨŝŶŝƚǇǁŝƚŚDĞƌůĞĂƵ-WŽŶƚǇ ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐŚŽǁ “The Primacy of Perception 
(1964), Signs (1964) and The Visible and Invisible (1968) would become important sources for 
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Blaser in the 1970s, especially when he was writing the first twelve Image-Nations ĂŶĚ ‘dŚĞ
Stadium In The Mirror ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?EŝĐŚŽůƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐ P 
 
What is of particular significance in Merleau-Ponty is the argument that 
human perception is chiasmatically entangled with non-human nature. The 
relationship between words and chaos, self and world, visible and invisible or 
inside and outside is that of complicated non-equivalence; the polarities are 
not ontologically distinct but neither do they collapse into each other.  
          (Ibid.) 
&ŽƌůĂƐĞƌ ?ƚŚĞŵĞĞƚŝŶŐŽĨ ‘ƐĞůĨ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ǁŽƌůĚ ?ŝƐĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐĂů ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚthe ontological 
ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶƐǁŚŝĐŚĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚŽŶĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌĂƌĞďŽƚŚ ‘ŝŶƐŝĚĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ? ?tŚĂƚ
ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞƐƚŚĞ ‘ĐŚŝĂƐŵ ? ?ĂƐƐƵĐŚ ?ŝƐĂƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƉĞůů-ŵĞůů ? ?ĂƉŚƌĂƐĞǁŚŝĐŚDĞƌůĞĂƵ-
Ponty uses and which Blaser adopts as the title of his 1988 collection of poems. As such, 
Merleau-Ponty writes: 
 
Once again [we] must recommence everything, reject the instruments 
reflection and intuition have provided themselves, and install [ourselves] in a 
locus where they have not yet been distinguished, in experiences that have 
ŶŽƚǇĞƚďĞĞŶ ‘ǁŽƌŬĞĚŽǀĞƌ ? ?ƚŚĂƚŽĨĨĞƌƵƐĂůůĂƚŽŶĐĞ ?ƉĞůů-ŵĞůů ?ďŽƚŚ ‘ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?
ĂŶĚ ‘ŽďũĞĐƚ ? ?ďŽƚŚĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞĂŶĚĞƐƐĞŶĐĞ ? ? Q ?^ĞĞŝŶŐ ?ƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐ ?ĞǀĞŶƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ
 ? Q ?ĂƌĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨƚŚŝƐŬŝŶĚ ?ďŽƚŚŝƌƌĞĐƵƐĂďůĞĂŶĚĞŶŝŐŵĂƚŝĐ ?  
       (Merleau-Ponty 1997, 130) 
 
Merleau-WŽŶƚǇ ?ƐŵŽǀĞďĞǇŽŶĚƐƵďũĞĐƚ-object relations to a sense of the encounter or 
ŵŽŵĞŶƚŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƐƵďũĞĐƚĂŶĚŽďũĞĐƚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐĂ ‘ůŽĐƵƐ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞĂĐƚŽĨ
ĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚŝŶŐŽƌ ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐŽǀĞƌ ?ŝƐƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝǌĞĚďǇƚŚĞƉresentness of the perceptual 
experience at hand. It is in this sense that Merleau-WŽŶƚǇǁƌŝƚĞƐŽĨ ‘ƐĞĞŝŶŐ ?ƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐ ?ĞǀĞŶ
ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ?ĂƐĂĐƚŝǀĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ-ƚĞŶƐĞĞǀĞŶƚƐŽĐĐƵƌƌŝŶŐ ‘ĂůůĂƚŽŶĐĞ ? ?dŚĞƌŽůĞůĂŶŐƵĂ ĞƉůĂǇƐŝŶ
 97 
 
ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŝŶŐƚŚŝƐƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ ‘ƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂů ? ? ‘ĨƌŝĞŶĚƐŚŝƉ ?Žƌ ?ƚŽƵƐĞEŝĐŚŽůƐ ?ƚĞƌŵ ?
 ‘ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝŽŶĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?ŝƐ ?ĂƐůĂƐĞƌĂƌŐƵĞƐ ?ĂŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨď ŝŶŐ ‘KƵƚƐŝĚĞ ?ƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?,ŝƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ
ŝŶ ‘dŚĞ&ŝƌĞ ?ĞǆƉůŝĐĂƚĞƚŚŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ P 
 
It is not language which is the source: it is the record of the meeting, and the 
magical structure of sight, sound and intellect is indeed a personal 
responsibility. Language is given to us and in the most insidious way it controls 
sight, sound and intellect, but it is also the medium which can be shaped. 
(2006b, 4) 
ůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇĂŶĚĂŐĞŶĐǇ ? ŽƵƌ ‘ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?  is a corollary 
ŽĨƚŚĂƚĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞŝƐŶŽƚ “ƚŚĞƐŽƵƌĐĞ ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌ “ƚŚĞƌĞĐŽƌĚŽĨƚŚĞŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ ? ? which 
ŝƐƚŽƐĂǇƚŚĂƚŽŶĞ ?ƐŚĂŶĚůŝŶŐŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞĐŽƌĚ ?ŝƐǁŚĞƌĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝbility lies. Put another way, this 
 “ƌĞĐŽƌĚ ?ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐĂůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞŽĨĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌŝŶŐ ?ďŽƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƌĂĚŝĐĂůůǇKƚŚĞƌĂŶĚ
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂůǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐůĂƐĞƌǁƌŝƚĞƐŝŶ ‘WĂƌƚŝĐůĞƐ ? P “/ŶĂƉƌŽĨŽƵŶĚƐĞŶƐĞ ?ƉŽĞƚƌǇ
always remains at the beginning, where the body is involved in thought ? ? ? ? ? ?ď ? 39). Our 
ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞŝƐ ?ĂƐƐƵĐŚ ?ĐŚŝĂƐŵŝĐ ?ŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĂƐďĞŝŶŐǁŚŽůůǇ ‘ŝŶƐŝĚĞ ?
Žƌ ‘ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ?ƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?dŚĞŵĞĞƚŝŶŐŝƐƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇƚŚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌƚǁŝŶŝŶŐŽĨďŽĚǇĂŶĚƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ?  and 
ŝŶƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞ ?ůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐŝƐ ‘ĞŵďŽĚŝĞĚ ?ŝŶŝƚƐŝ Ɛŝ ƚĞnce on illuminating selves as selves 
ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂƐ ‘ƐƵďũĞĐƚƐ ? ?ĨŽƌƚŽĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞŽĨƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌŝƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇƚŽŚĂǀĞŽďũĞĐƚŝĨŝĞĚƚŚĞKƚŚĞƌ ? 
  The serial for Blaser is not simply a form which can be adopted, but rather a condition 
to which all poetry is always-already subject. Charles Bernstein, in describing the nature of 
ůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ ?ƉĂƌĂƉŚƌĂƐĞƐKůƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ‘WƌŽũĞĐƚŝǀĞsĞƌƐĞ ? P 
One poem must follow instanter on the next, a next always out of reach until 
in hand, in mouth, in ear. (Blaser 2006a, 507) 




ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞĚĨŝŐƵƌĞŝŶůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚƌǇĂŶĚƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?ŝƚŝƐĂůƐŽĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚĨŽĐƵƐŽŶ
ƚŚĞ ‘KƵƚƐŝĚĞ ?ĂŶĚǁŚĂƚŚĞĐĂůůƐ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞĂůďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐŽĨƉŽĞƚƌǇ ?ĂƐ ?ĐŽƐŵŽůŽŐǇ ?ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐŚŝŵĂƐ
ĂĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚůǇŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƚŝĐƉŽĞƚĂŶĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŚŽŵŶĞĞĚŶ ?ƚŽĐĐƵƌŝŶKůƐŽŶ ?ƐƚĞƌŵƐ ?
ĞƌŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚƌĂƐĞ ‘ŝŶŚĂŶĚ ?ŝƐƵƐĞĨƵů ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?in establishing a contrast ?ƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶŚĂŶĚ ?ŝƐ
ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĨƌŽŵKůƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ‘ŵŽƵƚŚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĞĂƌ ? ?ďŽƚŚŽĨǁŚŝĐŚƚĞƌŵƐƵŶĚĞƌŐŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞ
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂƐŬĞǇƚĞƌŵƐŝŶKůƐŽŶ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?ůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚƌǇ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚĂƐŝƚŝƐ
with what friendship means for poetry, develops open-handedness as a crucially receptive 
stance.  
 
Folding and folding and folding 
Ɛ^ĐŽƚƚWŽƵŶĚǁƌŝƚĞƐ ?ŝƚŝƐ “ƚŚĞĂďƐĞŶĐĞŽĨƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇĂƐĂŶŽƌŐĂŶŝƐŝŶŐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŝŶůĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ
ƉŽĞƚƌǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŽƉĞŶƐƵƉƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐŽĨĨŽƌŵĂŶĚƐǇŶƚĂǆoutside of the delimitations of 
 “ĞŝƚŚĞƌƚhe lyric self or the epic world ? ? ? ? ? ). ůĂƐĞƌĨŝŐƵƌĞƐ ‘ŝŶƚŝŵĂĐǇ ?ĂƐ ?ƚŚĞůŽǀĞůŝĞƐƚ ?ƉĂƌƚ
ŽĨƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ? ? ?ůĂƐĞƌ ? ? ? ?Ă ? ? ? ? )ĞĐŚŽŝŶŐŚŝƐĐůŽƐĞĨƌŝĞŶĚZŽďĞƌƚƵŶĐĂŶ ?ƐĨŽŶĚŶĞƐƐĨŽƌƚŚĞ
ĂĚũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ‘ůŽǀĞůǇ ?ŝŶŚŝƐƐĞƌŝĂůƉŽĞŵ ‘dŚĞ^ƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞKĨZŝŵĞ ?ĂŶĚƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇĐŽŶũƵƌŝŶŐĂŶ
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƐƵĐŚ ‘ŝŶƚŝŵĂĐǇ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƐŚĂƌŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƚ ƌŵ ?ůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞŝŶ/ŵĂŐĞ-Nation 18 
 ‘ ?ŶƉƉůĞ ? ?ůĂƐĞƌǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
the mind I want, like an 
      apple, childish 
/ ?ǀĞĨŽůůŽǁĞĚĞǀĞƌǇŐƌĞĂƚĨƌŝĞŶĚ 
      / ?ǀĞŬŶŽǁŶ ? Spicer, Duncan, 
      Olson, Creeley, Zukofsky ?  
not to own it      (Ibid., 249) 
Again echoing Merleau-WŽŶƚǇ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ “ ?ǁ ?ĞĂƌĞŶĞǀĞƌŝŶƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐ ?
 ?ůĂƐĞƌ ? ? ? ?ď ? ? ? ) ?ůĂƐĞƌŚĞƌĞĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞƐ “ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ? Q ?ŐƌĞĂƚĨƌŝĞŶĚ ?Ɛ ? ?ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌ “ŶŽƚƚŽ
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ŽǁŶ ? “ƚŚĞŵŝŶĚ ?ŚĞ ?ǁĂŶƚƐ ? ?/ŶŽŶĞƐĞŶƐĞ ?ƚŚĞƚĞƐƚĂŵĞŶƚŽĨƐƵĐŚĂƉŽĞƚŝĐƐŝƐƐĞĞŶŝŶƚŚĞ
ĨƌĞƋƵĞŶĐǇŽĨůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƋƵŽƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽĂŶĚĚŝĂůŽŐƵĞǁŝƚŚĨŝŐƵƌĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚŽƐĞ
mentioned above in the bodies of his poems ?  in such instanceƐ ?ůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐǀŽŝĐĞŝƐ
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝǀĞůǇ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂů ? ?DŽƌĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŝƐĂƐĂŶĞĨĨŽƌƚƚŽ
offer a hand, a gesture of friendship writ large ?  Ă ‘ƌĞĐŽƌĚŽĨƚŚĞŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĞƚƐ ?
writers and thinkers he counted amongst his actual and philosophical companions.  
  dŚŝƐ ‘ƌĞĐŽƌĚ ?ŝƐŽĨƚĞŶĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŽĨƚŚĞ
intersubjective and social, and the intersections at which his poems and prose works meet 
various writers are always further openinŐƐŽŶƚŽĂŶ ‘KƵƚƐŝĚĞ ?ƚŽƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨĂĐůŽƐĞĚƉŽĞŵ ?
ƐƐƵĐŚůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƐĞƌŝĂůƉŽĞŵƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ 
narrative[s] which refuse to adopt an imposed story line, and complete itself 
only in the sequence of poems, if in, in fact, a reader insists upon a definition 
of completion which is separate from the activity of the poems themselves. 
The poems tend to act as a sequence of energies which run out when so much 
of a tale is told.     (Blaser 2006b, 5) 
What this developed sense of narrative seeks to enact is the argumĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞŝĚĞĂƚŚĂƚ
you can write a single poem, is a lie ? ?Ibid., 4). In this regard, Blaser sees his collected works 
ŝŶ ‘dŚĞ,ŽůǇ&ŽƌĞƐƚ ?ĂƐĂŽŶĞůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵǁŚŝĐŚĐŽŶƚĂŝŶƐŵĂŶǇƐŚŽƌƚĞƌůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵƐ ?ƚŚĞůŝŵŝƚƐ
of which are permeable and indistinct. In this manner, his serial poems which drop in and out 
across the span of 6 books, creating further instances of seriality in the distances between 
concurrent poems ?  for example, the gaps between poems of the Image-Nations series 
become varyingly meaningful depending on how one moves between them. If the book is 
ƌĞĂĚĂƐ ‘dŚĞ,ŽůǇ&ŽƌĞƐƚ ? ?ĂƐůĂƐĞƌŽĨĨĞƌƐ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌĂŶĂĐŽůůĞĐƚĞĚƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞŽĨƐĞƋƵĞŶƚŝĂů
poems, the interrelations between the long poems also become examples of different forms 
of poetic extension. Matthew Gagnon argues that  
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in a larger frame particular to The Holy Forest, [Image-Nation] is withdrawn 
from any synchronous elevation of materials functioning outside of history. 
 ? Q ?dŚĞǇŽƌĐŚĞƐƚƌĂƚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐŝƚǇĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĂďĂĐŬĚƌŽƉŽĨŵĞŵŽƌǇ ?ƚĞǆƚƵĂů
companions, and a community of travellers within language. (6) 
&ŽƌůĂƐĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƐĞƌŝĂůĐĂŶĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐŝƚǇ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŵŝĚƐƚŽĨ ‘ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚ
ďĂĐŬĚƌŽƉŽĨŵĞŵŽƌǇ ?/ŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?ƚŚŝƐ ‘ďĂĐŬĚƌŽƉŽĨŵĞŵŽƌǇ ?ĞǀŽŬĞƐƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞ
serial process establishes a modular field of meaning in which recurrent terms and motifs 
complement each other across the scope of a poem the composition of which stretches over 
three decades. He comments: 
The Holy Forest, what I had in mind there when I pulled that title was Dante 
and the whole sense of being in a forest, wandering in a forest, lost in a forest, 
ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐǇŽƵƌƐĞůĨŝŶĂĨŽƌĞƐƚ ?ŽƌŽƚŚĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞĨŝŶĚŝŶŐǇŽƵĂŶĚĂůůƚŚĂƚ ? ? Q ?dŚĞ
Holy Forest itself is an imagery in which you really are lost in a forest, of 
thought, of people, of things, and I have continued to work it all these years 
because it allows me my conversation with everything I can think of. I use 
quotation, I want them there in their own voices, I want my voice there with 
them so the interchange is a constant folding, I think of reality as a constant 
folding, and The Holy Forest is my way of folding tree after tree. I can wander 
through the forest, but I'm actually folding whatever reality I can find.  
       (Sakkis, np) 
The real is thus figƵƌĞĚĂƐ ‘ǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌƌĞĂůŝƚǇ/ĐĂŶĨŝŶĚ ? ?ĂŶŽŶ-idealistic conception which is 
ĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚǁŝƚŚůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐŝŵĂŐĞƌǇŽĨŵŽǀŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂĨŽƌĞƐƚ ?dŚĞƉŚƌĂƐĞ “/ŶƚĞƌĐŚĂŶŐĞŝƐĂ
ĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚĨŽůĚŝŶŐ ?ĂůƐŽŐĞƐƚƵƌĞƐĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŵĂƌŬƐŵĂĚĞĂƚƚŚĞŽƵƚƐĞƚŽĨImage-Nation, the first 
ƉŽĞŵŽĨǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ ?ƚŚĞĨŽůĚ ? ? and the effect of the serial organisation is just such a 
folding of meaning, narrative and image, where combined and alternating meanings, as in 
ƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ?ĂƌĞƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽ “ĂĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚĨŽůĚŝŶŐ ? ?ŶĚƌĞǁDŽƐƐŝŶ ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐƌĞŐĂrd, writes that Blaser is 
ĂƉŽĞƚǁŚŽ “ĞŶĨŽůĚ ?Ɛ ?ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚĞŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĚĞƚĂŝůŝŶ ?Ă ?ƉŽĞŵ ?ƐŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ǁŚŝůƐƚ
ŚĂƌůĞƐĞƌŶƐƚĞŝŶƐĞĞƐ ‘ĨŽůĚŝŶŐ ?ĂƐĂĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞŽĨůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ “ĚǁĞůůƐŝŶ
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pleats and upon folds: pleating and foldinŐďĞŝŶŐůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐůĂƚƚĞƌĚĂǇĞůĞƵǌŝĂŶŵĂŶŶĞƌŽĨ
ĞǆƚĞŶĚŝŶŐŚŝƐůŝĨĞůŽŶŐƉƌŽũĞĐƚŽĨƐĞƌŝĂůŝƚǇ ? ?ůĂƐĞƌ ? ? ? ?Ă ? ? ? ? ). Bernstein is right to describe 
ůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚĂƐǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂŶ “ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨŚŝƐůŝĨĞůŽŶŐƉƌŽũĞĐƚŽĨƐĞƌŝĂůŝƚǇ ? ?dŽ
ĨŽůůŽǁĞƌŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐŽǁŶŚŝŶƚ ?ĂŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ ‘ĨŽůĚŝŶŐ ? is presented in Deleuze and 
GuaƚƚĂƌŝ ?ƐA Thousand Plateaus: 
Folding does not make it possible to go from one type to another; quite the 
contrary, the types testify to the irreducibility of the forms of folding. (53) 
  
ĞůĞƵǌĞ ?ƐĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ŚĞƌĞĂŶĚĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ ?ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐĨƌŽŵĂƌĂŶŐĞŽĨƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ
fields in order to undermine philosophy as a repetition of metaphysical errors. Among these 
ƚĞƌŵƐŝƐ ‘ĨŽůĚŝŶŐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚƵŶĚĞƌŐŽĞƐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĞǆƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĞůĞƵǌĞ ?ƐFold: Leibniz and the 
Baroque (1993). He writes: 
A labyrinth is said, etymologically, to be multiple because it contains many 
folds. The multiple is not only what has many parts but also what is folded in 
many ways. A labyrinth corresponds exactly to each level; the continuous 
labyrinth is matter and its parts. (1993, 3) 
dŚŝƐŝƐŶŽƚƚŽƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚƌǇŝƐůĂďǇƌŝŶƚŚŝŶĞ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇĂŶĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚŝƐ
nature could be developed based on the workings of seriality. The fold here is characterised 
not only by multiplicity but by being generative ?  the fold establishes further folds. Deleuze 
expands on this: 
A fold is always folded within a fold, like a cavern in a cavern. The unit of 
matter, the smallest element of the labyrinth, is the fold, not the point which 
is never a part, but a simple extremity of the line. (Deleuze 1993, 6) 
dŚŝƐ “ƐŝŵƉůĞĞǆƚƌĞŵŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞůŝŶĞ ? ?ƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚĂƚǁŚŝĐ ƚŚĞĨŽůĚďĞĐŽŵĞƐǀŝƐŝďůĞ ?ŝƐƚŚĞ
smallest element of the labyrinth, though Deleuze extends this notion further in that a fold is 
never without its own smaller folds. The significance of the fold therefore lies in the fact that 
 102 
 
it attempts to bear witness to the minute contours which go towards shaping the wider 
ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐ ?ŝŶĞůĞƵǌĞ ?ƐƚĞƌŵƐ ?ƚŚĞůĂďǇƌŝŶƚŚ ?Ŷ analogue can be developed here 
between the fold, the labyrinthine and the intersubjective. The social world, a labyrinth of 
ƵŶĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚĂŶĚƵŶƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĂďůĞKƚŚĞƌƐ ?ŝƐ ‘ĨŽůĚĞĚ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚďǇƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶŝƚƐ
members, and each of these folds is subject to further foldings in which the labyrinth itself 
ĞǆƚĞŶĚƐƚŽĞŶĐŽŵƉĂƐƐ ?dŚĞƐĂůŝĞŶƚƉŽŝŶƚŚĞƌĞůŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ĨŽůĚ ?ĞǆƚĞŶĚƐĂĐƌŽƐƐ
further space within the wider form by virtue of allowing co-existing surfaces and textures to 
become proximate. In this regard, Charles Stivale argues in 'ŝůůĞƐĞůĞƵǌĞ ?ƐƐ PdŚĞ&ŽůĚƐŽĨ
Friendship ƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐ ‘ĨŽůĚŝŶŐ ?ŝƐĂůƐŽŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝǀĞŽĨƚŚĞǁĂǇŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚĨƌŝĞŶĚƐŚŝƉŝƐŝŶĂƵŐƵƌĂƚĞĚ
and nourished. He writes: 
dŚĞĨŽůĚŝƐ ? Q ?ŚŝŐŚůǇŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĨŽƌĞůĞƵǌĞ ?ŶŽƚŵĞƌĞly as a philosophical 
concept, but as a practical means by which all manner of intersections 
between ideas and cultural and existential practices can be developed, 
maintained and appreciated. (10) 
dŚĞƐĞ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌƐĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶĚŝƐƉĂƌĂƚĞ ‘ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚŝĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ?ĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶƚŽŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƚŚĞ
social situation in which Blaser conceptually places himself. In interview he addresses this to 
the extended poem: 
They're sequence poems that I'm very particularly interested in, work that 
ĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚƐƚŽƉƵŶƚŝůǇŽƵĚŽ ? ? Q ?The Holy Forest is set up to go on as long as I can 
keep folding and folding and folding. (Sakkis, np) 
^ĞƌŝĂůŝƚǇŝƐ ‘ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚŝƚĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƐĂŶĚǁŝůĨƵůůǇĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐǀĂƐƚĨŝĞůĚƐŽĨ
interrelated, associative, augmentative and counter-narrative meaning which, as Blaser 
ǁƌŝƚĞƐ ?ŝŶĂƵŐƵƌĂƚĞ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞĂů ?ďǇǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶĂůŵƵůƚŝƉůŝĐŝƚǇ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞ ?ƚŚĞƐĞƌŝĂů
ĨŽƌŵŝƐĂĐŽŵŝŶŐƚŽƚĞƌŵƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ?dŚŝƐŵŽǀĞƐƵƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨŚŝƐ
ŽǁŶƉŽĞƚŝĐƐĂƐƉĞƌƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŽĂ ‘ĐŽƐŵŽůŽŐǇ ? ?/ŶŚŝƐǁŽƌŬ ?ƚŚŝƐĐŽƐŵŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƐĞŶƐĞƌĞĨĞƌƐŶŽƚ
 103 
 
only to the cosmological origins of being but more specifically to the figures who formed 
ůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐŽǁŶƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞǁŽƌůĚ ?/ƚŝƐ ?ĂƐ:ŽƐĞƉŚŽŶƚĞĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞƐŝƚ ? “ĂĐŽƐŵŽůŽŐǇŝŶĂ




The notion of outside, figured as the exteriority of subjectivity, is as such of great concern to 
ůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐs. He sees it as being related ĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇƚŽ ‘ŽƉĞŶƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ
sees as being idiosyncratically American, influenced by untamed space. Blaser terms this 
 ‘ĐŽƐŵŽůŽŐǇ ? ?/Ŷ ‘dŚĞ&ŝƌĞ ? ?ŚĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐĂŵĂůĞůŝŶĞŐ ŽĨŵĞƌŝĐĂŶǁƌŝƚĞƌƐǁŚŽĞǆƉůŝĐĂƚĞ
this theme ?  Poe, Emerson, Thoreau, Melville, Whitman, Henry Adams and Pound ? “dŚĞ
ǁŚŽůĞƚŚŝŶŐ ? ?ŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ ?  “ĐĂŵĞŝŶĂŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůĨŽƌŵƐǁŽuld no longer 
hold our purposes ? ? ? ? ? ?ď ? ? ). His explication by way of reference to a fairly traditional 
lineage of American writers collects what is disparate in their discourses together to 
consolidate ƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ ‘ĐŽƐŵŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ?ƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?dŚĞƚĞƌŵƐĞĞŵƐŝŶŝƚŝĂůůǇƚŽƌĞĨĞƌƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƚŽ
ůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐĂŶĚ^ƉŝĐĞƌ ?ƐĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐĂƐ ‘DĂƌƚŝĂŶ ? ? but it also refers more 
generally to the etymologically derived meaning ?  discourse of the order of the world 
(Ancient Greek). As Matthew Gagnon writes: 
tĞŚĂǀĞŝŶůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐĐŽƐŵŽůŽŐǇĂƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůƌĞŵĂƉƉŝŶŐŽĨĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ?
ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽůĂƐĞƌ “tĞŶĞĞĚƚŽŬŶŽǁŚŽǁŽůĚǁĞĂƌĞ QtĞŶĞĞĚƚŽƚƌĂĐĞƚŚĞ
ĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĂƚĂŐĞŝŶŐ ? ?dŚĞĞǆĞŐĞƐŝƐŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚŝŶƚŚis thinking folds not 
ŝŶƚŽĂŶĞĂƚĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞ “ƐŝŵƉůǇƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŽƌƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů ? ?ďƵƚƌĞĐĂƐƚƐƚŚĞ
management of materials, the recombination of dissimilar discourses into a 
flexible poetic practice.    (Gagnon, np) 
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dŚŝƐ ‘ĨůĞǆŝďůĞƉŽĞƚŝĐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ŝƐŵĂĚĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞďǇƚŚĞ ‘ĨŽůĚ ? ?dŚĞĐŽƐŵŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĨŽƌůĂƐĞƌƌĞĨĞƌƐ
not only to the processes by which being initially came to being but also the processes by 
ǁŚŝĐŚůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐŽǁŶƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨĞŝŶŐŝƐŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞĚ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ǁŽƌůĚ ? ?ƚŚĞĨŽůĚƐŽĨ
which are perceived by the subject, can in turn be articulated in terms of a cosmology of 
subjectivity. This cosmology, which would seek to bear witness to the perceptual and textual 
ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƐĂŶĚƐŽƵƌĐĞƐŽĨǁŚŝĐŚŝƚŝƐĨŽƌŵĞĚ ?ĐŽŶƐƚŝƵƚĞƐƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘/ŵage-EĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?
ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞƐŽĨĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶĂƐĂŶŽŶŐŽŝŶŐƚĂƐŬŽĨĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐǁŚŝĐŚƐŚĂƉĞĂŶĚƌĞǀĞĂůƚŚĞƐĞůĨ ?ŽŶĐĞŝǀĞĚŝŶƚŚŝƐǁĂǇ ?ůĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ
cosmological poetics is an attempt to find an articulation for and of the social in which the 
self is constituted. 
  Cosmology is also, as Blaser has it, constitutively serial, and so in the various radical 
moves he sees in Poe, Emerson, Whitman and the other figures mentioned above the 
concern is always towards the way in which form is expanded or distorted to more accurately 
ŐĞƚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞŽƌĚĞƌ ?ŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?/Ŷ ‘/ŵĂŐĞ-EĂƚŝŽŶ ? ‘ ?ŚĂůĨĂŶĚŚĂůĨ ? ?ůĂƐĞƌǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
face to face    always outside 
ourselves    the astonishment is 
                                     that it is kosmos  (2006a, 167) 
 
dŚŝƐƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞĂƐƚŽŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚŝƐ ?ƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐŬŽƐŵŽƐ ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽƐŵŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ?
ŝƐĂŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨŶŽƚŽŶůǇƚŚĞŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ?ďƵƚ “ŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ƚŚŝƐŽĐĐƵƌƐ ‘ĨĂĐĞƚŽĨĂĐĞ ? ?Ă
ƉŚƌĂƐĞǁŚŝĐŚĞĐŚŽĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƚůĞ ‘ ?ŚĂůĨĂŶĚŚĂůĨ ? ?ĂŶĚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚĨŽƌůĂƐĞƌ
 ‘ǁŚŽůĞƐ ?ĂƌĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ ‘ĨĂĐĞƚŽĨĂĐĞ ? ?ŚĂƌůĞƐĞƌŶƐƚĞŝŶƵŶĚĞƌƐĐŽƌĞƐƚŚŝƐĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ
ůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐŝƚĂƐĂƐŝƚĞ “ǁŚĞƌĞyou is always ŝŶƚŚĞƉůƵƌĂů ?(Ibid., 507). This 
process can be witnessed in The Moth Poem, in which the forms of observation take their cue 
from and respond to the flitting appearance of a number of moths. The first poem in the 
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ƐĞƌŝĞƐ ? ‘dŚĞ>ŝƚĞƌĂůŝƐƚ ? ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐƐƵĐŚĂn encounter: 
 
the eye catches 
almost a tune 
 
the moth in the piano 
wherein 
               unhammered 
the air rings with 
 
an earlier un 
ease of the senses 
disturbed      (2006a, 67) 
 
dŚĞ ‘ĚŝƐƚƵƌďĂŶĐĞ ?ƚŽƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƐŝƐĂƐǇŶĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐŵĞĞƚŝŶŐŽĨ “ĞǇĞ ?ĂŶĚ “ĞĂƌ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ĐĂƚĐŚĞƐ ?
ƚŚĞŵŽƚŚ ?ŽƌŵŽƌĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ ?ĂƐůĂƐĞƌƚƌĂĐĞƐŝƚ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƌŝŶŐŝŶŐĂŝƌ ?ŽĨŝƚƐďĞŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞ ?tŚŝůƐƚ
ƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ ‘ƵŶĞĂƐĞ ?ŝƐƐƉůŝƚŝŶƚŽ ‘ƵŶ ? ? ?ĞĂƐĞ ? ?ƚŚĞůŝŶĞ ‘ĞĂƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƐ ?ƌĞŵĂŝŶƐŝŶƚĂĐƚ ?ůĂƐĞƌ
ƐĞĞŵƐƚŽƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĂĨŽƌŵŽĨ ‘ƐĞŶƐĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŽĐĐƵƌƐǁŝƚŚ ‘ĞĂƐĞ ? ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐ ?ĞĨĨŽƌƚůĞƐƐůǇ ?ďƵƚǁŚŝĐŚŝƐ
ŝƚƐĞůĨ ‘ƵŶĞĂƐǇ ? ?ĚŝƐƚƵƌďĞĚďǇƚŚĞŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ůĂƐĞƌƐĞĞŬƐƚŽŝůůƵŵŝŶĂƚĞƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŝŶ
ǁŚŝĐŚǁŚĂƚĐŽŵĞƐƚŽƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵ ‘ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ?ŝƐĚŝĐƚĂƚĞĚďǇĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ‘ŵĞĚŝƵŵ ? ?ĂƚĞƌŵ
Blaser uses to desĐƌŝďĞ^ƉŝĐĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ? ? ? ? ?ď ? ? ? ? ) ?/Ŷ ‘dŚĞ&ŝƌĞ ? ?ŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƐŽĨThe Moth 
Poem ƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐ “ĂƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĐŽƌĚŽĨƚŚĞďƵƌŶŝŶŐůŝŐŚƚĂŶĚĚĞĂƚŚŽĨĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ
ƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ď ? ? ? )ĂĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚĞĐŚŽĞƐĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ŵĂĚĞĂƚƚŚĞŽƵƚƐĞƚŽĨƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ
ĞƐƐĂǇ P “Ƶrning up myself, I would leave fire behind me ? ?Ibid., 3). This sense of poet as 
medium leaving a trace has implications for the functioning of poetic voice in his works. 
ůĂƐĞƌĨŽƌĞŐƌŽƵŶĚƐƐƵĐŚƉƌŽďůĞŵƐŝŶĂǀĂƌŝĞƚǇŽĨǁĂǇƐ ?ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐŵŽƐƚĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐĂůůǇŝŶ ‘dŚĞ
WƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŽĨKƵƚƐŝĚĞ ? ?ĂŶĞƐƐĂǇƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚĂůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞ:ĂĐŬ^ƉŝĐĞƌ ?ƐCollected Books which 
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explicates the processes of both Spicer ?Ɛ ĂŶĚůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?dŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌǁŽƌŬŝƐƵŶĚĞŶŝĂďůǇĂ
ŵĂũŽƌƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵƐ ?/ƚŝƐĨŝƚƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŽŶĞŽĨůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐŵŽƐƚŝŶĐŝƐŝǀĞ
works of poetics is an elegy for and meditation on the long poetry of Jack Spicer. In this 
ƌĞŐĂƌĚ ?ŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƐŝŶ ‘dŚĞ&ŝƌĞ ? P 
ŶĂĐĐƵƐĂƚŝŽŶŝƐůĞǀĞůůĞĚĂƚŵĂŶǇƉŽĞƚƐ ? ‘,ĞǁƌŝƚĞƐĨŽƌĂĐŽƚĞƌŝĞ ?ƚŚĞƉŽĞƚƐƚĂůŬ
ŽŶůǇĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ?dŚĞǇůŝǀĞŝŶĂǁŽƌůĚŽĨĨůĂƚƚĞƌǇĂŶĚƐĞůĨŚŽŽĚ ?/ƚŝs my 
belief that it is somewhere in this messy denial of the thought of poetry that 
ĂŶĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĐĂŶďĞĨŽƵŶĚĨŽƌƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ? Q ?^ƵĐŚ
communities tend to build a structure for men who wish to keep, hold, and 
record the passionate relation with the outside that the world, the nation, 
need.        (2006b, 12) 
The structure Blaser describes here gestures towards not only the dynamic of the coterie but 
ĂůƐŽǁŚĂƚƵŶĐĂŶ ?ůĂƐĞƌĂŶĚ^ƉŝĐĞƌĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚĂƐĂĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĨŽƌŵŽĨ ‘ƐĞƌŝĂůƉŽĞƚƌǇ ? ?&Žƌlaser, 
the form community takes is itself serial ?  ĂŶĚƚŚŝƐĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶŝŶĂǀŝĚ^ƵůůŝǀĂŶ ?ƐƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŽĨ
 ‘/ŵĂŐĞ-EĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĂƐ ‘ĂŶĂŵĂůŐĂŵĂƚĞĚŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĨƌŝĞŶĚƐǁŚŽĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚǁŝƚŚ ?ƚŽ ?ĂŶĚĨor each 
other ? ?EŝĐŚŽůůƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). The question of nation, repeatedly asked and interrogated 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐůŝĨĞ-ůŽŶŐ ‘/ŵĂŐĞ-EĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŝƐŽĨĨŝŶĚŝŶŐĂĨŽƌŵĨŽƌĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐ
ƌĞŐĂƌĚ ?ŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “tĞŚĂǀĞƌĞĂĐŚĞĚĂƉŽŝŶƚŶŽǁŚĞƌĞǁŚĞƌĞĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŵƵƐƚŝŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĞ
nation, or politics, the scholarship in which we tend to lay down the images of poetic 
thought ? ? ? ? ? ?ď ? ? ? ). dŚŝƐĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ ‘ŝŵĂŐĞ ? ? ‘ƉŽĞƚŝĐƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ? ?
 ‘ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌŵŽƚŝĨƐǁŚŝĐŚůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐŵŽƐƚƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůůŽŶŐ
poem considers. In interview with John Sakkis, Blaser relates his realisation of the importance 
ŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŽŚŝƐĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌǁŝƚŚƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐŝƐƚ,ĂŶŶĂŚƌĞŶĚƚ P 
Hannah Arendt was on campus for a year, and her way of speaking about 
politics became very influential for Jack [Spicer] and me, we wound up with an 
extraordinary sense of having to take on the whole crappy mess around us, to 
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try and find what was there that could last, or even that could be changed.  
(Sakkis, np) 
 
dŚŽƵŐŚŝƚŵŝŐŚƚďĞƚĞŵƉƚŝŶŐƚŽƌĞůĂƚĞƚŚŝƐŝŵĂŐĞŽĨĂ “ǁŚŽůĞĐƌĂƉƉǇŵĞƐƐ ?ƚŽůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƐĞƌŝĂů
ŵĞƚŚŽĚ ?ŝƚŝƐŵŽƌĞĐŽŵƉĞůůŝŶŐƚŽƚĂŬĞŝƚĂƐĂĨŝŐƵƌĞŽĨ ‘ŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶƚŚĞůŝŐŚƚŽĨ
ƌĞŶĚƚ ?ƐƉŽƐƚ-Holocaust discourse concerning the origins of totalitarianism in the 
ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚŽĨŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?/ŶŚŝƐĞƐƐĂǇ ‘dŚĞZĞĐŽǀĞƌǇŽĨƚŚĞWƵďůŝĐtŽƌůĚ ? ?ƚŚĞƚŝƚůĞŽĨǁŚŝĐŚŝƐ
ƚĂŬĞŶĨƌŽŵƌĞŶĚƚ ?ƐThe Origins of Totalitarianism ?ůĂƐĞƌǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ ?ƌĞŶĚƚ ?Ɛ ?ǁŽƌŬďĞŐŝŶƐ
with a major effort to understand the totalitarianism that dogs the political, social and artistic 
life of the twentieth century and of our modernity ? ? ? ? ). In this sense, distinguishing between 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƐǁŽƵůĚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĂƌĞũĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞĂů ? ?ƚŚĂƚǁŚŝĐŚŝŵƉŽƐĞƐŽŶ
ƵƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ?KĨƚĞŶŝŶůĂƐĞƌƚŚŝƐ ‘ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ?ŝƐ ĂƐŝŶ>ĞǀŝŶĂƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĂĚŝĐĂůĂůƚĞƌŝƚǇof the 
Other ?  ďƵƚũƵƐƚĂƐĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇŝƚŝƐĂďĞŝŶŐĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůƚŽƚŚĞƐƉĞĂŬĞƌ ?ƐďĞŝŶŐǁŚŝĐŚ ?ŝŶďĞŝŶŐĂƐ
ƐƵĐŚ ?ƌĞŝĨŝĞƐƚŚĞƐƉĞĂŬĞƌ ?Ɛ ‘ƌĞĂů ? ?ƌƵĐŝĂůůǇ ?ŝƚŝƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚ “ĨƌŽŵƉŽĞƚƌǇĂƐƐŝŵƉůǇƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů
ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?ĂƐĨĞĞůŝŶŐĂŶĚĞŵŽƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ?ĂƐůĂƐĞƌƚ ůůƐƵƐ ? “ŝƐŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞŝŶƐĂŶĞ ? ?^ĂŬŬŝƐŶƉ ). 
 ‘dŚĞWƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŽĨKƵƚƐŝĚĞ ?ŝƐĂĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚŽĨƐŚĂƌĞĚƉŽĞƚŝĐĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƐĞŶƐĞƐ ?  
ďƵƚŝƚŝƐĂůƐŽĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ^ƉŝĐĞƌŝƐĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇŚŝƐŽǁŶ ?ĂŶĚĂƐƐƵĐŚ ?ƚŚĞ
text is itself performing the praxis ŽĨŝƚƐƚŝƚůĞ ?dŚŝƐƉƌĂǆŝƐĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚůĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ
 ‘/ŵĂŐĞ-EĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ƚŽǁŚŝĐŚƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌǁŝůůŶŽǁƚƵƌŶ ? 
 
Image-Nation 
Scott Pound writes that the Image-Nation ƉŽĞŵƐŚĂǀĞ “ĂƐƚŚĞŝƌƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐĂ
ƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽĂďƐŽůƵƚŝƐŵ ?ŽƌƚŚĂƚǁŚŝĐŚŝƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ). This resistance can be seen 
in the title of the sequence ?  ƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ ‘ŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐǀŝƐŝďůǇĂŶĚƉŚŽŶĞƚŝĐĂůůǇƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞ
ĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ŝŵĂŐĞĂŶĚ ‘ŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? but it is crucially the relation between these three 
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terms, and the necessary relations between all terms, which acts as an initial disclosure of 
ƚŚĞƉŽůǇƉŚŽŶŝĐ ?ƐĞƌŝĂůĂŶĚĚĞĞƉůǇŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞĨŽƌŵŽĨůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?ŶĚƌĞǁ 
DŽƐƐŝŶĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉŽĞƚŝĐ ?ĨŽƌůĂƐĞƌ ?ŝƐĂ “ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌŝŶŐŝŵĂŐĞƐŝŶůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?
ǁŚĞƌĞďǇ “ǁĞŝŶŚĂďŝƚĂƚƌĂŶƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƐŝƚĞŽĨŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ “/ ?ĂŶĚ
 “KƚŚĞƌ ?ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŝƚǇĂŶĚĐůĂƌŝƚǇ ? (160). dŚŝƐ ‘ƚƌĂŶƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƐŝƚĞ ? ?ŝƚĐŽƵůĚďĞĂƌŐƵĞĚ ?ŝƐ
disclosed at length across the span and scope of Image-Nations. It is crucial, however, to 
ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĂƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĨŽůĚ ?ĂƐĂŶŽŶŐŽŝŶŐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŽĂƌŐƵĞĂƐWŽƵŶĚĚŽĞƐƚŚĂƚ
 “ƚŚĞƚŝƚůĞImage-Nation does not denote a totality that the poems represent; it names the 
activity the poems enact ? ? ? ? ? ). 
  /ŶĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂůƚĞƌŵƐ ?^ƚĂŶWĞƌƐŬǇǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “/ŵĂŐĞ-EĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? Q ?ŝƐĂŶŝŶƚĞƌŵŝƚƚĞŶƚ ?
rather than consecutive poem, one that would continue, concurrent with other poems, over 
the next three and a half decades ? ? ? ?-19). dŚĞƉŽĞŵƐŽĨůĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ ‘/ŵĂŐĞ-EĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĞƌŝĞƐďĞŐŝŶ
ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ƐImage-Nation 1-4 ĂŶĚĞŶĚǁŝƚŚ ‘/ŵĂŐĞEĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?ǆŽĚǇ ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ŚƌŽŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇ ?
ƚŚĞǇďĞŐŝŶĂĨƚĞƌůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƐĞƌŝĂůĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚƐŝŶThe Moth Poem, and intersect with his other 
ŵĂũŽƌƐĞƌŝĂůǁŽƌŬ ‘dŚĞdƌƵƚŚ/Ɛ>ĂƵŐŚƚĞƌ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚďĞŐŝŶƐŝŶSyntax (1979). The twenty-five 
ƉŽĞŵƐǁŚŝĐŚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ ‘/ŵĂŐĞ-EĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƌĞĂƐƐƵĐŚƐĐĂƚƚĞƌĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐďŽĚǇŽĨ
ǁŽƌŬ ?dŚŝƐ “ƉƌŽĨŽƵŶĚƐĐĂƚƚĞƌŝŶŐ ? ?DŽƐƐŝŶ ? ? ? )ŝƐŝŶŝƚƐĞůĨĂŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ƐĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ ?
ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐŽǀĞƌĂůůƉƌŽũĞĐƚŽĨThe Holy Forest, the 
ŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐĚŝĨĨĞƌŝŶŐŵŽĚĞƐŽĨƐĞƌŝĂůŝƚǇŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞƐƚŚĞǇ
create between their ƉĂƌƚƐ ?dŚĞƉŽŝŶƚŽĨŵĂŬŝŶŐƚŚŝƐĐůĞĂƌŝƐƚŽĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂ ‘ƐĞƌŝĂů ?
series poem, such as Cups or The Moth Poem, and a serial work which, as Blaser tells us, is a 
form of narrative of the outside.  
  As such, the preoccupations of Image-Nation are found not only in the discourses 
Blaser engages with, but also in the process of image-creation his serial method constitutes. 
Image-Nation is concerned with a proposed relationship with the two words of its title, and 
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as such recurring images accrue meaninŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ‘ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĞŵƚŚĞǇŵŝŐŚƚďĞĨŽƵŶĚ
ŝŶ ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƉƌĞǀĂůĞŶƚĨĞĂƚƵƌĞŽĨůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵŝŶImage-Nation is leaving each 
poem open to the outside ?  the most immediate of which is the surrounding poems, many 
of which, in the placement of the Image-Nation series throughout The Holy Forest, are 
seemingly unconnected to their neighbours. It seems appropriate to read Image-Nations in a 
variety of ways to meet the varieties of seriality on display. The preface to Syntax, for 
example, constitutes a commentary on moments in the Image-Nation series as well as 
individual poems in the collection. Here, Blaser writes: 
I read, walk, listen, dream and write among companions. These pieces do not 
belong to me. Syntax, a personification, looking for a predicate and vice versa.  
(2006a, 203) 
Such a prefatory comment has a wide reach; it reflects on not only the individual poems in 
Syntax, including Image-Nation 15, 16 and 17 and the first sixteen poems of The Truth Is 
Laughter, but on the wider whole of which Syntax is a part, The Holy Forest. The preface, 
then, works as a reification of certain motifs ?  the justification of personhood closely tied to 
ĂŶ ‘ĂŵŽŶŐŶĞƐƐ ?ĂŶĚĂůĂĐŬŽĨŽǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉŽǀĞƌƚŚĞůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞŽƵƚŽĨǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƉŽĞŵƐĂƌĞ
composed. As he writĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐEŽƚĞ ?ƚŽThe Holy Forest P “dŚŽƐĞƉŽĞŵƐĐĂůůĞĚ
Image-Nations come and go throughout, as I come upon them ? ?Ibid., xxv). Blaser develops a 
seriality the relations between the parts of which are difficult to clearly delineate, instead 
suggĞƐƚŝŶŐĂĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂůĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽĂǀŽŝĚ ‘ĐůĞĂƌĚĞůŝŶĞĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨƉĞƌŵĞĂďůĞ
extents ?  ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇ ?Ă ‘ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŽĨŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ? ? 
  As such, a wider scope is required in approaching Image-Nation as a part of The Holy 
Forest ?  and to not have so broad a nŽƚŝŽŶŽĨůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƐĞƌŝĂůŝƚǇǁŽƵůĚďĞƚŽŵŝƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ŚĞ
ŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐǇŽĨŚŝƐƉŽĞƚŝĐĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ ?/ƚŝƐƚĞŵƉƚŝŶŐƚŽƌĞĂĚƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐŵŽŵĞŶƚŝŶ ‘/ŵĂŐĞ




                      movement 
                                           of a finitude 
which re     opens 
                                    converging  
backward    with primal elements,  
syllables    of 
                             a longing 
for completion  
 
the task of a man    and his words  
is at the edge 
                     where  we  are  
translated    restless    men     (2006a, 153) 
dŚĞ ‘ůŽŶŐŝŶŐ ?ĨŽƌĐŽŵƉůĞƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂƌŝƐĞƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ “ĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚ ?ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĚŝƐƉĂƌĂƚĞ
ƉĂƌƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƌŝĂůƉŽĞŵŝŶĂƵŐƵƌĂƚĞƐĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨ “ƌĞ-open[ing] ?ĂŶĚ “ĐŽŶǀĞƌŐŝŶŐ ?ďĂĐŬǁĂƌĚ ? ?
/ŶƚŚŝƐ ‘ĨŽůĚ ? ?ůĂƐĞƌĨŝŐƵƌĞƐ ‘ƚŚĞƚĂƐŬŽĨĂŵĂŶ ?ĂƐďĞŝŶŐ “ĂƚƚŚĞĞĚŐĞ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂsimilar 
 “ƌĞƐƚůĞƐƐŶĞƐƐ ?ĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚůǇŵŽǀĞƐŵĂŶ ?KĨƚŚŝƐ ‘ĞĚŐĞ ? ?ůĂƐĞƌǁƌŝƚĞƐůĂƚĞƌŝŶƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ 
inside       the work  
at the edge 
                       of the words 
 
the silence       is the Other 
at the edge       of my words 
a   
          move  
                          ment    (Ibid., 155) 
dŚŝƐŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚ ‘ŵŽǀĞŵĞĂŶƚ ?ďǇƚŚĞǁŽƌĚƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐŚĞƌĞŐƌĂĚƵĂůůǇĚĞůŝŶĞĂƚĞƚŚĞ
ĞƋƵŝǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ĞĚŐĞ ? ?ƚŚĞƚŚƌĞƐŚŽůĚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘KƵƚƐŝĚĞ ? ?is ƚŚĞƐŝůĞŶƚ ‘KƚŚĞƌ ? ?ůĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ
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poetry often figures the Outside as precisely the voice of another, perhaps one who 
articulates a mutual sensibility (Spicer, Duncan, Olson) or a philosopher whose investigations 
ŐƵŝĚĞůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ?DĞƌůĞĂƵ-Ponty, Arendt, Agamben). More specifically, 
the relationship Blaser constructs between poetry, language and the Other is a matter of 
delicacy. Again, in Image-Nation 5, he writes: 
a translation of oneself into the Other  
is 
              so 
                             delicately 
                                                  perched among words 
ƚŚŝƐƚĞĐŚŶĤ           binding the heart 
like small poems read from 
vast stages        (Ibid., 150) 
dŚŝƐ ‘ďŝŶĚŝŶŐ ? ‘ƉĞƌĐŚĞĚĂŵŽŶŐǁŽƌĚƐ ?ƐĞĞƐ ?ĂƐůĂƐĞƌǁƌŝƚ Ɛ ? “ƚŚĞƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚĞĚŵĞŶ ?ĚŝƐĂƉƉĞĂƌ
into what they have/ translated ? ?Ibid., 149). dŚŝƐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŝƐĞǀŽŬĞĚďǇƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ƚĞĐŚŶĞ ? ?ƚŚĞ
ĞƚǇŵŽůŽŐǇŽĨǁŚŝĐŚŝƐŐŝǀĞŶĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞĞǆƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ,ĞŝĚĚĞŐĞƌ ?ƐThe Question Concerning 
Technology, in which ŚĞĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞƐĂƉƌŽũĞĐƚŽĨ “ĨŝŶĂůůǇƚĂŬ ?ŝŶŐ ?ƐĞƌiously the simple question 
of wŚĂƚƚŚĞŶĂŵĞ ‘ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ?ŵĞĂŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). He argues: 
The word stems from the Greek. Technikon means that which belongs to 
techne. We must observe two things with respect to the meaning of this 
word. One is that techne is the name not only for the activities and skills of the 
craftsman, but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts. Techne belongs 
to bringing-forth, to poiesis; it is something poetic.  (Ibid.) 
Existence for Heidegger can be understood poetically by virtue of the similitude of aesthetic 
and existential disclosure, an equivocation stated in the penultimate sentence above and 
ĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞŝŶ ‘dŚĞKƌŝŐŝŶKĨdŚĞtŽƌŬKĨƌƚ ? ?,ĞŝĚĞŐŐ ƌĚĞǀĞůŽƉƐƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ ‘ƚĞĐŚŶĞ ?ďǇ
ǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨŝƚƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ ‘ĞƉŝƐƚĞŵĞ ? ?ĂƚĞƌŵŽĨWůĂƚŽŶŝĐŽƌŝŐŝŶĨŽƌ ‘ũƵƐƚŝĨŝĞĚƚƌƵĞďĞůŝĞĨ ? P
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Both words are names for knowing in the widest sense. They mean to be 
entirely at home in something, to understand and be expert in it. Such 
knowing provides an opening up. As an opening up it is a reveĂůŝŶŐ ? ? Q ?/ƚ
reveals whatever does not bring itself forth and does not yet lie here before 
us, whatever can look and turn out now one way and now another.  (Ibid., 
184) 
dŚŝƐĞƋƵŝǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚŝŶƚŚĂƚŝƚĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞƐŚŽǁ ‘ŬŶŽǁŝŶŐ ?ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐĂŶĂǁĂƌĞŶess 
ĂŶĚŝŶǀŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶ ‘ŽƉĞŶŝŶŐ ?ĂŬŝŶƚŽůĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ ‘ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ? ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƋƵŽƚĞĚƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ
ŽĨ ‘/ŵĂŐĞ-EĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĂďŽǀĞ ?ůĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ ‘ƚĞĐŚŶĞ ?ŝƐƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĂƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ŽŶĞƐĞůĨŝŶƚŽ
ƚŚĞKƚŚĞƌ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ďŝŶĚ ?Ɛ ?ƚŚĞŚĞĂƌƚ ? ? a bind which is both a bond and tangle. It is in this 
ƐĞŶƐĞ ?ƚŚĞŶ ?ƚŚĂƚDŝƌŝĂŵEŝĐŚŽůƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐǀŝĞǁŽĨůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞĂƐ “ĂŚƵŵĂŶtechne, 
rooted in the primacy of the social ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). dŚĂƚƚŚŝƐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŝƐĨŝŐƵƌĞĚĂƐ ‘ƐŵĂůůƉŽĞŵƐ
ƌĞĂĚĨƌŽŵ ?ǀĂƐƚƐƚĂŐĞƐ ?ŝƐĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůly significant in that it suggests that, for Blaser, 
ŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŝƐĂŶŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚůǇƉŽĞƚŝĐĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚŝĂůĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ƚŚŝƐ ‘ƉŽĞƚŝĐ
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?ŝƐ ?ŝŶ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌŝĂŶƚĞƌŵƐ ?ĂŵƵƚƵĂůĂĐƚŽĨĚŝƐ-closure, one subjectivity revealing itself 
and having its contours defined through the encounter with the radically Other. Matthew 
'ĂŐŶŽŶƌĞůĂƚĞƐƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ ‘ƚĞĐŚŶĞ ?ƚŽůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƉƌŽũĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨ “ǁŽƌůĚ-
ŝŵĂŐĞ ?ŝŶImage-Nation: 
The insistence of subjectivity as explored through the Other is acted upon 
within a search for a world-image wrested from the seat of personal agency. 
Polarities such as darkness and light are employed, not as metaphorical 
elements by which meaning is implied, but to engage the reader in a wayward 
oscillation.         (Gagnon, np) 
 
'ĂŐŶŽŶ ?ƐƚĂǆŽŶŽŵǇŚĞƌĞŝƐŝůůƵŵŝŶĂƚŝŶŐ ?dŚĞƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚƚĞƌŵƐ ?   ‘ŝŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ? ? ‘KƚŚĞƌ ? ? ‘ĂĐƚĞĚ
ƵƉŽŶ ? ? ‘ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĂŐĞŶĐǇ ? ? gesture at the imperative significance of that which is deemed 
 ‘KƵƚƐŝĚĞ ?ƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?/ƌĞŵĂŝŶǁĂƌǇŽĨĚĞƐŝŐŶĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ ŵŽŵĞŶƚƵŵŽĨImage-Nation as a 
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ƐĞĂƌĐŚĨŽƌ ‘ĂǁŽƌůĚ-ŝŵĂŐĞ ? ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚ'ĂŐŶŽŶŝƐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇĐŽƌƌĞĐƚƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐĐŽƌĞƚŚĞĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐ
ůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵƉůĂĐĞƐŽŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐƌĞĐƵƌƌŝŶŐŝŵĂŐĞƐ ?ĂƐŝŶ ?
for example, the first four poems and their various perspeĐƚŝǀĞƐŽŶ ‘ƚŚĞŵŽŽŶ ? ?^ƵĐŚŝŵĂŐĞƐ
ĂƌĞĂŶĚĂĐƚĂƐ ‘ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƐ ?ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚǁŚŝĐŚƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇĨŝŶĚƐŝƚƐĞůĨŝůůƵŵŝŶĞĚ ? 
  ƌƵĐŝĂůůǇ ?ĂƐůĂƐĞƌǁƌŝƚĞƐŝŶ ‘dŚĞWƌĂĐƚŝĐĞKĨKƵƚƐŝĚĞ ? ?ŝƚŝƐĂŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇĂƐ
ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĨƌŽŵ ‘ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ?,ĞǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐƉƌŽũĞĐƚ “ĐƵƚƐƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚĨƌŽŵƵŶĚĞƌĂƉŽĞƚƌǇ
ƚŚĂƚĐĞĂƐĞůĞƐƐůǇƌĞƚƵƌŶƐƚŽǁƌĂƉŝƚƐĞůĨĂƌŽƵŶĚĂƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ?ď ? ? ? ? ). The nuanced 
distinction between the two terms stands as an indication of the extent to which Blaser 
ǁŝƐŚĞƐƚŽĂǀŽŝĚĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƐƵďũĞĐƚƐǁŝƚŚ ‘ƉĞƌƐŽŶŚŽŽĚ ? ?/ŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŝƐĨŝŐƵƌĞĚĂƐ
a movement between subjects ?  which is to say, for Blaser, the subjective is only ever an 
intersubjective phenomenon.  
 
 
We are journeying in company with the messenger 
 
ůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐĨĂƐĐŝŶĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƐŽĨ ‘ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?ŝŶŚŝƐƉŽĞƚƌǇĂƌĞĞŶĂĐƚĞĚŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ
intersubjectivity in the second poem in the sequencĞ ‘ ?ƌŽĂŵŝŶŐ ? ?,ĞƌĞƚŚĞ ‘ǁĂǇǁĂƌĚ
ŽƐĐŝůůĂƚŝŽŶ ?'ĂŐŶŽŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐĨŝŶĚĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĂĚĞŝĐƚŝĐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞƉŽĞŵďĞŐŝŶƐ P 
 
we are journeying in company with the messenger 
 
  but there, it was 
ƚŚĞƌĞ ‘ǇŽƵ ?ƐĂǁ 
the head of a horse burn, 
its red eye flamĞ ‘ǇŽƵ ?ƐƚĞƉƉĞĚ 
to the fireplace where the meta- 
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morphosed log lay without a body 
ĂŶĚƉƵƚ ‘ǇŽƵƌ ?ŚĂŶĚŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƐĞĞŝŶŐ   (2006a, 90) 
 
dŚĞƚŝƚƵůĂƌ ‘ƌŽĂŵŝŶŐ ?ŝƐĞŶĂĐƚĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ ‘ũŽƵƌŶĞǇŝ Ő ?ŝŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚůŝŶĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĨŽƌŵƐĂ
chorus appearing three times in the poem, each time modulating. It is also gestured at in the 
ĚĞŝǆŝƐŽĨƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƐƚĂŶǌĂ ?ƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞŐŚŽƐƚŽĨĂǀŽůƚĂ ?   ‘ďƵƚƚŚĞƌĞ ?ŝƚǁĂƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞ ? ? sets the 
poem against an indiscernible presence or location. This vagueness of reference is further 
reiterated in the scare-ƋƵŽƚĞƐƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ ‘ǇŽƵ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ǇŽƵƌƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐƚĂŶǌĂ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŶŽƚ
an ontological scepticism but rather a respect for the hypothetical nature of what constitutes 
ƚŚĞ ‘ǇŽƵ ?ǁŚĞŶǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĞĚďǇĂŶKƚŚĞƌ ?tŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇ ?ƚŚĂƚǁŚŝĐŚŝƐ ‘ǇŽƵ ?ŝƐ ?ŝŶƐŽĨĂƌĂƐ/Ăŵ
ŝƚƐǁŝƚŶĞƐƐ ?ŽŶůǇĐŽŶũĞĐƚƵƌĞ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞ/ǁŚŝĐŚ/ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞŝƐŽŶůǇĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ‘ǇŽƵ ?ŝŶĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ
eyes. The diction Blaser utilises thus seeks to preserve the radical alterity of that which is not 
 ‘/ ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐĨŝŐƵƌĞĚůĂƚĞƌŝŶƚŚĞ ƉŽĞŵĂƐĂŶŽƐĐŝůůĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ ‘ƉƵďůŝĐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ? P 
turned by that privacy 
from such public perils as words 
are, we travel in company with the messenger  (Ibid.) 
tŽƌĚƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĂƐ ‘ƉƵďůŝĐƉĞƌŝůƐ ?ƐĞĞŵƐƚŽŐĞƐƚƵƌĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞ ‘ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ?ůĂƐĞƌ conceives 
language as constitutive of. Intersubjectivity is enacted in the act of articulation. As such the 
ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞĐŚŽƌƵƐĞƐŽĨ “ƚƌĂǀĞů ?ůŝŶŐ ?ŝŶĐŽŵƉĂŶǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵĞƐƐĞŶŐĞƌ ?
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞƉŽĞŵƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĞƌŽĂŵŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ƐƚŝƚůĞ ? 
  The ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŵĞƐƐĞŶŐĞƌ ?ŝƐ ?ŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ƵŶĐůĞĂƌ ?ďƵƚĂƐƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚƉŽĞŵŝŶƚŚĞ
ƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞŝƚǁŽƵůĚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĂƚůĞĂƐƚĂƐƵƉĞƌĨŝĐŝĂůĂĨĨŝŶŝƚǇǁŝƚŚĂŶƚĞ ?ƐsŝƌŐŝůŝŶƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚĐĂŶƚŽ
of Inferno.  The function of this figure is as a companion who makes witnessing possible, 
ŽĨƚĞŶĂƚƚŝŵĞƐĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƉŽĞƚ ?ƐŐĂǌĞ ?/ŶŵĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞĞĂƌůǇ/ŵĂŐĞ-Nation poems, however, 
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ŝƚŝƐĂŶƚĞ ?ƐĨŝŐƵƌĞŽĨ ‘ŵŽƌ ?ǁŚŝĐŚůĂƐĞƌŝŶƐƚŝƚƵĞƐĂƐĂŵŽƚŝĨŝŶƚŚŝƐƐƚĂŶĐĞŽĨĐŽŵƉĂŶŝŽŶ
ĂŶĚǁŝƚŶĞƐƐ ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ŝŶ ‘'ƌĞĂƚŽŵƉĂŶŝŽŶƐ PĂŶƚĞůŝŐŚŝĞƌŝ ? ?ůĂƐĞƌǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
Dante, drawing upon the Provençal experience of 
the reason of poems, brings us to Amors ?  Giorgio 
Agamben tells us Amors is the name the Troubadours gave to 
ƚŚĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĂĚǀĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĞƚŝĐǁŽƌĚ ?/ƚŝƐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽ 
understand the sense in which poets understood love, as long as we 
obstinately construe it according to a secular misunderstanding, in 
a purely biographical context. For the Troubadours, it is not a ques- 
tion of psychological or biographical events that are successively ex- 
pressed in words, but rather, of the attempt to live the topos itself, 
the event of language as a fundamental amorous and poetic experi- 
ence ?        (2006a, 440) 
ĂŶƚĞ ?Ɛ ‘ĂŵŽƌ ?ŝƐƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽƚŚŽƵŐŚĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĨƌŽŵ ‘ůŽǀĞ ? ?ĂŶĚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĞƐƚŚĞŝŶĂƵŐural nature of 
ƉŽĞƚŝĐůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?ŐĂŵďĞŶ ?ƐƉŚƌĂƐĞ ? “ƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚŽĨůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞĂƐĂĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůĂŵŽƌŽƵƐĂŶĚ
ƉŽĞƚŝĐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ? ? ĞƋƵŝǀŽĐĂƚĞƐƚŚĞ ‘ƉŽĞƚŝĐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ĂŵŽƌŽƵƐ ? ?ĂŶĚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ
ďŽƚŚĂƐĨŽƌŵƐŽƌ ‘ůŝǀĞĚƚŽƉŽƐ ? ?dŚŝƐůĂƚƚĞƌƉŚƌĂƐĞƐĞ ŵƐƚŽŐĞƐƚƵre towards what we might 
ŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞƚĞƌŵĂ ‘ƐŝƚĞŽĨŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇĂŶŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ƐƉĂƚŝĂůůǇĂŶĚƚĞŵƉŽƌĂůůǇ ?
ǁŚĞƌĞďǇƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĐĐƵƌƐ ?dŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŽĐĐƵƌƌĞŶĐĞŝƐ ‘ĂŵŽƌŽƵƐ ?ďƌŝŶŐƐƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŝŶ
which signification is an intersubjective phenomenon ?   ‘ĂŵŽƌ ? ?ƚŚĞŐƌĞĞŬŶĂŵĞĨŽƌƵƉŝĚ ?
ĞƚǇŵŽůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇĐŽŵĞƐďĞĨŽƌĞ ‘ůŽǀĞ ? ?ĂŶĚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ‘ĂĨĨĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĨƌŝĞŶĚƐŚŝƉ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ
term, denoting a variety of relationships and not merely what we commonly today 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞĂŵŽƌŽƵƐ ? ? 
  As such, the influence Blaser professes to take from Dante is a matter of the effects of 
ƉŽĞƚŝĐǀŽŝĐĞƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůŽƌĨŽƌŵĂůĂĨĨŝŶŝƚǇ ?ůĂƐĞƌǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞŝŶƚŝŵĂĐǇŽĨ
ƐŽƵŶĚĚŝƐĐůŽƐĞƐƚŚĞŵŽƌƐŽĨŽƚŚĞƌŶĞƐƐĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ă ? ? ? ? ) ?ĂĐŽŵŵĞŶƚǁŚŝĐŚďĞĂƌƐǁŝƚŶĞƐƐto 
his own use of the words of Others, both close friends and those with whom he shares 
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intellectual and philosophical affinities. Blaser cites. His collection Syntax, the title of which is 
taken from KůƐŽŶ ?ƐĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŽůĂƐĞƌŝŶ ? ?64, ends with a sectioŶĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ “^ŽŵĞsŽŝĐĞƐ/Ŷ
Syntax ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚƚĂŬĞƐƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨĂŶĂŶŶŽƚĂƚĞĚďŝďůŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ?dŚĞďŽĚǇŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬSyntax 
extends into the margins of the pages with citations, an effect which is less a matter of 
scholarly accuracy than an extension of and into the diction of Others. Blaser describes this 
ĂƐ “ƚŚĞĞǀĞƌ-changing polyphony of amorous thought ? ?Ibid.). Andrew Mossin identifies this 
as a constitutive feature of Image-Nation ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĞƐĞĞƐĂƐ “ƚƌĂǀĞƌƐ ?ŝŶŐ ?ĂƐƉĂĐĞŽĨƚŚĞŵƵůƚŝ-
ǀŽŝĐĞĚƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞ ‘ǀŽŝĐĞ ? ?ƚŚĞƉŽůǇvalent rather than the singular ? ? ? ? ? ). Again, this is a 
question of friendship understood intersubjectively ?  and of seeking a syntax fit for the 
purpose of articulating this understanding. 
  It is important also to recognise the distance betwĞĞŶůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚŝŶŚĞƌŝƚĂŶĐĞ
of Dante with that of Ezra Pound in his Cantos. /ŶƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌĐĂƐĞ ?ĂŶƚĞ ?ƐƵƐĞŽĨůŝƚĞƌĂƌǇ-
historical figures to bear witness to the perceived violence of contemporary life is a guide in 
itself, and Pound follows in circulating the perspectives of his own collective of literary-
ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĨŝŐƵƌĞƐ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚ ?ŶĚƌĞǁDŽƐƐŝŶǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĂƚƚĞƐƚƐŶŽƚƐŽ
ŵƵĐŚƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ƚĂůĞŽĨƚŚĞƚƌŝďĞ ? ?ƚŽƌĞĐĂůůWŽƵŶĚ ?ƐƉŚƌĂƐĞ ?ďƵƚƚŽƚŚĞŵƵůƚŝƉůĞŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƐŽĨƐĞůĨ
and other that are by their very nature public and social realities ? ? ? ? ? ). These constitutively 
public-social realities are figured by Blaser in relation to Dante as: 
>ŽǀĞ ?ƐƌĞĂƐŽŶƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂŶƚĞƚĞůůƐƵƐŝƚǁŽƵůĚ 
be shame not to explain, enters into the discourses of  
the territory called world ?  the poetic is the language of the mapless 
         (2006a, 440) 
dŚŝƐ ‘ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞŵĂƉůĞƐƐ ? ?ŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ƌŽĂŵŝŶŐ ?ƐǇŶƚĂǆŝŶĂƵŐƵƌĂƚĞĚŝŶ/ŵĂŐĞ-Nation 2 and 
developed throughout Image-Nations and The Holy Forest,  is indicative of the movement 
ůĂƐĞƌƐĞĞƐĂƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽďŽƚŚůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞƵƐĞĂŶĚĂŶĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ? ?dŚĞ
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ƚĞƌŵ ‘ƌŽĂŵŝŶŐ ?ĚĞŶŽƚĞƐĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĂůĞĂƚŽƌŝĐĂŶĚǁŝĚĞ-ranging form of movement without 
ĚĞƐƚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?/Ŷ ‘/ŵĂŐĞ-EĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŵŽƌƉŚĞ ? ?ůĂƐĞƌ relates this process directly to the 
constitution of poetic form: 
  I know nothing of form 
that is my own doing     all out 
ŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐƐĞůĨŽƵƌǁŽƌĚƐǁĞƌĞ 
the form we entered,        turning intelligible 
and strange        at the point of 
a pencil       (2006a, 164) 
ŐĂŝŶ ?ƚŚĞŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ‘ŽƵƚ ?ŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐƐĞůĨ ?ŝƐǁŚĞƌĞĨŽƌŵĂƉƉĞĂƌƐ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞ ?ĨŽƌŵŝƐƉƌĂǆŝƐ ?
a movement the momentum of which comes from the Other. This movement is not achieved 
ďǇƚŚĞ ‘/ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ? ŝƚŝƐŶŽƚ “ŵǇŽǁŶĚŽŝŶŐ ? ? rather, it is a  ‘ƚƵƌŶŝŶŐŝŶƚĞůůŝŐŝďůĞ ?ĂŶĚƐƚƌĂŶŐĞ ? ?
a reorientation to Otherness. Furthermore, the hinge, as it were, on which this movement 
ƐǁŝŶŐƐŝƐ “ƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚŽĨ ?ĂƉĞŶĐŝů ? ?dŚĞǁŽƌĚ ‘ƉŽŝŶƚ ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐďŽƚŚƚŚĞƉĞŶĐŝů ?ƐůĞĂĚĂŶĚŝƚƐ
purpose. This latter reading is instructive in that it argues for a further Otherness which is 
ĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĐŽƌĚŽĨƚŚĞŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ ?ĂƉŚƌĂƐĞǁŚŝĐŚƌĞĐĂůůƐůĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ ‘ŶĞĐĚŽƚĞ ?ƋƵŽƚĞĚ
ĂƚƚŚĞŽƵƚƐĞƚŽĨƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?/Ŷ ‘dŚĞ^ƚĂĚŝƵŵŽĨdŚĞDŝƌƌŽƌ ? ?ůĂƐĞƌǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
The Other is present and primary to our speaking. There is no public realm 
without such polarity of language. The operation of its duplicity is the poetic 
ũŽď ?ƉĞƌŝůĂŶĚĂŶĞĐƐƚĂƐǇ ? ? Q ?dƌĂŶƐĐĞŶĚĞŶĐĞŝƐŶŽƚĂƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐŽŵĞǁŚĞƌĞ
else, but the manner of our being to any other (Merleau-Ponty). A co-
existence.       (2006b, 32) 
ůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ĞĐƐƚĂƐǇ ?ĨŝƚƚŝŶŐůǇŐĞƐƚƵƌĞƐĂƚƚŚĞƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ
exstasis, developed most recently by Michel Henry. For Henry, exstasis is a specific term for 
ƚŚĞ ‘ŐŽŝŶŐďĞǇŽŶĚ ?ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶ transcendental subjectivity. Blaser, quoting Merleau-Ponty 
above, makes clear that transcendence is not to a place but rather the existential situation 
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always-already at work. If the Other, as Blaser, Levinas, Henry and Merleau-Ponty contest, is 
vital to ƚŚĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨ^ĞůĨ ?ƚŚĞŶƚŚĞƉƌĞǀĂŝůŝŶŐƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŝƐ ‘ĐŽ-ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ? ? 
 
A Continuum of Utterance 
dŚĞ “ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵŽĨƵƚƚĞƌĂŶĐĞ ? ?'ĂŐŶŽŶ ?ŶƉ )ǁŚŝĐŚĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞƐƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶĐǇŽĨImage-
Nation is not, from the outset, a means of establishing limits to which the successive poems 
in the sequence adhere. The forms of the individual poems vary depending on the content 
ďĞŝŶŐǁŽƌŬĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ?ĂŶĚŝŶƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƉƌŽũĞĐƚ-poem resembles projective poetics. 
Blaser himself figures his form as distinct from Olsonian practice based on a comment Olson 
ŵĂĚĞƚŽŚŝŵŝŶ ? ? ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚůĂƐĞƌƌĞƉĞĂƚƐŝŶ ‘ŝĂƌǇ ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P 
KůƐŽŶƐĂŝĚ ? ‘/ ?ĚƚƌƵƐƚǇŽƵ 
anywhere with image, but 
ǇŽƵ ?ǀĞŐŽƚŶŽƐǇŶƚĂǆ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) 
this comes to mind out of the 
night and morning, rebelliously   (2006a, 223) 
ZĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĐŽŶĐĞŝǀŝŶŐŽĨůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐŵŽĚƵůĂƌĨŽƌŵŝŶImage-Nation as a projective measure, 
then, it is instead a matter, as Blaser wrŝƚĞƐ ?ŽĨ “ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶŐ ?ƐǇŶƚĂǆ ?(2006b, 30). In 
particular, he emphasises the fact that  
by extension in the series, the absence of syntax becomes polar to another 
language ?  of presences alongside absences, of speech alongside a silence of 
words, of visibility tensed alongside a love which traces its invisible open-
work. (Ibid.)  
In this sense, then, a crucial measure in Image-Nation is the syntax of form, a contingency of 
organisation. No one poem in the series determines the nature or shape of any other ?  
ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇ ?ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĞĚĞŵĂŶĚƐŽĨŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ ?ůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐŽĨĐŽŵŵƵŶĂůŝƚǇĂƌĞŽƉĞŶ
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to the vicissitudes of meditative lyricism. 
  This is not to say that Image-Nation is entirely without moments of narrative. 
Towards the end of the Image-EĂƚŝŽŶƐĞƌŝĞƐ ?ƉŽĞŵ ? ? ? ‘ŽŚ ?ƉƐŚĂǁ ? ?ŝƐ “ĂůŽŶŐŵĞĚŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŽŶ
ƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĞƚ ?ƐůŝĨĞ ? ?'ĂŐŶŽŶ ?ŶƉ ) ?^ƚĂŶWĞƌƐŬǇŐŽĞƐĂƐĨĂƌĂƐƚŽĚĞƐcribe the poem 
ĂƐĂŶ “KĚǇƐƐĞĂŶǁĂǇŚŽŵĞǁĂƌĚ ? ? ? ? ). dŚĞĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶŝƐŝŶƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ?ŚĞƌĞůĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ ‘ũŽƵƌŶĞǇ ?
is not literal but etymological, and the contrast between the two movements is significant in 
explicating the process at work in the poem. The poem in particular addresses specific Blaser 
family expressions of disdain ?   “ ‘ƌĂƚ ? ?/ŚĞĂƌĚŚĞƌƐĂǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞǁŝŶĚŽǁ ? rewinding the 
ďŽďďŝŶ ? ‘ƌĂƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?KĨƚŚŝƐ ?<ĞƌĞŶǇŝǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
dŚĞ “ĚƌĂƚ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŽƉĞŶƐƚŚĞƉŽĞŵĂŶĚƌĞƐŽŶĂƚĞƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞďŽĚǇŽĨŝƚƐ
words, draws us into a labyrinth of thinking and sounds, of sounded thinking, 
the splendour of which, like the lingering god in drat, is all too often lost to 
monotony. (15) 
As such, the extension the poem documents is phonetic and genealogical.  Two senses of the 
familial ?  of the social and of the relations between words ?  are evoked in this genealogical 
ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ ?ĂƐ'ĂŐŶŽŶǁƌŝƚĞƐ ?ƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ “ĨŝŶĚƐůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƉƐǇĐŚĞĐŝƌĐƵůĂƚŝŶŐĂƌŽƵŶĚŵĞŵŽƌǇĂƐĂ
mechanism for testing what might mĂŬĞƚŚĞĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƐĞůĨ ?(np). Again, as in earlier 
Image-Nation ƉŽĞŵƐ ?ƚŚŝƐ ‘ĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƐĞůĨ ?ŝƐŽŶůǇĞǀĞƌĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚďǇĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨ
ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐǁŚĂƚƉĞƌŵĞĂƚĞƐƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ?dŚĞ ‘ůĂďǇƌŝŶƚŚ ?<ĞƌĞŶǇŝĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐ
ŝƐĨŝƌƐƚŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ƐƐĞĐŽŶĚƐƚĂŶǌĂ P 
God, she meant ?  a block pattern ?  gawdelpus ?  gawking, 
I gaw-along now, giddy with salutations from bigots, better 
known as by-gods, godbwyes, and gossips, a.k.a, godsibbs, 
kin of some Indo-European past participle- *ghat ?  id est,  
an adjective acting like a verb, an epithet of Indra ?  Mind ?  
who has almost disappeared into the gods of everything ?   (2006a, 377) 
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The associative movement between clauses, separated by hyphens, traces a relation 
between sound and memory. In the above passage, this movement seeks to find the 
ƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ ‘ŐŽĚ ?ŝŶŚŝƐŐƌĞĂƚŐƌĂŶĚŵŽƚŚĞƌ/ŶĂ ?ƐĞǆƉůĞƚŝǀĞ “ĚƌĂƚ ? ?dŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ďůŽĐŬ
ƉĂƚƚĞƌŶ ?ƐĞĞŵƐƚŽƌĞĨĞƌƚŽ ‘ŵĂƚŚĞŵĂƚŝĐĂůŵĂŶŝƉƵůĂƚŝǀĞƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂŝŵƚŽĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƚŽ
children how one shape can contain or be constituted by other shapes. This conception of 
words as shapes which always fit into or encompass other shapes ?  ĂƐ ‘ŵĂŶŝƉƵůĂƚŝǀĞƐ ? ? 
ŝŶĨŽƌŵƐůĂƐĞƌ ‘ĨŝƚƚŝŶŐ ? ‘ĚƌĂƚ ? ?ĂŶĚ ‘'ŽĚ ?ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞƐǇŶƚĂǆƚƌĂĐŬƐƚŚĞ
process of thought in an aleatoric fashion, and this process undergoes a further and wider 
opening in the succeeding stanza, where Blaser manipulates individual letters and syllables: 
g & d retained become gad, gawd, gud 
or only the g becoming gog, golly, gosh, gum 
or disguise g as c and cock, cor, cod appear 
or drop g for untold suffixes, od, ud, etc. 
or add relationship, begad, beggar, bedad, egad 
or take up possession, swounds, zounds 
ŽƌƌĞĚƵĐĞƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞďƵƐǇŶĞƐƐƚŽ ‘ĚƌĂƚ ? 
I said, mouthing back through the window  (Ibid., 378) 
tŽƌŬŝŶŐďĂĐŬĨƌŽŵ ‘ĚƌĂƚ ?ĂƐĂƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞďƵƐǇŶĞƐƐ ? ? a pun but also, one feels, 
ĂŶĂǀŽŝĚĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶŶŽƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ‘ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ?ŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨĂĨĞĞůŝŶŐŽĨ ‘ďĞŝŶŐďƵƐǇ ? ? Blaser can 
be said to gesture at phonic and semantic possibilities the overwhelming effect of which is a 
plenum of dissemination. Which is to say, this vision of language as everywhere instigating 
ĂŶĚŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŶŐ ‘ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƐ ? ?ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ^ĂŵĞƚŽƚŚĞKƚŚĞƌ ?ƚŽĂĚŽƉƚĂ>ĞǀŝŶasian 
diction), is concerned with radical alterity and the desire to avoid objectification. It is in this 
ƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ƐƐĞĞŵŝŶŐůǇ-ĚŝĂůŽŐŝĐƌŝĨĨŝŶŐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞĐƵƌƐĞ ‘ĚƌĂƚ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƐĂĐƌĞĚ
 ‘'ŽĚ ?ĞǆƉŽƐĞƐƚŚĞǀĂƐƚůǇƉŽƉƵůĂƚĞĚƉŚŽŶĞƚŝĐĂŶĚƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐŵŝĚĚůĞ-ground. As Stan Persky 
ǁƌŝƚĞƐ ?ƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ “ǁŽƌŬƐĂŶĚƌĞǁŽƌŬƐƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĂƚůŝĨĞ ? Q/ƚ] delivers us to a world of 
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astonishing details, details in which the common and the marvellous are indistinguishable, in 
which they, it, constitutes the matter of life, of any life ? ? ? ? ). This working and reworking ?  
ǁŚŝĐŚůĂƐĞƌŚĂƐƚĞƌŵĞĚ ‘ĨŽůĚŝŶŐ ? ? is essential both to the compositional process of Image-
Nations ĂŶĚůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐůŝĨĞůŽŶŐĚĞĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƐĞƌŝĂůƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?ĂƐĚŝƐƉůĂǇĞĚĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨ
The Holy Forest. In this regard, Andrew Mossin writes: 
The Image-Nations develop from [an] intense awareness of the circumstances 
of the serial as a compositional and ethical mode invested in the collected, the 
gathered-together, and communal. (156) 
/ƚŝƐĐƌƵĐŝĂůůǇƚŚŝƐĞƋƵŝǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚĞƚŚŝĐĂůŝŶƐĞƌŝĂůŝƚǇǁŚŝĐŚůĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ
work develops. As he ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ?ƚŚĞ “Image-Nations are not devoted to my logic of desire, 
but to a nation invaded by what is other than itself ?  a continuous forming ? ? ? ? ? ?ď ? ? ? ). This 
 ‘ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐĨŽƌŵŝŶŐ ?ŝƐ ?ĨŽƌůĂƐĞƌ ?ĂŶĞƚŚŝĐĂůŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇ ?ĂƐŝƚƌĞŐĂƌĚƐĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶĐǇĂƐƚŚĞƌĞal 
content of communality ?  which is to say that regard for the radical alterity of otherness 
ĂďƐŽůƵƚĞůǇĚĞƉĞŶĚƐƵƉŽŶĂůĂĐŬŽĨĐůŽƐƵƌĞ ?ĨŝŐƵƌĞĚďǇůĂƐĞƌĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŽĨKƵƚƐŝĚĞ ? ?,Ğ
continues: 
The Image-Nations will have no formal end, no completion of what they feel 
or know. They are too adventurous for that. And too nearly overwhelmed by 
the intentionless and non-communicative utterances of a world. (Arendt)  
         (2006a, 34) 
dŚĞ ‘ĨŽƌŵĂůĞŶĚ ?ŽĨǁŚŝĐŚůĂƐĞƌǁƌŝƚĞƐŝƐĂŐĞƐƚƵƌĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƐĞƌŝĂůŝƚǇ ?s proposed unending 
ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?/ƚŝƐ ?ĂƐŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ ?ĂŶ ‘ĂĚǀĞŶƚƵƌĞ ? ?ĂŐĂŝŶƌĞĐĂůůŝŶŐƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ƌŽĂŵŝŶŐ ?
from Image-Nation 2 ?  a movement conceived in itself rather than dependent on two points 
of a proposed axis. Furthermore, the integrated quotation from Hannah Arendt is instructive 
ŝŶƚŚĂƚŝƚŐĞƐƚƵƌĞƐĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶǀŝƐŝďůĞ ? ?ĂƚĞƌŵůĂƐĞƌĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƐĂƐďĞŝŶŐŵŽƐƚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚŝŶ
the work of Merleau-WŽŶƚǇ )ǁŚŝĐŚĂĐƚƐĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ?ŽĨĂŶǇƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚĐĞŶƚƌĞ ?dŚĞƉŽŝŶƚ
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being not that at any one static moment a subject can determine once and for all what 
constitutes inside and outside, but that the process of relationality between two such 
categories ?  as with other likewise pairings: subject/object, self/other, visible/invisible ?  is 




I wish to let the reader loose in the invisibility where the text leads him. He is 
after all a perception of the text. (2006b, 30) 
dŚŝƐŝƐĂƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚǁŚŝĐŚŝůůƵŵŝŶĞƐƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐŐƌĂƐƉŽĨŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇĂƐa 
pervasive entanglement between subjectivities. Miriam Nichols locates in Blaser a 
 “ĐŚŝĂƐŵĂƚŝĐƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚŵĂŬĞƐƚŚĞƌĞĂůĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂƐǇƐƚĞŵĂŶĚ
entangles human thought in a world that it does not fully possess ? ?EŝĐŚŽůƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?91). In this 
ƐĞŶƐĞ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂĚĞƌĂƐĂ ‘ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƚĞǆƚ ?ŝƐĂŶĞǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐďǇǁŚŝĐŚĂ
ƐƵďũĞĐƚĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƐƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂ ?dŚŝƐŝƐĂĚĞĞƉůǇƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůŶŽƚŝŽŶ ?/Ŷ ‘dŚĞ
Intertwining- dŚĞŚŝĂƐŵ ? ?DĞƌůĞĂƵ-WŽŶƚǇǁƌŝƚĞƐŽĨ “ƚǁŽŵŝƌƌŽƌƐĨĂĐŝŶŐŽŶe another where 
two indefinite series of images set in on another arise which belong really to neither of the 
two surfaces, since each is only the rejoinder of the other, and which therefore form a 
couple, a couple more real than either of them ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?). This is to say a number of 
things; firstly, that this meeting, in poetic terms, wherein text and reader cannot be 
ĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞĚĨƌŽŵĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ?ŝƐ “ŵŽƌĞƌĞĂůƚŚĂŶĞŝƚŚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞŵ ? ?ĂŶĚƐĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ?ƚŚĂƚŶĞŝƚŚĞƌ
one can be said to fully objectify the other. The situation Merleau-WŽŶƚǇĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐŝƐ ‘ƚŚĞ
ĐŚŝĂƐŵ ? ?
  Nichols writes that Merleau-WŽŶƚǇ “ďĞŐŝŶƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĞŵďĞĚĚĞĚŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞŚƵŵĂŶ
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creature in the world and argues that the mind and the world fit because they were never 
separate ? ?EŝĐŚŽůƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). In the phenomenology Merleau-Ponty was writing at the end 
of his life, any perceived conceptual divisions between object and subject are untangled and 
ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞĨůĞƐŚ ? ?dŚŝƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐƐŽŵĞĞǆƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? “dŚĞ
ĨůĞƐŚ ? ?DĞƌůĞĂu-WŽŶƚǇǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? “ŝƐŶŽƚŵĂƚƚĞƌ ?/ƚŝƐƚŚĞĐŽŝůŝŶŐŽǀĞƌŽĨƚŚĞǀŝƐŝďůĞƵƉŽŶƚŚĞ
seeing body, of the tangible upon the touching body, which is attested in particular when the 
body sees itself, touches itself seeing and touching the things ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ). It is a concept, he 
ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ?ƚŚĂƚ “ŚĂƐŶŽŶĂŵĞŝŶĂŶǇƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ?Ibid., 147) ?  ŝƚŝƐ ?ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?ŵŽƌĞĂŬŝŶƚŽ “ƚŚĞ
ŽůĚƚĞƌŵ ‘ĞůĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŝƚǁĂƐƵƐĞĚƚŽƐƉĞĂŬŽĨǁĂƚĞƌ ?Ăŝƌ ?ĞĂƌƚŚĂŶĚĨŝƌĞ ? ?Ibid., 139). 
This is not to gesture at a metaphysical-universal; rather it is a question of the scope 
Merleau-WŽŶƚǇ ?ƐǀŝƐŝŽŶƐĞĞŬƐƚŽĚŝƐĐůŽƐĞ ?/Ŷ ‘dŚĞ^ƚĂĚŝƵŵŽĨƚŚĞDŝƌƌŽƌ ? ?ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚĂůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞ
the first twelve Image-Nation poems, Blaser employs and cites the term himself: 
The Other is not an object, but acts chiasmatically (Merleau-WŽŶƚǇ ?ƐǁŽƌĚ ) ?
EŽƚĂƐƚŝůůŶĞƐƐ ?EŽƚĂƌĞƐƚ ?ůǁĂǇƐƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƐŝƚĞĂŶĚĐŽŵƉĂŶŝŽŶŽĨĂŶǇŵĂŶ ?Ɛ
sudden form. This is the unrest given to thought.    (2006a, 28) 
/ƚŝƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽŶŽƚĞƚŚĞŝŶĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨDĞƌůĞĂƵ-WŽŶƚǇ ? ‘ŚŝĂƐŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇ ?ŝƐ
equivocated with restlessness ?  it constitutively cannot ďĞĂƐƚĂƚŝĐĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ ?ŝƚŝƐĂ “ƐƵĚĚĞŶ
ĨŽƌŵ ? ?^ĐŽƚƚWŽƵŶĚĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŝƐ “ĂŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚůǇĞǆƉŽƐŝŶŐƌĞlations rather than 
a substance ? ? ? ? ? ). Again, this is the distinction between method and praxis, the latter never 
resolving into a clearly defined or contoured fixture. For Blaser, the chiasm characterises the 
 ‘ƵŶƌĞƐƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƌĞƐƵůƚƐĨƌŽŵĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƵŶŽďũĞĐƚŝĨŝĂďůĞ ‘KƚŚĞƌ ? ?ĂŶĚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞŽĨĨĞƌƐ
an analogue for his serial poetics which seek to articulate a poetic voice responsive to a 





ůĂƐĞƌǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ P “ŶĂĐƚƵĂůĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨĂůůƐĞƌŝĂůƉŽĞŵƐŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞƌŝĞƐŝƐŽƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ ?not 
simply more than, its parts ? ? ? ? ? ?ď ? ? ? ). dŚŝƐ ‘KƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ ?ŝƐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚŝŶŐĂŝŶŝŶŐĂƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ
the serial as a means of thought, clearly indebted to and in dialogue with phenomenological 
ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞƐ ?ZĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞƉƌĞĨĂĐĞƚŽůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶPell Mell, the title of which is a term 
used by both Dante and Merleau-WŽŶƚǇ ?:ŽƐĞƉŚŽŶƚĞǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚůĂƐĞƌ “ƚĞůůƐƵƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƐĞ
poems follow of a principle of randonnée - the random and the given of the hunt, the game, 
ƚŚĞƚŽƵƌ ?  ? Q ?dŚĞĂůĞĂƚŽƌǇŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƌŝĞƐƚŚƵƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐĂŶĂƌĐŚŝĐ ?  not that it 
resorts to total riot, but that it refuses to impose an external order on its subject ŵĂƚƚĞƌ ?
(1992, 45). ŽŶƚĞŝƐƌŝŐŚƚƚŽǁĂƌŶĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŽĨůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĂƐ ‘ƌŝŽƚŽƵƐ ?Žƌ ‘ƌĂŶĚŽŵ ? ? 
as I have sought to show throughout this chapter, BlaƐĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĐŽƵůĚŽŶůǇďĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ
aleatoric in terms of the refusal to presuppose a structure, and not in the sense that his work 
ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞƐƚŚĞ ‘ƌĂŶĚŽŵŶĞƐƐ ?ŽĨƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? 
  This refusal, furthermore, is more than merely a rejection of closure, an inability to 
ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞ ?ZĂƚŚĞƌ ?ŝƚŝƐĂŶĞƚŚŝĐƐ ?ůĂƐĞƌŐŽĞƐĂƐĨƌĂƐƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƚŚĞƐĞƌŝĂůĂƐ ‘ŚŽŶĞƐƚ ?ŝĨ
ĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐŐƌŽƵŶĚ ? ?,ĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐ P 
The serial poem constantly circumscribes an absence that brings its presences 
to life. An indefiniteness that is one of the providing aspects of the world. The 
reader is disclosed in an act of such worldliness, or rather, he is open to it, and 
has not constituted the real himself. He may enter a disclosed obedience, 
different from the polis imposed upon our time. 
           (2006b, 34) 
dŽĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞ ?/ǁŽƵůĚůŝŬĞƚŽƌĞƚƵƌŶƚŽĂƉĂƐƐĂŐĞŝŶůĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ ‘/ŵĂŐĞ-EĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ŚĂůĨĂŶĚŚĂůĨ ? ?
ůĂƐĞƌŽƉĞŶƐƚŚĞƉŽĞŵďǇŝŶǀŽŬŝŶŐ ‘ƐŚŝŶŝŶŐŵĂƐƚĞƌƐ ?ǁŚŽ ‘ĂƌĞŶŽƚŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐ ?ďƵƚĂƌĞ
 ‘ĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶƚƐŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?dŚĞƉŽĞŵŽƉĞŶƐǁŝƚŚƚŚŝƐƐĞŶ ŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŚĂůĨĂŶĚŚĂůĨ ?ŽĨůĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ
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ƉŽĞƚŝĐǀŽŝĐĞ ?ďĞĨŽƌĞŵŽǀŝŶŐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂǁŝĚĞƌƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ
 ‘ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞǇĞŵĞƌŐĞŝŶ ?,ĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
wordlessness   no thing is so simply 
personal    I put my hand out to catch 
beauty in the act of    I know no beauty 
which is not permanent    not invoked 
in splendour     the words are meaningless 
until they emerge in the action       (2006a, 167-168) 
 
dŚĞŐĞƐƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŽƵƚƐƚƌĞƚĐŚĞĚŚĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƌĞĂĚǇƚŽ ‘ĐĂƚĐŚ ?ĂŶŝŵƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚďĞĂƵƚǇ
echoes the movement outside BlaƐĞƌƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐŝŶŚŝƐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŶŽƚŚŝŶŐŝƐƐŽƐŝŵƉůǇ ?
ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů ? ?dŚĞ ‘ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚŝŶŐƐĞŵĞƌŐĞŝŶǁŽƌĚƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐŶŽƚƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌĂŶ
ĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚKƚŚĞƌƐ ?ƚĂŬĞƐƉůĂĐĞŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ŵŽƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƉŽĞƚƌǇ
inaugurates. This iƐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨŚŝƐ ‘/ŵĂŐĞ-EĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚĞǆƚĞŶĚĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽĂ
ƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨƵŶƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĂďůĞŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞKƚŚĞƌ ?/ŶůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƚĂǆŽŶŽŵǇ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞ
Other does not necessarily remain anonymous in an effort to retain its absolute alterity. 
RaƚŚĞƌ ?ůĂƐĞƌĚĞǀĞůŽƉƐĂƉŽĞƚŝĐƐŽĨĨƌŝĞŶĚƐŚŝƉŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ ‘ŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĐĂŶďĞ
ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽ-ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ?ŽĨǀŽŝĐĞƐŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚĞĂĐŚƉŽĞŵŝŶƚŚĞƐ ƌŝĞƐ




5 A Grand Essay On Perception  
      Lyn ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĂŶĚ>ĞƐůŝĞ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ?ƐSight
   
      
 
ƋƵĂůůǇŵĂƌǀĞůůŽƵƐ ?ĂƐ'ŽŐŽůƐĂŝĚ ? 
ĂƌĞƚŚĞůĞŶƐĞƐƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƚĞŵƉůĂƚĞĂƐƚĂƌ 
ĂŶĚƚŚŽƐĞƚŚĂƚƐƚƵĚǇĂďƵŐ ? 
 WKǆŽƚĂ PZƵƐƐŝĂŶEŽǀĞů ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ? 
 
/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ 












ĞŝĚĞƚŝĐƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ? ‘sŝƐŝŽŶ ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƚĂŬĞŶŝŶŝƚƐŵǇƌŝĂĚĚĞŶŽƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƐŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝǀĞ
ŶŽƚŽŶůǇŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĞŶ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽƚŚĞƐĞĞƌ ?ĂŶĚŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƚŚĞŵĞƐŽĨƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ ?
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ƐĐŽƉĞ ?ƌĂŶŐĞĂŶĚĚŝƐ ?ĐůŽƐƵƌĞ ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ǁŚĂƚ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĂŶĚ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌǁŽƌŬƚŽǁĂƌĚƐŝŶ
^ŝŐŚƚŝƐĂŶŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐǇ ? 
 /ƚŝƐĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůĂƚƚŚĞŽƵƚƐĞƚ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚŝŶƐĞĞŬŝŶŐƚŽĚŝƐĐůŽƐĞƚŚĞ













ĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ ?ƉĞĐƵůŝĂƌŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐŽĨƚĞǆƚƐƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƉĞƌƐŽŶƐ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚ ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ
ǁƌŝƚĞƐŝŶ^ŝŐŚƚ P “/ƐĞĞŵƚŽďĞĚŽŝŶŐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŝŶĂǁŝĚĞƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ďƵƚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ?
ŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐŝĞƐƌĞŵŽǀĞĚ ? ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĂŶĚ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?&Žƌ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?ƚŚĞƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŝƐ
 ‘ǁŝĚĞ ?ďǇǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨƚŚĞƚǁŽƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞƌƐǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƚŽĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞǀŝƐƵĂůƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŝŶƚĂŶĚĞŵ ?ĂŶĚ
ƚŚŝƐ ?ĨŽƌ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĂƌĞŵŽǀĂůŽĨŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐŝĞƐ ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌĂŶĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ
ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞKƚŚĞƌ ?dŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌǁŝůůƐĞĞŬƚŽĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝǀĞ
ǁŽƌŬĚŝƐĐůŽƐĞƐƚŚĞŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐƵďũĞĐƚƐĂůůƚŚĞŵŽƌĞďǇǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨƚŚĞ



















KƌƐŚŽƵůĚǁĞďŽƚŚďĞŐŝŶƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇ ?ďŽŽŬŽŶĞĂŶĚďŽŽŬƚǁŽ ? 
ŶĚĂŵ/ƌŝŐŚƚƚŚĂƚǁĞĂƌĞƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐŝŶƚǁŽƐ ?ĂĚĚŝŶ Ő ?ůŝŶĞƐŽƌƚǁŽ
ƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞƐĂƚĂĐƌĂĐŬ ? ? Q ?/ůŝŬĞƚǁŽ ?/ƚŚŝŶŬ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐ ǁĞĂƌĞƚǁŽ ? 
          ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? )
dŚĞƐĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŵĂƌŬƚŚĞďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞĞƉŝƐƚŽůĂƌǇƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉŝŶĂŶĚŽĨƉŽĞƚŝĐƐǁŚŝĐŚ ?
ƐĞǀĞŶǇĞĂƌƐůĂƚĞƌ ?ǁĂƐƚŽďĞƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚĂƐ^ŝŐŚƚ ?dŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĂƐŬƐĂƌĞĂŶƐǁĞƌĞĚŝŶ
ƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ƐĨŝŶĂůĨŽƌŵ ?ƚŚĞ ? ? ? ‘ŝŶƐƚĂůŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĂŶĚ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ?
ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂƐĂƚƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚƐƚŽůĞƚƚĞƌƐ ?ĨĂǆĞƐĂŶĚĞŵĂŝůƐƐĞŶƚďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ? ? ? ?
ĂŶĚůĂƚĞ ? ? ? ? ?ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞƉŽĞŵǁĂƐĞĚŝƚĞĚ ?ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĞĚĂŶƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ ?^ŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇ ?ƚŚĞ




ǁĂůŬŝŶŐŽŶĂďĞĂĐŚ ?dŚŝƐĨŽƌƚƵŝƚŽƵƐŵĞĞƚŝŶŐŝƐĂůůƵĚĞĚƚŽŝŶƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ƐŽƉĞŶŝŶŐŝŶƐƚĂůŵĞŶƚƐ ?
,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
/ĂĐĐĞƉƚĂŐƌĞĞƚŝŶŐĂƚĂƉůĂĐĞ/ ?ǀĞŶĞǀĞƌƐĞĞŶ ?ůĞĂŶŝŶŐ 
ƚŽǁĂƌĚƚŚĞǁŝŶĚ ?ĂƐƐŽŵĞŽŶĞŵŽǀŝŶŐĨŽƌǁĂƌĚŝƐĐŽŵŝŶŐƚŽŵŝŶĚ ?  
ĂŶĚƚŚĞŵŽŵĞŶƚŝƚƐĞůĨŝƐďĞŝŶŐƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌĞĚĂƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞŝŶƐƚĂŶƚ ?ǁŝƚŚ 
ƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚ 
 ƚĂďĞĂĐŚǁŝƚŚďƌĞĂŬĞƌƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĂďƐĞŶĐĞŽĨǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌƚŚĞƌĞ 
ŝƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐĂŶĚŵĞ    ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĂŶĚ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ? ? ? ? ? ? )
^ŝŐŚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĨŝŐƵƌĞĚĂƐ ‘ĐŽŵŝŶŐƚŽŵŝŶĚ ? ?ĂƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚǁŚŝĐŚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĞĂůĞĂƚŽƌŝĐŶĂƚƵƌĞŶŽƚ
ŽŶůǇŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŶƚƐŽĨǀŝƐŝŽŶďƵƚŽĨƚŚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞǁŚŝĐŚ^ŝŐŚƚŐŽĞƐŽŶƚŽŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚ ?&ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ
ƚŚŝƐŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞƚǁŽĂŐƌĞĞĚƚŽĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚĞ ?ƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ ‘ŝŶƐƚĂůŵĞŶƚ ? ?ĂƚĞƌŵƵƐĞĚďǇďŽƚŚǁƌŝƚĞƌƐ
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞŝƌĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƚŝŵĞ )ǁĂƐƐĞŶƚĨƌŽŵ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶƚŽ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽŽŶ
ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ?ƚŚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ĂƌůǇŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĂŶĚ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚ
Ɛŝǆ ‘ŝŶƐƚĂůŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?ĂůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞĂďƌŝĞĨĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƉƌŽũĞĐƚĨŽƌƚŚĞ&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ?ŝƐƐƵĞŽĨ
^ŽũŽƵƌŶĞƌ PdŚĞtŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ&ŽƌƵŵ ?/ŶƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶŽƵƚůŝŶĞƐǁŚĂƚŐƌĞǁƚŽďĞƚŚĞ
ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĂŶĚĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ P 
dŚĞƐĞĐƚŝŽŶƐĚŽĐŽŶĨŽƌŵƚŽƚŚĞƚǁŽ ‘ƌƵůĞƐ ?ǁĞĂŐƌĞĞĚƵƉŽŶ ?ŶĂŵĞůǇ ?ƚŚĂƚǁĞ
ǁŽƵůĚǁƌŝƚĞĂďŽƵƚƚŚŝŶŐƐƐĞĞŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚĞĂĐŚ ‘ƉŽĞŵ ?Žƌ ‘ŝŶƐƚĂůŵĞŶƚ ?Žƌ
 ‘ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ?Žƌ ‘ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ǁĞ ?ǀĞƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƉĂƌƚƐŝŶĂůůŽĨƚŚŽƐĞƚĞƌŵƐ )ǁŽƵůĚ
ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚŝŶƚǁŽƐ ?ƚǁŽƉĂƌĂŐƌĂƉŚƐ ?ĂƉĂƌĂŐƌĂƉŚĂŶĚĂƐƚĂŶǌĂ ?ƚǁŽƐƚĂŶǌĂƐ ?ƚǁŽ
ǁŽƌĚƐ ?ƚǁŽƉĂŐĞƐ ?ƚǁŽƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞƐ ?ƚǁŽ ‘ƚĂŬĞƐ ? ?ƚŽƵƐĞĨŝůŵǀŽĐĂďƵůĂƌǇ )ŽƌĂŶǇ
ŽƚŚĞƌĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĂďůĞŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨďŝŶŽĐƵůĂƌĂŶĚƐƚĞƌĞŽƉƚŝĐĂůƉĞƌĐĞŝǀŝŶŐ ? 
        ? ? ? ? ? ?ŶƉ ) 
dŚĞƉůƵƌĂůŝƚǇŽĨƚǇƉĞƐŽĨďŝŶĂƌǇŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĞǀŝĚĞŶƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞƚĞǆƚ ?dŚŝƐ




ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚĞǁƌŝƚĞƌƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞƉŝĞĐĞ ?&Žƌ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?ƚŚŝƐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŝƐƚŚĞ ‘ƵŶĚĞƌůǇŝŶŐůŽŐŝĐ ?ŽĨ
ƚŚĞĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ “ƐŝŶĐĞŝƚƌŚǇŵĞƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚǁĞĂƌĞƚǁŽƉĞŽƉůĞƐĞĞŝŶŐ ?ƚǁŽƉĞŽƉůĞ
ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ?ǁĞĞĂĐŚŚĂǀĞƚǁŽĞǇĞƐ ?ĂŶĚǁĞĂƌĞƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽƉĞĞƌĂƚďŽƚŚƚŚŝŶŐĂŶĚǁŽƌĚ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
ĚŽƵďůĞƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚŝŶƚŚĂƚ ?ǁŝƚŚƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞĂŶĚ








ĐŽŵĞƐƚŽǀŝĞǁ ?ƐƋƵŝŐŐůĞƐ ?ƐŚŽƉƉĞƌƐ ?ƚŚĞƐŚĂĚŽǁŽĨŵǇŶŽƐĞ ?  
          ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? )
,ĞƌĞ ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĂƐŬƐĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞůŝŵŝƚƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?
dŚĞƐĞůŝŵŝƚƐƉĞƌƚĂŝŶďŽƚŚƚŽĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨǀŝƐŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĂĐƚŽĨ
ƐĞĞŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ĞǇĞƐŝŐŚƚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ǁŚĂƚǁĞƐĞĞ ? ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐĂ
ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƐĞĞŝŶŐĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐŽĨĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŶĂŵŝŶŐ ?
dŚĞƐĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶƐƵŶĚĞƌŐŽŵĂŶŝƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ^ŝŐŚƚ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐ ?ĂƐ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶƉŚƌĂƐĞƐŝƚ ? ‘ĂŐƌĂŶĚĞƐƐĂǇŽŶƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ? ?dŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂƐĂ
ůŽĐƵƐŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŝƐŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚďǇƚŚĞƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇŽĨĨŽƌŵƐĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚ ?DŽƐƚ





ǀŝƐŝŽŶŝŶ ‘ĠǌĂŶŶĞ ?ƐŽƵďƚ ? ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?/ŶdŚĞ sŝƐŝďůĞĂŶĚdŚĞ/ŶǀŝƐŝďůĞ ?DĞƌůĞĂƵ ?WŽŶƚǇ
ǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
We see the things themselves, the world is what we see: formulae of this kind 
express a faith common to the natural man and the philosopher ?  the 
moment he opens his eyes; they refer to a deep-ƐĞĂƚĞĚƐĞƚŽĨŵƵƚĞ ‘ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐ ?
implicated in our lives. But what is strange about this faith is that if we seek to 
ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞŝƚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƐĞƐŽƌƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ŝĨǁĞĂƐŬŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐǁŚĂƚŝƐƚŚŝƐ ‘ǁĞ ? ?
ǁŚĂƚ ‘ƐĞĞŝŶŐ ?ŝƐ ?ĂŶĚǁŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚŝŶŐ ?Žƌ ‘ǁŽƌůĚ ?ŝƐ ?ǁĞĞŶƚĞƌŝŶƚŽĂůĂďǇƌŝŶƚŚŽĨ
difficulties and contradictions.     (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 3) 









&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?/ŶĂĐŚĂƉƚĞƌĚĞĚŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŽDĂƵƌŝĐĞDĞƌůĞĂƵ ?WŽŶƚǇĂŶĚ:ĞĂŶ ?WĂƵů^ĂƌƚƌĞ ?ĂŶĚŝŶ
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƚŚĞŝƌĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞƐŽĨĂƌƚĞƐŝĂŶǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?ŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “/ŶŽƵƌƉŽƐƚ ?ƵĐůŝĚĞĂŶǁŽƌůĚ ? Q ?ǁĞ
ĂƌĞŶŽǁĂǁĂƌĞƚŚĂƚƐƉĂĐĞŝƐŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌǁŚĂƚŝƚƐĞĞŵĞĚƚŽĞƐĐĂƌƚĞƐ ?ǁŝƚŚŚŝƐŐĞŽŵĞƚĞƌ ?ƐĞǇĞ
ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞĂŶĚĂďŽǀĞƚŚĞƐĐĞŶĞŝƚƐƵƌǀĞǇĞĚ ? ?:ĂǇ ? ? ? ) ?/ŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇŝŶ








ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂŶĚůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?ĞƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ?ŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ŽŶŽŶĞ ?ƐŽƵƚůŽŽŬŽƌƉŽŝŶƚŽĨ
ǀŝĞǁ ?ƚŚĞƉƌĞǀĂůĞŶĐĞŽĨƐƵĐŚŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌƐǁŝůůďĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĞĚĂŶŽďƐƚĂĐůĞŽƌĂŶ
ĂŝĚƚŽŽƵƌŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ? ?:ĂǇ ? ? ) 
,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶŽĨĨĞƌƐĂĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƌǇŽŶƚŚŝƐĂŶĚ:ĂǇ ?ƐƚŚĞƐŝƐŝŶŐĞŶĞƌĂůŝŶĂůĞƚƚĞƌǁƌŝƚƚĞŶƚŽ
^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ^ŝŐŚƚ P 
/ ?ŵƌĞĂĚŝŶŐĂŶŽƚŚĞƌďŽŽŬ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ/ũƵƐƚďĞŐĂŶ PDĂƌƚŝŶ:ĂǇ ?ƐdŚĞŽǁŶĐĂƐƚǇĞ ?/ƚ
ŝƐ ?ŽƌǁŝůůďĞ ?/ƚŚŝŶŬ ?ĂĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŽĨƐĞĞŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĂŶƚŝ ?ŽĐƵůĂƌ ?




ĞƐƐĞŶĐĞƐŽǀĞƌĞƉŚĞŵĞƌĂůĂƉƉĞĂƌĂŶĐĞƐ ?    ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? )
:ĂǇ ?ƐƚŚĞƐŝƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĂƐŝƚĚŝƐƉůĂǇƐĂƉĂƌĂůůĞůďĞƚǁĞĞŶĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚĂůƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĂŶĚ
ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?ĂƌůǇŝŶ^ŝŐŚƚ ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
 /ƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌĨĞĞůŝŶŐƵƉďƌĂŝĚĞĚǁŚĞŶƌĞĂĚŝŶŐĂĐŽŵŵĞŶƚŝŶĂ 
ũŽƵƌŶĂůĂĐĐƵƐŝŶŐ ?ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇƉŽĞƚƌǇ ?ŽĨďĞŝŶŐ ?ŽƉƚŝĐŽ ?ĐĞŶƚƌŝĐ ? 
  ?/ƚ ? ?ƐĂŝĚƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌ ? ?ĂƌƌŽŐĂŶƚůǇƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞƐƚŚĞĞǇĞƐ ? 
  ?/ƚ ? ?ƚŚĞĞƐƐĂǇĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚ ? ?ĐŽůŽŶŝƐĞƐƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƐĞŶƐĞƐ ? 












ƌĞƐŝĚĞƐƚŚĞŝƌƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůƉƌĞƐƚŝŐĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ?Ă ? ? ? ? )









ƋƵĂůŝĨŝĞƐĂƐ ‘ŵĞƌĞƐŝŐŚƚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ǁŽƌůĚ ?ǀŝĞǁ ?ŝƐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚŽĨŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?
,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƚŽ^ŝŐŚƚ ?ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞƐƚŚŝƐĂƐĂƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ P 
Ɛ/ůŽŽŬĂƚƚŚŝƐǁŽƌŬŶŽǁŝŶƌĞƚƌŽƐƉĞĐƚ ?/ƐĞĞŝƚĂƐĞůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŶŐƉƌŽďůĞŵƐŝŶ
ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇďƵƚŶŽƚŝŶĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚŝƐ ?ŐŝǀĞŶŽƵƌƚŽƉŝĐ ?ƐĞĞŵƐ
ĐƵƌŝŽƵƐ ?KĨĐŽƵƌƐĞĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŝƐŽĨƚĞŶƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůŝŶŝŶƚĞŶƚ ?ĂŝŵĞĚĂƚ
ďƌŝŶŐŝŶŐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŝŶƚŽǀŝĞǁ ?ƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽƌĞƉůŝĐĂƚĞĨŽƌ ?ŽƌƉƌŽĚƵĐĞŝŶ )ƚŚĞƌĞĂĚĞƌ
ĂŶĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƐĞĞŶ ?ƵƚŝƚƐĞĞŵƐĂƐŝĨŽƵƌĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐǁĂƐŶŽƚŽŶ
ƚŚĞƚŚŝŶŐƐĞĞŶďƵƚŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŵŝŶŐƚŽƐĞĞ ?Ɛ/ƐĞĞŝƚ ?ƚŚŝƐďŽŽŬĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
ŵŽŵĞŶƚŽĨĐŽŵŝŶŐƚŽƐĞĞŝƐĂĐƚŝǀĞĂŶĚĚŝĂůŽŐŝĐ ?    
       ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĂŶĚ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ? ? ? ? ?ŝǀ ) 
KŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƐĂůŝĞŶƚƉƌŽďůĞŵƐŝŶĐŽŵŝŶŐƚŽƚĞƌŵƐǁŝƚŚƐŝŐŚƚŝƐǀĞƌǇŵƵĐŚƚŚĞĂĐƚŽĨ
 ‘ĐŽŵŝŶŐƚŽƐĞĞ ? ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĂŶĚ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶƚŽƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƚŽƚŚŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ





ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶĚƐŝŐŚƚĂƐĂƌĂĚŝĐĂůůǇƚĞŵƉŽƌĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ŽĐĐƵƌƌĞŶĐĞ ? ?dŚĞƐĞƚǁŽ
ƚĞƌŵƐ ?ĞƐƚƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚŽĐĐƵƌƌĞŶĐĞ ?ǁŝůůƵŶĚĞƌŐŽƐŝŐŶ ŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ
ƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?/ǁŝůůŶŽǁŵŽǀĞƚŽĚŝƐĐůŽƐŝŶŐƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝǀĞ





,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĂŶĚ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽǁƌŽƚĞƚŚĞƉŽĞŵŝŶĂŶĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞŽĨůĞƚƚĞƌƐ ?ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŶŐŽŶĞ ‘ŝŶƐƚĂůŵĞŶƚ ?
ĂƚĂƚŝŵĞ ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ƚŚĞƉŽĞŵĂŶĚŝƚƐƐĞƌŝĂůĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞŶŽƚŽŶůǇĂĨŽƌŵ
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůůǇĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞƚŽƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?ƐƚŚĞŵĞďƵƚĂůƐŽĂŶŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ





ůŝƚĞƌĂůůǇƚŽŐŽ ‘ŽƵƚŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐǁĂǇ ?ƚŽƐƉĞĂŬƚŽŽŶĞ ?ƐĨĞůůŽǁǁƌŝƚĞƌ ?ĂŶĚƚŚŝƐĂƉƉůŝĞƐ
ĂŬŝĚŽĨƉĞƌĐĞƉƚƵĂůƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞƚŽƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ? ? Q ?dŚŝƐƐĞĂƌĐŚĨŽƌ ‘ĐůĂƌŝƚǇ ?ŝƐĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ
ƌŚǇŵĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƌƚŚĞŵĞ ?      ? ? ? ? ? ?ŶƉ ) 
,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŚĞƌĞŝƐƌĞǀĞĂůŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚƵĂůƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ ?
ĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶĐĂƵƐĞƐŝƐĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽĞǆƚĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ŐŽŝŶŐŽƵƚŽĨ





dŚĞĞƉŝƉŚĂŶǇŽĨĞǆƚĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ?ƚŚĞŵĞĞƚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞKƚŚĞƌ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚĞǆƉŽƐĞƐƚŚĞ
ĚĞĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇŽĨƚŚĞƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶŝŶƚĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĚďĞŝŶŐ ?ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƐŝƚƵĂƚĞ
ŝŶƚĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ?ĂƐŽŶĞƉĂƌƚůŝŵŝƚĞĚďǇĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?ŝŶĂƚŽƚĂůŝƚǇ ? ? Q ?dŚĞĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞĨƌĞĞŝŶƚĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞĞǆƚĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇƚŚĂƚƐŚŽƵůĚůŝŵŝƚŝƚŝƐƌĞĐŽŶĐŝůĞĚ
ŝŶƚŚĞŵĂŶŽƉĞŶƚŽƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐ ?      ? ? ? ? ?Ă ? ? ? ? )
dŚĞ ‘ĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ?>ĞǀŝŶĂƐŝůůƵŵŝŶĂƚĞƐŚĞƌĞƉĞƌƚĂŝŶƐĨŽƌĞŵŽƐƚƚŽƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŚĂƐ
ĂĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽǀĞƌƚŚĞǁĂǇŝƚƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞƐƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ďƵƚƚŚĂƚǁŽƌůĚŝƐŝƚƐĞůĨĂŶĞǆƚĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ





ƌĞǀĞĂůƐĂƐŽĐŝĂů ‘ĐůĂƌŝƚǇ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ƌŚǇŵĞƐ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƚŚĞŵĞŽĨƐŝŐŚƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ?ĂŐĂŝŶ ?ƚŚĞǀŝƐƵĂůŝƐ
ŝŶĞǆƚƌŝĐĂďůǇďŽƵŶĚƚŽŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? 




ŝƐŝŶƚƌŝŶƐŝĐƚŽŝƚƐƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞƐƚŚŝƐĂƐ “dŚĞ ‘ǁĞ ?ŽĨĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŶŽƚƚŚĞǁĞ
ŽĨĂŐĂŶŐ ?ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚŝƚĐĂŶďĞƚŚĞǁĞŽĨƐƵƉĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞǁĞŽĨƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞ ? ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ? ? ? ? ?ŶƉ ) ?





ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇ ?ǁŚĞŶĂƚŚĞŵĞĂƉƉĞĂƌƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĂƚŽĨ ^ŚĂŬĞƐƉĞĂƌĞ ?Ɛ<ŝŶŐ>ĞĂƌŽƌĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ
ŝŵĂŐĞ ?ƚŚĞŵŽŽŶ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŽƉĞŶŝŶŐŝŶƐƚĂůŵĞŶƚƐ ) ?ƚŚĞĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĞĂĐŚƉŽĞƚ
ŵĂŬĞƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐ ‘ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ?ŝƐŝƚƐĞůĨĂĚŝƐƉůĂǇŽĨŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐǇ ?tŚŝůƐƚĂǀĂƐƚĂƌƌĂǇŽĨ
ŝŵĂŐĞƐƉŽƉƵůĂƚĞƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?ƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐŝƚǇŽĨƚŚŽƐĞŝŵĂŐĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐǁŝƚŚŝŶ
ƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƉŽĞŵƌĞůǇĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇŽŶĂĐƚƐŽĨƌĞƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶŽƌƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞǁŚĞƌĞďǇ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽŽƌ
,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƐĐƌƵƚŝŶǇŽŶƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƉŽĞƚŚĂƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ ?/Ŷ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?Ɛ ? ?ƚŚ
ŝŶƐƚĂůŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
 ƌŬĂĚŝŝƌĂŐŽŵŽƐŚĐŚĞŶŬŽǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚĞǀĞŶƚƐĂƌĞĂĨŽƌŵŽĨĐŽ ?ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ?ŚĞ
ĐĂŶƐĂǇƚŚŝƐŝŶĂƐŝŶŐůĞǁŽƌĚ ?ƐŝŶĐĞŝŶZƵƐƐŝĂŶĞǀĞŶƚ ?ƐŽďǇƚŝĞ )ĐĂŶďĞĚŝǀŝĚĞĚ
ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƉƌĞĨŝǆƐŽ ?ǁŝƚŚŽƌĐŽ ? )ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶŽƵŶďǇƚŝĞ ?ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽƌďĞŝŶŐ ) )tŚĂƚ
ŚŽůĚƐƵƐƚŽŽƵƌĞǀĞŶƚƐŵŝŐŚƚŶŽƚďĞƚŚƌĞĂĚůŝŬĞďƵƚĐůŽƵĚůŝŬĞ ?ĂŶĚĂůǁĂǇƐ
ĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŽƌǇ ) ?    ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĂŶĚ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) 
dŚĞ ‘ĞǀĞŶƚ ? ?ĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƐ ‘ĐŽ ?ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ?ŽĨĚŝƐƉĂƌĂƚĞĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐĐĂƵŐŚƚƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ?ĨŝŶĚƐ
ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ŽƌŵĂůŝƐŵĂŶĚƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?dŚĞĞǀĞŶƚŝƐ
 ‘ĐůŽƵĚůŝŬĞ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ ‘ƚŚƌĞĂĚůŝŬĞ ? ?ĂŶĚŝƐĐŽ ?ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚƚŽŽƚŚĞƌƐƵĐŚĞǀĞŶƚƐƚĂŬŝŶŐƉůĂĐĞ
ƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇ ?dŚŝƐŶŽƚŝŽŶŝƐĨƌĂŵĞĚůĂƚĞƌŝŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞŝŶƐƚĂůŵĞŶƚ ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
 ^ ŚĞĂŶĚǁŚĂƚƐŚĞƐĞĞƐĂƌĞƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐ ?ƵƚǁŚĂƚƐŚĞƐĞĞƐŝƐǁŚĂƚƐŚĞƐĂǁ ?
ƐŽƐŚĞůĂĐŬƐůŽƐƐ ?^ŚĞŝƐĚĞƉƌŝǀĞĚŽĨŐƌŝĞĨĂŶĚŽĨ 
ƌĞůŝĞĨ 
 ^ ŚĞŝƐĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇĚĞƉƌŝǀĞĚŽĨĂǀŽŝĚĂŶĚŝƚƐĐůĂƌŝƚǇĂŶĚďůƵĞ ?  
 /ŶĂŶĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂůĐůŽƵĚ ?ŶŽĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶƐĂƌĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ? 
ŽĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŝƐƚƌƵĞŽĨŝƚƐŽǁŶĂĐĐŽƌĚ ?     ?/ďŝĚ ? ? ? ? ) 
ZĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĞǀĞŶƚďĞŝŶŐƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŽĨŝŶŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƚĞƌŵƐ ?ŚĞƌĞ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶŚŝŶŐĞƐ
ŚĞƌĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ĞǀĞŶƚ ?ŽŶ ‘ƌĞůŝĞĨ ? ?dŚŝƐŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŝƐĂŬŝŶƚŽ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐ ŝŶsŝŬƚŽƌ
^ŚŬůŽǀƐŬǇ ?ƐŽƐƚƌĂŶĞŶŝĞŽƌĞƐƚƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ŝ Ĩ ‘^ŚĞĂŶĚǁŚĂƚƐŚĞƐĞĞƐĂƌĞƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐ ? ?ƚŚĞŶ
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ƐŚĞŝƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƚŚĞ ‘ǀŽŝĚĂŶĚŝƚƐĐůĂƌŝƚǇ ? ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞ ?ƚŚĞǁŝƚŶĞƐƐŝƐƚŚĞĂĐƚŽĨǁŝƚŶĞƐƐŝŶŐ ?
^ŚŬůŽǀƐŬǇǁƌŝƚĞƐ ?ŝŶ ‘ƌƚĂƐdĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞ ? P 
>ŝĨĞŝƐƌĞĐŬŽŶĞĚĂƐŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ ?,ĂďŝƚƵĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĚĞǀŽƵƌƐǁŽƌŬ ?ĐůŽƚŚĞƐ ?ĨƵƌŶŝƚƵƌĞ ?
ŽŶĞ ?ƐǁŝĨĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĨĞĂƌŽĨǁĂƌ ? ? Q ?ŶĚĂƌƚĞǆŝƐƚƐƚŚĂƚŽŶĞŵĂǇƌĞĐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ
ƐĞŶƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨůŝĨĞ ?ŝƚĞǆŝƐƚƐƚŽŵĂŬĞŽŶĞĨĞĞůƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?ƚŽŵĂŬĞƚŚĞƐƚŽŶĞƐƚŽŶǇ ?dŚĞ
ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨĂƌƚŝƐƚŽŝŵƉĂƌƚƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝŶŐƐĂƐƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĂŶĚ
ŶŽƚĂƐƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŬŶŽǁŶ ?dŚĞƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞŽĨĂƌƚŝƐƚŽŵĂŬĞŽďũĞĐƚƐ ?ƵŶĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌ ? ?ƚŽ
ŵĂŬĞĨŽƌŵƐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ?ƚŽŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƚŚĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚǇĂŶĚůĞŶŐƚŚŽĨƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŝƐĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĞŶĚŝŶŝƚƐĞůĨĂŶĚŵƵƐƚďĞ
ƉƌŽůŽŶŐĞĚ ?        ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) 
WĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŝƐ ?ĂƐƐƵĐŚ ?ĂŵŽƌĞǀŝƚĂůƐŽƵƌĐĞƚŚĂŶŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?/Ŷ^ŝŐŚƚ ?ƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚŝƐǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ
ŝŶ ‘ĚĞĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌŝƐŝŶŐ ?ŝƚďǇǁƌŝƚŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚĂƉĞƌĐĞƉƚƵĂůĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝǀĞůǇ
ƵŶƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚĂďůĞ ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉƐĂƉŽĞƚŝĐƐǁŚŝĐŚ ?ƚŽƵƐĞŚĞƌŽǁŶƉŚƌĂƐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉƌĞĨĂƚŽƌǇ
ŶŽƚĞƚŽ^ŝŐŚƚ ? “ĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵŽŵĞŶƚŽĨĐŽŵŝŶŐƚŽƐĞĞŝƐĂĐƚŝǀĞ ? ?dŚŝƐƌĂĚŝĐĂůƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ
ĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶĐǇŝƐĂůƐŽĂƚƚŚĞŚĞĂƌƚŽĨ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?ŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?ƐŵĞĚŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŽŶ
 ‘ĐŽĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ?ŽĨƐŝŐŚƚĂŶĚƐĞĞƌ ?^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽƌĞƉůŝĞƐ P 
,ĞƌƐĞůĨĂŶĚƚŚĞƐŝŐŚƚƐĐŽ ?ĞǆŝƐƚ ?dŚŝƐŝƐ ‘ĂŐĞ ?ĂůƐŽ ?^ƵƉƉŽƐŝŶŐ 
ƚŚĞƐŝŐŚƚƐĞŝƚŚĞƌďĞĂƵƚŝĨƵůŽƌĨƌŝŐŚƚĞŶŝŶŐĐŽ ?ĞǆŝƐƚǁŝƚŚŽŶĞ ?ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ 
ĚƌĞĂŵƐŵŽǀĞ ? ? ?ŽƌĚŽŶ ?ƚƐŽŽŶĞŝƐŶĞĂƌĚĞĂƚŚ ?ƐĂƚƵƌĂƚŝŽŶ ) ?DĂǇďĞ 
ƚŚĞǇŵŽǀĞŚĞĂǀŝůǇŝŶŚĞƌ ?ŽƌƐŚĞĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚƐĞĞƚŚĞŵ ? ) 
 tĞ ?ƌĞŶŽƚƚŽƐĞĞĞǀĞŶƚƐŝŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĐŽŶƐƚĞůůĂƚŝŽŶ ? 
     ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĂŶĚ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) 
dŚĞƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚŝƐĨŝŐƵƌĞĚƚĞŵƉŽƌĂůůǇĂƐ ‘ĂŐĞ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚƉƌŽǀŽŬĞƐ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽƚŽ
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐŝŐŚƚŝŶĚƌĞĂŵƐ ?dŚĞĚƌĞĂŵƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝǌĞƐƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƐĞĞƌĂŶĚƐŝŐŚƚĐŽĞǆŝƐƚŝŶ




ǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ǁĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĞǀĞŶƚƐ ?ĂƌĞƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĚŝƐĐƌĞƚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨ
 ‘ĞǀĞŶƚ ? ?ǀĞŶƚƐĂƌĞ ‘ĐŽŶƐƚĞůůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ďƵƚƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĨƌŽŵĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ?dŚŝƐƐƚĂŶĚƐƚŽƐŽŵĞĞǆƚĞŶƚŝŶ
ĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƐĞƌŝĂůĨŽƌŵŽĨ^ŝŐŚƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽƵůĚǁĞůůďĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐĂĐŽŶƐƚĞůůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ĨŝŐƵƌĞƐĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŵŽŵĞŶƚƐŽĨǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?Žƌ ‘ĞǀĞŶƚƐ ? ?^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ?ƐŝŶƐƚĂůŵĞŶƚ
ĐĂŶĂƐƐƵĐŚďĞƐĞĞŶƚŽƌĂŝƐĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?ƐƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐƌĞƉůǇ ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐ
ĂĐƚŝŶŐƐĞůĨ ?ƌĞĨůĞǆŝǀĞůǇŽŶƚŚĞƉŽĞŵĂƐŝƚƉƌŽĐĞĞĚƐ ?
 ŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐƚŚŝƐƌĞĨůĞǆŝǀŝƚǇ ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?ƐƌĞƉůǇĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞƐƚŚĞŝƌƉƌŽũĞĐƚďǇŝƚƐƉƌŽƉĞƌŶŽƵŶ
ĨŽƌƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƚŝŵĞŝŶƚŚĞƚĞǆƚ P 
^ŝŐŚƚŝƐůǇƌŝĐĂů ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚƐƐƵďƚĞǆƚŝƐĂŶŶŝŚŝůĂƚŝŽŶ 
dŚĞĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶƐ ?ǁŝƚŶĞƐƐŝŶŐƐ ) ?ƚŚĞŶ ) ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞŽĨĐŽ ?ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ? 
  ‘ĂŐĞ ?ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶďŽƚŚĂƉŚŽƌŝƐŵƐĂŶĚƐĂƚƵƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚŝƐ 
 ƐĞĞŵƐĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŽƌǇ 
ƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌƌƵƉƚĞĚĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐ ?ƐĞĞŝŶŐĂŶĚďůŝŶĚ    ?/ďŝĚ ? ? ? ? ) 
dŚĞŶĞŐĂƚŝŽŶƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĨŝŶĂůůŝŶĞŽĨ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ?ƐƉƌŝŽƌƌĞƉůǇŝƐĨŝŐƵƌĞĚŚĞƌĞĂƐ
 ‘ĂŶŶŝŚŝůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĞǀŽŬŝŶŐďŽƚŚƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŽĨĂƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƚŽŶŽƚŚŝŶŐĂŶĚ ?ŝŶƉŚǇƐŝĐƐ ?ƚŚĞĐŽŶǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ
ŽĨŵĂƚƚĞƌŝŶƚŽĞŶĞƌŐǇ ?dŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌƐĞŶƐĞƉƌĞǀĂŝůƐŝŶƚŚĂƚŶĞŝƚŚĞƌ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽŶŽƌ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶƐĞĞŵƚŽ
ĚŝƐƉůĂǇŶŝŚŝůŝƐƚŝĐŝŶƚĞŶƚ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞĐŚŝĂƐŵŝĐŶŽƚŝŶŽĨƐŝŐŚƚĂƐƐŽŵĞǁŚĞƌĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ŵĂƚƚĞƌ ?
ĂŶĚ ‘ĞŶĞƌŐǇ ? ?dŚŝƐƌĞĐĂůůƐƚŚĞůŽŶŐĞƉŝŐƌĂŵƚŽ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ?ƐĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƉŽĞŵtĂǇĨƌŽŵĂǀŝĚ
ŽŚŵ ?ƐĂƵƐĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚŚĂŶĐĞ/ŶDŽĚĞƌŶWŚǇƐŝĐƐ P 




ƐƵďƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ       ?^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ? ? ? ? ?ŝ ) 
KŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƐĞ ‘ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ĨƌŽŵĂƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ŝƐǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?
,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?ƐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ “^ŝŐŚƚŝƐůǇƌŝĐĂů ?ƚŚƵƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐĂƌĂĚŝĐĂůŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞůǇƌŝĐ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ
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dŽ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?ƐŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
It has occurred to me that our way of seeing is now working at some cross 
purposes trying to change each other's seeing, back and forth out of necessity. 
So trying to address, so as to allow, the difference seemed to me the way to 
go. I guess this is description of 'one's poetics' so as to be in the dead cornea, 
relaxing.        (Scalapino 1993)  
dŚĞƵŶƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚǁŚŝĐŚŽĐĐƵƌƐĨƌŽŵĂĨĞĞůŝŶŐŽĨŚĂǀŝŶŐƚƌŝĞĚƚŽ ‘ĐŚĂŶŐĞĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐƐĞĞŝŶŐ ?
ŝƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐĂ ‘ŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇ ? ?^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽǁĂŶƚƐƚŽ ‘ĂůůŽǁ ? Q ?ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ? ?dŽƚŚŝƐ ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶƌĞƉůŝĞƐ
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ƋƵĂƌƌĞů ?ŝƐ ‘ƉĞƌƚŝŶĞŶƚ ? Q ?ƐŝŶĐĞĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƌĞǀŝĞǁŝŶŐĂŶĚ ĚũƵƐƚŝŶŐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ
ĂƌĞĂůůĂƉĂƌƚŽĨƐŝŐŚƚ ? ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ? ? ? ? ) ?dŚŝƐƌĞĐŝƉƌŽĐĂůƌĞŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŶŽƚ ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?
 ‘ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐ ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌƉĞƌƉĞƚƵĂůůǇŐƌĂƉƉůŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵŽĨŚĂǀŝŶŐƚŽĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƚŚĂƚ
 ‘ƚŚŝƐƚŽŽŝƐĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞ ?ŽƌĞǀĞŶ ‘ƚŚŝƐƚŽŽŝƐǀŝƐŝďůĞ ? ?/ďŝĚ ? ) ?dŚĞƉůĞŶƵŵǁŚŝĐŚƐĞĞŵƐƚŽƵŶĚĞƌůŝĞ
ƚŚĞ ‘ƋƵĂƌƌĞů ?ŝƐĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞƚŽƚŚĞŝƌƚŚĞŵĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐŽĨĞǆĐůƵƐŝŽŶĂŶĚŝŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶĂƌĞ
ŽŶůǇƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶĂůďĞĨŽƌĞǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚůǇƌĞŶĞǁƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŝŵĂŐĞƐ ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐƚŚŝƐŵŽĚƵůĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚĚŝƌĞĐƚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽĂƉŚƌĂƐĞĨƌŽŵ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ?ƐůĞƚƚĞƌ P 
 





ĚŽǁŝƚŚƚŽŶĞ ?ŶŽƚƚƌƵƚŚ ? ?/ďŝĚ ? ) 
dŽŶĞ ?ƚŚĞŶ ?ƐĞĞŵƐĂŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐǇ ?ƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƚǁŽƉŽĞƚƐĐĂŶŶŽƚ
ďĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ? ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞ ?ƚŚĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶŚĞƌĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ƚŽŶĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ?
ŝƐǀĞƌǇŵƵĐŚĂƚƚŚĞŚĞĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ?ĂŶĚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞƵŶĚĞƌƐĐŽƌĞƐƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚ
^ŝŐŚƚŝƐĂǁŽƌŬǁŚŝĐŚ ?ƚŽĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞƚŚĞƚŝƚůĞŽĨ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?ƐĐŽůůĞĐƚĞĚƉƌŽƐĞ ?ŝƐĐŽŵƉŽƐĞĚŽĨĂ
 ‘ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞŽĨŝŶƋƵŝƌǇ ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĞĚŵŽƐƚĐůĞĂƌůǇŝŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ƋƵĂƌƌĞů ?ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĚŝƐƉůĂǇĂ
ƉƌŽďůĞŵďĞŝŶŐƐŽůǀĞĚ ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌŝŶƋƵŝƌĞƐĂŶĚƌĞŽƌŝĞŶƚƐ ?ĂůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞǁŽƌŬƚŽƌĞĨůĞǆŝǀĞůǇĂůƚĞƌ
ŝƚƐŽǁŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?ƐƚƵŵďůĞĚƵƉŽŶŝƐŶŽƚ
ŽŶůǇŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝǀĞŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨĨŽƌĐŝŶŐĂĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĞƚŝĐƐĂƚŚĂŶĚ ?ďƵƚŝŶƚƌŝŶƐŝĐƚŽƚŚĞ
ŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŽŶĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚǀŝƐŝŽŶ P 
 
 /ůŝŬĞƚŚĞďŝƉĂƌƚŝƚĞ ?ĚŝĂůŽŐŝĐƋƵĂůŝƚǇƚŽŽƵƌĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝĨŶŽƚŚŝŶŐĞůƐĞ
ŝƚƌŚǇŵĞƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚǁĞŚĂǀĞƚǁŽĞǇĞƐ ?ĂŶĚŽƵƌůĞĨƚƐƐĞĞƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĨƌŽŵďƵƚĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƌǇƚŽǁŚĂƚǁĞƐĞĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƌƌŝŐŚƚƐ ? 
 ƵƚǇŽƵƐŽƵŶĚĂůŝƚƚůĞǁŽƌƌŝĞĚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ ?ĐƌŽƐƐ ?ƉƵƌƉŽƐŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ? ?ƌĞǁĞŐĞƚƚŝŶŐ
ĐƌŽƐƐ ?ĞǇĞĚ ?
 ZĞĂĚŝŶŐǇŽƵƌůĂƐƚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞĐŽŶĨŝƌŵƐŵǇĨĂŝƚŚƚŚĂƚǁĞĂƌĞǁƌŝƚŝŶŐĂ
ŐƌĂŶĚĞƐƐĂǇŽŶƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐĂĐŽŶǀĞǇĂŶĐĞŽĨŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ )   ?/ďŝĚ ? ) 
 
dŚŝƐŵŽŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶĐĞĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶĐǇŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚ
ǁŚŝĐŚ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚĐŽŶƐŝƐƚŝŶŐŽĨĂŶĂĐĐƵŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉĂŝƌƐ ?ŝƐŶĞǀĞƌĚŝĂůĞĐƚŝĐĂů ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?ƐƚĞƌŵƐ
 ‘ĚŝĂůŽŐŝĐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ďŝƉĂƌƚŝĞ ?ŵŽƌĞĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞůǇĐĂƉƚƵƌĞƚŚĞĨŽƌŵ ?ƚǁŽĚŝƐĐƌĞƚĞůŽŐŝĐƐ ?ŽƌĚĞƌĞĚ
ƐĞƌŝĂůůǇ ?ǁŝƚŚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞĂƐŵŽŵĞŶƚƵŵ ?ƌĂŝƐŝŶŐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨĚŽƵďůĞ ?ǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?ŽĨ
ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞ ?ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐĞǆƉůŽƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?dŚĞƉŽĞŵƐǁŚŝĐŚ
ĂĐĐŽŵƉĂŶǇƚŚŝƐĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞĞǆƚĞŶĚƚŚĞŝƌƐĞůĨ ?ŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐĂ ‘ƋƵĂƌƌĞů ? ?ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞ





  ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?ĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ŽƌŽĨĂƐŝŶŐůĞ 
ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?ĂǁŽŵĂŶŝŶďůĂĐŬŐĂǌĞƐĂƚƚŚĞƐĞĂŝŶƚŚĞďůƵĞ ) 
ƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶŐďƵƚĚŝĨĨĞƌŝŶŐŝŶŵĞŵŽƌǇŽǀĞƌƚŝŵĞ ?ŽƌŽĨĂƐŝŶŐůĞƉĞƌĐĞƉƚ 
 ?ƉƵƌĞůŝŐŚƚŐůŝŶƚƐŽŶŐůŽƐƐǇŐƌĞĞŶ ?ďƌŽǁŶƐǁŽŽƉŽĨǁĂƚĞƌŝŶĨŽŐ )ĂƐ 
ĂƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶ ?ĂƚŚŽƵƐĂŶĚƐƵŶƐ )ŝŶŝƚƐĞůĨƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶŝ ĂŶŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ 
ŽĨǁŝƚŶĞƐƐŝŶŐ ?ŽƌŽĨĂŶŽďũĞĐƚŽĨƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐĞĞŶ ?ďƵƚŶĞǀĞƌĐĂƵŐŚƚ ) 
ďǇĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞƌƐ ?ĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞƐĞŵŝŐŚƚďĞĂƐ ƉŚĞƌĞƌĂƚŚĞƌ 
ƚŚĂŶĂŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ ?ĂĨĨŝǆĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƐƵŶ ?ƐůŽŐŝĐ 
 
  ?ĞŝŶŐƐĞĞŶ ‘ĂƐĂǁŽŵĂŶ ?ĚŝǀŝĚĞƐŽŶĞĐŽŶƐƉŝĐƵŽƵƐůǇǁŚŝĐŚ 
ŝƐǁŚĂƚƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶƐ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ )ƚŚĞƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůďŽĚǇ 
 
dŚĞŵĂŶŝƐǁŽƌƌŝĞĚďǇdƌƵĞ,ŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?ďǇǁŽŵĞŶ )ŽĨ 
ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŶŽĞŶĚǁŚŝĐŚĐŽƵůĚďĞǁƌŝƚƚĞŶŝŶƚŚĞ 
ĚĂƌŬ ?ƚŽŝŶĐůƵĚĞĂďůĂĐŬďƵƚƚĞƌĨůǇ ) ? ) 
 
 ? Q ? 
 
ƵƚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞũŽŝŶĞĚďǇĂŶĂůŵŽƐƚ ?ŝŶǀŝƐŝďůĞƐǁŝĨƚ 
ďƵƚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ‘ĂŶĚ ? ?ĂĨůŽǁŝŶŐĐŽŶũƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ? ‘ƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶƐŝŶŽƵƌŵŽǀŝŶŐ 











ŽĨƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ? ?ůĂƚĞƌƋƵĂůŝĨŝĞĚĂƐ ‘ dƌƵĞ,ŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?ďǇǁŽŵĞŶ ) ? ?ĂŶĚŚŽůĚƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
ƚŚĞƉĞƌĐĞƉƚƵĂůƌĞĂůŵƐŽĨŵĞŵŽƌǇ ?ƐŝŶŐůĞƉĞƌĐĞƉƚƐ ?ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂŝŶƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ?ƚŚĞŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞŽĨ
ǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĂŶĚŽďũĞĐƚƐŽĨƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐĞĞŶŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ?dŚŝƐ ‘ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?ŝƐ ?ĂƐ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶŶŽƚĞƐ ? ‘Ă
ƐƉŚĞƌĞƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ ? ?/ĨǁĞƚĂŬĞƚŚŝƐŝŶƐƚĂůŵĞŶƚƚŽďĞĂƐĞůĨ ?ƌĞĨůĞǆŝǀĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ
ŽĨ^ŝŐŚƚ ?ŝƚĞǀŽŬĞƐƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĂŶĚ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ?ƐŽǁŶ ‘ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐ
ƐĞƌŝĂůůǇŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞĚ ?ĂƐĂĐŽŶƐƚĞůůĂƚŝŽŶ ‘ĂĨĨŝǆĞĚƚŽŚĞƐƵŶ ?ƐůŽŐŝĐ ? ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐ ?ŽĨ ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ?ƚŝŵĞĂŶĚ
ůŝŐŚƚĂƐƚŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶŽĨǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ “dŚĞŵĂŶŝƐǁŽƌƌŝĞĚďǇdƌƵĞ
,ŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?ďǇǁŽŵĞŶ )ŽĨ ?ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŶŽĞŶĚǁŚŝĐŚĐŽƵůĚďĞǁƌŝƚƚĞŶŝŶƚŚĞ ?ĚĂƌŬ ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ
ĂǀŝƐƵĂůĚǇŶĂŵŝĐǁŚŝĐŚƉĂƌĂůůĞůƐƉĂƚƌŝĂƌĐŚǇĞůŝƐŝŽŶ ?/ĨƚŚĞƉĂƚƌŝĂƌĐŚĂůŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŝƐ
ĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚ ?ƐĞĞŶ ‘ŝŶĂďĞƚƚĞƌůŝŐŚƚ ?ƚŚĂŶƚŚĂƚŽĨǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƚŚĞŶƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůƐŚĂĚŽǁ ?ƐƉĂĐĞ
ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĐĐƵƌƐŝŶĨŝŶŝƚĞůǇďǇǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐŽǀĞƌĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝǀĞŽĨƉĂƚƌŝĂƌĐŚǇ ?
dŚŝƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ?ǁŚŽƌĞƉůŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐŝŶƐƚĂůŵĞŶƚ P 
 
/ĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁŝĨ/ĐĂŶĚƌŽƉƚŚĞƋƵĂƌƌĞůŽĨƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚĐŽŶũƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ
ǁŚĞŶ ? ? ? ?ƐĞĞŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?ƐĚĞĐŽŵƉŽƐŝŶŐƐĂĐŬŽĨĨůĞƐŚƉůĂǇĨƵůůǇĂŶĚ 
ĐĂůŵůǇ ? ?dŚĞŝƌ ?ǀŝĞǁŝƐƚŚĞĂĐƚƵĂůǁŽƌůĚŝƐƐǇŵďŽůŝĐĂŶĚƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚ 
ǁŚĞƌĞĂŚŝŐŚĞƌĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ?ŐŝǀĞƐ ?ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƚŽ ?ƐĐĞŶĞƐ ? ?ĚĞĐŽŵƉŽƐŝŶŐ 
ŚĂǀŝŶŐŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ )   ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĂŶĚ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ? ? ? ?   ? ) 
 
 ‘dŚĞŝƌǀŝĞǁ ?ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞƐƉĂƚƌŝĂƌĐŚǇĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞĂĐƚƵĂůǁŽƌůĚ ?ĂƐĂ ‘ƐǇŵďŽůŝĐĂŶĚƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚ ? ‘ŚŝŐŚĞƌ
ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ? ?dŚĞ ‘ƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĐŽŶũƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽƐĞĞƐĂƐƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌŝŶŐƉĂƚƌŝĂƌĐŚĂů
ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ?^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽƐĞĞŵƐƚŽƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ ?ŝƐĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ )ĂƌĞĂƋƵĂƌƌĞůǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞ
ĚƌŽƉƉĞĚ ?dŚĞƚĞŶƐŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽĂŶĚ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶŚĞƌĞŚĂƐƚŽĚŽǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽ
ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƐŽĨƉĂƚƌŝĂƌĐŚǇƐŚŽƵůĚďĞǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĞĚŝŶǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ?dŚĞ ‘ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨǀŝƐŝŽŶƚŚĞ
ƉĂŝƌƌĞĨĞƌƚŽŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĂĐĐŽŵƉĂŶǇŝŶŐůĞƚƚĞƌƐĂƐƐƵĐŚŚĂƐƚŽĚŽǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇ ?







ƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶǁŽƌŬ ?/ŶŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚůŝǌĂďĞƚŚ&ƌŽƐƚ ?^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚ P 
I was re-writing King Lear in a recent work of mine, called As: All Occurrence In 
Structure, Unseen ? (Deer Night), which I was doing alongside Sight. I was also 
writing The Front Matter, Deal Souls. Passages of mine originating in Sight got 
into The Front Matter as being alongside it. (Frost 1996, np)  
^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ?ƐŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚKing Lear appears first in their correspondence in relation to the 
ƚŚĞŵĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “KƵƌƚŚĞŵĞǁĂƐĂůƐŽ^ŚĂŬĞƐƉĞĂƌĞ ?ƐĨĂǀŽƵƌŝƚĞ ?
Together, are we one bard? One of us Shake and the other Spear? Those are interchangeable 
roles ?(1993). This playful evocation of the nature of their collaboration as an alternating 
ŝŶƚĞƌĐŚĂŶŐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞĂĐƚƐŽĨ ‘ƐŚĂŬŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƐƉĞĂƌŝŶŐ ?ŝƐƵƐĞĨƵůŝŶŝƚƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚĞĂĐŚ
ƉŽĞƚ ?ƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƐĞǆƉůŽƌĞĚĂŶĚŐŝǀĞŶĨŽƌŵŝŶSight, undergo a process of unsettlement 
and arrest by virtue of their responsive epistolary structure. That is to say, merely by virtue of 
sharing observations, perceptions and sights, these very images and conceptions are subject 
ƚŽ ?ŝŶ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?ƐƉŚƌĂƐĞ ? “ƐĞŝǌĞƐĂŶĚůĞĂƉƐ ? ?/ŶƚŚĞŝƌĐorrespondence, Hejinian is at first unsure 
about the comparison with Shakespeare ?   “ƵƚǁŚĂƚŝƐ^ŚĂŬĞƐƉĞĂƌĞ ?ƐƚŚĞŵĞ ? ? Q ?/ƚŵĂŬĞƐ
me insecure to be ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĂƚƉůĂĐĞƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? ? which prompts Scalapino to consider the 













^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐ ?ƚŚĞƚƌĂŐŝĐƐŝĚĞŽĨƐĞĞŝŶŐŝƐďůŝŶĚŶĞƐƐ ?sŝƐŝŽŶŝƐŝŶƐĐƌŝďĞĚǁŝƚŚďůŝŶĚŶĞƐƐ ?
ƚŚĞĐůŽƐŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞĞǇĞƐ ?ĨĞĂƌŽĨƚŚĞĚĂƌŬ ?ďůŝŶĚƐƉŽƚƐ ?ŶŽƚůĞĂƐƚƚŚĞ ‘ďůŝŶĚƐƉŽƚƐ ?ŽĨŽƚŚĞƌ
ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ?dŚĂƚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇ ?ŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝǀĞůǇĚĞŵĂŶĚƐĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶ
ďůŝŶĚƐƉŽƚƐ ?ĂŶĚŵƵĐŚŽĨƚŚĞƚƌĂŐĞĚǇŽĨ>ĞĂƌĐĂŶďĞĨŽƵŶĚŝŶƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌƐ ?
ĐŽŵŝŶŐƚŽƚŚŝƐĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐ ?KŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƌŝĐŚĞƐƚŝƌŽŶŝĞƐŽĨ<ŝŶŐ>ĞĂƌŝƐƚŚĞƉůĂǇŽĨ ‘ďůŝŶĚŶĞƐƐ ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘ǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?ĂƐŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌƐĨŽƌƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞ ?dŚĞ&ŽŽů ?ƐŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐĂƌĞƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚďǇŚŝƐ
ůŽŽŬ ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇ ?ƚŚĞǁĂǇŚĞŝƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚďǇǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨŚŝƐƌŽůĞĂŶĚƐƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞƉůĂǇ ?Ɛ
ŽƉĞŶŝŶŐĂůƐŽƐƚƌĞƐƐĞƐƚŚĞŝŶĐŽŵƉĂƚŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨǁŝƚŶĞƐƐŝŶŐďĞƚǁĞĞŶŽƌĚĞůŝĂĂŶĚ>ĞĂƌ ?ǁŚĞƌĞ





YƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐůŝŬĞ ?ĚŽǁĞƐĞĞǁŚĂƚǁĞŬŶŽǁ ?ŽǁĞŬŶŽǁŚĂƚǁĞƐĞĞ ?ŽĞƐ
ǁŚĂƚǁĞƐĞĞĞǆŝƐƚ ?ŽĞƐǁŚĂƚǁĞŬŶŽǁĞǆŝƐƚ ?,ĂǀĞ ?ŝŶŽŶĞǁĂǇŽƌĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ )
ďĞĞŶǇŽƵƌƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚŵǇƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨŽƵƌǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ
ůŝǀĞƐ ?/ĨǁĞĂƌĞƚŽďĞƵŶƐĞƚƚůĞĚĂŶĚĞǆĐŝƚĞĚ ?ǁĞĐĂŶďĞƵŶƐĞƚƚůĞĚĂŶĚĞǆĐŝƚĞĚďǇ
ĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌĂŶĚŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ?/ďŝĚ ? ) 
 
^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽŚĞƌĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚƐŚĞĂŶĚ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĂƌĞƵŶŝƚĞĚƉŽĞƚŝĐĂůůǇŝŶƚŚĞŝŶƋƵŝƌŝŶŐŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ
ƚŚĞŝƌƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĞƐĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ‘ƵŶƐĞƚƚůĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĞǆĐŝƚĞ ?ďǇǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌƉůĂǇ
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ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƚǁŽƉŽĞƚƐ ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐ “>ĞĂƌ ?ƐŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨŝŐŶŽƌĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐĞůĨĂƐƚŚĞ
ŝŐŶŝƚŝŶŐƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ? ?ďǇǁŽƌŬŝŶŐŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ?ďŽƚŚ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽĂŶĚ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŚŝƐ
ŝŐŶŽƌĂŶĐĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƉƌŝŵĂƌǇƐĞŶƐŽƌǇƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨǀŝƐŝŽŶ ? 
 /ƚƌĞŵĂŝŶƐƚŽĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚĞƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƐŚĂƌĞĚ






ĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚĐŚĂŶŐĞĂŶĚĞǀĞŶĂĐĐŝĚĞŶƚ ?ĂƉƌŽƚĞĂŶƐŚĂƉĞĂŶĚĂŶĂůĞĂƚŽƌǇŵĞƚŚŽĚ ? ? ? ? ? )ŽŶƚĞ ?Ɛ
ƚĂǆŽŶŽŵǇŚĞƌĞŝƐƵƐĞĨƵůŝŶĚĞƐŝŐŶĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚƐĞƌŝĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŚĂƐŽŶƚŚĞŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐŽĨ
ƚŚĞƉĂƌƚƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ?/ŶŵŽƐƚĐĂƐĞƐ ?ĂƐŝŶKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐKĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ?ůĂƐĞƌ ?ƐdŚĞ,ŽůǇ
&ŽƌĞƐƚŽƌƵŶĐĂŶ ?ƐWĂƐƐĂŐĞƐĂŶĚdŚĞ^ƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŽĨZŝŵĞ ?ƚŚĞƐĞƌŝĂůĨŽƌŵŝƚƐĞůĨƐƚĂŶĚƐĂƐĂ
ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĞƚŝĐƐĂƚŚĂŶĚŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŝƚƐĞůĨ ?tŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇ ?ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ
ĚŝƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝƚǇ ?ĂĐĐŝĚĞŶƚ ?ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?ĐŽŶƐƚĂŶĐǇĂŶĚŵŽĚƵůĂƚŝŽŶĂƌĞďŽƚŚŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂůĚĞǀŝĐĞƐ
ĂŶĚĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ?ŽŶƚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐ P 
The series describes an expanding and heterodox universe whose centrifugal 
force encourages dispersal. The epic goal has always be encompassment, 
summation; but the series is an ongoing process of accumulation. In contrast 
to the epic demand for completion, the series remains essentially and 
deliberately incomplete. (1992, 39) 
Conte discloses the ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐŽĨƐĞƌŝĂůŝƚǇŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚƚŽ ‘ĞƉŝĐ ?ŵŽĚĞƐ ?ŽŶƚĞ ?ƐĚĞƐŝŐŶĂƚŝŽŶ
here applies to 20th ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇĞƉŝĐƐ ?ŶĂŵĞůǇKůƐŽŶ ?ƐMaximus ĂŶĚWŽƵŶĚ ?ƐCantos. As such, the 
 ‘ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞ ?ŝŶĐŽŵƉůĞƚŝŽŶŽĨƐĞƌŝĂůŝƚǇƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚĂƐĞǆƉŽƐŝŶŐĂfalse 
totality naturally striven towards in epic modes. For Sight, this is most clearly evident in 
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,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĂŶĚ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ?ƐŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŵĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶĂƐ ‘ĂŶŽŶŐŽŝŶŐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨ
ĂĐĐƵŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽ ‘ƐƵŵŵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?dŚŝƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐƚŚĞ ‘ĚŝƐƉĞƌƐĂů ?ŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?
not only thematically but also in terms of the poetics which inform their writing. Scalapino 
again relates this to her conĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ĞǀĞŶƚ ?ŝŶSight:  
ĞǀĞŶƚƐŽĐĐƵƌƌŝŶŐĂƌĞƚŚĞŝƌĐŚƌŽŶŽůŽŐǇŝŶƚŚĞƐĞƌŝĂůǁĞ ?ƌĞ 
         concocting only movements on a retina 
  producing elation are outside, so one could just 
  produce that elation as such in order to see what 
  they are   (Hejinian and Scalapino 1999, 34) 
dŚĞƉŚƌĂƐĞ “ƚŚĞƐĞƌŝĂů ?ǁĞ ?ƌĞĐŽŶĐŽĐƚŝŶŐ ?ŝƐƐĞůĨ-reflexive, and underscores the sense of Sight 
ĂƐĂƉŽĞŵǁŚŝĐŚĚǁĞůůƐŽŶŝƚƐĞůĨĂƐŝƚƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐĞƐ ?dŚĞĂĐĐƌƵĂůŽĨ ‘ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐŽŶĂƌĞƚŝŶĂ ?ĂƌĞ
ŽƌĚĞƌĞĚ ‘ƚŽƐĞĞǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞ ? ?ĨŽƌ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?ƚŚŝƐƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƐ ‘ĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?dŚŝƐĞůĂƚŝŽŶŝƐ
furthermore bipartite, and takes place by virtue of shared witnessing. In this light, what does 
it mean to describe Sight as an epistolary serial form? The exchange of letters is itself subject 
to certain modes seriality takes; discontinuity, series, polyvocality, modulation, continuity. 
The letter itself, however, raises particular phenomenological issues in terms of the 
ŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŝƚŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚƐ ?dŚĞ ‘ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ?ƚŽǁŚŝĐŚĂůĞƚƚĞƌŝƐƐĞŶƚŝƐƚǁŽĨŽůĚ ?ŝƚestablishes 
not only physical locations as sites to and from which the dialogue can occur, but also the 
 ‘ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ?ƚŚĞůĞƚƚĞƌŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚƐ ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇ ?ŝƚƐƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐŵŽĚĞŽĨƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞĨĂĐƚ
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůĞƚƚĞƌƐǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ĐĂƌƌǇ ?ƚŚĞĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨSight ĂƌĞ ‘ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞƚǁŽǁĂǇƐ
constitutes the seriality of the work. This is specifically the case because the instalments 
ǁŽƌŬ ?ĂƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚ ?ďǇ ‘ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůďƌŽƵŐŚƚĨŽƌǁĂƌĚŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐ
and replies. This momentum constitutes the extension of the work, moving it forward in 
simultaneity with an epistolary friendship over the course of several years. In this sense, the 













ŚŽƌŝǌŽŶƚĂůƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞŽĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƉŽƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚĂŵďŝŐƵŝƚǇ ?ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ?ĨƵůů ?
ƵŶĨŝǆĞĚ ?ĂŶĚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇŝŶĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ ?tŚĂƚƐĂǀĞƐƚŚŝƐĨƌŽŵďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐĂǀĂƐƚ
ƵŶĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚĞĚŵĂƐƐŽĨĚĂƚĂĂŶĚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŽŶĞ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽŵĂŬĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) 
dŚĞƐĞ ‘ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂƌĞƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽďĞŝŶŐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƐǀĂƐƚĂŶĚ
ŽǀĞƌǁŚĞůŵŝŶŐ ?dŚĞĂŐĞŶĐǇŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶƚŚŝƐ ?ŝŶǁŽƌŬŝŶŐǁŝƚŚĂŶĚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ‘ĂƐǀĂƐƚĂŶĚ
ŽǀĞƌǁŚĞůŵŝŶŐ ? ?ŝƐƉŽĞƚŝĐŝŶĞƐƐĞŶĐĞ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞ ?, ũŝŶŝĂŶ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐĂƌĞŐƌŽƵŶĚĞĚŝŶĂ
ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶƐƵďũĞĐƚĂŶĚĐŽŶƚĞŶƚ ?/ŶĂůŝŬĞǁŝƐĞ
ŵĂŶŶĞƌ ?ŝŶƵƚŽďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ?ŝƚŚĞƌ ?^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞƐƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨŽĐĐƵƌƌĞŶĐĞǁŚŝĐŚ
ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚŚĞƌďŽĚǇŽĨǁŽƌŬ P 
 ƚŽ ‘ŽĐĐƵƌ ? 
ďĞĨŽƌĞ 
ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐŝƚƐĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƚƐŽĐĐƵƌƌĞŶĐĞ ? 
ŝƐŶ ?ƚĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐ ?ŝƐďĞĨŽƌĞŝƚƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŚĞŶ ? ‘ƚŚĞŝƌ ? 
ŝƐŽŶĞ ‘ĂƐ ?ĚĂǁŶ ?Ɛ ?ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? 
ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞŶŽƚ ?ŶŝŐŚƚƐ 
ŶŽƚĂƐĂďĂƐĞ ‘ŽŶĞ ?ŽƌĂƐƚŚĞŝƌŽĐĐƵƌƌŝŶŐ ?ŶŝŐŚƚƐŶŽƚďĞŝŶŐ  
ĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚŝƐďĞĨŽƌĞ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ ?ŝƐ ?ďĞĨŽƌĞŝƚƐ ?ŶŝŐŚƚ 
         ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )
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 ‘ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ? ?ĂƐĞǆƉůŽƌĞĚŝŶ ‘ŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚĂƐŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ
ĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƉŽĞŵƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞdĞŶĚĞƌƵƚƚŽŶƐ ?/ŶŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚůŝǌĂďĞƚŚ&ƌŽƐƚ ?^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽƐƚĂƚĞƐ
ƚŚĂƚ^ƚĞŝŶ “ŚĂƐĂƐŽƌƚŽĨƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?^ ŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐ P 
/ƚŽŽŬŚĞƌǁƌŝƚŝŶŐĂƐŶŽƚĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐ ?ďƵƚŚĂǀŝŶŐƚŽĚŽǁŝƚŚǁĂŶƚŝŶŐƚŽďĞĂďůĞ
ƚŽǁƌŝƚĞƚŚĞĞƐƐĞŶĐĞŽĨƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ?ŽĨĂŶĞŵŽƚŝŽŶŽƌĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?/ƚ ?ƐƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚŽ
ƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽƚŽŚĞƌƉŽƌƚƌĂŝƚƐŽĨŽďũĞĐƚƐĂŶĚƉĞŽƉůĞŝŶ
ƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽŐĞƚƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƚŝŵĞ ?ƐƌĞǀĞƌďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ? ?&ƌŽƐƚ ? ? ? ? ? ) 
 
,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?ƐĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐǁŚĂƚ^ƚĞŝŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚŝŶĂŶĚĨŽƌƉŽĞƚŝĐƐĂƌĞĞǆƉůŽƌĞĚŝŶ ‘dǁŽ^ƚĞŝŶ
dĂůŬƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘^ƚƌĂŶŐĞŶĞƐƐ ? ?ĐŽůůĞĐƚĞĚŝŶdŚĞ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞŽĨ/ŶƋƵŝƌǇ ?/ŶƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌĞƐƐĂǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƚĂŬĞƐ
ƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨĂĚŝĂƌŝƐƚŝĐŵĞĚŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŽŶĚƌĞĂŵƐ ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶďƌŝŶŐƐƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌĂĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨ
 ‘ŝŶƚƌŽƐƉĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ƚŚĞĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂůƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇŽĨtŝůůŝĂŵ:ĂŵĞƐĂŶĚ^ƚĞŝŶ ?ƐǁƌŝƚŝŶŐƚŽĞǆƉƌĞƐƐ
ƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶǁƌŝƚŝŶŐĂŶĚĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ P “DǇƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶƚƌŽƐƉĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ
ŵǇƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƚƌŽƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŵĞƚŚŽĚĂŶĚŝƚƐĞĨĨĞĐƚŽŶĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĂŶĚƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇƚŚĞŝƌ
ĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐĞŝŶƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?ĂƌĞŝŶĚĞďƚĞĚƚŽtŝůůŝĂŵ:ĂŵĞƐ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŽĨĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞƌĞďǇŽĨůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ? ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?dŚŝƐĞƋƵĂƚŝŽŶŝƐǀŝƚĂůƚŽĂŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ
,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?ƐǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ?ŚĞƌƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚŽĨ ‘ĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?ĂƐƐǇŶŽŶǇŵƐŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐƚŚĞ
ĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ?ŝƐĂŶĞǀĞƌ ?ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŚĞƌŵĂŶŝƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ
ŽĨůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?^ŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐ P “/ŶĞƐƐĞŶĐĞ ?^ƚĞŝŶƉƌŽƉŽƐĞƐƚŚĞĂĐƚŽĨǁƌŝƚŝŶŐĂƐƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ
ĂŶĚůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐŝŶůĞŐŝďůĞƵŶŝƚƐ ?ĂŶĚŶŽƚũƵƐƚŽĨĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐďƵƚŽĨƚŚĞ















ǌŽŶĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ?     ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ? ? ? ? ) 
 
,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?ƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ ‘ƌĂĚŝĐĂůŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĞĞŬƐƚŽĨŽƌĞŐƌŽƵŶĚǀŝƐŝŽŶĂƐĂŶĂĐƚŽĨůĞƚƚŝŶŐ
ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞĞŵĞƌŐĞ ?dŚŝƐ ‘ǌŽŶĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ?ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐĂƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƐŝƚĞ ?dŚĞĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ
^ƚĞŝŶƐŚĞĞǀŽŬĞƐŚĞƌĞĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶŵŽƐƚĐůĞĂƌůǇŝŶdĞŶĚĞƌƵƚƚŽŶƐĂŶĚ ‘ŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ




ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚďƵƚŝƚĐĂŵĞŶĂƚƵƌĂůůǇƚŽŵĞƚŽŵĂŬĞŽŶĞ ? ?^ƚĞŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) 
dŚĞ ‘ƉƌŽůŽŶŐĞĚƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ?ŝƐĂŶĂƚƵƌĂůĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ? ?ĂŶĚĂƐƐƵĐŚ ?ĂŶǇ
ƉŽĞƚŝĐĂĐƚŽĨŐĞƚƚŝŶŐ ‘ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞƚŚŝŶŐƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ?ǁŽƵůĚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇŚĂǀĞƚŽĂĚŽƉƚƚŚĞ
ƐĂŵĞǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?dŚŝƐĞŵďƌĂĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚ ?ŝŶƐƚĂŶƚĂŶĞŽƵƐŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚĂƚĞƐĂ ‘ďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐĂŐĂŝŶĂŶĚ
ĂŐĂŝŶ ? ?^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐŽŶƚŚŝƐŝŶ ‘WĂƚƚĞƌŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ^ŝŵƵůĂĐƌĂů ? P
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Stein's conception of a continuous present is when everything is unique 
beginning again and again and again. A does not equal A, in terms of Stein's 
view of the continuous present. This leads to lists; which leads to romanticism 
in which everything is the same and therefore different. (Hejinian and Watten, 
2) 










^ƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ?ĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚĂůƌĞĂĚǇŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚŵĞďĞĨŽƌĞ/ĐĂŵĞƚŽƌĞĂĚŚĞƌ ?
 ? ? ? ? ?ď ? ? ? ) 
 
dŚŝƐŵĞĞƚŝŶŐŽĨ^ƚĞŝŶĂŶĚƵĚĚŚŝƐƚƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ƐƉĞĐŝĨ ĐĂůůǇŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ
 ‘ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ? ?ŝƐŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝǀĞŝŶƚŚĂƚŝƚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐĂĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ
ƚŽĨŽƌĞŐƌŽƵŶĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶƚŝĂůƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂƐƚŚĞŝŶŝƚŝĂůŵĞĂŶƐďǇǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƐ
ƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚŚĞƌƌ ĂĚŝŶŐƐŝŶƵĚĚŚŝƐŵĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚ “ĨĂƌ
ŵŽƌĞƌĂĚŝĐĂů ?ƚŚĂŶ^ƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐĂƐĞŶƐĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĐ^ĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶĂ
ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ‘ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ?ŝƐŶŽƚŵĞƌĞůǇĂŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?ŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐƚŚŝƐ
ĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚĂƚ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ?ƐŵĞŵŽƌŝĂůƐĞƌǀŝĐĞŝŶ ? ? ? ? P 
Buddhist philosophy, which Leslie studied throughout her life in great depth 
ĂŶĚĚĞƚĂŝů ?ŵĂŬĞƐƚǁŽŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƌĞůĞǀĂŶĐĞƚŽ>ĞƐůŝĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ P
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first, that pain and suffering are ubiquitous; and second, that empirical reality 
is solely phenomenal  ?  a matter of appearances; we can never see anything 
as it is (or per se ?ƚŽƵƐĞ>ĞƐůŝĞ ?ƐƚĞƌŵ ) ?dŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŝŶƉĂƌƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞƌĞĂůŝƚǇ
ĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚƐŚŽǁŝƚƐĞůĨĂƐŝƚŝƐ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ?ĂĨƚĞƌĂŶŝŶĨŝŶŝƚĞƐŝŵĂůƐƉĂĐĞŽĨ
time, whatever perceptions we might have of reality are taken over by the 
distorting power of the mind, with its many preconceptions and fixations, and 
the conditioning force of the social sphere, which seizes, rather than observes, 
the world around it.  (Hejinian 2010, np) 
dŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ ‘ĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůƌĞĂůŝƚǇŝƐƐŽůĞůǇƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂů ?ďƵƚƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐ ‘ƐĞŝǌĞĚ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ
 ‘ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ ?ŝŶŚĂďŝƚƵĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚůĞĂĚƐ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐŽĨ
ŽĐĐƵƌƌĞŶĐĞĂƐƉƌŽĚƵĐŝŶŐĂŶ ‘ĂƐĞĨĨĞĐƚ ? ?/ŶƚŚĞŝƌĐŽƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶĐĞ ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶŽĨĨĞƌƐĂƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŽĨ
ƚŚŝƐĂƐŐƌŽƵŶĚĞĚŝŶĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? “/ƌĞĂůŝƐĞƚŚĂƚǁŚĂƚǇŽƵĂƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐŝŶŐ
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ ?ĂƐĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?ŝƐǁŚĂƚĞůĞƵǌĞĂŶĚ'ƵĂƚƚĂƌŝ ?ŝŶtŚĂƚ/ƐWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ?ĐŝƚĞĂƐĂ
ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇŵŽŵĞŶƚ ?Ă ?ŵŽŵĞŶƚŽĨĞĐŽŵŝŶŐ ? ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐĂůƐŽĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚŝŶ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?ƐǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ?
ŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ‘dŚĞZĞũĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨůŽƐƵƌĞ ? ?^ŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “ĂĐŚǁƌŝƚƚĞŶƚĞǆƚŵĂǇĂĐƚĂƐĂĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ?
ŵĂǇďĞĂĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? Q ?dŚĞŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚŝƐŽŶĞǁŚŝĐŚďŽƚŚĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƐƚŚĞǀĂƐƚŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞ
ǁŽƌůĚĂŶĚŝƐĨŽƌŵĂůůǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚŝŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?/Ŷ^ŝŐŚƚĂŵƵƚƵĂůŐƌŽƵŶĚŝƐĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?ƐĂŶĚ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ?ƐĚŝƐƉĂƌĂƚĞƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?ĂŶĚŝƚŝƐŝŶƉĂƌƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚŝƐƚŚĂƚ
^ŝŐŚƚŝƐĂŶ ‘ŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚ ? ?/ŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?ƐĞǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŚĞƌĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƉĞƌĐĞƉƚƵĂůĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐĂƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƐƚĂůŵĞŶƚƐĂƐĞĂĐŚďĞŝŶŐĂ
 ‘ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?dŚĞƐĞƌŝĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŐ ‘ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŝŶ^ŝŐŚƚĂƐƐƵĐŚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐĂ






In moving towards concluding it seems appropriate to turn to the closing pages of Sight, and 
ŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƚŽƚĞƐƚ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?ƐĂŶĚ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ?ƐŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƉƌĞĨĂƚŽƌǇĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐǁŚŝĐŚ
ŽƉĞŶƚŚĞƚĞǆƚ ?dŚĞƉĞŶƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞ ‘ƉĂŝƌ ?ŽĨŝŶƐƚĂůŵĞŶƚƐĂƌĞ ŶŽƚĞǆplicitly conclusive, though do 
display some awareness of the project they mark the ending of. Hejinian, who originally 
began the exchange, writes: 
  ‘WĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĂǀŝǀŝĚĐŽŶƐƚĞůůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ) ‘ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐ 
ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚĚŝƐƚĂŶĐŝŶŐ ? ? 
  'ŝƌůƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŵŽŽŶ ?ŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ŶĞǁ ?ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? 
ĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶƐďĞŐŝŶŚĞƌĞ ? 
 ƌĞǁĞĐůŽƐĞ ? 
 dŚĞƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĂǁŽƌŬŝƐďŽƵŶĚƚŽŝƚƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? 
  tĂŬŝŶŐ ?ďůŝŶŬŝŶŐ ?ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐ WƐĞĐƵƌŝŶŐĚŽƵďůĞ 
ďĞŝŶŐ PŚĂƉƉŝŶĞƐƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶůĞĂĚƚŽĂƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƵŶŚĂƉƉŝŶĞƐƐ ?ĞǀĞŶƚŽ 
ŝůůŶĞƐƐ ?ƌĞƉůĂĐĞŵĞŶƚ ) ) ? 
 dŚĞŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůĐĂŶŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌďĞĚŝƐĐĞƌŶĞĚ 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĐŽŶƚĞŵƉůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŐŝƌůƐĨƌŽŵŽƵƌƚŝŵĞƐĂĐƚĂĐĐŽƌĚ ŝŶŐůǇ 
      ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĂŶĚ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )
,ĞƌĞ ?ǁŚĂƚ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĐĂůůƐ “ĚŽƵďůĞ ?ďĞŝŶŐ ?ƵŶĚĞƌƐĐŽƌĞƐƚŚĞĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂůŵĞƚŚŽĚŽĨƚŚĞ
ǁŽƌŬ ?ƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƐƚĂŶǌĂŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞƐĂƉƌŽƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨĂƋƵŽƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞĚƚŽ
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?ƐŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĂǀŝǀŝĚĐŽŶƐƚĞůůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?dŚŝƐ
ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨĚŝƐƚĂŶĐŝŶŐƌĂŝƐĞƐƚŚĞĐŚŝĂƐŵŝĐŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƐŝŐŚƚŽŶĐĞŵŽƌĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĐŽĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨ
ƐŝŐŚƚĂŶĚƐĞĞƌ ?/ŶƚŚĞ ‘ŶĞǁ ?ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƉƌĞƐƵŵĂďůǇĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚĚŝƐƚĂŶ ?ĐĞ ? ? ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĂƐŬƐ ‘ƌĞ
ǁĞĐůŽƐĞ ? ? ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐďŽƚŚĂĐŽŵŵĞŶƚŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ŐƌĂŶĚĞƐƐĂǇŽŶƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨ^ŝŐŚƚĂŶĚĂůƐŽ
ŽŶƚŚĞĚŝĂůŽŐŝĐŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĞƉŝƐƚŽůĂƌǇĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚƐƚĂŶǌĂŵŽĚƵůĂƚĞƐƚŚŝƐ
ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ?ĂŶĚĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐƚŽŽŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ?ƚŚĂŶ ‘ĐĂŶŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌďĞĚŝƐĐĞƌŶĞĚ
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ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĐŽŶƚĞŵƉůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?/ƚŝƐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚŝƐ ‘ŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ?ŝƐ
ĚĞƐŝƌĞĚ ?ŽƌǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐƚƌĞĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚĂŵďŝǀĂůĞŶĐĞ ?dŚŝƐůĂƚƚĞƌƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŝƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ
ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĐůĂƵƐĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞƐ ‘ŐŝƌůƐĨƌŽŵŽƵƌƚŝŵĞƐĂĐƚ ?ŝŶŐ ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐůǇ ? ?dŚŝƐƐĞĞŵƐĂ
ŚŽƉĞĨƵůŐĞƐƚƵƌĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂůĨŽƌŵŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĞŵŝƚƐĞůĨ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ĂĐƚƐ ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ
ƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶĐŝĞƐƚŚĞǁŽƌŬĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞƐŝƚƐĞůĨƚŽ ?ŝŶ ƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĐĂƐĞ ?ƐŝŐŚƚĂŶĚƚŚĞǀŝƐƵĂů ?/Ŷ
ƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞ ?ƚŚĞĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨ ‘ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĐĂŶďĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐĂĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨƌĞƚƌŽƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ
ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ?ĨĂǀŽƵƌŝŶŐŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ ‘ǁĂŬŝŶŐ ?ďůŝŶŬŝŶŐ ?ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐ ?ĂƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞĞǇĞ ?ƚŚĞƐĞŶƐŽƌǇ
ĚĂƚĂŽĨǁŚŝĐŚŝƐŚĂŶĚůĞĚŝŵŵŝŶĞŶƚůǇ ? 
 ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞƐƚŚĞǁŝƚŶĞƐƐŝŶŐŽĨ ‘ĂƌĐƚŝĐƐǁĂŶƐ ? ?ĂŶĚŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐƚŚŝƐ
ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚŚĂůĨŽĨŚĞƌŝŶƐƚĂůŵĞŶƚ ?ďĞĨŽƌĞŵŽǀŝŶŐƚŽƐƉĞĂŬĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇƚŽ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?Ɛ
ƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƚŚĂƚ ‘dŚĞƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĂǁŽƌŬŝƐďŽƵŶĚƚŽŝƚƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? P 
 KďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶŽƌƐŝŐŚƚŽƌĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůďĞŝŶŐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĨƌŽŵĞĂĐŚ 
ŽƚŚĞƌ ?ĨĂĐƵůƚŝĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƐǁĂŶƐďĞŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?ƐĨĂĐƵůƚǇ ?ƚŚĞŵ ?EŽƚ 
ďĞŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶĞǇĞƐŽƌĂŶǇĞǇĞƐ WĂŶĚďǇƚŚŝƐƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚŝƐ 
ĂďƐĞŶĐĞ ? ?ƚŚĞƐǁĂŶƐĨůŽĂƚŝŶŐŽŶĨůŽŽĚ )ŽŶĞ ?ƐĚŝƌĞĐƚĨĂĐƵůƚǇ ?ĂƐ ‘ďǇ ? 
ŶŽƚďĞŝŶŐŽŶĞ ) ? 
 ŝƐŵĂŶƚůŝŶŐŽƌƐŝŐŚƚŽƌĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůďĞŝŶŐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĨƌŽŵĞĂĐŚ 
ŽƚŚĞƌ ?ĨĂĐƵůƚŝĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƐǁĂŶƐďĞŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?ƐĨĂĐƵůƚǇ WƚŚĞŵ ?EŽƚ 
ďĞŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶĞǇĞƐŽƌĂŶǇĞǇĞƐ ?ĂŶĚďǇƚŚŝƐƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ W ?ƚŚĞ 
ƐǁĂŶƐĨůŽĂƚŝŶŐŽŶĨůŽŽĚ )ŽŶĞ ?ƐĚŝƌĞĐƚĨĂĐƵůƚǇ ?ĂƐ ‘ďǇ ? ?ďĞƐŝĚĞŶŽƚ 
ďĞŝŶŐŽŶĞ ) ? 
 ŝƐŵĂŶƚůŝŶŐŽƌĚƌŽƉƉŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĞĂƌůǇďĂƐŝƐĂŶĚ 
ƐĞĞŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝƐŶŽƚŽĐĐƵƌƌŝŶŐ ?ĐĂŶŶŽƚ ?ĂƐďĞŝŶŐǁŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚďĞƚŚĂƚ 
ŽĐĐƵƌƌŝŶŐ ?ŝƐĂƐƚĂƚĞƚŚĂƚŝƐĂĐƚƵĂůůǇĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚ  ‘ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ?ĞŝƚŚĞƌ 
ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŽƌĐŽŶƚĞŵƉůĂƚŝŽŶ ?   ?,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĂŶĚ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )




ĐŝƌĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚĞƌŵƐ ? “ŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? “ƐŝŐŚƚ ? ? “ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ? ? “ĚŝƐŵĂŶƚůŝŶŐ ? ?ĂůůŐĞƐƚƵƌĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ
ƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐďǇǁŚŝĐŚǀŝƐŝŽŶŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐĂĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚ ‘ƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ ?ŽĨǁŚĂƚŝƐƐĞĞŶ ?dŚŝƐƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ
ŽĐĐƵƌƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶǁŚĂƚŽĐĐƵƌƐĂƐŵĞƌĞ ‘ŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚǁŚĂƚŽĐĐƵƌƐĂƐ
 ‘ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ?Žƌ ‘ĚŝƐŵĂŶƚůŝŶŐ ? ?tŚĂƚƚŚŝƐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞƐ ?ƚŚĞŶ ?ŝƐĂƐĞŶƐĞ ŽĨƐŝŐŚƚĂŶĚŝŶĚĞĞĚ^ŝŐŚƚĂƐ
ďĞŝŶŐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞǁĂǇƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚǀŝƐŝŽŶŝƐĂůǁĂǇƐĂŵƵůƚŝĨĂƌŝŽƵƐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?
















ŽďũĞĐƚŽĨŝƚƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ?ŶĂŵĞůǇ ?ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞŝƚƐĞůĨ ?dŚĞƐƚĂƚĞĚĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĂůůůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?ƵƐĞŝŶƚĞǆƚƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ^ŝůůŝŵĂŶ ?ƐdŚĞEĞǁ^ĞŶƚĞŶĐĞĂŶĚ/ŶdŚĞ
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶdƌĞĞŽƌĞƌŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐWŽĞƚŝĐƐĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞƚĂŬĞŶĂƐƚŚĞĨŝŶĂůǁŽƌĚŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƐŽĨ












ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐƐĞĞŬƚŽĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ ?/ŶƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĐĂƐĞ ?ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐĨƌŽŵ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĂŶĚ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ?Ɛ
ĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶĐĞĂŶĚƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ^ŝŐŚƚĨŽƌƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƚŝŵĞĂƐĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨĂƚƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚƐƚŽůĞƚƚĞƌƐ ?ĨĂǆĞƐ
ĂŶĚĞŵĂŝůƐ ?/ǁĂƐƐƚƌƵĐŬďǇƚŚĞůĂĐŬŽĨŝŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽŶĚŽŐŵĂŽƌƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬƐŝŶďŽƚŚ
ƚŚĞĂĐƚŽĨĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞĨŝŶŝƐŚĞĚƚĞǆƚŝƚƐĞůĨ ?KŶĞĐĂŶŝŵĂŐŝŶĞ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŽĨ
^ŝŐŚƚďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?dŚĞEĞǁ^ĞŶƚĞŶĐĞ ?/ĂŵŶŽƚĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐ
ǁŽƵůĚďĞĂŶŝŶĐŽƌƌĞĐƚĨƌĂŵĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǁŽƌŬĐŽƵůĚďĞƐŝƚƵĂƚĞĚ ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐŶŽƚŝŶ
ƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŽĨŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐǇ ?ŶŽƌŽĨ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĂŶĚ^Đ ĂůĂƉŝŶŽƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ?ƚŽƌĞůĞŐĂƚĞƚŚĞ
ƉŽĞƚƌǇŝƚƐĞůĨƚŽƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐŽĨďĞŝŶŐĂǀĞŚŝĐůĞŽĨƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐĂůĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ ?
ƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞĂƵƐƉŝĐĞƐŽĨĂ ‘ƉŽĞƚŝĐŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐŶŽƚŵĞƌĞůǇĂĐůĂŝŵ/ŚĂǀĞŶƵĂŶĐĞĚƚŽƐƵŝƚ
ŵǇŽǁŶĞŶĚƐ ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶŝŶ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?ƐŽǁŶĞƐƚŝŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?ĂƐĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚ
ĚƵƌŝŶŐŚĞƌĞƵůŽŐǇĨŽƌ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽŝŶ ? ? ? ? P 
 Our project was an experiencing of the senses, a foray into sensation. But it 
was also an investigation into shared time  ?  what one might call our historical 
moment, postmodern and besieged by various forms of social violence. Leslie 
Scalapino could be infuriated by events but she was never abashed by them. 
She lived with ardor and honesty to the very end. 
      (Hejinian 2010) 
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ĨŽƌĞŵŽƐƚŝŶĞǆƉůŽƌŝŶŐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶƚůǇ ?ŽĨĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐŝŶŐ ?ƚŽƵƐĞ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ?ƐƉŚƌĂƐĞ ?




6     Marginal Phenomenology    Susan Howe   
  
 
That this book is a history of 
a shadow that is a shadow of 
Me mystically one in another 
another another to subserve 




>ǇŶ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶĂŶĚ>ĞƐůŝĞ^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽ ?ƐSight displays how extension can come about through 
collaboration and retain its idiosyncratic character by virtue of the frame of an epistolary 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?^ƵƐĂŶ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŝƐĂůƐŽĐƌƵĐŝĂůůǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?  
ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?,ŽǁĞ ?ƐĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĐĐƵƌďĞƚǁĞĞŶŚĞƌƐĞůĨĂŶĚƚŚĞĂďƐĞŶƚǀŽŝĐĞƐŽĨŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇ
marginalised writers and figures. These figures are predominantly female and Howe, acting 
ĂƐ ‘d,Zs/^Z ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ĞŶƚĞƌƐƚŚĞŝƌŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĂĐƚƐŽĨ ‘ĞŶĐůŽƐƵƌĞ ?
which have occurred in the production of literary history. The site of these collaborations in 
,ŽǁĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝƐƚŚĞŵĂƌŐŝŶ ?ŵŽƐƚĐŽŵŵŽŶůy a marginal space between texts which exclude 
those without voices.  
     ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƉŽĞŵƐĞǀŽŬĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƐĞĞŬŝŶŐƚŽŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚǁŚĂƚƐŚĞĐĂůůƐ ‘ŝŶĨŝŶŝƚĞ
ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ĂƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶǁŚĞƌĞŝŶƚŚĞĨƌĂĐƚƵƌ ĚƐǇŶƚĂǆĂŶĚƐĐĂƚƚĞƌĞĚĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ
of her ƉŽĞŵƐŐĞƐƚƵƌĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂŶĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚŝƐ ‘ŝŶĨŝŶŝƚĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵĂƌŐŝŶ
ĞǆŝƐƚƐǁŚĞƌĞǀĞƌĂŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞŽĨĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŝƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚ ?dŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌǁŝůůƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ,ŽǁĞ ?Ɛ
explications of phenomenology in Pierce-Arrow and Incloser. The former work performs a 
recovery of American philosopher Charles Sanders-Peirce with a particular focus on his 
writings on phenomenology, whilst the latter proposes a stance towards literary-historical 
research deeply committed to giving voice to those who have been silenced. From this I will 
ƐĞĞŬƚŽĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐĂŶŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƚŝĐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶĨŝŶŝƚĞ ? ?
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/ŶĂŶŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚ>ǇŶŶ<ĞůůĞƌ ?^ƵƐĂŶ,ŽǁĞƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ ?Ǉ ?ŽƵŝŵƉŽƐĞĂĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶďǇ
ďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐ ? ?<ĞůůĞƌ ? ) ?dŚŝƐŝƐĂĨŝƚƚŝŶŐĐĂƵƚŝŽŶƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌďĞĨŽƌĞďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐƚŽƌĞĐŽƌĚ
reflections ŽŶƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶ^ƵƐĂŶ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƉŽĞŵƐĂŶĚƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ ?
ƐŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚ ?,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉŽĞƚƌǇŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚǁŝƚŚŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐŽĨŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů ?
ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů ?ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĂŶĚůŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŽĂĚŽƉƚ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƚĞƌŵƐĨƌŽŵ ‘/ŶĐůŽƐĞƌ ? ?
thiƐǁŽƵůĚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĂŶĂĐƚŽĨ ‘ĞŶĐůŽƐƵƌĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĨƌƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƐƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĂĚĞƌďĞŝŶŐ
 ‘ŝŶ ?ĐůŽƐĞƌ ?ƚŽƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƚĞǆƚŝƚƐĞůĨ ? ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ŶĞĂƌŶĞƐƐŽĨƉŽĞƚƌǇ ? ?,ŽǁĞ ? ? ? ? ?
50). To start out thereby with a sense of Howe as a phenomenological poet is instructive in 
ƉĂƌƚĨŽƌĚŝƐĐůŽƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƐǁŝƚŚŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?ůŝƚĞƌĂƌǇĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵĂŶĚ
ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐŝƚǇĂƐĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌĞĚŝŶĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůŝĂŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůůǇ ‘ĂƚŚĂŶĚ ? ?,ŽǁĞ
ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚ ‘ƵƐĞ ?ƚŚĞƐĞĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚƐŝŶŶŽĐĞŶƚůǇ ? Hélène Ali writes in this regard that: 
Images, or documents at that, in Howe are not illustrations, this seems 
obvious from the start, they are not factors of fragmentation, and they are not 
content coexisting with other texts and configurations for the sake of  ‘ĚĞĨǇŝŶŐ
ƐǇŶƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůůŽŐŝĐ ? ?      (9) 
ůŝ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŝƐŽƌŝĞŶƚĞĚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚŝŶŐ,ŽǁĞĂƐĂƉŽĞƚĨŽƌǁŚŽŵŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƚǇŝƐĂƚ
stake, the materiality of lives and lives as evoked by texts; this is a solely conceptual defiance 
ƚŽĂĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ “ƐǇŶƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůůŽŐŝĐ ? ?,ŽǁĞ ?ƐĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚƐĂƌĞŶŽƚŵere evocations of chaos, of 
a kind of total scattering ?  they are often site specific; they restore to the notion of the 
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fragment in poetry a materiality. This is in stark contrast to perhaps the most famous 
modernist example of the fragment: 
WŽŝƐ ?ĂƐĐŽƐĞŶel foco che gli affina  
Quando fiam ceu chelidon ? O swallow swallow  
>ĞWƌŝŶĐĞĚ ?ƋƵŝƚĂŝŶĞăůĂƚŽƵƌĂďŽůŝĞ 
These fragments I have shored against my ruins 
tŚǇƚŚĞŶ/ůĞĨŝƚǇŽƵ ?,ŝĞƌŽŶǇŵŽ ?ƐŵĂĚĂŐĂŝŶĞ ?     (Eliot 11) 
ůŝŽƚ ?ƐĐŽŵƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ? Dante, Tennyson, Kyd and Desdichado ?  shored against 
 ‘ƌƵŝŶƐ ? ?ďŽƚŚĂƉůƵƌĂůŽĨƚŚĞŶŽƵŶƌƵŝŶĂŶĚƚŚĂƚǁŚŝĐŚƌĞŵĂŝŶƐĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞƌĂǀĂŐĞƐŽĨƚŝŵĞ ) ?
evokes a sense of surface rather than material fragmentation, which is to say, a 
fragmentation itself constituted by ƚŚĞƉŽĞƚ ?ƐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨŐĂƚŚĞƌŝŶŐ ‘ƉŽĞƚƌǇ ?ĨƌŽŵǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ
sources ?  which feign disparity but find a cohesion in the difficulty of articulation ?  the poet-
ƐƉĞĂŬĞƌ ?ůŝŽƚ ?ƐĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚƐĂƌĞǀŽĐĂůŝƐĞĚ ?ĂŶĚĂƐƐƵĐŚƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ƐĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨǀŽŝĐĞ ? as a 
ŬŝŶĚŽĨ ‘ďƌŽŬĞŶ ? dramatic monologue ?  ŵĂŬĞƐ ‘dŚĞtĂƐƚĞ>ĂŶĚ ?ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĂƐĂprocess of 
fragmentation rather than an account of the fragment.  
  The same cannot be said of Howe. ,ĞƌĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚƐĂƌĞŶŽƚ “ĨŝŐƵƌĞƐĨŽƌƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞǇ
acquire the capability of being figures of thŝŶŐƐ ?ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?ũŝ ? ) ?Her fragments 
ĂƌĞĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚůǇ ‘ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ? ? ƚŚĂƚŝƐ ?ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŽĨƚĞŶƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚŝŶĂƐŵƵĐŚ ‘ĂĐƚƵĂůŝƚǇ ?ĂƐƚŚĞ
publication allows ?  for example, mimeographs and facsimiles of Emily Dickinson, Charles 
Sanders Peirce or attenĚĂŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞŚĂŶĚǁƌŝƚƚĞŶŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůŝĂŽĨDĞůǀŝůůĞ ?ƐůŝďƌĂƌǇ ?,ŽǁĞ ?Ɛ 
ƐĞŶƐĞŽĨŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƚǇĐĂŶďĞǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĞĚ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŝŶ  ‘&ƌĂŐŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞtĞĚĚŝŶŐƌĞƐƐŽĨ
^ĂƌĂŚWŝĞƌƉŽŶƚĚǁĂƌĚƐ ?ŝŶSouls of the Labadie Tract (Howe 2007). The poem explores the 
relationship ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚĞǆƚĂŶĚƚĞǆƚŝůĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚ ?ŝŶĂǀĂƌŝĞƚǇŽĨ
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ƐĞŶƐĞƐ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚĞĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚ ?ŝƚƐĞůĨ ?ƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚŝŶĂƌŽƵŐŚďůĂĐŬĂŶĚǁŚŝƚĞyĞƌŽǆŽŶƚŚĞ
ƉŽĞŵ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚƉĂŐĞ ?
         (Howe 2007, 55-56) 
Without turning to another source to corroborate the history of the wedding dress, merely 
witnessing the image of the fragment on the page, it is unclear how the fragment came to be 
a fragment ?  whether it was torn in anger, or cut for posterity, salvaged from ruin or has 
merely deteriorated over time. This critical naivety is justified in the fact that the 
corresponding fragmentation of the poem which follows (seen above on the right) cannot be 
clearly described by any of these procedures. In this sense, the threads, in particular the 
frayed edges, are materially present in the text(ile), with threads appearing as tangles of 
characters in different fonts. The boldness of the left of the image is also replicated in the 
ůĞŐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨ ‘ƉŚǇůůŝƌĞĂ ? ?ĨĂĐŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞĂĚĞƌƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĨƌĂǇŝŶŐĂǁĂǇŝŶƚŽ illegible fragments. In 
ƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞ ?ƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ƐƚŝƚůĞŚŽůĚƐƚĞǆƚ ?ŝŵĂŐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚƚĞǆƚŝůĞ ‘ŽďũĞĐƚ ?ŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ
ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌŝŶĂĐŽŵƉĂĐƚŽĨŽǀĞƌĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?tŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽŽŶĞůĞĂĚŝŶŐ ‘ĨƌĂŵĞ ?
in which the poem can be comprehended. This unsettles the reader ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ ‘ŐƌĂƐƉ ?ƚŚĞ
fragment, which is of course delicate and already torn and fraying. The interpenetrating 
forms of text and textile here press onto each other in a way which creates a generative 
 ‘ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚůǇ ? ?Žƌ ?ĂƐ,ŽǁĞƉŚƌĂƐĞƐŝƚŝŶ ‘^ĐĂƚƚĞƌŝŶŐĂƐĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌdŽǁĂƌĚƐZŝƐŬ ? ?Ă ‘ĐƵŵďĞƌŝŶŐ ? ?
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This latter term, ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ‘ƚŽŵĂŬĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ? ?ƚĂŬĞƐŝƚƐƌŽŽƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŵĞĚŝĞǀĂů&ƌĞŶĐŚen-
combre ?ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƚŽďůŽĐŬƵƉ ?ŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĂƌŝǀĞƌ ?dŚŝƐƐĞŶ ĞŽĨůǇƌŝĐĂů ‘ĨůŽǁ ?ďĞŝŶŐďůŽĐŬĞĚ
brings together the space of the page and the difficulty of the language employed as a 
ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ‘ĐƵŵďĞƌŝŶŐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƚĂŬĞƐƉůĂĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇƐƵďũĞĐƚĂŶĚŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů
anecdote.  
  These difficulties in and of Howe are important to address. In reading her work, it is 
very often difficult to tell precisely what one is reading. In interview with Keller, Howe 
ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚ P “WĞŽƉůĞŽĨƚĞŶƚĞůůŵĞŵǇǁŽƌŬŝƐ ‘ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ? ?/ŚĂǀĞƚŚĞƐŝŶŬŝŶŐĨĞĞůŝŶŐƚŚĞǇŵĞĂŶ
 ‘ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ?ĂƐŝŶ ‘ŚŽƉĞůĞƐƐ ? ? ?DĐ>ĂŶĞ ? ? ? ) ?dŚŝƐ ‘ŚŽƉĞůĞƐƐŶĞƐƐ ?ŵĂǇǁĞůůďĞƚŚĞƌĞĂĐtion of 
ƐŽŵĞƌĞĂĚĞƌƐƚŽ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉĂŐĞƐ ? one could be forgiven for being intimidated by a poetry 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ “ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚĂƌǇƉŽĞƚŝĐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ? ?<Ğůů ƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )ĂŶĚƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŽŶĞ
ǁŚŝĐŚ ?ĂƐŝŶƚŚĞĂďŽǀĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŝƐŝŶƉůĂĐĞƐƐĞĞŵŝŶŐůǇ “ƵŶƌĞĂĚĂďůĞ ? ?DĐ>Ăne 114). These 
ĨŽƌŵĂůĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐĂƌĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚ ?ĂƐZĂĐŚĞůdǌǀŝĂĂĐŬǁƌŝƚĞƐ ?ďǇ,ŽǁĞ ?Ɛ “ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ-
over-ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ “ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƐƚŚĞ ? Q ?ĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŝƚǇŽĨǀŽŝĐĞƐ Wand of 
tales Wspeaking at once, cutting into each other and being, visually and aurally Was well as 
thematically Wat cross-ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?dŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƚŚĞŶŝƐŶŽƚŽŶĞŽĨĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐĂŵĞƚŚŽĚ
of reading the wild(er)ness of the page, but rather recognising, coming to terms with the 
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇĂƚǁŽƌŬǁŚĞŶŽŶĞ ‘ƐƚƵŵďůĞƐ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽŶĞŽĨ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƚĞǆƚƐ ?,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƚĞǆƚƐŵĂǇ
be difficult then, but, as Hélène ůŝĂƌŐƵĞƐ P “[w]e are not presented with aporetic 
ƉƌŽǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ũŝ ? ) ?ŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚŝƐŵŝŐŚƚďĞƐĞĞŶŝŶƚŚĞƚŝƚůĞĂŶĚĨŝŶĂůƉĂŐĞŽĨ ‘^ĐĂƚƚĞƌŝŶŐ
ƐĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌdŽǁĂƌĚƐZŝƐŬ ? ? ? ?90, 70): 
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This compact of overdetermination presents its materials as a plenum, all at once, 
ĚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝǌŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚǇŽĨƚŚĞƉĂŐĞ ?dŚĞƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚĐĂůůŽĨ ‘,ƵŵĂŶŚƵŵĂŶ ? ?
ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞďƌĂĐŬĞƚĞĚ ‘ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚĂƚŝǀĞ ?ŵŝŐŚƚďĞƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƉŚƌĂƐĞƚŚĞƌeader encounters, 
though the eye could just as equally be drawn to the bold typeface THE REVISER, confidently 
upright in contrast to the slants and leanings of the other phrases. This phrase ends the 
poem; it is the ghost of signature, as though the voice of this work were a bold archetype. 
dŚĞůĂƐƚƉŚƌĂƐĞďĞĨŽƌĞd,Zs/^Z P “^ĞĐƌĞƚĨĂĐƚĂƚŝƚůĞŐŝǀĞŶ ? ? ‘ƚŝƚůĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŐŝǀĞŶ ?ŽǀĞƌƌƵŶǁŝƚŚ
 ‘ŚĞĂƌƚ ? ?ŵĂŬŝŶŐĂůůƚŚƌĞĞǁŽƌĚƐƐůŝŐŚƚůǇŝůůĞŐŝďůĞ )ŽĨĨĞƌƐĂƚƌĂĐĞŽĨĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?  the 
ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĨƌŽŵ ‘ƐĞĐƌĞƚĨĂĐƚ ?ƚŽ ‘ƚŝƚůĞ ? ? an appropriation which perhaps Howe is suggesting is 
ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĚďǇ ‘d,Zs/^Z ? ?dŚĞĐŽŶƐƚĞůůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉŚƌĂƐĞƐƐĞĞŵƐƚŽŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐďǇ
ǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌůŝƚĞƌĂůŽǀĞƌůĂƉƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇ ?ƚŚĞƉŚƌĂƐĞ ‘dŚĞǇĐƵŵďĞƌĞĚƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚ ? ?
sheering off to the ƌŝŐŚƚĞǀŽůǀĞƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞdŽĨ ‘ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚĂƚŝǀĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶŶĞĐƚĞĚƉŚƌĂƐĞ ?dŚĞ
ƐƋƵĂƌĞďƌĂĐŬĞƚƐǁŚŝĐŚĐŽŶƚĂŝŶ ‘ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚĂƚŝǀĞ ?ƐĞĞŵƐƚŽ ƉŚŽŶĞƚŝĐĂůůǇĂĚĂƉƚƚŚĞƚŝƚůĞŽĨ
&ƌŝĞĚƌŝĐŚEŝĞƚǌƐĐŚĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ‘,ƵŵĂŶůůdŽŽ,ƵŵĂŶ ?ƚŽƚŚĞƉŚƌĂƐĞ ‘,ƵŵĂŶƵƚŚŽƌŝƚĂƚŝǀĞ
,ƵŵĂŶ ? ?dŚĞǁŽƌĚ ‘ƵƚŚŽƌŝƚĂƚŝǀĞ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŽĐĐƵƉŝĞƐƚŚĞƉůĂĐ ŽĨEŝĞƚǌƐĐŚĞ ?Ɛ ‘ůůdŽŽ ? ?ƚƌĂĐĞƐĂ
ƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŽƚĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŽEŝĞƚǌƐĐŚĞ ?ƐƚŝƚůĞ ?dŚĞĞĨĨ ĐƚŽĨƚŚŝƐŝƐƚŽƌĞĂĚ ‘ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚĂƚŝǀĞ ?ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞ
 ‘ĂůůƚŽŽŚƵŵĂŶŶĞƐƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŚƵŵĂŶ ?/ƚŝƐƚŚĞ ‘ůůdŽŽ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĚĞůŝŵŝƚƐ ?ǁŚŝch totalises and thus 
undermines the validity of its claim. This final page could be construed as a critique of the will 
to power ?  ĂƌĞĐƵƌƌŝŶŐŵŽƚŝĨŝŶ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ? ĂŶĚƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ‘ƉĂƌĞŶƚŚĞƐŝƐĞĚ ?ďǇŝƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
ŝƐĞŶƚĂŶŐůĞĚǁŝƚŚĂ ‘ďůŽĐŬŝŶŐƵƉ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŐƌŽund. Howe discloses an ideology of enclosure and 
erasure at work in a philosophy which implicitly presupposes the limits of the human and a 
totalising primal drive which has ethically problematic overtones. This process of disclosure is 
ĞǀŽŬĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?s title ?  scattering as behaviour towards risk ?  a tight and odd syntactic 
unit which offers three nouns the functioning of which elides only an elliptical sense of the 
ĞƚŚŝĐĂůĂŶĚƚŚĞĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ?dŚŝƐ ‘ƐĐĂƚƚĞƌŝŶŐ ?ŝƐĞǀŽŬĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƵŶŝƚƐŽŶƚŚĞ page, 
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ŝƚƐĞůĨƐĞĞŵŝŶŐůǇĚŝƐƉůĂǇŝŶŐĂ ‘ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇ ‘ďĞŚĂǀŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐŝŶĂ
variety of ways ?  ĂůůƚŚŝƐ ‘ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƌŝƐŬ ? ? ƚŚĞƌŝƐŬŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇƌƵŶďǇ ‘d,Zs/^Z ? ?dŚŝƐƌŝƐŬis 
ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚďǇ,ŽǁĞ P “dhe selection of particular examples from a large group is always a 
ƐŽĐŝĂůĂĐƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 1) In this sense, Howe seeks to foreground her agency in the poem as a 
 ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůĂĐƚ ? ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚ-positon is one keenly aware of its own role in the 
revision of history. As such, the absences ĂŶĚůĂĐƵŶĂƐŽĨ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉĂŐĞƐĐĂŶďĞƌĞĂĚĂƐ
ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽĐƌĞĂƚĞĂƐƉĂĐĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŚĞƌ ‘ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐ ?ĐĂŶďĞĚŝƐĐůŽƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌ
particularity, rather than pre-ĂƌƌĂŶŐĞĚŝŶƚŽĂĐŽŚĞƐŝǀĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚĂƚŝǀĞŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ ?,ŽǁĞ ?Ɛ
procedures throughout her poetry are concerned with developing a means of intervention in 
history which does not repeat the mistakes of historical record which lead to marginalisation. 
dŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝǀĞ ‘ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚǇ ?ŽĨ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉƌŽũĞĐƚĂƐƐƵĐŚŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƐƚŚĞ ‘ŵĂƌŐŝŶĂů ?
position the speaker-poet necessarily occupies in pursuing the ethically imperilled task of 
historical revisionism. 
 
Stumbling Phenomenology  
dŚĞƐĞƐĞŶƐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚǇĂŶĚƌĞĂĚĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĐĂŶďĞ
witnessed in what Howe calls  “ƐƚƵŵďůŝŶŐƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ ?ŝŶ ‘ƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ^ŽƵŶĚ&ŽƌŵƐ
ŝŶdŝŵĞ ? ?dŚĞƌĂŶŐĞŽĨƚŚŝƐƉŚƌĂƐĞ ?ƐƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŝƐƚĂŶƚĂůŝƐŝŶŐůǇǁŝĚĞ ?  it could refer to the 
stumble that constitutes phenomenology or its radically cautious nature; or, read in 
sequence with the line it follows ?   “ŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐŐƌĂƐƉƐŝƚƐƐƵďũĞĐƚ ? ?  “ƐƚƵŵďůŝŶŐ
ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ ?ŵŝŐŚƚƉĞƌŚĂƉƐďĞƚŚŝƐǀĞƌǇƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂů ‘ŐƌĂƐƉŝŶŐ ? ?ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƐƚŝůů ?
ƐƚƵŵďůŝŶŐƵŶĚĞƌƐĐŽƌĞƐƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĐŝĞŶƚƚŚĞŵĞŽĨŚĞƐŝƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƐƚƵƚƚĞƌŝŶŐŝŶ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĂŶĚ
ŵĂŶŝƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ǀŽŝĐĞ ? ?,ŽǁĞƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐŽŶƚŚŝƐŝŶ ‘/ŶĐůŽƐĞƌ ? P
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[Poetry] involves a fracturing of discourse, a stammering even. Interruption 
and hesitation used as a force. A recognition that there is an other voice, an 
ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽŚĞĂƌĂŶĚƐƉĞĂŬŝƚ ?/ƚ ?ƐƚŚŝƐďƌŽŬĞŶŶĞƐƐƚŚĂƚŝŶƚĞƌĞsts me (1993, 
192) 
/ƚŝƐŽĨƚĞŶƚĞŵƉƚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ƐƚƵŵďůĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞƐĂƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŽĨ,ŽǁĞƚŽ ‘ŐƌĂƐƉ ?Ă
singular phrase ?  ůŝŬĞ ‘ƐƚƵŵďůŝŶŐƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ ? ? and wield it as a torch with which to 
illumine the surrounding syntactic forms and traces. It ƐŚŽƵůĚ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ďĞĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚ,ŽǁĞ ?Ɛ
ǁŽƌŬŝƐĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚůǇƐƚƌƵŐŐůŝŶŐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƐƵĐŚ ‘ŐƌĂƐƉŝŶŐ ? ? ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƐƚƵŵďůŝŶŐƐ ?ŽĨŚĞƌ
writing are a response to the immanent ethical question of how to approach the radically 
Other. In this regard, Howe writeƐŝŶ ‘/ŶĐůŽƐĞƌ ? P
 
Mountains are interrupted by mountains. Planets are not fixed. They run 
together. Planets are globes of fire. Imagination is a lense. Pastness. We find 
by experience. A sentence tumbles into thought. A disturbance calls itself free. 
(1993, 12) 
dŚŝƐůĂƐƚƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞĞǀŽŬĞƐƚŚĞǁĂǇŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝǀĞƐƵďũĞĐƚ ‘ĂŶƐǁĞƌƐ ?ƚŚĞĐĂůůŽĨ
 ‘ƉĂƐƚŶĞƐƐ ? ?ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐ ‘ďǇĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?dŚĞƐĞƉƌŽƐĞƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞƐ ‘ƚƵŵďůĞŝŶƚŽƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ? ?  “ĂƌĞ
ŝŶƚĞƌƌƵƉƚĞĚ ? Q ?ĂƌĞŶŽƚĨŝǆĞĚ ? Q ?ƌƵŶƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ? ?ŝĨ ‘ƉůĂŶĞƚƐĂƌĞŶŽƚĨŝǆĞĚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƌƵŶƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ? ?
then constellations ?  of meaning, of relativity, or ideas ?  are themselves unfixed, subject to 
vicissitudes and the delimiting perspective of the perceiving subject. There is a constitutive 
difficulty to this project of articulating the marginal, not only in the sense of giving a voice to 
the voiceless, but also in presenting this without appropriation in the text. In this regard, 
Howe writes:  “WĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶŽďũĞĐƚŵĞĂŶƐůŽŽƐŝŶŐĂŶĚůŽƐŝŶŐŝƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?dŚŝƐ ‘ůŽŽƐŝŶŐ ?
ĂŶĚ ‘ůŽƐŝŶŐ ?ŝƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚďǇǁĂǇŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ?ĨŽƌŵŽĨ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉŽĞƚƌǇ ?ǁŚĞƌĞŽĨƚĞŶ ?ĂƐ
DĐ>ĂŶĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ ?ƐŚĞ “ŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶĂůůǇĨůŝƌƚƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƵŶƌĞĂĚĂďůĞ ? with words crossed out or 
ƉŚƌĂƐĞƐĐŽůůĂŐĞĚĂŶĚƚǇƉĞƐĞƚƚŽŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞǁŝƚŚŽŶĞĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ? ? ? ) ?dŚŝƐĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞƐĂ
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constŝƚƵƚŝǀĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚǇŽĨ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ŵĂĚĞŵŽƌĞĐŽŵƉůĞǆďǇ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉƵŶŶŝŶŐ ?ǁŽƌĚ
ĚĞĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŶĞŽůŽŐŝƐŵƐ ?ĂƌĐŚĂŝĐŝƐŵƐĂŶĚ ?ŽĨƚĞŶƵŶĐŝƚĞĚ )ƋƵŽƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?,ŽǁĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐ
ƐƵĐŚŵŽŵĞŶƚƐŽĨ ‘ƵŶƌĞĂĚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇǁŚŝĐŚ ?ĚƵĞƚŽƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ of 
ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƐ ?ĂůƐŽŵĂŬĞƐŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƐ ‘ƵŶƌĞĂĚĂďůĞ ? ?,ŽǁĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ĂƐƐƵĐŚ ?ĐĂŶďĞ
conceived as extending in order to creĂƚĞĂƐƉĂĐĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞ ‘ƵŶƌĞĂĚĂďůĞ ?ĐĂŶďĞƌĞĂĚ ?
where the slightest marks on the page suggest a plenum of associations. This play between 
ƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞĂŶĚĂďƐĞŶĐĞŵĂŬĞƐ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ‘ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ?ŝŶĂƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇĞƚŚŝĐĂůƐĞŶƐĞ ?ŝĨƚŚĞƉĂŐĞ
ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐŚŝƐƚŽƌǇĂƐĂƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ƌĞĂĚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?ƚŚĞŶƚŚĞĂĐƚŽĨ ‘ƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ ?ŝƐŝƚƐĞůĨĂŶĞƚŚŝĐĂů
engagement.  
  It might at this point seem that Howe is in some ways the most appropriate poet for 
ƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?ĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƚŽĞǆƉůŽƌĞǁŽƌŬƐŽĨĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚĞŶŐĂŐĞǁŝƚŚƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
notions. Indeed, her early work My Emily Dickinson is in one sense a work of 
phenomenological literary criticism by ǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨŝƚƐĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚĨŽƌĞŐƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉůĂĐĞĂƐ
the engaged and enthused critic, with a particular emphasis on the act of going to and 
ĞǆƉůŽƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐƉĞŶŶĞĚďǇŝĐŬŝŶƐŽŶ ?,ŽǁĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “/ůĞĂƌŶĞĚ ?ĞǆĂŵŝŶŝŶŐ
the facsimiles, that Emily Dickinson, in her carefully handwritten manuscripts ?  some sewn 
into fascicles, some gathered into sets ?  may have been demonstrating her conscious and 
ƵŶĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐĨƌŽŵĂŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵůŝƚĞƌĂƌǇŽƌƚŚŽĚŽǆǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?/ƚŝƐĂĚĞĞƉůǇĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶƚŝĂůǁŽƌŬ ?
and adopts a position of personal embeddedness in Dickinson in knowing contradiction to 
academic discourse ?  ƚŚŝƐŝƐ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐŽǁŶĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŐĞƐƚƵƌĞĚĂƚŝŶŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚĚǁĂƌĚ
&ŽƐƚĞƌ P “ĞŚŝŶĚƚŚĞĨĂĕĂĚĞŽĨ,ĂƌǀĂƌĚhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇŝƐĂ ƐĐĂĨĨŽůĚĂŶĚĂƌĞŐŝĐŝĚĞ ?hŶĚĞƌƚŚe ivy 
ĂŶĚĐŝǀŝůŝƚǇƚŚĞƌĞŝƐƚŚĞŝŶƐƚŝŶĐƚĨŽƌŵƵƌĚĞƌ ?ĞƌĂƐƵƌĞĂŶĚĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚĂƌŝĂŶŝƐŵ ? ?Ibid., 176-77). 
Elsewhere, in The Birth-Mark, ƐŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “/ŬŶŽǁƌĞĐŽƌĚƐĂƌĞĐŽŵƉŝůĞĚďǇǁŝŶŶĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚ
ƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉŝƐŝŶĐŽůůƵƐŝŽŶǁŝƚŚĐŝǀŝůŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?Ibid., 34). As works like My Emily Dickinson, 
 ‘ƌŝƐďĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ^ŽƵŶĚ&ŽƌŵƐŝŶdŝŵĞ ?ƐŚŽǁŝŶƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ƌĞĐŽǀĞƌŝĞƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞůŝǀĞƐŽĨ
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 ‘ŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůĨŝŐƵƌĞƐ ? ?ƚŚŝƐĞƌĂƐƵƌĞŝƐŶŽƚŽŶůǇĂŶĞĚŝƚŽƌŝĂůŵĂƚƚĞƌ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽĂƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂů
question. Howe is not a writer who can be made ultimately clear or be fully realised by 
deferring from the page to another work, a master text somewhere. Peter Nicholls writes 
ƚŚĂƚ “,ŽǁĞŚĂƐŶŽĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽƐĞŶĚƵƐďĂĐŬƚŽŚĞƌƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ?Žƌ ?ŝŶĚĞĞĚ ?ƚŽĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞƵƐƚŽƌĞĂĚ
ƚŚĞŵŝŶƚĂŶĚĞŵ ? Q ?WĞƌŚĂƉƐ ?ƚŚĞŶ ?ƚŚĞƐŽƵƌĐĞŝƐŝƌƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?/ŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?ƚŚĞƐƉĂĐĞƐŽĨ
,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉĂŐĞƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚďƌŝŶŐƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌĚŝƐƉĂƌĂƚĞǀŽŝĐĞƐĂŶĚƐŽƵƌĐĞƐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞƚŚĞ
ŵĂƌŐŝŶĂů ?ŽĨĨĞƌĂŶĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌǁŝƚŚŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĂďƐĞŶĐĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂƉĂƌĂĚŽǆŝĐĂů ‘ƉƌĞƐĞŶĐŝŶŐ ?ŽĨ
materials. Howe ?ƐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐĨŽƌĐĞĂƌĞŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĂĚĞƌ ?ŽĨƚĞŶůŝƚĞƌĂůůǇŝŶŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐŽĨ
the page being rotated and mirrored, which invites at its most rewarding a disclosure of 
vision to the generative multifariousness of the marginal and fragmentary.  
  This chapter will now turn towards specific instances in Howe which illuminate her 
sense of the infinite margin, a notion which brings together history, language and ethics in 
ŚĞƌƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?tŝƚŚƚŚŝƐŝŶŵŝŶĚ ?/ǁŝůůĨŝƌƐƚĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇƚhrough 
close readings of two different works of poetic extension; first, in Pierce-Arrow, a text which 
works to recover the phenomenology of nineteenth century American logician Charles 
Sanders Peirce; and second, in Incloser, an early statement of poetics by Howe which 
occupies a liminal position between criticism and poetry.  
 
 
Pierce-Arrow P^ƵƐĂŶ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐWĞŝƌĐĞ 
 
Pierce-Arrow (1999) discloses the life and thought of the philosopher and logician Charles 
Sanders Peirce. This distinction ?  life and thought ?  is provocatively unclear throughout the 
ďŽŽŬ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽŶƚĂŝŶƐƚŚƌĞĞŝŶƚĞƌƌĞůĂƚĞĚĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƉŽĞŵƐ P ‘ƌŝƐďĞ ? ? ‘dŚĞ>ĞŝƐƵƌĞŽĨdŚĞdŚĞŽƌǇ
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ůĂƐƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ZƵĐŬĞŶĨŝŐƵƌ ? ?tŚŝůƐƚŝƚŝƐƚƌƵĞƚŚĂƚ ?ĂƐ Peter Nicholls writes, Pierce-Arrow is 
ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚ “ĂƉŽĞƚŝĐƐŽĨůŽƐƐ ĂŶĚƌĞŵĞŵďƌĂŶĐĞǁŚŝĐŚ ? Q ?ƌĞƐƚůĞƐƐůǇŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚĞƐƚŚĞ
ŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨŚƵŵĂŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ? ?EŝĐŚŽůůƐ ? ? ? ) ?ƐƵĐŚĂƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŽƌŝĞŶƚƐPierce-Arrow in the same 
ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶĂƐŵƵĐŚŽĨ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐŽƚŚĞƌǁŽƌŬ ?dŚŝƐƐĞƌǀĞƐƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐĐŽƌĞĂĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐǇŽĨŚĞƌ
writing ?   ‘ůŽƐƐ ? ? ‘ƌĞŵĞŵďƌĂŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ?ĂƐƉĞƌǀĂƐŝǀĞŵŽƚŝĨƐ ?  and at the 
ƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞƌƵŶƐƚŚĞƌŝƐŬŽĨŵŝƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐǇŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?ƐŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐĂŶĚŵŽƌƉŚŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ?
The extent to which Howe explicitly includes phenomenology in the discourse of Pierce-
Arrow is far greater than in any of her other works. Furthermore, the work it performs in 
 ‘ƌĞĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐ ?WĞŝƌĐĞĂƐĂƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐŝƐƚŝƐŶŽƚĂďůĞŝŶ ŝƚƐŽǁŶƌŝŐŚƚĂƐĂŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝǀĞŵŽŵĞŶƚ
in the meeting of a largely European constellation of thinkers with American philosophy. The 
composition of the work involved visits to the archives of both Peirce and Edmund Husserl, 
and Howe includes not only details from these visits but also commentary on the experience 
of going to the archive. This emphasis on praxis is a motif developed from Peirce himself. 
Howe treats Peirce far less as a logician or semiotician and instead emphasises the ideas 
ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚŝŶŚŝƐĞƐƐĂǇ ‘dŚĞWƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨWŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ ? ?^ŚĞƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽƚŚŝƐĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨŚŝƐ
ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŝŶ ‘dŚĞdŚĞŽƌǇŽĨdŚĞ>ĞŝƐƵƌĞůĂƐƐ ? P
Mr. Charles Sanders Peirce 
ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ “ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ĂŶĚ 
 “ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂů ?ŝŶƚŽƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ 
As when someone planning a 
journey blind-eyed solitary 
prepares a lamp and fastens 
linen screens and the fine 
linens from that moment end 
with a question of fire in 
flight the wŽƌĚ “ƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝƐŵ ? 
spread pleading particulars   (1999, 111) 
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The contribution Howe claims Peirce makes to philosophy is an orientation towards praxis, 
ŶŽƚŽŶůǇŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌĚƐ ‘ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂů ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽĨŝŐƵƌĞĚĂƐĂ ‘ƐŽůŝƚĂƌǇ ?ũŽƵƌŶĞǇŝŶŐ
forward to ask  “ĂƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨĨŝƌĞŝŶ ?ĨůŝŐŚƚ ? ?dŚŝƐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶůŝŐŚƚƐƚŚĞĨŝƌĞƚŚĂƚ “ƐƉƌĞĂĚ ?Ɛ ?
ƉůĞĂĚŝŶŐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƐ ? ? ƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƐŽĨĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚWĞŝƌĐĞǁƌŝƚĞƐŝŶ ‘dŚĞ
WƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨWŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ ? P
We perceive objects brought before us; but that which we especially 
experience ?  ƚŚĞŬŝŶĚŽĨƚŚŝŶŐƚŽǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ ‘ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?ŝƐŵŽƌĞ
particularly applied ?  is an event. We cannot accurately be said to perceive 
ĞǀĞŶƚƐ ? ? Q ?tĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞǀŝĐŝƐƐŝƚƵĚĞƐ ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ ?  (1986, 88) 
This distinction between perception and experience in the lived world distinguishes 
ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĂƐĂ ‘ĐŽŵƉƵůƐŝŽŶ ? ? ‘ƚŚĞĂďƐŽůƵƚĞĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚƵƉŽŶƵƐƚŽƚŚŝŶŬŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞƚŚĂŶǁĞ
ŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ? ?Ibid., 88-89). This is figured as a plurality of vicissitudes. Peirce 
continues: 
We cannot experience the vicissitude without experiencing the perception 
which undergoes the change; but the concept of experience is broader than 
that of perception, and includes much that is not, strictly speaking, an object 
of perception.  (Ibid., 88) 
,ŽǁĞ ?ƐPierce-Arrow ĞǀŽŬĞƐĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ ‘ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞŝŶŝŶĚŝǀŝ ƵĂůƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐ ?  
of words, letters, pages, poems collected into a book ?  are best conceived as the experience 
of vicissitude rather than as clear designations between perceptions. In this sense, Pierce-
Arrow approaches Peirce the historical figure, the man and the philosopher by virtue of the 
ĚŝƐƉĂƌĂƚĞĚĞƚĂŝůƐŽĨŚŝƐůŝĨĞ ?ĂŶĚĂƐƐƵĐŚĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞƐŚŝŵŶŽƚĂƐ ‘ĂŶŽďũĞĐƚŽĨƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚ
rather as a series of vicissitudes. In this sense, she aligns ŚĞƌƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞǁŝƚŚWĞŝƌĐĞ ?ƐŝŶƚŚĞ
sense that, for Howe, the poem is always a matter of praxis. In this regard, Howe engages 
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ǁŝƚŚĚŵƵŶĚ,ƵƐƐĞƌůŝŶ ‘dŚĞ>ĞŝƐƵƌĞŽĨdŚĞdŚĞŽƌǇůĂƐƐ ? ?ƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƉŽĞŵŽĨƚŚĞ
book: 
,ƵƐƐĞƌů ?ƐNachlass his 
transcendental phenomenology 
Cartesian Meditations 
Appendixes to the main text 
&ŝŶŬ ?ƐŽǁŶĐŽƉǇŽĨƚŚĞ 
Sixth Meditation a massive 
system the urgency of his 
position in context of 
the times then preparing 
Nachlass for the future.    (1999, 122) 
,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚŽĨ,ƵƐƐĞrl on this page is not explicitly engaging with his thought but 
rather gesturing towards the dramatic story of the rescue of his manuscripts. Nachlassen is a 
'ĞƌŵĂŶǁŽƌĚĨŽƌ ‘ůĞĂǀŝŶŐĂĨƚĞƌ ?ĂŶĚƌĞĨĞƌƐŝŶĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĂƚŽƚŚĞŵĂŶƵƐĐƌŝƉƚƐ ?ŶŽƚĞƐ ?ŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůŝĂ
and correspondence left behind after death. For Howe, the nachlass is often the source and 
motivation of her writing. Husserl died in Nazi Germany in 1938 and his estate, as a Jewish 
intellectual, was expected to be destroyed by the fascists ?  Howe evokes this aƐĂŶ “ƵƌŐĞŶĐǇ
ŽĨŚŝƐ ?ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨ ?ƚŚĞƚŝŵĞƐ ? ?ƵƌŐĞŶĐǇĨŝŐƵƌĞĚďŽƚŚĂƐƚŚĞŶĞĂƌŶĞƐƐŽĨƚĞƌƌŽƌ
ĨŽƌĂ:ĞǁĂŶĚƚŚĞǀŝƚĂůŝƚǇŽĨ,ƵƐƐĞƌů ?ƐƚƌĂŶƐĐĞŶĚĞŶƚĂůƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?,ĞƌŵĂŶ>ĞŽsĂŶƌĞĚĂ ?ƚŚĞŶ
a postgraduate student, went to Nazi Germany in the yeĂƌŽĨ,ƵƐƐĞƌů ?ƐĚĞĂƚŚƚŽƐĞĐƵƌĞƚŚĞ
nachlass ǁŝƚŚĂǀŝĞǁƚŽƉƵďůŝƐŚŝŶŐĂŶĚĞǆƉůŝĐĂƚŝŶŐ,ƵƐƐĞƌů ?ƐƵŶƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚŵĂŶƵƐĐƌŝƉƚƐ ?sĂŶ
ƌĞĚĂŝƐŶŽƚŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚŝŶ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐďŽŽŬ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚŝƚŝƐĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚ,ŽǁĞŝƐďŽƚŚĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌǁŝƚŚĂŶĚ
invested in ƚŚĞƐƚŽƌǇŽĨ,ƵƐƐĞƌů ?Ɛnachlass.  
   This implicates phenomenology in the same kind of problematic master narratives 
and textual erasures to which literary history is subject. In this sense, Howe seeks to 
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illuminate Peirce as a marginal figure in order not only to emphasise his place outside of 
institutions and phenomenological tradition, but also to establish an early point at which 
phenomenology is being written in America. There is something at stake for Howe in 
underscoring the existence of a phenomenological source who, as an American, writes an 
idiosyncratically American phenomenology, distinguished nominally by Peirce at the outset of 
ŚŝƐĞƐƐĂǇĂƐ ‘ƉŚĂŶĞƌŽƐĐŽƉǇ ? ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚŝƐƚĞƌŵĂŶĚƚŚĞ ĨŽƌŵĞƌĂƌĞƵƐĞĚǁŝƚŚůŝďĞƌĂůŽǀĞƌůĂƉŝŶ
his reassembled writings. In addition to historical questions concerning the place of 
ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇŝŶ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ƐŚĞĂůƐŽƐĞĞŬƐƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƉƌŽďůĞŵƐŽĨƚŚĞƚĞǆƚƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨ
ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ ‘ƌŝƐďĞ ? ?ĂƌůǇŝŶƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ƐŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
Phenomenology asks what are the elements of appearance. In my nature 
(cross out with) it is a sort of instinct toward (slash to) a solid (cross out 
visible) instinctive attraction for living facts. (1999, 14) 
,ĞƌĞ ?,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉůĂŝŶŽƉĞŶŝŶŐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚũƵǆƚĂƉŽƐĞƐǁŝƚŚĞĐŽŵƉůĞǆƐĞůĨ-editing second 
sentence. Articulation is followed by parenthetical notes which alter the text outside the 
ďƌĂĐŬĞƚďƵƚĚŽŶ ?ƚƌĞƉůĂĐĞŝƚ ? ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? “ĂƐŽůŝĚ ?ĐƌŽƐƐŽƵƚǀŝƐŝďůĞ ) ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞŝƚǁŽƵůĚƐĞĞŵ
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ĐƌŽƐƐĞĚŽƵƚǀŝƐŝďůĞ ?ŝƐŝŶǀŝƐŝďůĞ ?ŽƌŚĂƐďĞĞŶǁƌŝƚƚĞŶŽǀĞƌǁŝƚŚ ‘ƐŽůŝĚ ? ?dŚŝƐŚĂƉƉĞŶƐ
three times in the sentence, marking the process by which articulation of perception must 
necessarily fold back on itself to adhere to the contingency of perception. This textuality of 
phenomenology is an unavoidable complication of its methods. Many of its research 
interests ?  perception, intersubjectivity, contingency, philosophy as praxis ?  encounter 
irreconcilable problems on the page. How can a constantly developing thesis of 
phenomenology on ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇĞǀĞƌƌĞƐƚ ?tŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŽĂƐŬ ?ĂƐ,ŽǁĞĚŽĞƐ ? “/ĨĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ
forges conception, can quick particulars of calligraphic expression ever be converted to 
ƚǇƉĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ),ŽǁĞĞǀŽŬĞƐƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽů ŐǇas ƉŽĞƚƌǇůĂƚĞƌŝŶ ‘ƌŝƐďĞ ? P
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A person throws a stone 
as fact through air not 
fact but appearance of 
fact floating in vacuua 
Blind existential being 
may possibly not occur 
at all we know nothing 
with absolute certainty 
of existent things not even 
ƚŚĞƐŝŶŐůĞ ‘ǁŽƌĚ ?ƚŚĞ  (1999, 6-7) 
The ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶŵĂĚĞŝŶƚŚĞŚŝŶŐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚƚŽƚŚŝƌĚůŝŶĞŵĂŬĞƐŽĨ ‘ƐƚŽŶǇĨĂĐƚ ?ĂŶ
appearance. There is a taut contradiction between the direct diction of the opening line and 
ƚŚĞůŝŶĞƐǁŚŝĐŚĨŽůůŽǁ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŐƌĂĚƵĂůůǇ ‘ĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚ ?ďŽƚŚƚŚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞƐƚŽŶĞ ?dŚĞ ‘ǀĂĐƵƵĂ ?
ǁŚŝĐŚĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞƐƚŚŝƐŵĂŬĞƐ ‘ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚŝĂůďĞŝŶŐ ? ‘ďůŝŶĚ ? ?ĞƋƵŝǀŽĐĂƚĞĚĂƐ ‘ƉŽƐƐŝďůǇŶŽƚ
ŽĐĐƵƌ ?ŝŶŐ ? ? ?dŚĞƐƚĂŶǌĂŵŽǀĞƐĨƌŽŵ ‘ĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĂƐƚŽŶĞ ? ?ŐĞŶĞƌĂůĂŶĚƵŶƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ?ƚŽĂ
ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ “ĂďƐŽůƵƚĞ ?ƵŶ ?ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ?ŽĨ ?ƚŚĞƐŝŶŐůĞ ‘ǁŽƌĚ ?ƚŚĞ ? ?dŚŝƐĚĞŝǆŝƐŐĞƐƚƵƌĞƐ
towards what Howe describes elsewhere as a process ŽĨ “ƵŶĂǁĂŬĞŶĞĚĨŝŶŝƚĞŝŶĨŝŶŝƚĞ
ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ƚŚĞůĂƚĞŶƚƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůŽĨĨŝ ŝ ĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĞƌƐƚŽƐŝŐŶŝĨǇŝŶĨŝŶŝƚĞůǇĚĞƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ
on the vicissitudes of context. This accouŶƚŽĨĨĂĐƚĂƐ ‘ĂƉƉĞĂƌĂŶĐĞŽĨĨĂĐƚ ?ŝƐĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĚůĂƚĞƌ
in the poem: 
What is the secret nature of fact? What is the fact that is present to you now? 
[...] Let y be y you cannot gasp at blue. (1999, 14) 
The sense of wonder that might provoke a gasp at the secƌĞƚŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ ‘ďůƵĞ ?ŝƐĚĞŶŝĞĚ ? ‘ůĞƚy 
be y ? )?  ƚŚŝƐ ‘ƐĞĐƌĞƚŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?ŽĨĨĂĐƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐŶŽƚ ‘ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƚŽǇŽƵŶŽǁ ?ŝƐƵŶƌĞĂĐŚĂďůĞ ?dŚŝƐ
speculative categorisation of fact as distinct from appearance appears to be derived from 
WĞŝƌĐĞ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?,ŝƐĂŶƐǁĞƌƚŽ  ‘ůŝŶĚĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚŝĂůďĞŝŶŐ ?ŝƐĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŬŝŶĚŽĨůŽŐŝĐĂů
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ĚĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŶƚƐŽĨĂƉƉĞĂƌĂŶĐĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƉŚĂŶĞƌŽŶ ? ?WĞŝƌĐĞ ?ƐƚĞƌŵ )Žƌ
phenomena. For Peirce, everything is first encountered as a phaneron. To test the reliability 
of this totalisation, he invites the reader to engage in the same process of reduction his text 
is an account of: 
There is nothing quite so directly open to observation as phanerons; and since 
I shall have no need of referring to any but those which (or the like of which) 
are perfectly familiar to everybody, every reader can control the accuracy of 
what I am going to say about them. (1986, 74) 
What might seem wilful obscurity can instead be seen as a grounding in the deictic, that 
which always pertains to a subject, which at once appears to locate something specific but 
takes the form of unspecific gesture. Peirce further explicates the phaneron as a totality, 
albeit a totality unsettled by its constitutive deixis: 
By the phaneron I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in any 
sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any 
real thing or not. If you ask present when, and to whose mind, I reply that I 
leave these questions unanswered, never having entertained a doubt that 
those features of the phaneron that I have found in my mind are present at all 
times and to all minds. (Ibid., 74) 
dŚĞƉŚĂŶĞƌŽŶŝƐŵĞƚĂƐ ‘ƚŚƌĞĞŵŽĚĞƐŽĨďĞŝŶŐ ? ?,ĞƚĞƌŵƐƚŚĞƐĞ&ŝƌƐƚŶĞƐƐ ?^ĞĐŽŶĚŶĞƐƐ ?
dŚŝƌĚŶĞƐƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƌŽƵŐŚůǇĞƋƵĂƚĞƚŽƚŚĞƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂŽĨ ‘ƋƵĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ? ? ‘ĨĂĐƚƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐ ? ?
,ŽǁĞǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “WĞŝƌĐĞ ?ƐŝĚĞĂƐŽĨƚŚĞĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐ ?Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness as a 
way to explain the process of artistic inspiration ?ĂƌĞĚĞĂƌƚŽŵĞ ? ?DĐ>ĂŶĞ ?ŶƉ ) ?&ŽƌWĞŝƌĐĞ ?
ĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ “ŝƐĂƚĂŶǇƚŝŵĞďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞŵŝŶĚŝŶĂŶǇǁĂǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )ĐĂŶďĞĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĞĚĂƐ




attention in the poem to the life-world of Peirce and his wife Juliette as she does explicitly to 
ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨWĞŝƌĐĞ ?ƐǁƌŝƚŝŶŐƐ ?/ŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?,ŽǁĞŝƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŵŝŵĞŽŐƌĂƉŚƐƐŚĞ
ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚĂƚWĞŝƌĐĞ ?ƐĂƌĐŚŝǀĞ ?ďŽƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƚĞǆƚƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨŐŽŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞ
archiǀĞ ?dŚĞĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƉĂŝĚƚŽƚŚĞƐŝƚĞŽĨƚŚĞƐŽƵƌĐĞĂƚ ŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?ƐŽƵƚƐĞƚĂĨĨŝƌŵƐƚŚĞƐŝŶŐƵůĂƌ
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞĨŽƌ,ŽǁĞŽĨƚŚĞĂƌĐŚŝǀĞĂƐĂůŝǀĞĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂŶŽƚŝŽŶ ?dŚƵƐ ?,ŽǁĞ ?Ɛ
evocation of the archive, both as an idea and as a locus of meaning, is figured by Howe as 
ƐĞĐŽŶĚŶĞƐƐ P “WĞŝƌĐĞĐĂůůƐƐĞĐŽŶĚŶĞƐƐĂůůŶĂŬĞĚĨĞĞůŝŶŐĂŶĚƌĂǁůŝĨĞ ?KƌŝŐŝŶĂůŝƚǇŝƐŝŶďĞŝŶŐ
ƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚƵƐƚŚŝƐďĞŝŶŐŝƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?dŚĞƚĂƵƚƐǇŶƚĂǆŚĞƌĞĂŐĂŝŶŝŶǀŽŬĞƐƚŚĞĚĞŝĐƚŝĐ ?ĂŵŽƚŝĨ
in Howe which is not only an opening on and regard of radical alterity but a constitutive 
feature of her poetics. This can be demonstrated with reference to a mimeographed page 
reproduced early in Pierce-Arrow. The handwriting is fairly neat, though problematized by 
edited passages which have been heaviůǇƐĐƌĂǁůĞĚŽƵƚ ?dŚĞƉĂŐĞŝƐƚŝƚůĞĚ ‘dŚĞ&ŝƌƐƚŚĂƉƚĞƌŽĨ
>ŽŐŝĐ ? P 
The earliest occupation of man is poetizing, is feeling and delighting in feeling. 
That is what the infant in his cradle seems mainly to be saying to be about. But 
feeling generates dreams; dreams, desires; desires, impulses to do things. So 
ƚŚĞŵĂŝŶďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐŽĨĂŶŽƌŵĂůŵĂŶ ?ƐůŝĨĞĐŽŵĞƐƚŽďĞŝŶĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? 
        (1999, 3. My transcription) 
Howe later writes that this work was never published, but by beginning her own poem with 
the opening words of an unpublished fragment of Peirce she establishes an analogue 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĞĂĐŚǁŽƌŬ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƉĂƐƐĂŐĞ ?ƚŚĞƐŽƵƌĐĞŝƐ ‘ƚŚĞŝŶĨĂŶƚŝŶŚŝƐĐƌĂĚůĞ ? ? 
a radical move is made to the apparently originary in order to establish the scope of Peirce ?Ɛ
work. He locates poetizing as constitutive of the beginnings of human experience, 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚďǇWĞŝƌĐĞ ?ƐĞƋƵŝǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶĂƐ ‘ĨĞĞůŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĚĞůŝŐŚƚŝŶĨĞĞůŝŶŐ ? ?/ŶƚŚĞƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ
ŵŝŵĞŽŐƌĂƉŚ ?WĞŝƌĐĞƐĐŽƌĞƐŽƵƚ ‘ƚŽďĞƐĂǇŝŶŐ ?ŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌ Ĩ ‘ƚŽďĞĂďŽƵƚ ? ?ŵŽǀŝŶg from speech 
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ƚŽ ‘ĂďŽƵƚŶĞƐƐ ? ?ĂƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚŝƐďŽƚŚŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇŵĂƌŐŝŶĂů ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĞŶĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŶŐ ?
ďǇǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?WĞŝƌĐĞ ?ƐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƉŽĞƚŝǌŝŶŐŝƐǁŚĂƚŵĂŶŝƐ ‘ĂďŽƵƚ ?ƵŶĚĞƌƐĐŽƌĞƐ
the sense in which the poetic is an extension of already present faculties, which is to say, a 
phenomenal undertaking.  
  /ƚƌĞŵĂŝŶƐƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŚŽǁ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŽŶWĞŝƌĐĞĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐƚŚĞŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐŝĞƐŽĨ
her poetic extension. One particular measure through which this can be illuminated is, as 
,ŽǁĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? “ƚŚĞƚǇĐŚŝĐĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ ?ĂƐŚĂƌůĞƐ^ĂŶĚĞƌƐWĞŝƌĐĞŵŝŐŚƚƐĂǇ ? ?DĐ>ĂŶĞ ?ŶƉ ) ?^ŚĞ
continues: 
This is what attracts me so strongly to the ideas of Peirce, the philosopher and 
ůŽŐŝĐŝĂŶ ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚďĞŐŝŶƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚůŽŐŝĐ ?ďƵƚ/ƐĞĞƚŚŝŶŐƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞǀŝƐƵĂů
quality of his manuscripts that a professional Peircian might miss or ignore.
          (Ibid.) 
&Žƌ,ŽǁĞ ?ŚĞƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽWĞŝƌĐĞ ?ƐǁƌŝƚŝŶŐƐŝƐ ?ĂƐƐŚĞƐĂǇƐ ?ƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ?  “/ƐĞĞƚŚŝŶŐƐ
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞǀŝƐƵĂůƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨŚŝƐŵĂŶƵƐĐƌŝƉƚƐ ? ?, an effort which again displays a focus on the 
marginal, not only in terms of Peirce as an often destitute and dismissed academic, but also 
ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚƚŽƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚWĞŝƌĐĞƚŽƚŚĞĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ůŽŐŝĐŝĂŶ ?ŝƐƚŽŽǀĞƌǁƌŝƚĞƚŚĞǀĂƌŝĞĚ
intentions of his often vastly dissimilar writŝŶŐƐ ?ƌƚŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶZŝĐŚĂƌĚ^ŚŝĨĨ ?Ɛascribes an 
uncannily similar process to materials, designating it with the same term:  
I sometimes take a book from my library shelf at random and let it inspire the 
next stage of an unfinished essay. Any writing can be useful in this way, 
ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇŝĨŝƚ ?ƐŐŽŽĚǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶǇƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ?ƌĞŵŽǀĞĚĨƌŽŵŝƚƐ
intended context of use, is likely to provoke a profitable turn in imagination 
and reasoning. If I wanted to give this method a theoretical identity, I would 
caůůŝƚ “ƚǇĐŚŝĐ ? ? ? Q ?/ƚ ?ƐůŝŬĞĂŶŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƉĂƌƚǇŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐŝŶŐĂŚĞĂůƚŚǇŵŽŵĞŶƚŽĨ
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ĚŽƵďƚŝŶƚŽĂŶĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚďǇĂƐŬŝŶŐĂƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚŝƌƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ? ? Q ?(Shiff, 
np) 
/ƚŝƐ “ƚŚĞĐŚĂŶĐĞĞůĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƚŚĞůƵĐŬŝŶĂƚƵƌŶŽĨƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŐŽŽĚĨŽƌƚƵŶĞŽƌďĂĚ
ĨŽƌƚƵŶĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ “ƉƌŽǀĞƐŝƚƐĞůĨƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇ ?ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ ? ?Ibid. ) ?dŚĞ ‘ƚǇĐŚŝĐ ?ŝƐĂƐƐƵĐŚ
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝǀĞůǇŵĂƌŐŝŶĂů ?ĂŶĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌǁŚŝĐŚƚĂŬĞƐƉůĂĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ĐŚĂŶĐĞ ?
ĞůĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?,ŽǁĞĂĚŽƉƚƐƚŚŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚĨƌŽŵWĞŝƌĐĞ ?ĂŶĚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞĞŵƉůŽǇƐŝƚŝŶŚĞƌapproach 
to his work. This revitalises not only his writing but the conditions of his life, and furthermore 
establishes a sense of Howe as embracing the vicissitudes involved in the act of going to a 
historical body of work. As such, Howe writes of her method more generally in recovering the 
histories of marginalised figures: 
It is strange how the dead appear in dreams where another space provides 
our living space as well. Another language another way of speaking so quietly 
always there in the shape of memories, thoughts, feelings, which are extra-
marginal outside of primary consciousness, yet must be classed as some sort 
of unawakened finite infinite articulation. Documents resemble people talking 
in sleep. To exist is one thing, to be perceived another. I can spread historical 
information, words and words we can never touch hovering around 
subconscious life where enunciation is born, in distinction from what it 
enunciates when nothing rests in air when what is knowledge?  (1993, 6) 
Howe here presents a number of things which are vital to her procedure, perhaps most 
importantly the fact that the Other ?  ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌǁĂǇŽĨƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐ ? ? is classed 
ĂƐ ‘ƵŶĂǁĂŬĞŶĞĚĨŝŶŝƚĞŝŶĨŝŶŝƚĞĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?dŚŝƐ ‘ĨŝŶŝƚĞŝŶĨŝŶŝƚǇ ?ĐŽŵĞƐĂďŽƵƚďǇǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨƚŚĞ
fact ƚŚĂƚ ‘ĞǆŝƐƚ ?ŝŶŐ ?ŝƐŽŶĞƚŚŝŶŐ ? ?ďĞŝŶŐ ?ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ? ? a situation which makes words 
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 ‘ƵŶƚŽƵĐŚĂďůĞ ? ?ďŽƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƋƵŝĚĚŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚĂƚŽƚĂůĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ
ĂůǁĂǇƐƌĞŵĂŝŶƐŽƵƚŽĨƌĞĂĐŚ ?dŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŶŽƚŚŝŶŐƌĞƐƚƐŝŶĂŝƌ ?ƉƌŽŵƉƚƐƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ‘ǁŚĂƚŝƐ
ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ? ?dŚŝƐƐĞĞŵƐƚŽĞǀŽŬĞĂƐĞŶƐĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŬŶŽǁŝŶŐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŝƐ ?ĨŽƌ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƵďũĞĐƚ
ƚŽĂƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƐĞůĨĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚŝŶŐ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƐŽŵĞĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞ ‘ƚŚŝŶŐ ?ŝƐ
ŐƌĂƐƉĞĚ ?dŚŝƐůŽĐĂƚĞƐƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂ ‘ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞŽĨƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ? ?ŝŶĂƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚŝƐ
 ‘ĞǆƚƌĂ-ŵĂƌŐŝŶĂů ?ƚŽƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?dŚĞƐĞŵŽƚŝĨƐĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚPierce-Arrow in the 
sense that, as we have seen, Peirce and in turn Howe seek to encounter perception as a 
plenum of vicissitudes. The implications ƚŚŝƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŚĂƐĨŽƌ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨŚŝƐƚŽƌǇĐĂŶ
ŶŽǁďĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚĂƚůĞŶŐƚŚ ?ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇŝŶƌĞŐĂƌĚƐƚŽ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨůŝƚĞƌĂƌǇŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?
ĂƐĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚŝŶ ‘/ŶĐůŽƐĞƌ ? ?ĂŶĞĂƌůǇĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůǁŽƌŬƚŚĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐŽĨǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶ
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉŽĞtry. 
 
Incloser:  History & Phenomenology 
ƵĞƚŽƚŚĞƉĞƌǀĂƐŝǀĞƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů mode as a tychic encounter throughout her 
ǁŽƌŬ ?ƚŚĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ƉŽĞƚƌǇ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ?ŝƐŽĨƚĞŶŝŶĐƌĞĚŝďůǇĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽŵĂŬĞ ?dŚĞ
orientation it forces is to absorb what constitutes criticism for Howe into what constitutes 
poetry ?  ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇ ?,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉŽĞŵƐĂnd essays display significant overlap to the point 
ƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌŝƐĂŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝǀĞŵŽǀĞŝŶĞůŝĚŝŶŐ,ŽǁĞ ?Ɛ
ĞǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?dŚŝƐŝƐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ-ĞƐƐĂǇ ‘/ŶĐůŽƐĞƌ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
explicates and reflects on her critique of historical appropriation and the processes of 
marginalisation. 
  ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐŵƵĐŚŽĨƚŚĞ
source material of her long poems, is problematic for the reader in a number of ways. Her 
project is charged with over-determination ?  which is to say, whole poems and books are 
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unclearly situated within the texts they quote from, read or appropriate. As such, the surface 
ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚǇŽĨ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉŽĞŵƐĐĂŶďĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽƌĞĐŽŶĐŝůĞǁŝƚŚŚĞƌĞǆƉůications of method and 
ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐŝƐƚǀŝƐŝŽŶĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ ?KŶĞŽĨƚŚĞĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚŝŶŐĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐŽĨ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐŝƐŝƚƐ
idiosyncratic extension into the margin and towards the marginal ?  but this gesture of 
unsettling the centre against which the margin is always ůŽĐĂƚĞĚŝƚƐĞůĨĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐĂ ‘ŵĂƌŐŝŶĂů ?
centre which requires further investigation for its prejudices and biases. This logic has its 
ƐŽƵƌĐĞŝŶ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐŽǁŶǁŽƌŬ ? to trust the authorial voice is to trust a process of omission and 
ĞŶĐůŽƐƵƌĞ ?/Ŷ ‘/ŶĐůŽƐĞƌ ? ?ƐŚe writes: 
The selection of particular examples from a large group is always a social act. 
By choosing to install certain narratives somewhere between history, mystic 
speech, and poetry, I have enclosed them in an organization although I know 
there are places no classificatory procedure can reach where connections 
between words and things we thought existed break off. For me, paradoxes 
and ironies of fragmentation are particularly compelling. (1993, 1) 
 
dŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞƐďŽƚŚƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚŽĨ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐĐƌŝƚicism and a self-consciousness 
ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐŚĞƌŽǁŶƉůĂĐĞŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶƐƚĂůůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨ ‘ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƐ ? ?dŚĞ “ƉůĂĐĞƐŶŽĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŽƌǇ
ƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞĐĂŶƌĞĂĐŚ ? ?Ibid. ? ? )ĂƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚďǇǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨƚŚĞ “ƉĂƌĂĚŽǆĞƐĂŶĚŝƌŽŶŝĞƐŽĨ
ĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŝƚŚǁŚŝĐŚ,ŽǁĞĚĞĂůƐŝŶŚĞƌĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?,ŽǁĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐŝŶ ‘WĞƌƐŽŶĂů
EĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ ? P 
My retrospective excursions follow the principle that ghosts wrapped in 
appreciative obituaries by committee members, or dedications presented at 
vanished community field meetings, can be reanimated by appropriation.   
(Ibid., 15) 
,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŝƐŝŶĚĞůŝďůǇŽŶĞŽĨ ‘ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?^ŚĞĨŝŐƵƌĞƐŚĞƌǁŽƌŬĂƐ
that of reanimating ghosts through appropriation, underscoring the self-consciousness and 
contradiction of a body of work which ĂƐŬƐ P “/ƐĂƉŽĞƚŝĐƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶŝŶŐĂďƐĞŶĐĞĂŶ
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ŽǆǇŵŽƌŽŶ ? ? ?Ibid. ? ? ? ) ?dŚŝƐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŚĂƵŶƚƐ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉŽĞƚƌǇ ?dŚĞ ‘ŽǆǇŵŽƌŽŶ ?ŚĞƌĞŝƐǁŚĂƚ
ŵĂŬĞƐ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐĂǁŽƌŬŽĨƚŚĞŵĂƌŐŝŶĂů ?ƚŚĞƌĞŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĞĂůǁĂǇƐ
establishes a new centre, and therefore new margins. Howe pays particular attention to this 
haunting, and as such occupies a position which necessarily has to appropriate its materials. 
In the opening of The Birth-Mark she writes: 
 
You are straying, seeking, scattering. Was it you or is it me? Where is the 
stumbling block? Thoughts delivered by love are predestined to distortion by 
words. If experience forges conception, can quick particulars of calligraphic 
expression ever be converted to type?  (Ibid., 4) 
 
Howe foregrounds her sense of the historic ?  which itself is notably consistent in its process 
of disclosing lives and material fragments from marginal history ?   as knowingly problematic. 
,ĞƌĞ ‘ůŽǀĞ ?ŝƐ ‘ƉƌĞĚĞƐƚŝŶĞĚƚŽĚŝƐƚŽƌƚŝŽŶďǇǁŽƌĚƐ ? ?  a phrase which gestures toward the 
ƉƌĞǀĂŝůŝŶŐƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ? ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇ ?ƚŚĂƚ “ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĨŽƌŐĞƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?
ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŵĂŬĞĐůĞĂƌƚŚŝƐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨĐŽŶǀĞƌƐŝŽŶŝŶƚŽ ‘ƚǇƉĞ ? ? “ƚŚĞƋƵŝĐŬƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƐŽĨ
ĐĂůůŝŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ? ?/Ŷ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞĚistorted by language, particularly 
ƚŚŽƐĞ “ĚĞůŝǀĞƌĞĚďǇůŽǀĞ ? ?/ŶĂƐĞŶƐĞ ?ƚŚĞŶ ?ŝƚŝƐƚŚĞĐĂƌĞǁŝƚŚǁŚŝĐŚ,ŽǁĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐŚĞƌ
materials which places them in tension; by wanting to avoid over-appropriation, the product 
is necessarily fragmentation and difficulty.  A major aspect of the project, then, is not just an 
investigation of the marginal-historical, but also an account of the difficulties of pursuing 
such a poetics.   
  dŚĞƐĞŝƐƐƵĞƐĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶĂƚǁŽƌŬŝŶ ‘/ŶĐůŽƐĞƌ ? ?ƐZĞĚĞůůKůƐĞŶǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “^ƵƐĂŶ,Žǁe 
ĐŝƚĞƐtĞďƐƚĞƌ ?ƐĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨenclose, a synonym for  ‘ŝŶĐůŽƐĞ ?, merges distinctions between 
ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ?ďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇ ?ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚĐŽŶĐĞĂůŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? ) ?ďŽǀĞƚŚĞtĞďƐƚĞƌ ?ƐĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ
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there is a longer more varied range of definitions: 
 
-CLOSE. See INCLOSE.  
1. To surround; to shut in; to confine on all sides; as to inclose a field with a 
fence; to inclose a fort or an army with troops; to inclose a town with walls.  
2. To separate from common grounds by a fence; as, to inclose lands.  
3. To include; to shut or confine; as to inclose trinkets in a box.  
4. To environ; to encompass.  
5. To cover with a wrapper or envelope; to cover under seal; as to inclose a 
letter or a bank note.     (1993, 1) 
Here, surrounding, shutting in, separating with a fence, including, confining, encompassing 
ĞǀŽŬĞďĞŝŶŐ ‘ĞŶĐůŽƐĞĚ ?ĂƐĂĚƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨƐŚĞůƚĞƌĂŶĚĐŽŶĨŝŶĞŵĞŶƚ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĞŶ ?ƚŚĞ
definitions are ironic in that they enact a process of enclosure. Whether an enclosure 
ƐŚĞůƚĞƌƐŽƌĐŽŶĨŝŶĞƐŝƐĂŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?ĂŶĚŽĨŽŶĞ ?s specific relation to that environment. 
The question of enclosure has to do not only with language and narrative but also 
subjectivity. Howe writes: 
Every statement is a product of collective desires and divisibilities. Knowledge, 
no matter how I get it, involves exclusion and repression. National histories 
hold ruptures and hierarchies. On the scales of global power what gets 
crossed over? Foreign accents mark dialogues that delete them. Ambulant 
vagrant bastardy comes looming through assurance and sanctification. (1993, 
1) 
 
This developed sense of an epistemology of history has as its object a pervasive sense of 
 ‘ĞǆĐůƵƐŝŽŶĂŶĚƌĞƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ? ? ‘ƌƵƉƚƵƌĞĂŶĚŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚǇ ? ?  ƚŚĞ ‘ŵĂƌŬ ?ŽĨ ‘ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĂĐĐĞŶƚƐ ?ůŽŽŵŝŶŐ
ŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨůŝƚĞƌĂƌǇŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?,ŽǁĞ ?ƐĚŝƐƚƌƵƐƚŽĨ “ĂƐƐƵƌĂŶĐĞĂŶĚƐĂŶĐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?
informs a process of epistemology which explicitly searches for the unassured and 
unsanctified, which is to say, the marginal. 
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  ŐĂŝŶƐƚƐƵĐŚŚŝŐŚƐƚĂŬĞƐ ?,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂƐĂŶĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƚŽĂƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚ
dominant patriarchal model of the writing of history, are figured not as the offering of 
answers concerning historical questions, but rather an incessant questioning of the centre 
ǁŚŝĐŚƚĂŬĞƐƉůĂĐĞŝŶƚŚĞŵĂƌŐŝŶƐ ?<ĂƉůĂŶ,ĂƌƌŝƐǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ,ŽǁĞ “quotes extensively while 
ǁŝƚŚŚŽůĚŝŶŐŚĞƌŽǁŶĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ ?ĂƐŝĨƚŽůĞƚĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ƉĞĂŬĨŽƌƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ?,ĂƌƌŝƐ ? ? ? ) ?
In this regard, Howe writes:   
A poem can prevent onrushing light going out. Narrow path in the teeth of 
proof. Fire of words will try us. Grace given to few. Coming home though bent 
and bias for the sake of why so. Awkward as I am. Here and there invincible 
things as they are. If history is a record of survivors, Poetry shelters other 
voices. (1993, 3) 
 
This is poetry as tychic encounter. The sense of chance illumination ?   “ŽŶƌƵƐŚŝŶŐůŝŐŚƚŐŽŝŶŐ
ŽƵƚ ?ĐĂƵŐŚƚŝŶĂ “ŶĂƌƌŽǁƉĂƚŚ ?ŝƐĐĂƵŐŚƚ “ĂǁŬǁĂƌĚ ?ůǇ ? ? ?dŚĞƌŽǀŝŶŐĚĞŝǆŝƐŽĨƚŚĞƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞ
 “ ?, ?ĞƌĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞŝŶǀŝŶĐŝďůĞƚŚŝŶŐƐĂƐƚŚĞǇĂƌĞ ?ĨŽƌĞŐƌŽƵŶĚƐƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ?ŽĨƐƵĐŚƚǇĐŚŝĐ
ĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƐ ?ŐƌŽƵŶĚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƉŽĞƚ ?ƐĐŽŶƚĂĐƚ ?,ŽǁĞǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐ “ĨƵŶƚŽďĞŚŝĚĚĞŶďƵƚ
horrible not to be found ?  ƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝƐŚŽǁƚŽďĞŝƐŽůĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚďĞŝŶŐŝŶƐƵůĂƚĞĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
 ? ? ? ) ?dŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ŝƐŽůĂƚĞĚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŝŶƐƵůĂƚĞĚ ?ŝƐĂŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨǁŚĂƚŝƐĂƚƐƚĂŬĞ
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉŽĞƚry. One possible explanation of how this distinction is made is 
suggested by Hélène ũŝ ?ǁŚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉƌŽũĞĐƚĂƐƉƌŽĨŽƵŶĚůǇŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚŝǀĞ P 
As she runs the gamut of the possible intrusions of history in the poem, Susan 
Howe asks her readers the same questions over and over, without ever 
ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶĂĚƵŵďƌĂƚĞĚĂŶƐǁĞƌƐ ?/ƐŚŝƐƚŽƌǇĐŽŚĞƌĞŶƚ ?/ƐŝƚƚŚĞƉŽĞƚ ?Ɛ
ĚŽŵĂŝŶƚŽŵĂŬĞŝƚĐŽŚĞƌĞ ?^ŚŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚŽŶĞĂĐĐĞƉƚůŝǀŝŶŐĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞ
uncertainties of impossible coherence? How is one to understand the 
persistence of assemblage and composition even in the face of scattering and 
decomposition? (Aji 4) 
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dŚĞĂĚƵŵďƌĂƚŝŽŶũŝĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐŚĞƌĞƌĞĐĂůůƐŚĂƌůĞƐWĞŝƌĐĞ ?ƐƚĞƌŵ ‘ƐǇŶĞĐŚŝƐŵ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚďƌŝŶŐƐ
ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĂŶĚŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůƌĂĚŝĐĂůŝƐŵĂƐĂpraxis. Howe writes: 
Synechism is the tendency to regard everything as continuous in the way no 
 “ƐĐŚŽůĂƌůǇŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶĐĂŶďĞ ? ?/ƚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĞůŝŶŬĂŐĞŽĨůŝŬĞĂŶĚůŝŬĞ-in-
chance contiguities and alignments. That idea is in my writing generally. He 
was willing to carry the doctrine so far as to maintain that continuity governs 
the domain of experience, every part of it. Synechism denies there are any 
immeasurable differences between phenomena. (1999, 14) 
Synechism signifies a phenomenological notion ?  derived not only from its denial of a 
ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽŝŶŝƚƐƌĂŵŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ “ƐĐŚŽůĂƌůǇ
ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?dŚŝƐĐŚĂŶĐĞĐŽŶƚŝŐƵŝƚǇĂŶĚĂůŝŐŶŵĞŶƚŝƐŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝǀĞŽĨĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐŝƚƐĞůĨ ?ĂŶĚ
is instructive in underscoring the work of subjectiviƚǇŝŶƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂŶĚĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ?dŚŝƐ “ŝĚĞĂŝƐŝŶ
 ?,ŽǁĞ ?Ɛ ?ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ? ?which is to say, this sense of the continuity of everything, its 
contingent ongoingness, bears on the process of her compositions. Howe expresses a similar 
sentiment in an interview, making clear the elliptical ? and therefore thoroughly 
idiosyncratic ? nature of her research: 
/ůŽǀĞŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?/ůŽǀĞƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉ ?ďƵƚ/ ?ŵĂŶĂƵƚŽĚŝĚĂĐƚ ?/ŚĂǀĞŶĞǀĞƌƚŽƵĐŚĞĚ
down in a disciplined way. I get these obsessions and follow trails that often 
end up being squirrel paths. There are huge blanks. (McLane, np) 
,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƵŶŐƌŽƵŶĚĞĚ ‘ĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞ ?ŝƐƐĞůĨ-generating and personal involving obsessions which 
ĐƌĞĂƚĞ ‘ŚƵŐĞďůĂŶŬƐ ? ?,ĞƌŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůǀŝƐŝŽŶƐĞĞŬƐƚŽĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞƚŚĞŝŶĨŝŶŝƚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ
margins ŝŶĂƵŐƵƌĂƚĞĚŝŶǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŶĚŽƉƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐŝŶ ‘/ŶĐůŽƐĞƌ ? ?,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƐĞůĨ-awareness of 
her autodidactic method both announces and seeks to address the constitutive problem 
involved in all engagements with history ?  the risk of enclosure and erasure. 
  An example of how this historical vision comes to bear in her critical work appears in 
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My Emily Dickinson, in which Howe dedicates roughly half of the work to an esoteric reading 
ŽĨŝĐŬŝŶƐŽŶ ?ƐƉŽĞŵ ‘DǇ,ĞĂƌƚ,ĂĚ^ƚŽŽĚ ? ‘ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝǀĞƌĞĂĚŝŶŐƐŽĨZŽďĞrt 
Browning, Elizabeth Barret-Browning, Louis Zukofsky, Henry Adams, Emily, Anne and 
Charlotte Brontë, George Eliot, Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Ralph Waldo Emerson, John 
Keats, Wallace Stevens, Edmund Spenser, William Shakespeare and Friedrich Nietzsche. My 
Emily Dickinson displays various methods of reading, the most prescient of which is a 
complementary poetic-critical meditation on the unspoken margins of even the slightest 
ŵŽŵĞŶƚƐŝŶŝĐŬŝŶƐŽŶ ?ƐƉŽĞƚƌǇ ?,ŽǁĞǁƌŝƚĞƐĂƚƚŚĞŽƵƚƐĞƚŽĨƚŚŝƐƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ P 
The faĐƚƚŚĂƚ ‘DǇHeart had stood ?  a Loaded Gun ? ‘ŝƐƉůĂĐĞĚĚĞĂĚĐĞŶƚĞƌ
may be chance or choice. It consists of six four-line stanzas loosely rhymed. 
Written in the plain style of Puritan literary tradition, there are no 
complications of phrasing. Each word is deceptively simple, deceptively easy 
to define. But definition seeing rather than perceiving, hearing and not 
understanding, is only the shadow of meaning. (1985, 35) 
 
,ŽǁĞƉůĂŝŶůǇĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ƐĨŽƌŵŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐĐŽƌĞŚŽǁ “ĚĞĐĞƉƚŝǀĞůǇƐŝŵƉůĞ ?ŝƚ 
ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐ ?,ŽǁĞ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƐĂƚƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚŝƐƉĂƌĂŐƌĂƉŚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨĂŐĞŶĐǇŝŶĂ
reading of the poem; definition-seeing is made distinct from definition-perceiving, as the 
ĨŽƌŵĞƌŝƐ “ŽŶůǇƚŚĞƐŚĂĚŽǁŽĨŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ? ?/ƚŝƐĨƌŽŵƚŚŝƐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƚŚĂƚ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůǁŽƌŬ
begins, steadily retracing moments in texts in order to display their shadowed parts. This is 
ŶŽƚ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂƐŝŵƉůĞĂĐƚŽĨ ‘ŝůůƵŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?&Žƌ,ŽǁĞ ?Ăƚ ǆƚĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚŵĞƌĞůǇďǇ
the definition of its parts, but rather involves a process of coming to understand both the 
compositional decisions involved in the production of a text and the histories in which the 
text is embedded. My Emily Dickinson ĚŝƐƉůĂǇƐ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐŝƐƚĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶďǇŐĞƐƚƵƌŝŶŐ
towards the proliferation of meaning which takes place in the margin, beside the work, not 
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ĂŶƚĞƌŝŽƌƚŽŝƚďƵƚƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐƚŽŝƚ ?tŝƚŚƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů mode, it is necessary 
ŶŽǁƚŽƚƵƌŶƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐĂƐĞǆƉůŽƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶĨŝŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶƚĞǆƚƵĂůŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? 
 
Infinite Articulation: Howe and Levinas 
,ŽǁĞ ?ƐĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ ?ĂƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶĐůĂŝŵĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?ŝƐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŵĂƌŐŝŶƐ ?ĂŶĚŚĞƌ
ůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵƐĂƌĞĂŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚŝƐŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?/ƚƌĞŵĂŝŶƐƚŽĚŝƐĐůŽƐĞƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ,ŽǁĞ ?Ɛ
extension as inaugurating a poetics of the infinite margin. In order to best illuminate what I 
ŵĞĂŶďǇƚŚŝƐ ?/ǁŝůůƚƵƌŶƚŽ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƉŽĞŵ ‘dŚŽƌŽǁ ?ĨƌŽŵSingularities, which 
ĚŝƐĐůŽƐĞƐ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌǁŝƚŚŶĂƚŝǀĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ “ĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞǁŝŶƚĞƌĂŶĚƐƉƌŝŶŐŽĨ
 ? ? ? ? ?Ăƚ>ĂŬĞ'ĞŽƌŐĞ ?Eew York. At the end of the first page of the poem, Howe figures this 
ĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĂƐĂŐŽŝŶŐ “ĚŽǁŶƚŽƵŶŬŶŽǁŶƌĞŐŝŽŶƐŽĨŝŶĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )ĞĨŽƌĞ
section 1 of the poem begins, Howe arranges a series of prefatory quotations, the 
associations between which set a grounding for the phonic investigations of the poem itself. 
dŚƌŽƵŐŚdŚŽƌĞĂƵ ?ĞůĞƵǌĞ ?ĂŶŝĞůZŝĐŬĞƚƐŽŶĂŶĚDƌƐŚĞƐƚĞƌ&ƌĞŶĐŚ ?ƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ƐŽƉĞŶŝŶŐ
gesture is towards how problematic proper nouns become in recollections of history. In this 
regĂƌĚ ?,ŽǁĞƋƵŽƚĞƐ'ŝůůĞƐĞůĞƵǌĞĂŶĚ&Ğůŝǆ'ƵĂƚƚĂƌŝ ?Ɛ ‘KŶĞKĨ^ĞǀĞƌĂůtŽůǀĞƐ ? P
 
The proper name does not designate an individual: it is on the contrary when 
the individual opens up to the multiplicities pervading him or her, at the 
outcome of the most severe operation of depersonalisation, that he or she 
acquires his or her true proper name. The proper name is the instantaneous 
apprehension of a multiplicity. The proper name is the subject of a pure 




/ŶĂĐƌƵĐŝĂůƐĞŶƐĞ ?ƚŚĞŶ ? ‘dŚŽƌŽǁ ?ĚĞůŝŶĞĂƚĞƐĂŶĞŶĐŽƵ ƚĞƌǁŝƚŚĂŶKƚŚĞƌǁŝƚŚƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ
attention to the significations of Otherness. Of her relation to materials from the field 
generally referred to as Continental Philosophy, Howe comments P “I never approached 
Barthes, Foucault, Kristeva, Irigaray, Lyotard, or Derrida on a systematic basis. In magpie 
ĨĂƐŚŝŽŶ ?/ǁĞŶƚĨŽƌƚŚĞďŝƚƐĂŶĚƚŚĞƉŝĞĐĞƐ ?ƚŚĞĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƵƐĂďůĞƋƵŽƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?DĐůĂŶĞ ?ŶƉ ) ?
ŐĂŝŶ ?,ŽǁĞ ?ƐǀŝƐŝŽŶŝƐŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůŚĞƌĞŝŶƚŚĂƚŶŽƚŽŶůǇŝƐŚĞƌŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ “ƵŶƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƚŝĐ ?ďƵƚŝƚĂůƐŽ
ĂĚŵŝƚƐƚŽƚŚĞ “ƵƐĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ŽĨƋƵŽƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?dŽďĞĐŽŵĞƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇŝŶǀĞƐƚĞĚŝŶĞƌƌŝĚĂŽƌ
Foucault would, for Howe, constitute a totality the margins of which threaten the voices of 
less centralised figures. In this sense, one can conceive of Pierce-Arrow as an extension of this 
vision ?  Husserl is treated unsystematically, whilst Peirce receives a meditative recovery 
involving the particulars of his lebenswelt as accrued from marginalia and unpublished 
manuscripts. 
   ƌĂĚŝĐĂůƐĞŶƐĞŽĨĂŶKƚŚĞƌŝƐŝŶĂƵŐƵƌĂƚĞĚŝŶ ‘dŚŽƌŽǁ ? ?ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĞĚŽŶůǇďǇƚŚĞŝƌ
 “ƵŶŬŶŽǁŶƌĞŐŝŽŶ ? ?,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐƐŽĨĂŶŝŶĨŝŶŝƚĞůǇ-produced margin/alisation are, among 
many other things, American ?  ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇ ?,ŽǁĞ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨŚĞƌƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĞŶcounter 
with the words and objects of New York native American history is a necessary task which, 
ĐŚƌŽŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇ ?ŐƌŽƵŶĚƐŵƵĐŚŽĨ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐůĂƚĞƌǁŽƌŬŝŶ ĂƉŽĞƚŝĐƐƚŚĞƌĂĚŝĐĂůŝƐŵŽĨǁŚŝĐŚ
seeks to capture the likewise radicalism of the encounter with the Other. Towards the end of 
the poem, Howe writes: 
 
  you are of me & I of you, I cannot tell  
where you leave off and I begin (1990, 58) 
 
dŚĞĐŽƵƉůĞƚĞǀŽŬĞƐŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇĂƐĂŶŝŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚĞĐŚŝĂƐŵŽĨ “ŵĞ ?ĂŶĚ “ǇŽƵ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
acts as a frame within which Howe ?ƐƉŽĞŵĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƐŝƚƐKƚŚĞƌƐ ?^ƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ŵĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ
poem seems less an intrusion by Howe reflecting on her place in the poem than a gesture by 
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the poetic voice towards the fact that in appropriating the historical narrative, the distinction 
between the appropriator and the appropriated becomes difficult to distinguish. Levinas 
articulates this sense of embeddedness alongside the Other as a major ambition of his work. 
,ĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “/ŶƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽŶĞŝƐĨŽƵŶĚďĞƐŝĚĞƚŚĞKƚŚĞƌ ?ŶŽƚ
confronted with him, not in the rectitude of the in-front-of-Śŝŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?dŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ
non-ĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐĂƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ “ďĞŝŶŐŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
Other is not to thematise the Other and consider him in the same manner one considers a 
ŬŶŽǁŶŽďũĞĐƚ ? ?Ibid.). The Other necessarily transcends the knowledge we can obtain 
concerning them in the facticity of their presence. Howe evokes this infinite process at the 
ĞŶĚŽĨŚĞƌƉƌĞĨĂĐĞ P “ǀĞƌǇŶĂŵĞĚƌŝǀĞŶǁŝůůďĞĂƐĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƌŝǀĞƚŝn the machine of a universe 
ĨůƵǆ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?/Ŷ>ĞǀŝŶĂƐ ?ƚĞƌŵƐ ?ƚŚĞ ‘^ĂŵĞ ?ŝƐƚŚĞĂŶƚŝƚŚĞƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞKƚŚĞƌ ?ĂŶĚĂŶǇĂĐƚŽĨ
reconciliation of the latter with the former constitutes a violence. Levinas argues that the 
encounter with the Face of the other, their living presence, inaugurates a situation wherein 
either the Other is grasped in the terms of the Same, terms which originate from the finite 
perspective of the appropriating subject ?  or the radical alterity of the Other is maintained 
and they are held at a respectful distance. He continues: 
 
We can proceed from the experience of totality back to a situation where 
totality breaks up, a situation that conditions the totality itself. Such a 
situation is the gleam of exteriority or of transcendence in the face of the 
Other. The rigorously developed concept of this transcendence is expressed 
by the term infinity. (24-5) 
 
dŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌǁŝƚŚƚŚĞKƚŚĞƌŝƐƐŽǀŝƚĂůƚŽƚŚĞ “ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶǁŚĞƌĞƚŽƚĂůŝƚǇďƌĞĂŬƐ
ƵƉ ?ŝƐĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚďǇ>ĞǀŝŶĂƐďǇƚŚĞĞƋƵŝǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ P “ƚŚŝĐƐŝƐĂŶŽƉƚŝĐƐ ? ?dŚĞĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ ?
totality, is glimpsed in war:  
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The visage of being that shows itself in war is fixed in the concept of totality, 
which dominates western philosophy. Individuals are reduced to being 
bearers of forces that command them unbeknown to themselves. The 
ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ? Q ?ŝƐĚĞƌŝǀĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƚŽƚĂůŝƚǇ ?dŚĞƵŶŝĐŝƚǇŽĨĞĂĐŚ
present is incessantly sacrificed to a future appealed to to bring forth its 
objective meaning. (21-22) 
 
Levinas counters this by proposing the notion that metaphysics precedes ontology, 
particularly in relation to the perception of the outside world through signification and the 
ĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĨĂĐĞŽĨƚŚĞKƚŚĞƌ ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?>ĞǀŝŶĂƐ ?ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĞƚŚŝĐƐůŽĐĂƚĞ
ĂƐƚŚĞŝƌŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶ ‘ĚĞƐŝƌĞ ? ?,ĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “ĞƐŝƌĞŝƐĚ Ɛ ƌĞĨŽƌƚŚĞĂďƐŽůƵƚĞůǇŽƚŚĞƌ ? Q ?ĚĞƐŝƌĞ
without satisfaction which, precisely understands the remoteness, the alterity, the exteriority 
ŽĨƚŚĞKƚŚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ) ?/ŶĂĐŽŵƉůŝŵĞŶƚĂƌǇĨĂƐŚŝŽŶ ?,ŽǁĞǁƌŝƚĞƐŝŶ ‘dŚŽƌŽǁ ? P
 
The track of Desire 
Must see and not see 
Must not see nothing 
Burrow and so burrow 
Measuring mastering    (45) 
 
The track of desire Howe describes is both visible and invisible, a will to not see, or to see no 
thing ?  a burrowing. The equivocation or progression of  ‘DĞĂƐƵƌŝŶŐŵĂƐƚĞƌŝŶŐ ?ƚĂŬĞƐƚŚŝƐ
sense of an infinite track of desire towards the ethical problems of appropriation. In this 
ƌĞŐĂƌĚ ?>ĞǀŝŶĂƐĨŝŐƵƌĞƐĚĞƐŝƌĞŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŝŶĨŝŶŝƚǇ P “/ƚŝƐĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŚĂƚŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐƚŚĞŝŶĨŝŶŝƚǇŽĨ
the infinite, for it is a measuƌĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞǀĞƌǇŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ? ? ? ? ) ?/ƚŝƐǁŽƌƚŚ
ĚǁĞůůŝŶŐŽŶ>ĞǀŝŶĂƐ ?ƉŚƌĂƐŝŶŐ ?ĂƐŝƚĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞƐĂĨƌƵŝƚĨƵůƌĞƐŽŶĂŶĐĞŝŶ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉŽĞŵ ?>ĞǀŝŶĂƐ
ǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚĚĞƐŝƌĞŝƐ “ĂŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ? ? ĂŶĚŝƚŝƐĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐ ‘ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŶĞƐƐ ?ŝƐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶt 




compound polyvocality ?  ƐĞĞŬƐƚŽĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ ‘ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŶĞƐƐ ? ?dŚĞĞĐŚŽĞƐŽĨ
dŚŽƌĞĂƵ ?ƐŶĂŵĞ ?ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ƐŽƵƚƐĞƚ ?ĐŽŵďŝŶĞǁŝƚŚĂŶŽƚĞďǇ^ŝƌ
,ƵŵĨƌĞǇ'ŝůďĞƌƚ ?^ŝƌtĂůƚĞƌZĂůĞŝŐŚ ?ƐŚĂůĨ-brother and an architect of the colonial empires in 
EŽƌƚŚŵĞƌŝĐĂĂŶĚ/ƌĞůĂŶĚ P “dŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽƚŚŽƌŽǁƉĂƐƐĂŐĞŶĂǀŝŐĂďůĞƚŚĂƚǁĂǇ ? ? ? ? ) ?ŝŶ
ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞĂĐĐĞƐƐ ‘/ŶĚŝĂŶƐ ?ŚĂĚƚŽEĞǁĨŽƵŶĚůĂŶĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŶŽƌƚŚĞĂƐƚ ?KĨ'ŝůďĞƌƚ ?tĂƌĚ
and Waller write: 
 
At the conclusion of [A New Passage To Cataia ? ?ŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “,ĞŝƐŶŽƚǁŽƌƚŚǇ
to live at all who, for fear of danger ŽƌĚĞĂƚŚ ?ƐŚƵŶŶĞƚŚŚŝƐĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞŽƌ
ŚŝƐŽǁŶŚŽŶŽƵƌ ?ƐŝŶĐĞĚĞĂƚŚŝƐŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůĞĂŶĚƚŚĞĨĂŵĞŽĨǀŝƌƚƵĞŝŵŵŽƌƚĂů ? ?
This discourse has the true ring of a scholarly and patriotic Englishman, and 
there is much freshness in its persuasive earnestness. (Quoted in Sobecki, 98) 
 
dŚĞƐĞũƵǆƚĂƉŽƐĞĚǀŽŝĐĞƐŽĨƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŶĞƐƐŵĂƌŬƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌƐĞĐƚŝŽŶĂƚǁŚŝĐŚ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐǀŽŝĐĞ
begins its inquiry. Whilst Thoreau is indicative of an intellectual and literal movement 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞǁŽŽĚƐ ?'ŝůďĞƌƚ ?ƐǀŽŝĐĞŝƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĚŝƐƚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐĐŽůŽŶŝĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ?dŚŝƐůĂƚƚĞƌ
judgment is made clear in a quoted fragment in The Invasion of America: 
 
The heddes of all those (of what sort soever thei were) which were killed in 
the daie, should be cutte off from their bodies and brought to the place where 
he incamped at night, and should there bee laied on the ground by eche side 
of the waie ledying into his owne tente so that none could come into his tente 
for any cause but commonly he muste passe through a lane of heddes which 
ŚĞƵƐĞĚĂĚƚĞƌƌŽƌĞŵ Q ?/ƚďƌŽƵŐŚƚ ?ŐƌĞĂƚĞƚĞƌƌŽƵƌƚŽƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚĞŶƚŚĞŝ
sawe the heddes of their dedde fathers, brothers, children, kindsfolke, and 




The dismemberment and aestheticisation of Others here involved not only murdering but 
ĚĞƐĞĐƌĂƚŝŶŐĂƐŝƚĞ ?ŵĂŬŝŶŐƚĞƌƌŽƌĂƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞ ?dŚĞƉĂƚŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇŚĞƌĞ ?ĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐĂ “ůĂŶĞ
ŽĨŚĞĚĚĞƐ ? Q ?ŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĚĞĚĚĞĨĂƚŚĞƌƐ ?ďƌŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ŬŝŶĚƐĨŽůŬĞ ?ĂŶĚĨƌŝĞŶĚƐ ? ?ĐŽŵƉŽƐĞƐĂ
ĐŽůŽŶŝĂůŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ‘ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ?ĂƉĂƚŚůŝŶĞĚǁŝƚŚƐƵĐŚŵĂƐƐĂĐƌĞ ? 
  /ŶƚŚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚ ?ZĂĐŚĞůůĂƵƵWůĞƐƐŝƐǁƌŝƚĞƐŽĨ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƉŽĞŵƐ P “dŚĞƉĂŐĞŝƐ
not neutral. Not blank, and not neutral. It is a territoƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŶƉ ) ?,ŽǁĞ ?ƐŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ
 “ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ&ŽƌĞƐƚ ?ĨŽƵŶĚŝŶƚŚĞĚŝƌŽŶĚĂĐŬƐŝƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂĐůĞĂƌŝŶŐǁŚĞƌĞŚĞƌ “ǁŚŽůĞ
ďĞŝŶŐŝƐsŝƐŝŽŶ ?ŽĨ “ƚŚĞŵĂĐŚŝŶĞƌǇŽĨŝŶũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?dŚŝƐŝƐĞǀŽŬĞĚŝŶĂŶĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇ
Transcendental manner in the opening statĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨ ‘dŚŽƌŽǁ ? ?  “^ŽŵĂŶǇƚƌƵĞ
things// which are not truth itself/ We are too finite// Barefooted and bareheaded/ extended 
ŝŶƐƉĂĐĞ ? ?ƐƵƌĞŽĨƌĞĂĐŚŝŶŐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ? ?Ibid. ? ? ? ) ?dŚĞĞĐŚŽŽĨŵĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ‘EĂƚƵƌĞ ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐŶŽƚ
only a shared sentiment ďƵƚĂƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ƐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? which is to say, the 
ĐŽŵƉůĞǆĨŝŐƵƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĨŝŶŝƚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚĞĚďǇ ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ?ďƵƚŶŽƚ ‘ƚƌƵƚŚŝƚƐĞůĨ ?ĂƐ
ŵĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐŝŶǀŝƐŝďůĞĞǇĞďĂůů ‘ƐƵƌĞŽĨƌĞĂĐŚŝŶŐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ?ĂůƐŽĂĐƚƐĂƐĂŵŽĚĞůĨŽƌƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?Ɛ
voice. The disƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚƌƵƚŚŝƚƐĞůĨ ?ĂŐĂŝŶƌĂŝƐĞƐƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
margin, which I will return to now by way of conclusion. 
  
Ethics is an optics:  Conclusion 
 dŚĞǁĂǇŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ,ŽǁĞĂŶĚ>ĞǀŝŶĂƐƐĞĞŬƚŽĞǆƉůŽƌĞƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶĨŝŶŝƚĞ ?ŝŶůŝǀĞĚŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚive 
experience differ radically in their forms but have similitude in their ambitions. To measure 
,ŽǁĞ ?ƐŵĂƌŐŝŶĂů-ŝŶĨŝŶŝƚĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ>ĞǀŝŶĂƐ ?ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇŽĨĞƚŚŝĐƐŝƐƵŶĨĂŝƌ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚŝƚĚŽĞƐ
illuminate the possible problems of the work Howe produces. Which is to say, the ambition 
ŽĨ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ?ĞǀŽŬĞĚŝŶThe Birth Mark and in the many prose prefaces to her extended 
poems is problematically related to the page. Furthermore, such prefaces and explication of 
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poetics are themselves subject to the multifarious signification of the more immediately 
 ‘ƉŽĞƚŝĐ ?ƉĂŐĞƐŽĨ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉŽĞŵƐ ? 
  The focus needs to be brought back to what constitutes the marginal for Howe. In the 
ŵĂƌŐŝŶ ?ĞƚǇŵŽůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇ ‘ĂƚƚŚĞĞĚŐĞ ? ?,ŽǁĞƐĞĞŬƐƚŽĚŝƐƌƵƉƚƚŚĞƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚĐĞŶƚƌĞŽƌƚŽƚĂůŝƚǇ
which institutes the marginal in its very being. It is this process of the inauguration of margins 
ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐŝŶĨŝŶŝƚĞ ?dŚĞƌĞǁŝůůĂůǁĂǇƐďĞŵĂƌŐŝŶƐĂƐůŽŶŐĂƐĐĞŶƚƌĞƐĂƌĞ
claimed. The ethical presides precisely in illuminating the marginal and the process by which 
that marginalisation took place. The project is undoubtedly impressive, but in practice it is 
not always the case. Howe herself constructs margins. Her margins are in fact particularly 
wide in many poems ?  there is often, as in Pierce-Arrow and Singularities, an oscillation 
between prose pages which occupy the majority of the page and establish small margins; 
 ‘ǁŽƌĚƐƋƵĂƌĞƐ ? ?ZĞĞĚ ?ŶƉ )ǁŚŝĐŚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĂƌŐŝŶƐǁŚŝĐŚŽĐĐƵƉǇŵŽƌĞƐƉĂĐĞŽŶƚŚĞƉĂŐĞ
than the central form; and pages which wilfully disrupt the inauguration of the margin. For 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƚŽƌĞĨĞƌďĂĐŬƚŽ ‘&ƌĂŐŵĞŶƚKĨdŚĞtĞĚĚŝŶŐƌĞƐƐ Q ?ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚĂƚƚŚĞŽƵƚƐĞƚ ?ƚŚĞ
shape of fragments of words and letters is set on the far right of the page, almost slipping off 
beyond the margin. The simultaneous effect of this composition of the page is that the 
surrounding blankness does not seem to constitute a margin ?  rather, the word fragments 
themselves become the margin.  
  ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĨŽĐƵƐŽŶŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƐĂƐƚŚĞƐŝƚĞŽĨƐƵĐŚŵĂƌŐŝnalisation is 
ƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŵŽǀĞŝƚƐĞůĨŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůŝƐĞƐƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ?,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉŽĞŵƐ
are aesthetically some of the most radically generative poems being written in American 
ƉŽĞƚƌǇ ?ďƵƚŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞǁƌŽŶŐƚŽĐŽŶĨƵƐĞ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƐŝƚĞƐŽĨŵĞĂŶŝŶg in history with a more 
general all-encompassing History. Which is to say, her project is idiosyncratic in a variety of 
senses ?  it formidably constitutes the etymologically derived meaning ?   ‘ŽǁŶǁŝƚŚ
ŵŝǆƚƵƌĞ ? ? in its personally invested interrogations of marginalisation ?  but it also runs the 
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risk of being hermetic to the point of solipsism. It might seem wrong to judge a poet by what 
ƚŚĞŝƌƉŽĞŵƐĚŽŶ ?ƚĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ?ĂŶĚŝƚŵŝŐŚƚĂůƐŽĂƉƉĞĂƌƚŽďĞƉůĂĐŝŶŐƚŽŽĨŝŶĞĂƉŽŝŶƚŽŶƚŚĞ
ƌĞĂĚĞƌ ?ƐĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌǁŝƚŚ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉŽĞms ?  ďƵƚƚŚĞĂůŝĞŶĂƚŝŶŐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůŽĨŶŽƚŽŶůǇ,ŽǁĞ ?Ɛ
difficult compositions but the relation between her poetics and her poems runs the risk of 
instituting the kind of totalising subjectivity the project avows to critique. This concern does 
not constitute an intimidation in the face of difficulty; rather it seeks to treat seriously the 
marginalisation of the reader by a poetry whose central concerns are constitutively marginal, 
which is to say, idiosyncratically related to Howe in the guise of THE REVISER. What this 
ĂŵŽƵŶƚƐƚŽŝƐĂƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƌŝƐŝŶŐĨƌŽŵĂƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚůĂĐƵŶĂĞŝŶƚŚĞƐŽƉŚŝƐƚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,ŽǁĞ ?Ɛ
compositions and the way in which, by occupying a margin, they necessarily establish other 
margins. Howe reflects on this in Pierce-Arrow: 
Another language another way of speaking so quietly always there in the 
shape of memories, thoughts, feelings, which are extra-marginal outside of 
primary consciousness, yet must be classed as some sort of unawakened finite 
infinite articulation. (1999,11) 
 
Since it is not explicitly ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƚŽǁƌŝƚĞĂ>ĞǀŝŶasian poetics, she does so to an 
extent which is rewarding to the model of ƉŽĞƚŝĐĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐŚĞŽĨĨĞƌƐ ?,ŽǁĞ ?ƐŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐǇŝƐ
found in her vision against totality, figured as an occupation and elucidation of the margin, 
ƚŚĞŝŶĨŝŶŝƚĞ “ƐƵƌƉůƵƐĂůǁĂǇƐĞǆƚĞƌŝŽƌƚŽƚŚĞƚŽƚĂůŝƚǇ ? ? ? ?-  ? ) ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞ ?,ŽǁĞ ?ƐƉŽĞƚŝĐ
extension, which involves the tychic encounter as described by Peirce, involves a 
compositional method which attempts to arrange fragments so as to not merely disclose 
meaning in the Heideggerian sense but to inaugurate an encounter with the marginal-infinite 
ǁŚŝĐŚƐĞĞŬƐƚŽ “ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚ “ƐŚĞůƚĞƌŝŶŐ ? ?ƚŚƵƐĚŝƐĐůŽƐŝŶŐKƚŚĞƌƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĂůƚĞƌŝƚǇ ?dhis 




ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?ŶĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌǁŝƚŚ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚŝƐĚŝĨĨiculty as a unique type of 
ǁŝƚŶĞƐƐŝŶŐ ?ĂŶŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƚŝĐǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?dŚŝƐǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?ƚŽƵƐĞ>ĞǀŝŶĂƐ ?ǁŽƌĚƐ ? “ďƌĞĂŬƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƚŽƚĂůŝƚǇ
of wars and empires in which one does not speak. It does not envisage the end of history 
within being understood as a totality, but institutes a relation with the infinity of being which 
ĞǆĐĞĞĚƐƚŚĞƚŽƚĂůŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ) ?&ŽƌƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƉĂƌƚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝŶĨŝŶŝƚǇŽĨďĞŝŶŐ,ŽǁĞ
institutes is in excess of totality through the necessary fragmentation involved in pursuing 
margins. Her long poems and critical work ?  both taken as extended poetics ?  thus generate 
ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶďǇǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĞƚ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚĂŶĚŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚŝŶŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ




7 The book withdraws into itself   Rachel Blau DuPlessis 
 
Imagine the reader who 
would persist and still persists 
Something so small; something so large; 
how to get a handle on it. 





process of seeking to magnify and illuminate the marginal. For both poets, this engagement 
ŽĨƚĞŶƚĂŬĞƐƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ŵĂƌŐŝŶĂů ?ƐƚĂƚƵƐŽĨĨĞŵĂůĞƉŽĞƚƐ ?&ŽƌuPlessis, 
however, the most significant margins she bears witness to are those of her own texts. Her 
major extended poetic work, Drafts, is composed from the initial principle of 19 poems being 
re-drafted six times in series, creating a 114-part extended pŽĞŵ ?ĂĐŚ ‘ƌĞ-ĚƌĂĨƚŝŶŐ ? ?ŽƌƚŽƵƐĞ
ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ƚĞƌŵ ‘ĨŽůĚ ? ?ĂĚŽƉƚƐƚŚĞƚŚĞŵĞƐŽĨŝƚƐƐŽƵƌĐĞ-text, expanding on specific terms or 
further developing themes and motifs established in the first 19 Drafts. The marginal 
becomes magnified in the processes of what ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐƚĞƌŵƐ ‘ĨŽůĚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĚƌĂĨƚŝŶŐ ? ?dŚĞ
former term will recall my observations concerning Robin Blaser ?  and indeed there are 
similarities not only in approach but also in their shared interest in Gilles Deleuze. For 
ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ĨŽůĚ ?ŝs less a metaphorical basis for a poetics than a specific and 
idiosyncratic process of composition in which the six books which constitute the complete 
Drafts write across and alongside each other. This is at once an aleatoric and structurally 
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precise process ?  ƚŚĞ ‘ŐƌŝĚ ?2 into which the 114 poems fit displays spatially the links between 
ƚŚĞĚƌĂĨƚƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ůŝŶĞƐ ? ?ƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƵWůĞƐƐŝƐƵƐĞƐƚŽŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƚŚĞŵĂŶŶĞƌŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĞĂĐŚĚƌĂĨƚ
ƐŝƚƐĂůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞŝƚƐ ‘ĨŽůĚƐ ? )ĂŶĚƚŚĞďŽŽŬƐƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĐŽůůĞĐƚĞĚŝŶ ? As such, DuPůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚ
ƉŽĞƚŝĐƉƌŽũĞĐƚŝƐĂĐĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞĚďǇĂ ‘ŵĂƉ ?ĨƌŽŵǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƌ ĂĚĞƌĐĂŶƐĞĞŬƚŽŐĞƚƚŚĞŝƌ
bearings. However, to confuse the order of the grid with the movements between the drafts 
themselves is to overlook the extent to which DuPlessis conceives of her project as 
ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůůǇƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶĂů ?dŚŝƐŝƐŐĞƐƚƵƌĞĚĂƚŝŶ ‘ƌĂĨƚƐ PWƌĞĐŝƐ ? ?ĂŶŝŶƐƚĂůŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞƐĞƌŝĞƐ
which has no number, though it ŝƐƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚďĞƚǁĞĞŶƌĂĨƚƐ ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ?ĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ŚŝŶŐĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ
fold. This centre-outside-the-centre which unsettles the relation between form and content 
establishes Drafts as a work occupied with a variety of resistances to totality. These 
 ‘ƚŽƚĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ?ƚĂŬĞĂǀĂƌŝĞƚǇŽĨĨŽƌŵƐŝŶƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇƚŚĞƚŽƚĂůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞ
Modernist canon, the hegemony of patriarchy and the totalitarianisms of the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries.  
  In this task, DuPlessis has a number of recurring figures, the most significant among 
whom is George Oppen. In Oppen, DuPlessis finds a method of articulating resistance to 
totalities which is responsive to both philosophical and political discourse but never merely 
dealing in rhetoric. As indicated in the opening chapter of this thesis, Oppen is a poet for 
whom the ambitions of Heidegger and Socialism are appealing but are ultimately too 
ĚŽŐŵĂƚŝĐ ?dŚĞŵĂŝŶƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌƚŚŝƐ ?ĂƐKƉƉĞŶĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞƐŝŶ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ? ?ůŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ
ĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚǁŚŽǁŝƐŚĞƐƚŽĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞ ‘ǁĞ-ŶĞƐƐ ?ŝƐƐƚŝůůĨĂĐĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĚĂŶŐĞƌŽĨ
shipwreck, of solitude. It is in this sense then that DuPlessis also avoids the problems 
associated with such prescriptive bodies of thought. There are of course other important 
moments of interaction between the two writers, many of which will be explored in the 
                                                          
2 The grid itself can be found in Appendix A. 
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present chapter, but it is important to underscoƌĞŚŽǁŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƉŽĞƚƌǇ ? 
cautiously balanced between the philosophical and political ?  is for DuPlessis specifically in 
this sense of poetry being a mode of inquiry rather than a vehicle of rhetoric. 
   This chapter will work characterising DuPlessis as a poet whose idiosyncratic poetic 
extension arises from a desire to develop and critique poetic extension itself. Lyn Keller 
writes that, in the light of DuPlessis ? ĂǀŽǁĞĚƉŽĞƚŝĐƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽƚŽƚĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ? “ŝƚŝƐŚĂƌĚůǇ
surprising that DuPlessis should ďĞŐƌĂƉƉůŝŶŐƋƵŝƚĞĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞůǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ? “tŚĂƚƚŽ
ĚŽĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ ? ? ?<ĞůůĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )dŚŝƐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝƐƉŽƐĞĚƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ
Drafts in variety of ways, and I will seek to illuminate these as they appear. As indicated, the 
sheer vŽůƵŵĞŽĨƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?Drafts makes reading it as an entire work an ambitious project 
which would require more space than can be dedicated to it here. As such, I will adopt a 
number of strategies in seeking to come to terms with DuPlessis ? extensive practice. In 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?/ĂŵŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚůĂǇĞƌƐŽĨƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ĨŽůĚƐ ? the terms, the lines, the 
ƐƚĂŶǌĂƐ ?ƚŚĞƐĞĐƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞĚƌĂĨƚƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?/ǁŝůůďĞŐŝŶ “ŝŶƐŝĚĞƚŚĞŵŝĚĚůĞŽĨ
 ?ƚŚĞ ?ůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ ? ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ƌĞĂĚŝŶŐĂƌĂĨƚǁŚŝĐh stood out in my initial reading 
ŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬĨŽƌŝƚƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƚŝĨŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌĂĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚŝƐŚĂƐĨŽƌƚŚĞ
traces in and of Drafts. &ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚŝƐ ?/ǁŝůůŵŽǀĞƚŽĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĚƌĂĨƚƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ůŝŶĞƐ ? ?
taking as examples the first ĂŶĚƚŚĞĨŝĨƚŚůŝŶĞƐ ?ƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽďǇƵWůĞƐƐŝƐƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞ
ůŝŶĞŽĨŝƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ůŝŶĞŽĨŐĂƉ ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞŝƚůĞŽĨƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĚƌĂĨƚƵƉŽŶǁŚŝĐŚŝƚŝƐďĂƐĞĚ
 ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐƵƐĞƐƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ĚŽŶŽƌ ?ĚƌĂĨƚ ) ?dŚĞƐĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐǁŝůůĂůůŽǁŵĞŝŶƚƵƌŶƚŽĚŝƐĐůŽƐe 
DuPlessis ? ƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐŽĨ ‘ĚƌĂĨƚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĨŽůĚŝŶŐ ? ?&ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚŝƐ ? ĞĐŚĂƉƚĞƌǁŝůůƐĞĞŬƚŽ
ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞďǇĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞǁĂǇƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?Drafts constitutes a self-conscious 
ĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĂŶĚĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚŝĂů ‘ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂƌŝƐĞŝŶƚŚe composition of 




Inside the Middle of a Long Poem 
/ŶƚŚĞ ‘WƌĞĨĂĐĞƚŽ^ƵƌŐĞ PƌĂĨƚƐ ? ?- ? ? ? ? ?ZĂĐŚĞůƵWůĞƐƐŝƐǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚŚĞƌ “ƉŽĞŵƐƐŝŶĐĞ ? ? ? ?
are part of one large work called Drafts. In 2012, this work reached the numerical goal that 
 ?ƐŚĞ ?ŚĂĚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?dŚĞĚĂƚĞƐŝŶ ƋƵ ƐƚŝŽŶŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƌĞǀĞĂůŝŶŐŝŶĂǀĂƌŝĞƚǇ
of ways ?  ƚŚĞǇƐŚŽǁƚŚĂƚĂůůŽĨƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ƉŽĞƚŝĐǁƌŝƚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞůĂƐƚ ? ?ǇĞĂƌƐĨŝŶĚƐŝƚƐƉůĂĐĞŝŶ
Drafts; that ƚŚĞ ‘ŶƵŵĞƌŝĐĂůŐŽĂů ?ŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬǁĂƐŶŽƚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚĂƚƚŚĞŽƵƚƐĞƚďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌ
ĂƌƌŝǀĞĚĂƚƐĞǀĞŶǇĞĂƌƐĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ?ƐŝŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŚĂƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŽĨĂŶ
end, at least in terms of the production of subsequent works, which has now been arrived at. 
The publishing of the final book of Drafts ŝŶ ? ? ? ?ŽĨĨĞƌƐĨŽƌƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƚŝŵĞƚŚĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ‘ĂƐĂ
ǁŚŽůĞ ? ? though it will quickly become clear why discussing Drafts as a whole is a particularly 
difficult task ?  ĂŶĚĂƐƐƵĐŚ ?ŽĨĨĞƌƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŽĨĂ ‘ƐĞƚƚůŝŶŐ ?ƚŽĂǁŽƌŬǁŚŝĐŚĂƚĂůůŵŽŵĞŶƚƐ
points explicitly to other moments in the work through the idiosyncratic procedures of 
 ‘ĚƌĂĨƚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĨŽůĚŝŶŐ ? ?dŚŝƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞǁŽƌŬĂƐĂƚŽƚĂůŝƚǇŝƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇ
articulated by Harriet Tarlo: 
Holding ĂŶĚƌĞĂĚŝŶŐZĂĐŚĞůƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ƐĚƌĂĨƚƐŐĂƚŚĞƌĞĚƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌŝŶŽŶĞƐŽůŝĚ
and serious volume confirms a conundrum about her draft-work. There is the 
provisionality of this writing, running through it at all levels, and there is the 
completeness of each draft, each fold, each individual volume and, now, the 
culmination of one volume. The contradiction or tension between these 
apparent oppositions creates an endless series of questions as to how to read 
the writing presented here. (Tarlo, np) 
dŚĞ “ƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ ?dĂƌůŽŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞƐĂƐƉƌŽǀŽŬŝŶŐ “ĞŶĚůĞƐƐ ?ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ “ŚŽǁƚŽƌĞĂĚƚŚĞǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ?
is key to approaching Drafts, and will be one of the main focuses of this chapter which aims 
to disclose the varieties of reading which Drafts provokes. This anxiety in approaching Drafts 
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is on display in several critical approaches; for example, Thomas Devaney poses these 
anxieties as questions: 
We are prompted to ask our own questions, and the first may simply be: How 
does one read an avant-garde epic like Drafts? One approach is to begin at the 
beginning and to forge ahead. But another path that I have found, musing on 
the conventions of the epic itself, is to start in the middle. (Devaney, np) 
 
ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐĐŽŶĨŝƌŵƐƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ “ŽŶĞĐĂŶďĞŐŝŶ
anywheƌĞĂŶĚƌĞĂĚŝŶĂŶǇĚĞƐŝƌĞĚĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?dŚŝƐŝƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŽĨĂƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂů
question; whilst one can appreciate the labyrinthine complexity of the structural 
manipulation at play in Drafts ?ŽŶĞĐĂŶƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇ “ĚĞƐƉĂŝƌ ?ĂƚƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨ
achieǀŝŶŐĂŶǇƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ‘ǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ ?ŽǀĞƌƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?dŚŝƐŝƐ ? ŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ŵƵĐŚŽĨƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨ
Drafts, which explores epistemic questions in and of the long poem from the microstructure 
of syllables and words to the larger framing questions of form, seriality and order.  
  &ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ĚĞƐŝƌĞĚĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶDrafts often has much to do with 
ǁŚĂƚŝŶŚĞƌĞƐƐĂǇ ‘&ŽƌdŚĞƚƌƵƐĐĂŶƐ ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐĐĂůůƐ ‘ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐĂƐĨĞŵŝŶŝƐƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ
1990,  ? ) ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĨŽƌĨĞŵŝŶŝƐƚĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŝƐŶŽƚĞǆĐůƵsively a matter of bearing 
witness to Feminist philosophers like Judith Butler, Hélène Cixous and Julia Kristeva, but is 
rather a radical project of seeking to hold poetic history to account for its exclusions and 
marginalisations of major female figures. ƐƐŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƐŝŶ ‘KƚŚĞƌŚŽǁ ? P “DǇĚĞƐŝƌĞŚĂƐůĞĚŵĞ
to construct counter poems ?  counterfactual poems ? postulating that there are many 
woman poets throughout history (some real, some imagined) who have written poems 
uncannily positioned as having views aslant ŽĨĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚǀŝĞǁƐŽĨƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ?/ďŝĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?
This poetics is informed by the memory DuPlessis has of being told, when proposing her PhD 
ƚŚĞƐŝƐŽŶsŝƌŐŝŶŝĂtŽŽůĨ ?ƚŚĂƚ “ƐŚĞƐŚŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚďĞǁŽƌŬŝŶŐŽŶtŽŽůĨ ? ?/ďŝĚ ? ? ? ) ?KŶĞĐĂŶƐĞĞĂŶ
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irony in the fact that ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?WŚƚŚĞƐŝƐǁĂƐƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇǁƌŝƚƚĞŶŽŶĂƌůŽƐtŝůůŝĂŵƐ ?ĂŶĚ
WŽƵŶĚ ?ƐůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵƐ ?dŚĞƐĞŵĂůĞŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƐƚƐĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƐƵŶĚĞƌŐŽƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞĂŶĚ
revisionism in the works ?  both poetic and critical ?  DuPlessis was to go on to write. We 
must enter Drafts with an awareness not only of its philosophical rigour but also its deeply 
engaged feminist project. Specifically, this is a case of maintaining a sense of feminism as 
ƉƌĂǆŝƐ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂƐĂƉƌĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞďŽĚǇŽĨƚŚŽƵŐŚƚǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶďĞ ‘ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚ ? ?ŐĂin, this is 
ƌĞŵŝŶŝƐĐĞŶƚŽĨKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚŽĨ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?ŝŶƚŚĂƚǁŚŝůƐƚŬĞǇĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐĂŶĚƚĞƌŵƐ
circulate throughout his work, to describe Oppen as explicitly Heideggerian would risk 
misrepresenting his engagement with phenomenology. Similarly, DuPlessis writes as a 
feminist rather than as a poet articulating feminism ?  and this distinction is important in 
ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ĨĞŵŝŶŝƐƚƉƌĂǆŝƐŝƐŽƌŝĞŶƚĞĚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝƐŝŶŐ
hierarchies wherever they might appear.  
  One of the most striking features of the span and scope of Drafts is that throughout 
the process of composition DuPlessis spoke and wrote extensively about the long poem as a 
ĨŽƌŵ ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐƐƚĂƚĞƐĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐĚĞƐŝƌĞ “ƚŽĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƚŽƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?
as a woman in the 21st century (McCreary 2015, np), which finds articulation in discrete 
dialogues with other, mainly Modernist, writers of the long poem, specifically H.D, George 
KƉƉĞŶ ?ŝŶ ‘,ĂƌĚŽƉǇ ? ) ?d ?^ůŝŽƚ ?ŝŶ ‘tĂůůEĞǁƐƉĂƉĞƌ ? )ĂŶĚǌƌĂWŽƵŶĚ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ ?ĂƐ
indicated in ƌĂĨƚƐ ?ĂůůƵƐŝŽŶƚŽ ‘ƌĂĨƚŽĨyyyĂŶƚŽƐ ? ?ďƵƚƉĞƌŚĂƉƐŵŽƌĞĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇŝŶ ‘y P
>ĞƚƚĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚŝƚƐ ‘ĨŽůĚƐ ?ƉŽĞŵƐ ) ?ĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ?ƚŚĞǀĂƐ ŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŽĨƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůǁŽƌŬ ?ĂƐ
represented in the critical trilogy The Pink Guitar, Blue Studios and Purple Passages, is 
concerned with redressing patriarchal histories of Modernism as represented by Pound and 
ůŝŽƚ ?ĂŶĚŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌ ?ƐĞĚŝƚŝŶŐŽĨDŝŶĂ>ŽǇĂŶĚ, ? ) ?WĞƌŚĂƉƐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞ
of these works of Modernist revisionism and inquiry is HD: The Career of that Struggle, which 
ŽĨĨĞƌƐƉƌŽůŽŶŐĞĚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ, ? ?ƐůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵƐ ? The Walls Do Not Fall (1944), Tribute to the 
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Angels (1945), The Flowering of the Rod (1946) and Helen in Egypt (1961). DuPlessis is 
ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚďŽƚŚ ‘ŝŶƐŝĚĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ?Drafts ƚŽ “ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƚŽƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ
ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ŶŽƚŽŶůǇŝŶǁƌŝƚŝŶŐŚĞƌŽǁŶƉƌŽũĞĐƚďƵƚĂůƐŽŝŶƌĞĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĞůŝƐŝŽŶŽĨǁŽŵĞŶ
poets and female voices from that tradition in her critical work. 
  Drafts as a whole is a work consisting of 114 long poems arranged together into 6 
 ‘ĨŽůĚƐ ?ŽĨ ? ?ƉŽĞŵƐ ?ĂĐŚďŽŽŬŽĨ ? ?ƌĞǁŽƌŬƐĂŶĚŵĞĚŝƚĂƚ ƐƵƉŽŶŝƚƐĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƉĂƌƚŝŶƚŚĞ
ƉƌĞĐĞĚŝŶŐďŽŽŬ ?ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŝŶŐĂ ‘ŐƌŝĚ ? ?ƚŽƵƐĞƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ƚĞƌŵ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞŝndividual Drafts are 
ƉůĂĐĞĚŝŶĂǀĂƌŝĞƚǇŽĨƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐĂƚŽŶĐĞ ?ďĞůŽŶŐŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ďŽŽŬ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ůŝŶĞ ? ?ĂƐǁĞůů
as sitting in juxtaposition to neighbouring poems. Tarlo describes this situation:  
tĞĂƌĞĂůǁĂǇƐŝŶƚŚĞ “ŵŝĚĚůĞŵƵĚĚůĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĨŽůĚĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŐƌŝĚ ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?Ɛ
Drafts refer back to themselves along the same numerical line in groupings of 
nineteen (i.e., 1/20/39/58 or 7/26/45/64).     (Tarlo, np) 
This circulation establishes a distinctly idiosyncratic means of extension, and furthermore 
allows DuPlessis to combine a procedural principle (Drafts will be 114 poems long) with an 
ĞŵďƌĂĐĞŽĨǁŚĂƚƵWůĞƐƐŝƐĐĂůůƐ ‘ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ?ĂƐĞǀŝĚĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶŶŽƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ‘ĚƌĂĨƚŝŶŐ ?Ăƚ
ǁŽƌŬŝŶƚŚĞǀĂƌŝŽƵƐŽŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůůĞǀĞůƐŽĨƚŚĞůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ ‘ĂƐĂǁŚŽůĞ ? ) ?The chiasm here 
between procedure and provisionality is a key point of access to the work. Of this, Catherine 
Taylor writes: 
Drafts ŽĨĨĞƌƐĂŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƐƉĞĂŬĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŵƉůĞǆƐƵďũĞĐƚƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚ
through them, we are offered the opportunity to consider our own. Drafts 
represents a material, and immaterial, life in such a way that we are forced to 
encounter it not just as mere representation, a place for identification, but as 
an ethical and phenomenological practice wherein issues of human autonomy 
and agency are experienced.  
         (2015, np) 
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As such, the procedural and the provisional are necessarily taken together, the attempt at 
one always collapsing into the other. Furthermore, Taylor highlights the position this places 
the reader of the full Drafts in ?  ŚĞůĚŝŶĂƚĞŶƐŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂĚĞƐŝƌĞĨŽƌƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĂů ‘ŚŽůŝƐƚŝĐ ?
understanding and obfuscated from this throughout by the provisionalities of the work.  
  /ĨǁĞƚĂŬĞƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚ “ŽŶĞĐĂŶďĞŐŝŶĂŶǇǁŚĞƌĞĂŶĚƌĞĂĚŝŶĂŶǇ
desired direction ? ?ŝƚĂƉƉĞĂƌƐĨŝƚƚŝŶŐƚŽĚŽƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇƚŚĂƚŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƚŚĞ
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨĨŝŶĚŝŶŐŽŶĞƐĞůĨ ?ĂƐƵWůĞƐƐŝƐƚĞƌŵƐŝƚ ? ‘ŝŶƐŝĚĞƚŚĞŵŝĚĚůĞŽĨĂůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ ? ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌǁŝůůďĞŐŝŶďǇƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ? PdƌĂĐĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? (2010, 78-
111) as a means of determining the ways in which it is indicative of and distinct from the 
other poems which constitute Drafts. Following this engagement, this chapter will then 
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐƚŚƌĞĞŽĨƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ŵŽƐƚƉƌĞǀĂůĞŶƚĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂůŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ ?  Drafting, Folding and 
the Grid. Once these have been established, I will turn to specific moments in Drafts, with a 
ǀŝĞǁƚŽŽďƐĞƌǀŝŶŐƚŚĞǁĂǇƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ĨŽůĚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƌĂĨƚŝŶŐ ?ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞŚĞƌŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƚŝĐ
means of poetic extension.  
 
Trace Elements 
 ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ? PdƌĂĐĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐĂ ? ?-part meditation on the engagement with traces 
ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶǁƌŝƚŝŶŐƉŽĞƚƌǇ ?dŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ĂƐŝƚƐŶĂŵĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ?ŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚŽƐĞ ‘ƚƌĂĐĞ
ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƉƌŽǀŽŬĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ?ŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƚŚĞŐƌĂƉŚŝĐƚƌĂĐĞŽƌŵĂƌŬ ?dŚĞĞŶĚŶotes to 
 ‘dƌĂĐĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ůŝƐƚĂǁŝĚĞǀĂƌŝĞƚǇŽĨƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ?ƐŽŵĞĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌ ?ĞƌƌŝĚĂ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŽƌƚŚĞ
Objectivists) whilst others are more oblique (T.R.A.C.E  W “dƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶZĞŐŝŽŶŶĚŽƌŽŶĂů
ǆƉůŽƌĞƌ ? ? and sardine poisoning). There are over fifty-three uses of the term itself, most 
frequently in the context of presenting a further aphoristic reflection on the uses and 
ĐŽŶŶŽƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌĂĐĞ ? ?,ĞƌĞĂƌĞƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƚĞŶ ‘ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐŽĨĨĞƌƐĨŽƌƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ? 
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dƌĂĐĞŝƐ “ĂŚŽůĚ ?ĂŚŽůĞŽĨĞǀĂŶĞƐĐĞŶĐĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ǁŚŝĐŚ ?ƚƌĂǀĞůƐŵĂůůƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůƚŚŝŶŐƐ ? ?/ďŝĚ ? ?
 ? ? ) ?Ă “ƌĞĂĚĂďůĞƐŝŐŶĂŐĞ ? ?/ďŝĚ ? ) ?Ă “ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚƵĂůƵŶƐĞƚ ůŝŶŐŝ ƚŚĞ ?ƉĞƉƉǇĚĞƉƚŚƐŽĨĚĂŝůǇ ?
ĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ ? ?/ďŝĚ ? ) ?Žƌ “ƚƌĂĐĞĞǆŝƐƚƐďĞĨŽƌĞĂůůƚŚŝƐ ? ĂŶĚďĞǇŽŶĚŶŽŶĞ ? ?ǇĞƚďƵŽǇĞĚ ?ĂŶĚ
ĞŶĚůĞƐƐůǇŝŵƉĂůƉĂďůĞ ? ?/ďŝĚ ? ? ? ? ) ?ŝƚ “ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐĂůŵŽƐƚŵĞĂŶŝŶŐůĞƐƐƉƌŽƉƵůƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƐŵƵĚŐĞĂŶĚ
Őƌŝƚ ? ?/ďŝĚ ? ? ? ? ) ?ŝƚŝƐĂ “ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƚƌĂŝůƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂŶĞǆĂĐƚŝŶŐůĂŶĚƐĐĂƉĞ ? ?ŵĂĚĞďǇƚŚĞŝŶĚŝŐĞŶŽƵƐ ?
 ?/ďŝĚ ? ? ? ? ) ?ŝƚŝƐ “ůŝŬĞĂŵŝƐƐŝŶŐĐƌǇ ? ?/ďŝĚ ? ? ? ? ) ?dƌĂĐĞŝƐ “ƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇŽĨĨŝůů ?ďƵƚƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ it is 
Ĩŝůů ?ƚƌĂĐĞƉƌŽƉƐŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚŝĞƐ ?ŽĨĞŵƉƚŝŶĞƐƐŽƉĞŶ ? ?/ďŝĚ ? ? ? ? ) ?ďƵƚ “tŚĂƚƚƌĂĐĞŝƐĨŽƵŶĚĚĞƉĞŶĚƐ
ŽŶǇŽƵƌƌĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐ ? ?/ďŝĚ ? ? ? ? ) ? “ƚŚĞƚƌĂĐĞĂŶĚŝƚƐ ?Ƶ ĞƌƚŽŶĞƐĞŵĞƌŐĞĂƐĂƐŵĂůůůĂƌŐĞŶĞƐƐ ?
ĂŶĚƐƵďƚĞǆƚĨůŝƉƐƚŽƚĞǆƚ ? ?/ďŝĚ ? ? ? ) ?^ŽŵĞŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƌĞ necessary here. The unifying 
ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞŽĨĂůůƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞƚƌĂĐĞůŝĞƐŝŶĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŝĐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ?  
ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚŽŶ ‘ƌĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĨĂĐĞŽĨ ‘ĂƉĞƌĐĞƉƚƵĂů ŶƐĞƚƚůŝŶŐ ? ?ƚŚĞƚƌĂĐĞŚĞƌĞŝŶǀŽŬĞƐ
Derridean grammatology: 
The trace is not a presence but is rather the simulacrum of a presence that 
dislocates, displaces, and refers beyond itself. The trace has, properly 
speaking, no place, for effacement belongs to the very structure of the trace.
        (Derrida 1973, 156) 
dŚŝƐƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ‘ďĞǇŽŶĚŝƚƐĞůĨ ?ůŽĐĂƚĞƐƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌĂĐĞ ?ĂƐĂŶĞĐƐƚĂƚŝĐƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶ ?ĂůďĞŝƚĂŶ
exstasis without site which effaces its own structure. All this is to say that the thing-concept 
which sustains a trace as any one thing is immediately a question of the subject. Trace as 
such describes the ephemeral location from which meaning arises. This is a situation, in 
ĞƌƌŝĚĂ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ĂůǁĂǇƐ-ĂůƌĞĂĚǇŝŶĞĨĨĞĐƚ P ‘ǀĞƌǇƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐ ?ĂĨŽƌŵĂůƉůĂǇ
of differences. That is to say, of traces. (Derrida 1981, 26). In a work so concerned with 
processes of signification as Drafts, ƚŚŝƐ ‘ĨŽƌŵĂůƉůĂǇ ?ĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶĂƐĂĨŝƚƚŝŶŐĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŽŶŽĨ
ƚŚĞƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇǁŝƚŚǁŚŝĐŚƵWůĞƐƐŝƐĐŽŵƉŽƐĞƐƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůǁŽƌŬƐ ? ‘dƌĂĐĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ŝƐ ?ĂƐ
such, a fitting place to start with a text wherein a poetics of the trace is inscribed throughout. 
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dŚŝƐŝƐƚƌƵĞŶŽƚŽŶůǇŽĨƚŚĞƉĂŐĞŝƚƐĞůĨ ?ǁŝƚŚŝƚƐǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ ‘ĚƌĂĨƚ ?ƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐǁŚŝĐŚůĞĂǀĞƚŚĞƚĞǆƚ
in a state of indeterminacy, but also of the wider structure of the work as a series of serial 
compositioŶƐƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇ ‘ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ?ŝŶĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƌĂĨƚƐ ?ƚŽǁŚŝĐŚŝƚŝƐƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůůǇ
related. As such, Derrida writes: 
Nothing, neither among the element nor within the system, is anywhere ever 
simply present or absent. There are only everywhere, differences and traces 
of traces.          (2001, 157) 
/ŶƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?Drafts, the variation of definitions offered and employed 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ? PdƌĂĐĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĂƌĞƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐƌƵďƌŝĐƐĨŽƌƚŚĞůĂƌŐĞƌǁŽƌŬ ?dŚĞ ‘ĚŽŶŽƌ ?
ƚĞǆƚƐ ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ƚĞƌŵ )ĨŽƌ ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ? ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇ ? ŚĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐĚƌĂĨƚƐǁŚŝĐŚŽĨƚĞŶĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚ
ƚŚĞƚŚĞŵĂƚŝĐĂŶĚĨŽƌŵĂůĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞůĂƚĞƌƌĂĨƚƐ ?ĂƌĞ ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ? P^ĐŚǁĂ ? ? ‘ƌĂĨƚyyy P
&ŽƐƐĞ ? ? ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ? PdƵƌŶƐ ? ?dƵƌŶƐ ?ĂŶ/ŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ? PdŚƌĞƐŚŽůĚ ? ?ŝƚŝƐĨŽůůŽǁĞĚŝŶ the 
final book of Drafts ďǇ ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ? ? PtŽƌĚƐ ? ?/ƚĐŽƵůĚďĞĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞŵŽŵĞŶƚƐŝŶ
Drafts can be seen to mutually address a thematic of the indeterminacy of language, but this 
ǁŽƵůĚƐƵĨĨŝĐĞƚŽƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞƚŚĞ ‘ĨŽůĚŝŶŐ ?ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵǁŚŝĐ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵtes the extension of 
ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ǁŽƌŬ ?KĨƚĞŶƚŚĞ ‘ĨŽůĚ ?ĐĂŶĞůŝĚĞĂƐŵƵĐŚĂƐŝƚĚŝƐĐůŽƐĞƐ ?dŚĞĂŵďƵůĂƚŽƌǇŵĂŶŶĞƌŝŶ
ǁŚŝĐŚƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƚŚĞŵĂƚŝĐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐƌĞĂƉƉĞĂƌŵĂŬĞƐƚŚĞ ‘ůŽŐŝĐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĞŵĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽĐĂůĐƵůĂƚĞ ?
ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇ ?ƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŝƐŶŽƚ ‘ŝŵƉƌŽǀŝƐĞĚ ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌĚƌĂĨƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ ‘ůĞĨƚ
ƵŶĨŝŶŝƐŚĞĚ ? ?dŚŝƐĚĞŶŝĂůŽĨtelos is not meant to imply a commitment to avoiding closure, but 
rather of acknowledging at large and at length the provisionality in which even supposedly 
 ‘ĐůŽƐĞĚ ?ǁŽƌŬƐƌĞƐƚ ?ƐƐŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƐŝŶ ‘KŶDrafts ? P “ ‘ƌĂĨƚƐ ?ĂƌĞĂŶĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚ
ŚĞƌĞ ?ŶŽƚĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ ?EŽŵĂƚƚĞƌǁŚĂƚ ? ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ) ?tŚŝůƐƚǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĐĂƌĞĨƵůƚŽ
think too strongly of DuPlessis as a writer of interiority, it is important to stress the extent to 
which Drafts deals with itself, which is to say, concerns itself with the implications of its own 
mode(s) of articulation.   
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  ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ĞƌƌŝĚĂ ?ƐƉůĂĐĞŝŶĂƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŽĨZĂĐŚĞůůĂƵƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ŽƌĂŶǇǁƌŝƚĞƌŽĨůŽŶŐ
poems, is complicated from the off by tŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚĞǆƉĂŶƐŝǀĞŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌ ?ƐƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ?
/ƚǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞĚŽŝŶŐĞƌƌŝĚĂũƵƐƚŝĐĞƚŽŵĞƌĞůǇĂĚŽƉƚ ‘ĚŝĨĨĠƌĂŶĐĞ ? ? ‘ƚŚĞƐƵƉƉůĞŵĞŶƚ ?Žƌ ‘ƚŚĞ
ƚƌĂĐĞ ?metaphorically; which is to say, as a structural model which neatly designates the 
workings of seriality ?/ŶŚĞƌůĞĐƚƵƌĞŽŶƚŚĞůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ ‘'ĞŶƌĞWƌŽďůĞŵƐ ? ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ
ƐƉĞĂŬƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵŽĨ “ƐƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŽďĞĞƌƌŝĚĞĂŶ ? ?KŶĞŵŝŐŚƚƐƉĞĐƵůĂƚĞƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐ
ŚĞƐŝƚĂŶĐĞŝƐĂƌĞůƵĐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽĐŽŵŵŝƚƚŽƚŚĞƚŽƚĂůŝƚǇŽĨĞƌƌŝĚĂ ?ƐĂǀŽǁĞĚůǇĂŶƚŝ-systematic 
thinking ?^ƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐŝƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶĞƌƌŝĚĂ ?ƐĞƐƐĂǇ ‘dŚĞ>ĂǁKĨ'ĞŶƌĞ ? ?ĞƌƌŝĚĂ
1992). DuPlessis writes: 
If we believe Jacques Derrida, this attempt to define the long poem can have 
ŽŶůǇŽŶĞĨŝŶĚŝŶŐ ?/ĨĞǀĞƌƚŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞĂŐĞŶƌĞŽĨƚŚĞ “ŵŽĚĞƌŶĂŶĚĐŽŶtemporary 
ůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ ?ĂƐĂ “ůĂǁ ? ?ƚŚĂƚůĂǁŽĨŐĞŶƌĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶŵŽŽƚĞĚ ? as is true of any 
ŐĞŶƌĞ ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞƐůŝĚǇƐŽƌƚŽĨ “ůĂǁ ?ŝůůĞŐĂůůǇŚĂŶĚĞĚĚŽǁŶŝŶĞƌƌŝĚĂ ?Ɛ
essay. Any genre can only be self-different, contaminated and parasitic [terms 
from Acts of Literature ? ?ĞƌƌŝĚĂ P “/ƐƵďŵŝƚĨŽƌǇŽƵƌĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĞ
following hypothesis: a text would not belong to any genre. Every text 
participates in one or several genres, there is no genreless text, there is always 
a genre and genres, yet such participation ŶĞǀĞƌĂŵŽƵŶƚƐƚŽďĞůŽŶŐŝŶŐ ? 
          (2008, np) 
 
dŚŝƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨŐĞŶƌĞŝƐĐĞŶƚƌĂůŶŽƚŽŶůǇƚŽƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞůĞŐĂĐǇ
of Modernism but also with the interplay of genre in her work. Drafts develops its own forms, 
establishes generic hybrids and pays homage to a variety of established generic forms in the 
ƚŝƚůĞƐŽĨŝƚƐƉĂƌƚƐ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ? PZĞŶŐĂ ?ĂĚŽƉƚƐ ƚŚƌĞĞ-line Japanese form in which 
the first line is written by one person, and ƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƚǁŽďǇĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚ ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ? P,ĂŝďƵŶ ?
ŝƐĂ:ĂƉĂŶĞƐĞĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉƌŽƐĞĂŶĚŚĂŝŬƵ ? ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ? PĞŶƚŽ ?ŝƐĂůŝƚĞƌĂƌǇǁŽƌŬŵĂĚĞƵƉŽĨ
quotes from other authors; Drafts 34 and 35 ?   ‘ZĞĐƚŽ ?ĂŶĚ ‘sĞƌƐŽ ? ?reflect on the 
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relationship between left-hand and right-ŚĂŶĚƉĂŐĞƐ ? ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ? ? PtĂůůEĞǁƐƉĂƉĞƌ ?ŝƐŵĂƉƉĞĚ
ŽŶůŝŽƚ ?Ɛ ‘dŚĞtĂƐƚĞ>ĂŶĚ ? ? ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ? PDĂŝůƌƚ ?ŝƐĂĐŽůůĂŐĞǁŽƌŬ ? ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ? PYƵŝƉƚǇĐŚ ?ŝƐĂ
double diptych, in which a painting is spread across two panels with a hinge connecting the 
ƚǁŽ ? ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ? PŝůĚƵŶƐŐĞĚŝĐŚƚǁŝƚŚƉƉůĞ ?ŝƐĂ ?ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝ ŶƉŽĞŵ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇƉĂƌĂůůĞůƐƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ? ‘ƌĂĨƚy PWƌŝŵĞƌ ?ŝƐĂŶĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ
to the topics of Drafts ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƌĂĨƚhŶŶƵŵďĞƌĞĚ PWƌĞĐŝƐ ?ŝƐƐƵŵŵĂƌǇŽƌĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚ of a text. 
These smaller questions of individual generic forms are brought together under the same 
chiasmic auspices of the movement in Drafts between the provisional and the programmatic. 
KŶĞĐĂŶǁŝƚŶĞƐƐƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƚĂŬŝŶŐƵƉŽĨŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĨŽƌŵƐ and their histories; but 
ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇƚŚĞ ‘ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ?ŽĨŐĞŶƌĞŝƐŶŽƚƐŽŵƵĐŚĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĂƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐwith specific genres 
but of querying the workings of genre as such. ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚŝƐƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŽ
conceive of genre not as a category, but rather as an activity: 
 
In a more cunning universe, to use a genre ? the long poem ? or a historical 
ĞŶƚŝƚǇ “ƚŚĞ ? ?ƚŚĂŶĚ ? ?ƐƚĐĞŶƚƵƌǇůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ ? ?as a rubric with any hopes of 
achieving a genre definition is a doomed undertaking, doomed to be 
undermined by plethora simultaneous with inadequacy. A network of genre 
relationships overcomes, even clogs any text, so all literature becomes one 
extensive textual landscape, while the individual text, if it has borders at all, is 
always just a feature in that larger intertextual landscape.  
       (Duplessis 2008, np) 
 
dŚĞ ‘ĚŽŽŵ ?ŚĞƌĞŝƐĂĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚĞŽĨƐĞĞŬŝŶŐƚŽďŝŶĚƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƐŽĨĂŚŝŐŚůǇĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂůƉŽĞƚŝĐ
ĨŽƌŵŝŶƚŽŶĞĂƚŐĞŶĞƌŝĐĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐ ?dŚĞ ‘ůĂƌŐĞƌŝŶƚĞƌƚĞǆƚƵĂůůĂŶĚƐĐĂƉĞ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽ
literature as a cultural and social body as well as the overwhelming plenum of Drafts, is the 
ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ŐĞŶƌĞ ?ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵƐ ?'ĞŶƌĞŝƐ ?ĂƐƐƵĐŚ ?ĂŶĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĞŶŐĂŐĞĚǁŝƚŚ ?ĂŶ
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 ‘ƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬŝŶŐ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂƌƵůĞ ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐĞǆƉĂŶĚƐƚŚŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵǁŝƚŚ
referencĞƚŽ'ĞƌƚƌƵĚĞ^ƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ‘ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ? P 
 
Just as Stein might be said always to have multiple subplots without there 
ĞǀĞƌďĞŝŶŐ “ƉůŽƚ ? ?ƐŽƚŚĞůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵŵĂǇďĞƐĂŝĚƚŽŚĂǀĞŵƵůƚŝƉůĞŐĞŶƌĞƐ
without having a single genre. What long modes do claim is the space-time to 
register and elaborate multiple generic activities. 
       (Ibid., np) 
dŚĞƐĞ ‘ŵƵůƚŝƉůĞŐĞŶĞƌŝĐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ?ƚĂŬĞƉůĂĐĞǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƐŵĂůůĞƌƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
is to say, the poems themselves are subject to this multiplicity of genre. As such, the cultural 
and ideological implications of a given generic form ?  ƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞ ‘>ĞƚƚĞƌ ? ? ‘>ǇƌŝĐ ?Žƌ ‘ŽŽŬ ? ? 
can be placed under scrutiny by virtue of being stripped of their closure ?  for example, the 
 ‘>ĞƚƚĞƌ ?ƌĂĨƚƐĂƌĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƌĞƉůŝĞƐ ?ƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŽŽŬ ?ŝƐŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚĞĚĂĐƌŽƐƐƐŝǆďŽŽŬƐ ?
ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘>ǇƌŝĐ ?ďĞĐŽŵĞƐĂƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨƉŽĞƚŝĐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇĂŶĞƚŚŝĐĂůĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŝŶ
 ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ? PDŝĚƌĂƐŚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨĚŽƌŶŽ ?ƐŶŽƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĞƚŝĐ ?dŚŝƐŝƐŶŽƚƐŽŵƵĐŚĂ
probing investigation of genres but of genre as such.  
  Genre also raises questions of gender and sexual difference. In her dialogue with 
ĞƌƌŝĚĂ ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ůĂǁŽĨŐĞŶƌĞ ?ŝƐŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚůǇƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚƚŽŵĂƚƚĞƌƐŽĨƐĞǆƵĂů
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ĞƌƌŝĚĂƵŶĚĞƌƐĐŽƌĞƐƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŐĞŶƌĞ ?ŝŶ&ƌĞŶĐŚƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽŵŽĚĞƐŽĨǁƌŝƚŝŶŐĂƐǁĞůů
as gender. As such, DuPlessis writes: 
 
dŚĞƐƚĂƌƚůŝŶŐĞǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŐĞŶĚĞƌŝŶƚŚĞŵŝĚĚůĞŽĨ “dŚĞ>ĂǁŽĨ'ĞŶƌĞ ?ŝƐ
peculiar in its trace of binarist thought, no matter what Derrida does in 
queering and critiquing. The pun in French on genre makes the 
 “ŐĞŶĚĞƌƐ ?ŐĞŶƌĞƐƉĂƐƐŝŶƚŽĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?ĂŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝǀĞ “ŵŝǆŝŶŐŽĨŐĞŶĚĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚ
ŐĞŶƌĞƐĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚůǇĂŶƐǁĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ “ŵĂĚŶĞƐƐ ?ŽĨƉŽůĂƌŝǌĞĚŐĞŶĚĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚƌŝŐŝĚůǇ




ĞƌƌŝĚĂ ?ƐƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞĚŽƵble-bind of genre and gender is oriented towards exposing the 
 ‘ŵĂĚŶĞƐƐ ?ŽĨƉŽůĂƌŝǌĞĚƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŚĞƌĞŝƐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚŝŶƚŚĂƚŝƚƐĞĞƐ
ĞǀĞŶŝŶĞƌƌŝĚĂ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚůǇƚŽƚĂůĚĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ?  and 
therefore patriarchal ?  ŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ?^ŚĞĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐƚŚĂƚ “ĞƌƌŝĚĂĚŽĞƐŚĂůĨ-hold onto the life 
ũĂĐŬĞƚŽĨĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůŐĞŶĚĞƌŶŽƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?/ďŝĚ ?ŶƉ ) ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ĐůĂŝŵƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞ différance 
which undermines stable categories (speech and writing; male and female) require further 
critique based on the assumed notions and sedimented ideological traces which are 
maintained within a discourse. DuPlessis continues: 
&ŽƌƌĞĂůůǇ ?ŝƚĚŽĞƐĂƉƉĞĂƌĂƐŝĨĞƌƌŝĚĂŝƐƚĂůŬŝŶŐŚĞƌĞ ? Q ?ĂďŽƵƚĚĞƐŝƌĞ ?
ƉĂƐƐŝŽŶĂƚĞĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? Q ?ǇĞƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞof other ideological tugs, this magnetism 
gets imagined as female-y or feminine in a heterosexual economy. By the end 
of the essay, one does separate desire from the more sclerotic, if important, 
sex-gender ideas that undergird it, but to me, at any rate, the tinge of 
commonplace binaries remains.       (Ibid., np) 
 
dŽĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĞǆƚĞŶƚ ?ƚŚŝƐ ‘ƚŝŶŐĞŽĨĐŽŵŵŽŶƉůĂĐĞďŝŶĂƌŝĞƐ ?ŝƐĂŶƵŶĂǀŽŝĚĂďůĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂů
situation the philosophers necessarily finds themselves in. A writing of complete différance, 
in which any and all conventional binaries and assumptions are absent, would seemingly be 
ĂŶĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůůǇƌĞĂůŝƐĂďůĞƚĂƐŬ ?/ŶƚŚĞůŝŐŚƚŽĨƚŚŝƐ ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ
ŽĨƚŚĞůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵƐĞĞŬƐƚŽĞŵďƌĂĐĞƚŚĞ “ĞŶĚůĞƐƐĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĂĐƚƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƚhe text, 
rather than holding any one means as the more or most successful: 
 
Maybe we can have a taxonomy but no final definition; this endless putting in 
and taking out of category mimics the endless cultural acts of the long poem 
itself: creolized, inclusive, errant, omnivorous, palimpsestic, and over-written 




ĞƌƌŝĚĂ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƉŽƐƚ-phenomenological thought embraces to a great extent what I have 
ƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ƌĂĚŝĐĂůĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶĐǇ ?ŽĨƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚŚŝƐǁŽƌŬƚŚƌŽughout is rich with 
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĞƚŝĐ ?/ŶŵĂŶǇǁĂǇƐ ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ǁŽƌŬĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶƚŽĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĂŶĚ
ǁŽƌŬǁŝƚŚŶŽƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ‘ƚƌĂĐĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŐĞŶƌĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƌ ŝĚĞĂŶƐĞŶƐĞƐ ?ďƵƚŚĞƌǁŽƌŬŝƐŶŽƚ
restricted to a deconstructive project. Whilst this question will be returned to frequently 
throughout the chapter, for now it is worth concluding that Drafts deals with a provisionality 
in which inherited notions are themselves subject to the contingency of their being 
experienced. Drafts as such can be seen to develop a model, always radically provisional, 
which proposes a plenum of meaning rife with present-absences and absent-presents, 
ǁŚĞƌĞŝŶĞǀĞŶĂďŽĚǇŽĨƚŚŽƵŐŚƚůŝŬĞĞƌƌŝĚĂ ?Ɛ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚĂƐŝƚŝƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ
generation and deferral of meaning, is challenged by the unsettled contradictions and 
ƐĞƌĞŶĚŝƉŝƚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĚƌĂĨƚ ?ƚĞǆƚ ?dŚŝƐŝƐŶŽƚƚŽƐĂǇ ƚŚĂƚ ‘ĚƌĂĨƚŝŶŐ ?ƐƵƌƉĂƐƐĞƐdifférance in the 
ĞǆƚĞŶƚŽĨŝƚƐƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ?ZĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĞŝŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂĐǇŽĨƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ƉŽĞƚŝĐĨŽƌŵĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞ ? ? ?Drafts 
explores a perpetually unanticipated ground, in which a (deconstructive) totality like the non-
concept of différance is present alongside a multitude of similar effects and affects, and is as 
such used in a draft form ?  ƚŚĞĞŶĚŶŽƚĞƚŽ ‘dƌĂĐĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ŵĞŶƚŝŽŶƐThe Derrida Dictionary 
alongside more than 30 other sources, and as such is subject to the same non-hierarchical 
impulse which also allows the reader to start anywhere and read from there. This is to say, 
Drafts functions (or fails to) on the premise that each of its parts is related to other poems, 
ďŽƚŚ ‘ŝŶƐŝĚĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ?ƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇĐŽŶƐŝƐƚŝŶŐŽĨ ? ? ?ƐĞůĨ-contained 
long poems. In this regard, this chapter addresses Derridean notions as they appear in Drafts, 
with a view to establishing tŚĞŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĞƌƌŝĚĂ ?ƐƉŽƐƚ-phenomenological readings of 
 ‘ƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ ?ŚĂƐĨŽƌ ? ?th and 21st century long poems. 
  dŚĞƐĞĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞŽŶĚŝƐƉůĂǇŝŶƚŚĞƚǁĞŶƚŝĞƚŚƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘dƌĂĐĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?




writing with traces, 
alluding to trace elements, 
and bargaining with the strange ?  
without the fact of ultimate loss 
untold, untellable, with no ear to tell, 
no bell to toll, no sound to read 
within the out-flung pitch of cosmic time 
except such unspeakable 
force or residue as will unknow itself 
inside gigantesque vibrations 
that we-the-missing theorized once, 
once upon a time.      (2013, 90) 
 
dŚĞĂĐƚŽĨĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĨŝŐƵƌĞĚŚĞƌĞĂƐĂ “ďĂƌŐĂŝŶŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐƚƌĂŶŐĞ ?ĞŶƚĂŝůƐĂƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ
ǁŚĞƌĞŝŶ ‘ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůŽƐƐ ?ŝƐ ‘ƵŶƚŽůĚ ?ƵŶƚĞůůĂďůĞ ? ?ĂƐƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂůǁĂǇƐ “ƐƵĐŚƵŶƐƉĞĂŬĂďůĞ ?ĨŽƌĐĞŽƌ
ƌĞƐŝĚĞ ? ?dŚĞƚƌĂĐĞĂƐƐƵĐŚĂůƐŽŝŵƉůŝĞƐĂĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƌĞĂůŝƚǇǁŚĞƌĞ ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇŝƐĂƚƌĂĐĞ ? “ǁĞ-
the-ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ ? ) ?ĂĨĂŝƌǇ-ƚĂůĞ ? “ŽŶĐĞƵƉŽŶĂƚŝŵĞ ? ) ?dŚŝƐŶŽƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůŽŐŝĐ ĨƚŚĞƚƌĂĐĞ
ĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞƐĚĞŵŝƐĞŝƐĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ǁŽƌŬƚŽĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŽƚĂůŝƚǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
is to say, in developing a poetics of the trace DuPlessis commits herself to the necessary 
elision and incidental contingency that this implies.  
  DuPlessis further complicates this constellation of ideas surrounding the trace by 
ũƵǆƚĂƉŽƐŝŶŐŝƚƐƚŚĞŽƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŝƚƐ ‘ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ?ŝŶƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?dŚĞĨŽůlowing questions are 
ĨŽƵŶĚŝŶƚŚĞŽƉĞŶŝŶŐƐĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ‘dƌĂĐĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? P
 “ŽĞƐƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌŚĂǀĞƚŚĞŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƐŬŝůůƚŽ 
     carry out  
ƚŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? ?   (Ibid.) 
 ? Q ? 
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 “/ƐƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵ ‘ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂďůĞ ? ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐ ?ĐĂŶŝƚďĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞĚ 
through ƚŚĞĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨĚĂƚĂ ? ? 
 “tĂƐĞĂĐŚƉŝĞĐĞŽĨĚĂƚĂƐƵďũĞĐƚĞĚƚŽĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůƌĞǀŝĞǁ ?dŽ 
ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ? ?    (Ibid.) 
Most academic readers will detect the origin of such questions, inextricably tied as they are 
to the justifications a researcher must have to carry out their work and secure funding. 
Placed in this context, these questions open onto far larger questions concerning the 
ŽŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƐƚĂƚƵƐŽĨƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƚŚĂƚǁŚŝĐŚĚĞĂůƐŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƐŽĨ ‘ƚƌĂĐĞƐ ? ?Ɛ
such, the above inquiƌŝĞƐĞǀŽŬĞĐŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐĂĨĨĞĐƚƐ PƚŚĞǇĂƌĞůŝƚĞƌĂůůǇ ‘ĂĐĚĞŵŝĐ ? ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞ
of arbitrariness, whilst betraying, almost against themselves, an opening into the thinking of 
 ‘ƉŝĞĐĞ ?Ɛ ?ŽĨĚĂƚĂ ? ?ĂŶĚǁŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŵŝŐŚƚĞǀĞŶďĞŐŝŶƚŽŵĞĂŶŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?uPlessis 
offers us one response: 
  ? Q ? Data as every 
part of the poem on 
every scale, with every layered 
possibility for shim, split, and  
juxtaposition, that prismatic 
hedron for the faceted refraction 
of choices and debris. 
These pensive intersections  
are what demands research 
are what research demands.      (Ibid., 82) 
 This poetics concerned with thresholds of meaning ?   “dŚĞƐĞƉĞŶƐŝǀĞŝŶƚĞƌƐĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? can be 
ƐĞĞŶƚŽǁŽƌŬŽŶĂŵƵĐŚůĂƌŐĞƌƐĐĂůĞ ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƉŽĞŵŽĨ ‘ĚĂƚĂ ?ŝƐĂ ‘ƉƌŝƐŵĂƚŝĐŚĞĚƌŽŶ ? ?dŚĞ
play beƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĚĞŵĂŶĚ ?ŝƐĐƌƵĐŝĂůƚŽƚŚĞƐŚĂƉĞŽĨƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?inquiry. Again, a 
chiasmatic situation is invoked ?  ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ŵĞĂŶƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚŝŽŶĂƌĞĐůĞĂƌůǇŚŝŐŚůǇ
influenced by academic criticism, perhaps most clearly in the extensive bibliography and 
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endnotes which substantiate the work. The demand of research into a topic is distinct from 
the research of this demand, which is to say, directing attention specifically towards the 
 ‘ĚĞŵĂŶĚ ?ŽŶǁŚŝĐŚĂůůƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝƐďĂƐĞĚŝƐĂŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵůǁĂǇŽĨĞǆƉŽƐŝng that which falls 
ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĚĞŵĂŶĚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?/ĨǁĞƌĞĐĂůůƚŚĞƐƵďǀĞƌƐŝǀĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ
of research questions earlier in the poem, we can begin to see an argument in Drafts which 
seeks to retain the provisional starting-out of research, the original demand, rather than a 
ƐƵďƐĞƌǀŝĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ĚĞŵĂŶĚƐ ?ŽĨŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ? ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ? ?ĂůƐŽƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ
ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŽĨĂĐŽƐŵŽůŽŐŝĐĂůǀŝĞǁ ?Ă ‘ƚƌĂĐŝŶŐ ?ďĂĐŬƚŽƚŚĞƐŽƵƌĐĞ ?Ɛ ) ?dĂƌůŽƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐŽŶƚŚŝƐŝŶ
relation to the long poem form, stating that Drafts deals with  
the cosmological sense of the bigness of this space in contrast to the 
fragmentary smallness of words, objects and tiny narratives which appear 
within it.        (Tarlo, np) 
 
In the work of Quentin Meillassoux, questions concerning the origins of human life are used 
to establish a strong critique of, in particular, the phenomenological insistence upon 
phenomena being a process of perception rather than a question of there being such a thing 
ĂƐĂ ‘ƚŚŝŶŐ-in-ŝƚƐĞůĨ ? ?DĞŝůůĂƐƐŽƵǆĂŝŵƐŚŝƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐǁŚĂƚŚĞĐĂůůƐ ‘ĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƚ ?
philosophy, as represented in the perceptual contingency of Heideggerian phenomenology 
and the language-games of Wittgenstein, and establishes this argument from cosmological 
ƉƌĞŵŝƐĞƐ ? ‘ŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƚ ?ŚĞƌĞŝƐƚŚĞƚĞƌŵDĞŝůůĂƐƐŽƵǆƵƐĞƐƚŽƌĞĨĞƌƚŽĂƉŽƐƚ-Kantian 
ŝŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽŶƚŚĞŝŶĂĐĐĞƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƚŚŝŶŐ-in-ŝƚƐĞůĨ ? ?ĂƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚŝŶƐƚĞĂĚĂƌŐƵĞƐĨŽƌ
ĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŝĐĂŶĚŽŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐďĞŝŶŐĂŶƐǁĞƌĞĚďǇĂ ‘ĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ^ĞůĨĂŶĚ
Thing, rather than any determined conclusion that phenomena have their existence wholly in 
Self or Thing. In particular, the deceptively simple question of whether we can attest to the 




ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?/ĨƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽǁŝƚŶĞƐƐƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ĂƌĐŚĞ-ĨŽƐƐŝů ? ?DĞŝůůĂƐƐŽƵǆ ?ƐƚĞƌŵĨŽƌĂƉƌĞ-human 
artefact), how can anything reliable be said about what preceded human life? In particular, 
ƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĂŶĐĞƐƚƌĂů ? “ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĚĞƐŝŐŶĂƚĞĂŶ ďƐĞŶĐĞin the given, and for givenness, 
but rather an absence of ŐŝǀĞŶŶĞƐƐĂƐƐƵĐŚ ? ? ? ? ) ?DĞŝůůĂƐƐŽƵǆŝƐŶŽƚĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐŶĂŢǀĞ
empiricism in his postulation concerning the arche-fossil; rather, it is the cosmological 
question of conceiving existence without givenness as such, which is to say, without the 
ŵĞĂŶƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƵŶĚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇďǇ ‘ĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƚ ?ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĞƐ ?
   ƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌĂĐĞ ?ƌĞůĂƚĞŚĞƌǁƌŝƚŝŶŐŚĞƌĞƚŽƚŚĞƐĐĞƉƚŝĐŝƐŵ
ǁŚŝĐŚDĞŝůůĂƐƐŽƵǆŐƌŽƵŶĚƐŚŝƐ ‘ƐƉĞĐƵůĂƚŝǀĞƌĞĂůŝƐŵ ?ŝŶ ?ĂŶĚĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇĚŝƌĞĐƚƐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ
ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐǁŚĂƚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐƚŚĞ ‘ďĞǇŽŶĚ ?ŽĨƉŽĞƚƌǇ ?/ŶƚŚĞŶŝŶĞƚĞĞƚŚƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?
she writes: 
Pedestrian acronyms will boil right down to atoms 
and leave no Earth, 
ůĞĂǀŝŶŐǁŚĂƚǁĞǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ ? 
ŚĂĚǁĞƐĞĞŶŝƚŽƌŶŽƚĞǀĞŶ ‘ŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ ? Pŝƚ ?ƐƚŚĂƚĂůůŽƵƌĞŽŶƐ 
that were known and lived 
will just have been 
ƐŽŵĞĂƐŚǇƐŵƵĚŐĞƚŚĂƚ ?ƐŶŽǁŝŶĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ Q 
        (2010, 89) 
dŚĞƐĞ “ƉĞĚĞƐƚƌŝĂŶĂĐƌŽŶǇŵƐ ? ?seemingly both banalities of life and a greater sense of all 
ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞĚĞƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŽŶŽŶĞ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ƉĞĚĞƐƚƌŝĂŶŝƐŵ ? ? ďŽŝůĚŽǁŶĂŶĚůĞĂǀĞ “ǁŚĂƚ
ǁĞǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ ?ŚĂĚǁĞƐĞĞŶŝƚ ? ?dŚŝƐ ŝŶǀŽŬĞƐƚŚĞ ‘ĂŶĐĞƐƚƌĂů ?ŝŶDĞŝůůĂƐƐŽƵǆ ?Ɛ
ƐĞŶƐĞ ?ƚŚĞƚƌĂĐĞ ‘ƐŽŵĞĂƐŚǇƐŵƵĚŐĞ ?ŝƐ “ŶŽƚĞǀĞŶ ‘ŶŽƚŚŝ Ő ? ? ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞĂƉƉĂƌĂƚƵƐǁŚŝĐŚũƵĚŐĞƐ
presence and non-presence is itself absent. To reiterate: no judgment of presence takes 
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place without a correlationist present to judge. This concept of the trace, and the burden it 
places on subjectivity, becomes a focus of a later section of the poem: 
/ ?ǀĞŬŶŽǁŶƉĂƌĂůůĞůĚĂǇƐŽĨƵŶƌĞĂĚĂďůĞ 
alphabets, unutterable 
languages unravelling, in which 
materials bubble up (from what? 
and how?) ?  an engram sent by chemistry, a dream-plot 
out of sedimented fossil-thought, 
a locale or event in which there is as much 
forgetting, salvaging, evoking, condensing 
losing rearticulating, interfering and mixing 
as any single memory trace, 
taken, that is, aƐĂĐƚƵĂůůǇƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌŝŶŐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ Q 
         (Ibid., 81) 
ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞƚƌĂĐĞ
allow for a writing which occupies a distinctly liminal position. With a sense of the trace as 
inextricably bound up in questions of provisionality, DuPlessis develops a subject position in 
ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƉŽĞƚŝĐƚĞǆƚĂůůŽǁƐĨŽƌŝŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂĐǇ ?KŶĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ƚŽDĞŝůůĂƐƐŽƵǆ ?Ɛ
critical position lies in the potential opened by the poetic text. This is more than merely a 
designation of the philosophical status of the poem; rather, it displays a more general 
ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƚǇŽĨǁƌŝƚŝŶŐŝƚƐĞůĨ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĂĐƚŽĨŵĂŬŝŶŐĂŶĚůĞĂǀŝŶŐƚƌĂĐĞƐ ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?
meditĂƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌĂĐĞ ?ŝŶ ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ? ?ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐĂƐĞŶƐĞ ŽĨƚŚĞƌĂĚŝcal contingency of 
meaning-generation (and elision) in the poetic text. Having gained a sense of the ways in 
ǁŚŝĐŚƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ƚĞǆƚƐĐĂŶĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŽŶĂƐŵĂůůƐĐĂůĞ ?ŝƚŝƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽĨƌĂŵĞƚŚĞƐĞƉŽĞƚŝĐ
ĞĨĨĞĐƚƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐŽĨ ‘ĚƌĂĨƚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĨŽůĚŝŶŐ ? ? 
     
Drafting & Folding 
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ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ ?ƌĂĨƚƐ ?ĂƌĞŶĞǀĞƌĨŝŶĂů ? P 
 ‘ƌĂĨƚƐ ?ĂƌĞĨƌĞƐŚůǇĚƌĂǁŶĂŶĚĨƌĞĞůǇĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚ ?ĂƐŝĨĂ ƉƌĞůŝŵŝŶĂƌǇŽƵƚůŝŶĞŽƌ
ƐŬĞƚĐŚ ?/Ŷ ‘ƌĂĨƚƐ ? ?ĐŽŵƉůĞƚŝŽŶŝƐĂůǁĂǇƐƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶĂů ? ‘ƌĂĨƚƐ ?ŝŶǀŽůǀĞƚŚĞƉƵůů or 
traction on something a drain on something, conscription into something. 
        (2006, 21) 
This constellation of terms ?  the preliminary outline, the sketch, freshly drawn, freely 
declared, provisional ?  ŝƐŚĞůĚŝŶƚĞŶƐŝŽŶďǇĂ ‘ĚƌĂŝŶ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĐŽŶƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚĞƌĞďǇƚŚĞ ‘ĚƌĂĨƚ ?ŝƐ
ĐŽŵƉĞůůĞĚƚŽƌĞƐŝƐƚŝƚƐŽǁŶĐůŽƐƵƌĞ ?KĨƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ ‘ĐŽŵƉůĞƚŝŽŶŝƐĂůǁĂǇƐƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶĂů ? ?ƚŚŝƐ
refers not only to the various ways in which DuPlessis elides signification with complexes of 
language but also to the structural implications of writing over each set of 19 poems six times 
ŝŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞ ?ĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ĚƌĂĨƚŝŶŐ ?ŽĨDrafts ŝƐĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞŵĂŶǇ “ŐƌĂƉŚŝĐ
ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŽŶĚŝƐƉůĂǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?KĨƚĞŶƚŚĞƐĞƚǇƉŽůŽŐŝĐĂůŵĂŶŝƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚĂǀĞ
the effect of deferring the closure of a line, stanza or image. In the first 19 Drafts, one can 
ƌŽƵŐŚůǇƚƌĂĐĞƚŚĞƐĞ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ĂƐZŽŶ^ŝůůŝŵĂŶŚĂƐŝŶ ‘hƌ-Scene, Ur-EĞǁ ? PƌĂĨƚ ? ‘/ƚ ?ŚĂƐ
ůĂƌŐĞE ?ĂŶĚ ‘z ?ƐĐƌĂǁůĞĚŝŶƉĞŶĐŝůŝŶƚŚĞďŽĚǇŽĨƚŚĞ ƚĞǆƚ ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐŝƚƐĚŝǀŝƐions 
ŵĂƌŬĞĚďǇĞƋƵĂůƐƐŝŐŶƐ ?ƌĂĨƚ ? ‘^ŚĞ ?ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐŵŽŵĞŶƚƐŝ ůŝŶĞƐǁŚĞƌĞƚǁŽǁŽƌĚƐĂƌĞǁƌŝƚƚĞŶ
ĂďŽǀĞĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƌĂĨƚ ? ‘KĨ ?ŚĂƐŝƚƐĨŝƌƐƚŚĂůĨŵĂƌŬĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŵĂƌŐŝŶďǇƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ ‘hd ? ?
ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŶŐĞƌĂƐƵƌĞŽƌĚƌĂĨƚŝŶŐ ?ƌĂĨƚ ? ‘/Ŷ ?ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐďŽůĚƚǇƉĞĨĂĐĞůines written through the 
ďŽĚǇŽĨƚŚĞƚĞǆƚ ?ƌĂĨƚ ? ‘'ĂƉ ?ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐůĂƌŐĞďůŽĐŬƐŽĨƌĞĚĂĐƚĞĚƚĞǆƚ ?ŵĂƌŬĞĚďǇďůĂĐŬ
ƐƋƵĂƌĞƐ ?ƌĂĨƚ ? ‘DŝĚƌƵƐŚ ?ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐĂůĂƌŐĞŚĂŶĚ-drawn incomplete letter O ?  and so on. The 
recurrence of these draft techniques is not systematic throughout the folding process, but 
ŽĨƚĞŶ ?ĂƐŝŶƚŚĞ ‘>ŝŶĞŽĨ&ŝǀĞ ? ?ĞĂĐŚƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚĚƌĂĨƚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŚĞŵĂƚŝĐŵŽĚĞŽĨ
draft or erasure.   
  dŚĞƐĞ ‘ĚƌĂĨƚ ?ƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞƐĂƌĞƌĞŵŝŶŝƐĐĞŶƚŽĨĐŽůůĂŐĞĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐƐ ?  a notion which 
DuPlessis herself acknowledges: 
 213 
 
Another way of reading my work sees in it the visual art tactic of collage, 
taking disparate materials and setting them by juxtaposition in relation to 
ĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ?ŽůůĂŐĞƵƐĞƐĂůŽƚŽĨĐŝƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ “ƌĞĂůǁŽƌůĚ ?
imbedded, and it features oblique angles and edges, a sense of startle at the 
relations of the elements.     (McCreary 2015, np) 
dŚŝƐ ‘ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĨĐŽůůĂŐĞ ?ǁŚĞƌĞďǇŝŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂĐǇŝƐĞŵďƌĂĐĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ
coexistence of disparate themes and forms, is not so much a means of defining DuPlessis ? 
Drafts ĂƐĂǁŽƌŬŽĨĐŽůůĂŐĞĂƐŐĞƐƚƵƌŝŶŐĂƚŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŐĞŶĞƌŝĐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĂƚǁŽƌŬ ?dŚĞƉŽŝŶƚŽĨ
stressing this distinction lies in making clear that Drafts is not necessarily a work which relies 
on disparity to generate its meaning. However, collage, and in particular the combination of 
visual and linguistic signs in the poem-space. These take a variety of forms ?  on display most 
clearly in the collage poems, which offer an example of DuPlessis claim about the work 
ĂďŽǀĞ ? ‘ƌĂĨƚy PWƌŝŵĞƌ ?ŝƐĂĐŽůůĂŐĞǁŽƌŬǁŝƚŚŽŶĞƉĂŐĞ-poem per letter of the alphabet. 
DuPlessis begins with a preface: 
This is a work from bursts of the visual in the verbal, and round about again, 
verse visa. This is a work primed with letters, with colours, read and seen, red 
and scene, the magic and oddity of daily life ripped to bits    (2007, 47) 
YƵŽƚŝĚŝĂŶ ‘ŵĂŐŝĐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŽĚĚŝƚǇ ?ďĞĐŽŵĞƐŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵůďǇǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨƚŚĞƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŝƚŝƐŚĞůĚŝŶ
between image and word ?   “ƌĞĂĚĂŶĚƐĞĞŶ ?ƌĞĚĂŶĚƐĐĞŶĞ ? ? ĂŶĚĂƐƐƵĐŚ “ƚŚĞǀŝsual in the 
ǀĞƌďĂů ?ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐĂƐĞŶƐĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ ?ĨŽƌƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ĐŽůůĂŐĞŝƐŶŽƚƐŽŵƵĐŚĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĞĚŝŶ
perception but rather a mode of perception, an activity. DuPlessis ? embraces the fragment in 
its literal presence rather than by virtue of its occlusion ?  which is to say, collage is 
appropriate to the notion of Drafts as a grid, made up of vastly different forms and textual 
interventions, a collage tapestry folded over and over. Ron Silliman comments on how 
integral this sense of the collage is to DuPlessiƐ ?ǁŽƌŬ P 
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It is in this sense, right at the edge of the written, of writing, that I take the 
collage poems to be in many ways the sections closest to being a core 
thematic statement for the whole of Drafts. I am not kidding in the slightest 
when I say that I think that M could be the topic sentence for the entire 
project. Unlike much that today calls itself asemic writing, DuPlessis 
demonstrates/explores that such marks upon paper are never without 
meaning.      (Silliman 2015, np) 
 
 ĂĐŚ ‘ƉŽĞŵ-ƉĂŐĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞCollage poems features its corresponding letter of the alphabet, 
ĂŶĚŽĨƚĞŶƐĞǀĞƌĂůŽƚŚĞƌǁŽƌĚƐǁŚŝĐŚĞǆƚĞŶĚƚŚĞůĞƚƚĞƌ ?ƐŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ? ‘D ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŚĂƐĂ
small cut out white M in a red box in the top left corner, whilst the rest of the page is 
occupied by shapes of string surrounding and interweaving between cut out geometrical 
blocks of colour. The shapes of string elicit the appearance of human figures, particularly the 
lower-central dark blue shape which resembles a female with her arms held out as if to 
cradle a child. A reading of this might propose that the figure of the caring female is strung 
ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌĂŶĚŽŶůǇǀĂŐƵĞůǇǀŝƐŝďůĞďĞŶĞĂƚŚƚŚĞůĞƚƚĞƌ ‘D ? ?ƚŚĞŐŚŽƐƚŽĨ ‘ŵŽƚŚĞƌ ?ŽŶƚŚĞƉĂŐĞ
and in the letter itself. This interpretation is of course an act of seizure on the work ?  a motif 
ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽůůĂŐĞƉŽĞŵ ‘^ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐŝŵĂŐĞƐŽĨĐůŽƵĚƐĐƵƚŽƵƚƚŽƐĞĞŵŝŶŐůǇ
ĐƌĞĂƚĞƐŚĂƉĞƐ ?ƵŶĚĞƌǁŚŝĐŚĂƉƉĞĂƌƚŚĞǁŽƌĚƐ “^ĂĚĂŶĚĐůŽƵĚƐĂŶĚƐŬǇ ?ƌĞǀĞŝůĞĚĂŶĚ
ďĞĐŽŵĞƐŝůĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ŽƚŚƚŚĞǁŽƌĚƐĂŶĚƚŚĞĐůŽƵĚƐ are obscured by a sheet of gauze 
stapled to the page. These combined elements ?  the poetic commentary on the image, the 
ĐůŽƵĚƐ ?ŝŶǀŝƚĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƐƉĂƚŝĂůŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞŐĂƵǌĞǁŚŝĐŚĞůŝĚĞƐďŽƚŚ ?  disclose the 
process of collage, wherein the work is reliĂŶƚŽŶƚŚĞĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚƐ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ
rather than their individual presences. The Collage Poems then can be seen to extend many 
of the techniques at work throughout Drafts, just as the Collage Poems, as Silliman argues, 
are a vital means of reading the larger body of Drafts. &ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ůŝŶĞŽĨĨŝǀĞ ? ?ĞĂĐŚ
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ƐŝǆƌĂĨƚƐŽĨǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ ‘'ĂƉ ? ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐƵƐĞƐ ‘ƚĞǆƚƵĂůŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĂ
collage between differing processes of erasure and mourning. The process of erasure in 
 ‘ƌĂĨƚ  ? P'ĂƉ ?ŝƐŶŽƚƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƚŝĐ ?dŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŐĂƉ ? ?ŽƌŝƚƐĂďƐĞŶƚ-presence, takes a 
ǀĂƌŝĞƚǇŽĨĨŽƌŵƐ ?ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐŵŽƐƚůŝƚĞƌĂůůǇŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ďůĂĐŬŽƵƚƐ ?ŽĨŝŶŬĞĚƐƋƵĂƌĞƐƐĞĞŵŝŶŐƚŽĐŽǀĞƌ
over writing. For example, in Draft 5, DuPlessis writes: 
Strange                              
                                                                           
                                                 (2001, 28) 
dŚĞ ‘ŐĂƉ ?ŝƐĂŶĂƉŽƌĞƚŝĐƉŽĞƚŝĐĚĞǀŝĐĞ ?/ŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽƐŝŵƵůĂƚĞĞƌĂƐƵƌĞ ?ƚŚĞďůĂĐŬŝŶŬsquares can 
only be said to present the process of omission in general rather than specific acts of erasure. 
tŚĂƚ/ŵĞĂŶďǇƚŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ŐĂƉ ?ŝƚƐĞůĨŝƐŶŽƚƐŽŵƵĐŚƚŚĞďůĂĐŬĞĚŽƵƚƐƋƵĂƌĞƐďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌ
ƚŚĞ ‘ĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚŝƐŵĂŶŝƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉĂŐĞ and the intelligible text surrounding it 
to which it is related. What is important to stress, then, is that unlike the redacted FBI files on 
'ĞŽƌŐĞKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƐƚĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇǁŚŝĐŚƵWůĞƐƐŝƐĂĐĞƐƐĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ&ƌĞĞĚŽŵŽĨ
Information Act in the process of editing his Selected Letters ?ƚŚĞ ‘ŐĂƉƐ ?ŝŶ ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ?ƐŝŵƵůĂƚĞĂ
variety of effects of erasure in a subversive manner. DuPlessis writes: 
dŚĞƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚƚŝƚůĞ ?ĂďŽƵƚůŽƐƐ ?ŝƐŽŶƚŚĞ “ůŝŶĞŽĨ ? ? ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂ “'ĂƉ ? ? “ƌĂĨƚ ? P
'ĂƉ ? ?ƚŚĂƚƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽƚŚĞĚĞĂƚŚŽĨŵǇĨather, and to the blacked out files of the 
ƉŽĞƚŽĨ'ĞŽƌŐĞKƉƉĞŶ ?dŚĞŶĞǆƚ “'ĂƉ ?ŝƐĂůƐŽĂďŽƵƚůŽƐƐ ?  
       (McCreary 2015, np) 
 ‘'ĂƉ ?ĂƐƐƵĐŚƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨĞƌĂƐƵƌĞƐ ?dŚŝƐ ‘ŐĂƉ ?ŝƐŽĨƚĞŶƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽŵŽƵƌŶŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚĂƐ
ƐƵĐŚƚŚĞƌĂĨƚƐŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ůŝŶĞŽĨĨŝǀĞ ?ĂƌĞŽĨƚĞŶĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚĞůĞŐŝĂĐŵŽĚĞƐ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŝŶ
 ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ? P'ĂƉ ? ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐǁƌŝƚĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĨŝŐƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŐĂƉĂƐ “dŚĞǁŚĂƚŝƐ-ness of it./ The 
nothing is-ŶĞƐƐŽĨŝƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?dŚĞ ‘ŝƐ-ŶĞƐƐ ?ŝƐĂŵďŝŐƵŽƵƐůǇŚĞůĚďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞĂŶĚ





ůĂƚĞƌŝŶƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “ďŽǆŽĨďůĂĐŬĨŽƌĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐ ? ?tŚĂƚŝƐĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐ ?ǁŚĂƚ
ŝƐŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ ? ? ?/ďŝĚ ? ? ? ? )dŚĞ ‘ďŽǆŽĨďůĂĐŬ ?ŚĞƌĞƐĞĞŵƐƚŽ ƌ ĨĞƌůŝƚĞƌĂůůǇƚŽƚŚĞ act of redaction, 
ďƵƚĂůƐŽĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽĂůůƵĚĞƚŽǁŚĂƚ ?ŝŶĐŽŵƉƵƚŝŶŐĂŶĚŵĞĐŚĂŶŝĐƐ ?ŝƐŬŶŽǁŶĂƐĂ ‘ďůĂĐŬďŽǆ ? ? “Ă
ĐŽŵƉůĞǆƐǇƐƚĞŵŽƌĚĞǀŝĐĞǁŚŽƐĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƐĂƌĞŚŝĚĚĞŶŽƌŶŽƚƌĞĂĚŝůǇƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ ?
 ?K ) ?dŚĞ ‘ŐĂƉ ?ŝŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝƐĞŶŝŐŵĂƚŝĐŝŶŝƚƐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝcation, though this does not mean that 
the materials surrounding it are likewise obscured. Rather, the presence of gaps can be said 
to generatively develop a specific site of meaning ?  in these cases both the text and the act 
of mourning. This typographical feature, then, can be seen to prompt a variety of semantic 
effects in its literal and etymological aspects. 
  As such, collage is a concern in specific moments of Drafts, as above, but also 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚďǇǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ? ‘ĨŽůĚŝŶŐ ?ƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚdrafts, in books of 19, 
ďĞĐŽŵĞ ‘ĚŽŶŽƌƐ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚŐƌŽƵƉƐŽĨ ? ? ?dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƐĞďŽŽŬƐ ?ĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ ? ?
lines, establishing a grid. This grid allows the reader to locate themselves at any point in the 
poem, able to see the neighbouring drafts and thematic recurrences ?  for example, a 
ĚŝĂŐŽŶĂůůŝŶĞĞǆƚĞŶĚƐĨƌŽŵ ‘y P>ĞƚƚĞƌƐ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ‘yyy P&ŽƐƐĞ ? ? ‘> ?^ĐŚŽůŝĂ ?ZĞƐƚůĞƐƐŶĞƐ ? ? ‘>yy
>ĞǆŝĐŽŶ ? ? ‘yǆĐĞƐƐ ?ƚŽ ‘y PWƌŝŵĞƌ ? ?ƚŚĞƌŽŵĂŶŶƵŵĞƌ ůƐ ŽĨǁŚŝĐŚŝŶǀŝƚĞƚŚĞƐƉĞĐƚƌĞŽĨ
WŽƵŶĚ ?ƐCantos to bear on the work. There are 114 drafts created in this way, in addition to 
ƚŚĞŚŝŐŚůǇĐŽůůĂŐŝƐƚŝĐ ‘hŶŶƵŵďĞƌĞĚ PWƌĞĐŝƐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚƐŝƚƐŽƵƚƐŝĚĞŽĨƚŚĞŐƌŝĚĂŶĚŝƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĚŽĨ
lines of the first 57 drafts. DuPlessis describes it as such: 
dŚĞ “ĨŽůĚŝŶŐ ?ŽĨŽŶĞƉŽĞŵŽǀĞƌĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?in which any draft corresponds in 
ƐŽŵĞƐĞŶƐƵŽƵƐ ?ŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂů ?ĂůůƵƐŝǀĞ ?ŽƌĞǀĞŶƐŝŵƉůĞǁĂǇƚŽĂƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ “ĚŽŶŽƌ
ĚƌĂĨƚ ?ŽŶĂƉĞƌŝŽĚŝĐŝƚǇŽĨŶŝŶĞƚĞĞŶ ?dŚĞƚĂĐƚŝĐŽĨƌĂŶĚŽŵŝǌĞĚƌĞƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶŝƐĂ
way of constructing the work like a gigantic memory of itself. The tactic of the 
fold creates a regular, though widely spaced, recurrence among the poems, 
and a chained or meshed linkage whose regularity is both predictable and 
suggestive. My inventing both a vertical and a horizontal way of thinking about 
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the relations of these poems was very liberating ? the work became malleable 
and porous, and yet framed.     (McCreary 2015, np) 
 
,ĞƌĞ ?ƚŚĞǁŽƌŬĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƐĂ ‘ŐŝŐĂŶƚŝĐŵĞŵŽƌǇŽĨŝƚƐĞůĨ ?ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ
ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞŝƐŶŽƚƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĂƚŝĐ ? which is to say, it undergoes the vicissitudes of 
 “ƌĞŐƵůĂƌ ? Q ?ƌĞĐƵƌƌĞŶĐĞ ? ?ĂƚŽŶĐĞ ‘ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĂďůĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝǀĞ ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐĐƌƵĐŝĂůƚŽƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?
extension ?  ŝƚĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞĨŽƌŵƵůĂŝĐĂůůǇĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚ ?ďƵƚŝƚŚĂƐĂƚƌĂũĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?dŚĞ ‘ĨŽůĚ ?ŝƐǁŚĂƚ
establishes the radical contingency of the composition, which is to say, it is in the process of 
creating a poem out of the materials and inquiries of another which opens the text to 
indeterminacy. Harriet Tarlo identifies this as a compositional mode whilst simulateneously 
seekinŐƚŽŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇƚŚĞĚŝƐŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ĚƌĂĨƚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĨŽůĚ ?ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐŚĂǀĞŽŶƚŚĞƌĞĂĚĞƌ
herself: 
Here we become involved in a constant -reading of the work. Yet, however 
closely we follow the folds of the drafts, however many connections we draw, 
the effect is that of moving in a series of concentric circles, a spiral which 
gradually homes in to the place where we are, but which never gets there. 
This endless desiring deferral of presence enacts its own brand of différance. 
The enfolded nature of the work prevents us from settling into reading the 
drafts either as a seamless whole or as a series of discrete pieces. Instead we 
find that we have a continual, overlapping sense of beginning again and again: 
ǁĞĂƌĞĂůǁĂǇƐ “ŝŶĐŝƉŝƚ ? ?ƚŚĞƚŝƚůĞŽĨƚŚĞƚǁĞŶƚŝĞƚŚĚƌĂft). (Tarlo, np) 
Tarlo explicitly makes the same move we performed earlier, seeking to understand the 
 ‘ƐƉŝƌĂůůŝŶŐ ?ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŽĨDrafts ďǇǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨ ‘ĞŶĚůĞƐƐĚĞƐŝƌŝŶŐĚĞĨĞƌƌĂůŽĨƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŽ
ƐĂǇ ?ŝŶĞƌƌŝĚĞĂŶƚĞƌŵƐ ?dŚĞ ‘ĨŽůĚ ?ŝƚƐĞůĨ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŚĂs a critical precedent in the work of Giles 
ĞůĞƵǌĞ ?ĂŶŽƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚWĂƚƌŝĐŬWƌŝƚĐŚĞƚƚĂƌŐƵĞƐ P “ ?d ?ŚĞĨŽůĚƌĞĐĂůůƐĞůĞƵǌĞ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ
ƚŚĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞĨŽƌƚŚĞĨŽůĚŝƐŚŽǁƚŽŵƵůƚŝƉůǇŝƚƐĞůĨƚŽŝŶĨŝŶŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŶƉ ) ?YƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ
infinite and composition are implied throughout by Drafts, but it would be more correct to 
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say that Drafts ŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚĞƐƚŚĞŝŶĨŝŶŝƚĞƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂĐƚƵĂůůǇĚŝƐƉůĂǇŝŶŐĂŶ ‘ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐŽĨƚŚĞ
ŝŶĨŝŶŝƚĞ ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞĂŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĨŝŶŝƚĞ ?/Ŷ ‘tŚĂƚ/ƐWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ?, 
Deleuze and Guattari address this in relation to the fold: 
There are always many infinite movements caught within each other, each 
folded in the others, so that the return of one instantaneously relaunches 
another in such a way that the plane of immanence is ceaselessly being 
woven, like a gigantic shuttle. (1994, 19) 
The diction here is illuminating ?   ‘dŚĞĨŽůĚ ?ŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐďĞŝŶŐ “ŝŶƐƚĂŶƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇƌĞůĂƵŶĐŚĞ ?Ě ? ?
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉĂƌƚƐŽĨĂ “ĐĞĂƐĞůĞƐƐ ?ǁĞĂǀŝŶŐ ?/ŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽDrafts ?ŽŶĞĐĂŶƐĞĞĞůĞƵǌĞ ?Ɛ address 
of the fold as indicative of the movement between the individual poems plotted in their grid. 
&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ĂƐĞůĞƵǌĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? “ ?ƚ ?ŽƚƵƌŶƚŽǁĂƌĚĚŽĞƐ Ŷ ƚŝŵƉůǇŵĞƌĞůǇƚŽƚƵƌŶĂǁĂǇďƵƚƚŽ
ĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚ ?ƚŽůŽƐĞŽŶĞ ?ƐǁĂǇ ?ƚŽŵŽǀĞĂƐŝĚĞ ? ?/ďŝĚ ? ? ? ? ) dŚŝƐ ambulatory gesture is useful in 
ĐŽŶĐĞŝǀŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĂĚĞƌ ?ƐĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĨŽůĚ ? ? a movement of orientation is always 
polysemic, simultaneously a turn away and toward, a confrontation and a getting lost, an 
avoidance. This question is one of simultaneity. How does a reader experience a poem the 
parts of which take place in variety of sequences and serials at the same time? 
  As such ?ĂŶĚƚŽƌĞƚƵƌŶďƌŝĞĨůǇƚŽĞƌƌŝĚĂ ?ƐƚĂǆŽŶŽŵǇ ?ƚŚĞĨŽůĚĐƌĞĂƚĞƐĂƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ
between the poems which can be discussed in tĞƌŵƐŽĨƐƵƉƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƌŝƚǇ ?/Ŷ ‘ QdŚĂƚ
ĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐ^ƵƉƉůĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?ĞƌƌŝĚĂǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
dŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨƚŚĞƐƵƉƉůĞŵĞŶƚ ? Q ?ŚĂƌďŽƌƐǁŝƚŚŝŶŝƚƐĞůĨƚǁŽƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ
whose cohabitation is as strange as it is necessary. The supplement adds itself, 
it is a surplus, a plenitude enriching another plenitude, the fullest measure of 
ƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞ ?/ƚĐƵŵƵůĂƚĞƐĂŶĚĂĐĐƵŵƵůĂƚĞƐƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞ ? ? Q ?ƵƚƚŚĞƐƵƉƉůĞŵĞŶƚ 
supplements. It adds only to replace. It intervenes or insinuates itself in-the-
place-of; if it fills, it is as if one fills a void.  
       (1992, 146) 
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dŚŝƐƵŶĞƋƵŝǀŽĐĂůĚƵĂůŝƐŵ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĨĂƌƚŽŽ ‘ƐƵƌƉůƵƐ ?ƚŽďĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚŵĞƌĞůǇĚŝĂůĞĐƚŝĐĂůůǇ ?ŝƐĂƚ
ŽŶĐĞĂŶĞǆƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĞƌƌŝĚĂ ?Ɛdifférance and an instructive means of coming to terms with 
the poetic encounter as a seemingly infiniƚĞ “ƉůĞŶŝƚƵĚĞ ?ĂĐĐƵŵƵůĂƚŝŶŐĂŶĚƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇ
 ‘ĨŝůůŝŶŐŝŶ ?ĂǀŽŝĚ ?DŽƌĞƚŚĂŶũƵƐƚ ‘ĨŝůůŝŶŐ ? ?ƚŚĞƐƵƉƉů ŵĞŶƚƌĞƉůĂĐĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞĚĞĨĞƌƐ
meaning. What this means for the relationship between one Draft and another is a play of 
presences and absences is always at work, most significantly in the form of citations, the 
extensive bibliography and the folding process. Whilst the Drafts themselves are often self-
contained long poems, their reliance on neighbouring works makes them subsistent on the 
arguments developed elsewhere. This logic, extended across the work, would seem to 
suggest that ultimate conclusion is deferred by the generative multiplicity of the structure of 
Drafts. This is a convenient conclusion, but might overstate the extent to which DuPlessis 
rejects notions of closure. This is to say that closure functions like any other theme in 
Drafts ?  provisionally. In this sense, there are moments wherein telos can be seen to settle, 
ďƵƚƚŚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞŝƐĂǆŝŽŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇŝŵƉĞƌŝůůĞĚďǇƚŚĞ ‘ŐƌŝĚ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĞĂĐŚ Draft sits. This 
conception of Drafts ĂůůŽǁƐƵƐǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƚŽ ?ĂƐƵWůĞƐƐŝƐǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? “Think of the whole work with 
ĂůůŝƚƐƉŽĞŵƐĂƐĂŐƌŝĚ ? ?^ŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐ P 
There is a place for any poem before it is written. This is a wonderful fact. 
What relationships are crĞĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƐĞ “ůŝŶĞƐ ? ? ?well, any that can be 
ŝŵĂŐŝŶĞĚ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƌĞƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐŝŵƉůĞĐŽůŽƌƌĞĚ ?ĂƐŝŶ “ƌĂĨƚ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ
 “ůŝŶĞŽĨ ? ? ?ƚŽĐŽŵƉůĞǆƌĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐ ŶĚŝĚĞĂƐ ?dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞ
funny rules, amusing pulsations, mini-runs (like the use of Roman numerals on 
a diagonal pattern from the Poundean XXX), necessities, intentions that reveal 
ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇĂŶĚƚĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇ ?ĂŶĚŵƵƐƚďĞŚŽŶŽƌĞĚ ?dŚĞ “ůŝŶĞŽĨ ? ?
ƐĞĞŵƐƚŽŚŽŶŽƌƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ŝƚ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐďƵƌŝĞĚŽƌĞŶĐŽĚĞĚŝŶĂůůŽĨƚŚĞƚŝƚůĞƐƚŽ
date along that line.    (McCreary 2015, np) 
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&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƐĞ ‘ůŝŶĞƐ ?ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƐŝŵƉůǇƐŝƚƵĂƚĞŽƌĨŝǆĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƌĂĨƚ
ŝŶĂƐŝŶŐůĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞ ‘ƌĂĨƚƐ ?ĂƌĞŝŶƐƚĞĂĚŚĞůĚŝŶĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨŶŽŶ-narrative arrangements at 
once. ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ŐƌŝĚ ?ŽĨDrafts ?ƚŚĞǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ ‘ĨŽůĚƐ ?ĂƌĞĂƌƌĂŶŐĞĚŝŶƚŽ ‘ůŝŶĞƐ ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐƚŽ
say, the 19 poems from Toll, the first book of drafts, are each followed in sequence by five 
ŽƚŚĞƌƉŽĞŵƐ ?ĞĂĐŚŽĨǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ĨŽůĚƐ ?ƚŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůĂŶĚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐĂ ‘ĚŽŶŽƌ ?ĚƌĂĨƚĨŽƌƚŚŽƐĞƚŚĂƚ
follow. DuPlessis comments: 
ǇůŝŶĞ ?/ŵĞĂŶǁŚĂƚ/ŚĂǀĞƚĂŬĞŶƚŽĐĂůůŝŶŐƚŚĞ “ůŝŶĞŽĨ ? ?ŽƌƚŚĞ “ůŝŶĞŽĨ ‘E ? ? P
ĂůůƚŚĞƉŽĞŵƐƚŚĂƚŽĐĐƵƌĞǀĞƌǇ ? ? ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐ “ƌĂĨƚ ? P/ƚ ? ? “ƌĂĨƚ ? ? P/ŶĐŝƉŝƚ ? ?
 “ƌĂĨƚ ? ? P^Ɖůŝƚ ?ĂŶĚƌĂĨƚ ? ? ?ĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚůǇĐĂůůĞĚ “/Ŷ^ŝƚƵ ? ?ĂƐ/ǁƌŝƚĞ ?ďƵƚŽŶĞ
never knows) ? you can see the warp/woof, even/odd in the sequence 1, 20, 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Q ?     (Ibid., np) 
In order to, as I have proposed, work with the various levels of Drafts, it seems wise, though 
not strictly necessary, to now move back to the beginning of the work, and follow the first 
 ‘ůŝŶĞ ? ?ďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐǁŝƚŚ ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? P/ƚ ? ? 
 
 ‘ƚŚĞůŝŶĞŽĨŽŶĞ ? P ‘/ƚ ? ? ‘/ŶĐŝƉŝƚ ? ? ‘^Ɖůŝƚ ? ? ‘/Ŷ^ŝƚƵ ? ? ‘WŝƚĐŚŽŶƚĞŶƚ ? ? ‘sĞů ĐŝƚǇ ? 
ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞ “ůŝŶĞŽĨ ? ?ƐĞĞŵƐƚŽŚŽŶƵƌ ƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ŝƚ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐďƵƌŝĞĚŽƌ
ĞŶĐŽĚĞĚŝŶĂůůŽĨƚŚĞƚŝƚůĞƐƚŽĚĂƚĞĂůŽŶŐƚŚĂƚůŝŶĞ ? ?/ďŝĚ ? ?ŶƉ ) ?KŶĞǁĂǇŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚŝƐ ‘ƐŵĂůů
ŶŽƵŶ ?ĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶƚŽĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŝƐĂƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞŽĨƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨĚĞŝǆŝƐ ?  uses of language 
the meaning of which is elided wŝƚŚŽƵƚĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?&ŝƌƐƚĂŶĚĨŽƌĞŵŽƐƚ ? ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? P/ƚ ?ŽƉĞŶƐ ƚŚĞ
poem in medias res raising the deixis of its title as a key motif in the work to come. 
Furthermore, the opening Draft also establishes a dialogue with a number of other openings 
of long poems, in particular Louis Zukofsky, Charles Olson and Ezra Pound. For example, Ron 
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Silliman writes, the two pairs of Ns, the first typed, the second handwritten, which open the 
entire work of Drafts can be seen to function within a nexus of meaning. He writes: 
 “ƌĂĨƚ ? P/ƚ ?ďĞŐŝŶƐǁŝƚŚƚǁŽƐŝŶŐůĞĐĂƉŝƚĂůůĞƚƚĞƌƐ ?ĞĂĐŚƉƵŶĐƚƵĂƚĞĚďǇĂƉĞƌŝŽĚ
ƐŽƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŵŝŐŚƚďĞƌĞĂĚĂƐĂďďƌĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶƐŽƌĂƐƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞƐ ?dŚĂƚĞĂĐŚŝƐ “E ?
echoes, maybe even puns the Zukofskian An. This is followed immediately by a 
pair of hand-drawn capital Ns, interlocked, one larger than the other, giving an 
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨĂŵŽƵŶƚĂŝŶƌĂŶŐĞ ?ƚŚĞůƉƐ ? ) ? ? Q ?zŽƵŵŝŐŚƚĂůƐŽ ?ŝĨǇŽƵǁĞƌĞŝŶĐůŝŶĞĚ
as I, see in that first peak of the larger N an echo there of an A, not just a 
further hint of the Zukofskian An, but of the idea of an Alpha Bet, the Roman 
written character as a medium for poetry perhaps not as divorced from the 
natural world as we might imagine. (Silliman 2015, np) 
dŚĞ ‘ĂůƉƐ ?ƚŽǁŚŝĐŚ^ŝůůŝŵĂŶĂůůƵĚĞƐĂƌĞĂƐŝůƵŶƚŝŐ ?Ɛ ?ŝŶŚŝƐƌĞĐŬŽŶŝŶŐŽĨWŽƵŶĚ ?Ɛantos, 
ĂŶĚŝŶĚĞĞĚƚŚĞE ?ƐǁƌŝƚƚĞŶĂĐƌŽƐƐĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌĞǀŽŬĞĂŵŽƵŶƚĂŝŶƌĂŶŐĞ ?^ŝůůŝŵĂŶƌĞĂĚƐĞǀĞŶ
this opening graphic gesture as indicative of a variety of allusions and intertextual references. 
This continues in the opening lines, where the dialogue can be seen to begin: 
And something spinning in the bushes  The past 
  Dismembered      sweetest 
 dizzy chunk of song 
    one possible: there is a 
in another            strange erosion and 
dready fast flash  all the sugar is reconstituted: 
    sunlight 
silver backed     ĂƐ ‘ƐƚĞŵ ? PƐƵŐĂƌĂƐĚŝƌƚ ? 
light this 
governed being:  it?  that?     (DuPlessis 2001, 1) 
 
/ŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚƚŽWŽƵŶĚ ?ƐƐĞƚƚŝŶŐŽĨĨĚŽǁŶƚŽƚŚĞƐŚŝƉƐ ?ŽƌDĂǆŝŵƵƐŽĨĨƐŚŽƌĞďǇŝƐůĂŶĚƐŝŶƚŚĞ
blood, or a quartet playing Bach, DuPlessis opens Drafts with a counter-gesture, one 
ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚŝŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂĐǇŽĨŝŵĂŐĞ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂĐůĞĂƌĨŝŐƵƌĞŽƌƐƚĂŶĐĞ ? “^ŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ?
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ƐƉŝŶƐŝŶƚŚĞďƵƐŚĞƐ ?ŽƵƚŽĨƐŝŐŚƚ ?ĂŶĚƵWůĞƐƐŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐŚĞƌƐĞůĨǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ‘ƐƚƌĂŶŐĞĞƌŽƐŝŽŶ ?ŽĨ
ƚŚŝƐƉĂƐƚ ?ĂƉĂƐƚǁŚŝĐŚŝƐďŽƚŚ ‘ƐǁĞĞƚĞƐƚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĚŝƐŵĞŵďĞƌĞĚ ? ?dŚĞĚŝƐũŽŝŶƚĞĚƐƚĂŶǌĂĞŶĚƐǁŝƚŚ
a call to the deictic ?   “ůŝŐŚƚƚŚŝƐ ?ŐŽǀĞƌŶĞĚďĞŝŶŐ Pŝƚ ?ƚŚĂƚ ? ? ?/ďŝĚ ? ) ?dŚĞ ‘ůŝŐŚƚ ?ŝŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝƐ
ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚǁŚŝĐŚŐƌĂŶƚƐŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞĚĞŝĐƚŝĐ ?ĂďĞŝŶŐǁŚŝĐŚŝƐ ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶĞĚ ?ďǇƚŚĞ
epistemological light of context.  
  dŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚƉŽĞŵŝŶƚŚĞůŝŶĞ ? ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ? P/ŶĐŝƉŝƚ ? ?ĂůůŽǁƐƵƐƚŽǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĂƉŽĞƚŝĐƐŽĨĚĞŝǆŝƐ
ĨŽůĚĞĚ ?dŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ ‘ĨŽůĚĞĚ ?ƉŽĞŵŽĨDrafts, and as such, its discussion of perpetual 
ďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶĐŝƉŝƚ ?ŶŽƚŽŶůǇĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐĂƚŚĞmatic of the fold but also embeds 
ƚŚĞ ‘ŝƚ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŽƉĞŶŝŶŐƌĂĨƚĂƐƚŚĞůĂƐƚƚǁŽůĞƚƚĞƌƐŽĨ ‘/ŶĐŝƉŝƚ ? ?dŚŝƐĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐĂĨŽůĚŝŶƚŚĞ
titles themselves which to some extent indicates the nature of the specific fold in question. In 
ƚŚĞŽƉĞŶŝŶŐůŝŶĞƐŽĨ ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ? P/ŶĐŝƉŝƚ ? ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
Curious, this querying letter from a stranger 
  Just when I had in fact 
turned back to begin, 
  it made me think again 
where I had been.      (Ibid. 130) 
 
dŚĞůĂƌŐĞ ‘ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŽƉĞŶƐƚŚĞĨŽůĚĞĚƌĂĨƚŝƐĐĂƌƌŝĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĨŝŶĂůůŝŶĞŽĨ ‘ƌĂĨƚKŶĞ P/ƚ ? ?
ǁŚŝĐŚĞŶĚƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉŚƌĂƐĞ “ĚĂƌŬĞƌ ?ĂŶƚĞĐĞĚĞŶƚƐĞĂ ? ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞ ?ĂĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝƚǇŝƐ
established, albeit a continuity which undergoes modulation ?   ‘^ĞĂ ?ďĞĐŽŵĞƐ ‘ ? ?ĂŶĚ
furthermore the line seems to reflect back on the process of ƚŚĞ ‘ĨŽůĚ ? ?dŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƌŽĨ ‘/ƚ ?ŝƐ
ĨŝŐƵƌĞĚĂƐĂƐƚƌĂŶŐĞƌ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ůĞƚƚĞƌ ? ? ‘ ? )ƋƵĞƌŝĞƐďǇǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶŶŽƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŝƚŽƉĞŶƐ ?
>ĂƚĞƌŝŶƚŚĞƉŽĞŵƵWůĞƐƐŝƐĂŐĂŝŶĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƐƚŽ ‘ƌĂĨƚKŶĞ P/ƚ ? ?ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞ
ƐĐƌĂǁůĞĚ ‘E ?ĂŶĚ ‘z ? P 
The beginning was, as these things go, 
negation. But 
 ‘ƚǁĂƐĂůƐŽƐĞƚƚŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚŽĨƐŝŐŶƐƚŽƌĞĂĚŽƌƚĞůů ? 
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Moonlit refraction by a strange heap  
ĐŽƵŶƚĞĚŽŶďĂƐĞ “E ?ĂŶĚŽŶďĂƐĞ “z ? ? 
Yes and no. Both and and.     (Ibid. 131)  
&ŽƌĂďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐƚŽďĞĨŝŐƵƌĞĚĂƐ ‘ŶĞŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƉĞƌŚaps implies the tradition in which it takes 
ƉůĂĐĞ ?dŚŝƐĂŐĂŝŶƌĞĐĂůůƐƐƵƉƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƌŝƚǇ ?ďǇ ‘ĂĚĚŝŶŐ ?ƚŽƚŚĞƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶŝŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ
ƐĞĞƐŚĞƌƐĞůĨĂƐŶĞŐĂƚŝŶŐĂƐǁĞůůĂƐ “ƐĞƚƚŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚ ? Q ?ƐŝŐŶƐƚŽƌĞĂĚŽƌƚĞůů ? ?dŚĞ ‘DŽŽŶůŝƚ
ƌĞĨƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĞĞŵƐƚŽĂůůƵĚĞƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶĞĚďĞŝŶŐ ? ‘ůŝƚ ?ŝŶ ‘ƌĂĨƚKŶĞ P/ƚ ? ? ĂŶĚĂƐƐƵĐŚ “ǇĞƐ
ĂŶĚŶŽ ?ĂƌĞĚĞŝĐƚŝĐƚĞƌŵƐ ?ƌĞůŝĂŶƚŽŶƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƚŽďĞĞŝƚŚĞƌ ?Žƌ ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞƐƚŚŝƐŝŶ
ƚŚĞƉŚƌĂƐĞ “ŽƚŚĂŶĚĂŶĚ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚƐĞĞŵƐƚŽƵƐĞ ‘ĂŶĚ ?ĂƐĂŶŽƵŶ ?ďƌŝŶŐŝŶŐƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ‘ďŽƚŚŶĞƐƐ ?
ĂŶĚ ‘ĂŶĚŶĞƐƐ ?ŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĚĞŝǆŝƐŽĨ ‘ǇĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ Ž ? ?ƚƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ŝŶĂŶ
italicised endnote, DuPlessis writes: 
/ƚ ?ƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞ/ƌĂŶŽƵƚ 
ŽĨƉĂƉĞƌƚŚĂƚ/ ?ŵǁƌŝƚŝŶŐƚŚŝƐ 
on another draft. 
So here and there 
a stranger word 
comes through. 
It being the only canvas  
wide enough for human sadness.   (Ibid. 133) 
What appears as a practical solution, a paper-saving exercise, is the opening experience of 
the fold. This gesture at the economy of drafts again recalls Derrida, whose work on Hegel in 
Writing and Difference ƐĞĞŬƐƚŽǁŽƌŬƉĂƐƚĚŝĂůĞĐƚŝĐƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂ ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂůĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ? ?Ă ‘ƉůĂǇ ?ŽĨ
ƐŝŐŶƐ ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ĨŝŶĂůůŝŶĞŚĞƌĞǁŽƌŬƐŝŶƚǁŽĚŝƐƚ ŶĐƚǁĂǇƐ ?  it seems to suggest first that the 
folded-ĚƌĂĨƚŝƐ “ƚŚĞŽŶůǇĐĂŶǀĂƐ ?ǁŝĚĞĞŶŽƵŐŚĨŽƌŚƵŵĂŶƐĂĚŶĞƐƐ ? ?ƚŚĞŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶďĞŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ
the possibilities and potentialities of the long poem allow for an interrogative mode. At the 
ƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞ ?ƚĂŬĞŶŝŶŝƚƐĚĞŝǆŝƐ ?ƚŚĞ “ŝƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŚĞ “ŽŶůǇĐĂŶǀĂƐ ?ǁŝĚĞĞŶŽƵŐŚ ?ĐŽƵůĚďĞ
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itself ?  ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇ ?ƚŚĞĚĞŝǆŝƐŽĨ ‘ŝƚ ?ŵŝŐŚƚǁĞůůďĞƚŚŝƐ ‘ĐĂŶǀĂƐ ? ?ǇůŽĐĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ŝƚ ?ŝŶ
 ‘/ŶĐŝƉŝƚ ? ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐďĞŐŝŶƐDrafts again, restating its inquiry.  The notion of restatement itself 
ƵŶĚĞƌŐŽĞƐĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŝŶ ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ? P^Ɖůŝƚ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂƚƚĞŶĚƐ ŽƉƌŽďůĞŵƐŽĨĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ
writes: 
When you are powerless 
 you say the same things 
over again 
 and over it seems 
the opposite of poetry, 
 no plumping sumptuous brocade 
with self- 
 fashioning diction. 
So writing is impossible,  
 my dog eats and is 
vaccinated, unlike some people, 
 and I am helpless ?  can this be? ?  
hardened from the concrete 
 infrastructure rigid through me. 
What would it take 
 to articulate it? 
Is writing this way 
 legit? 
Why is this entitled 
 split? 
/ƚ ?ƐůŝŬĞ/ũŽůƚŵǇĨŽƌŵĞƌŚŽƉĞƐ 
  with a rhymed bit.     (2004, 3-4) 
 
Here, a critique of the powerlessness of repeating oneself is expressed throughout a stanza 
ǁŚŝĐŚďĞĐŽŵĞƐƉĂƌŽĚŝĐĂůůǇƌĞƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞ ?ƌĞůǇŝŶŐŽŶƚŝŐŚƚƌŚǇŵĞƐĂƚƚŚĞĞŶĚƚŽ “ũŽůƚ ? Q ?ĨŽƌŵĞƌ
ŚŽƉĞƐ ? ?dŚĞƐĞĨŽƌŵĞƌŚŽƉĞƐƐĞĞŵƚŽƌĞĨĞƌƚŽĂŶŝůůƵƐŝŽŶĐƌĞĂƚĞĚďǇ “ƐƵŵptuous brocade/ 
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with self- ?ĨĂƐŚŝŽŶŝŶŐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?/ŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?ƚŚĞƉŽĞƚŝƐ ‘ŚĞůƉůĞƐƐ ?Ă ǁĞůůĂƐ ‘ƉŽǁĞƌůĞƐƐ ? ?ǁŽŶĚĞƌŝŶŐ
what it would take/ to articulate it? ? ?DǇĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐ ? ?ŐĂŝŶ ?ĚĞŝǆŝƐŝƐƌĞǀĞĂůĞĚŚĞƌĞŝŶĂŶ ‘ŝƚ ?
ǁŚŝĐŚŝƚƐĞůĨƐĞĞŵƐ ‘ƉŽǁĞƌůĞƐƐ ? ?ůŽƐƚŝŶƌĞƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŽďůŝƋƵĞŝŶƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ? ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ? P^Ɖůŝƚ ?
begins with a statement that: 
 









 “/ƚ ?ŵĂƌŬƐĚŽƚƐ 
down on the page.      (2004, 2) 
 
Here an image of the inexorable power of writing is contrasted with the later helplessness. 
ǀĞŶŝŶĂƚƚĞŶƚŝǀĞĂŶĚĨƌŽŵĂůŝŵƉůǇŚĞůĚƉĞŶ ?ĨƌŽŵŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ “ĂŶ ‘/ƚ ?ŵĂƌŬƐĚŽƚƐ ?ĚŽǁŶŽŶƚŚĞ
ƉĂŐĞ ? ?dŚŝƐ ‘/ƚ ?ƐĞĞŵƐƚŽŐĞƐƚƵƌĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐŶĞŝƚŚĞƌƚŚŚĂŶĚŶŽƌƚŚĞƉĞŶ ?ďƵƚƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ
indeterminate between them. TŚĞ ‘ŝƚŶĞƐƐ ?ŽĨŝŶƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŝƚƐĞůĨŝƐ ?ĂƐƐƵĐŚ ?ĨŝŐƵƌĞĚĂƐďĞŝŶŐ
neither an act purely of the pen or the hand, but a chiasmic interplay. These concerns are 
developed further in the following fold, which concerns itself with the self-reflective question 
ŽĨ “ŚŽǁĐĂůů ‘ŝƚ ?ƚŽĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ? ? ? ? ) ?/Ŷ ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ? P/Ŷ^ŝƚƵ  Du lessis writes: 
This was to be a beginning, 
 a simple beginning, in situ, 
  that is, in the middle, here. 
An impossible task 
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 but tempting. 
  Since all words dismember into invention. 
For in (or by) the act of starting (staring, stating) 
 something else takes shape. 
  How  
could It be otherwise?   (2007, 1) 
 
 
 “/ƚ ?ŝƐĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚĂƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝƐ ? ?ĂƐƚĂƚĞŽĨ ŚĞŽďũĞĐƚ ?ŝƚƐƋƵŝĚĚŝƚǇ ?dŚĞĂĐƚŽĨ
ďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐŝƐƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽƚŚŝƐ “ŝƚŶĞƐƐ ?ďǇǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨƉresence. The beginning of a thing, of a 
ůŝƚĞƌĂƌǇǁŽƌŬ ?ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƚŝŵĞƚŚŝƐ ‘ŝƚŶĞƐƐ ? ?ƚŚŝƐĞŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƚŚŝŶŐ ?dŚĞŽƉĞŶŝŶŐ
phrase ?   “dŚŝƐǁĂƐƚŽďĞĂďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐ ? ? itself indicates a prior establishment of a desire to 
begin, which itself raises the question of the immanence of such a recognition. The event of 
 ‘ďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐ ?ŝƐĂƐƐƵĐŚŝŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚĞ ? ĂƐƵWůĞƐƐŝƐŚĂƐŝƚ ? “ĂŶŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚĂƐŬ ? ?ďƵƚ
ƚĞŵƉƚŝŶŐ ? ?dŚĞƐĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞ ‘ůŝŶĞŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ
context, articulation, quiddity and deixis find a direct voicing in the following fold, which 
seeks to question structure and arrangement, particularly in regards to the Drafts themselves 
ĂƐĞĂĐŚŽƉĞŶŝŶŐĂ ‘ďŽŽŬ ?ŽĨDrafts.  ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ? PWŝƚĐŚŽŶƚĞŶƚ ? begins with a Hélène Cixous 
quotation which opens the poem onto an investigation of its own place in the book and 
books of Drafts. ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐƋƵŽƚĞƐŝǆŽƵƐŝŶƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ƐĞŶĚŶŽƚĞ P
Books are characters in books. Between authors and books, not everything 
can be taken for granted. It [the book] wants to write. It wants me to write it.  
        (2010, 173) 
dŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ƐŽƉĞŶŝŶŐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĞƐĞĂŶǆŝĞƚŝĞƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐƚŚĞƉůĂĐĞŽĨĞĂĐŚĚƌĂĨƚŝŶ Drafts and 
the place of Drafts in each draft: 
A 
first page empty, blank and null. 
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The table clear. 
Begin. But how? as Empty? Full? 
And where?         (Ibid., 3) 
Again, the problem of beginning is reiterated, and, with reference to tabula rasa, the 
prospect of beginning again is troubled simultaneously by a vacuum and a plenum. The 
 ‘ǁŚĞƌĞŶĞƐƐ ?ŽĨƚŚŝƐďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐŝƐďŽƚŚŝŶƐŝĚĞĂŶĚŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĞďŽŽŬ P 
The Book 
or B 
  would show itself as wall, 
  writing scribbled on off-cuts, 
  marks smuggled into cracks, 
   opening, penetration, fold, hinge; 
   leave something, leaving anything. 
   A dot, a smudge, a scrap.      (Ibid., 2) 
 
 
This wall which the book shows itself as, carrying its smuggled marks, prompts a taxonomy of 
procedures we recognise from throughout Drafts. dŚĞ ‘ŚŝŶŐĞ ?ĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĚƌĂĨƚƐ
ŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ůŝŶĞŽĨŽŶĞ ?ŝƐĐůĞĂƌĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝƌƉĞŶƐŝǀĞŵĞĚŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŽŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐŽĨďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐ ?ĂůůŽĨ
ǁŚŝĐŚƐĞĞŵƐŝŵƉůŝĞĚŝŶƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞůŝŶĞ ?ƐŽƉĞŶŝŶŐǁŽƌĚ ‘/ƚ ? ? 
   ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ? PsĞůŽĐŝƚǇ ? ?ƚŚĞĨŝŶĂůƉŽĞŵŝŶƚŚĞůŝŶĞ ?ĐĂƌƌŝĞƐ ƚŚĞĚĞŝĐƚŝĐ ‘ŝƚ ?ŝŶƚŽ ‘ǀĞůŽĐŝƚǇ ? ?
addressing speed and pace in the context of perception. The poem opens with the image of a 
swallowtail: 
 
Pulses uneven, pushes 
  surging air gusts, gusts plunge 
   horizontally, sweeping 
wings, its wings 
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  open and shut, balancing 
   the swallowtail 
gripping down. 
  It snorkels precariously, 
   fast as it can.    (2013, 23) 
 
dŚĞƐĞůŝŶĞƐĐĂƐĐĂĚĞŝŶĂƐƚǇůĞƌĞŵŝŶŝƐĐĞŶƚŽĨůĂƚĞĂƌůŽƐtŝůůŝĂŵƐ ? ‘ƐƉŚŽĚĞů ?ƚŚĂƚ'ƌĞĞŶǇ
&ůŽǁĞƌ ? ) ?ǁŚŝůƐƚƚŚĞƐǇŶƚĂǆĂŶĚŽƌŐĂŶisation of line breaks recalls the relation between form 
and object of perception in The Falls sections of Paterson. This modernist lyricism is used to 
enact velocity, offering five clauses before indicating the noun to which these velocities are 
occurring ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƐƚĂŶǌĂƚŚĂƚ “dŚŝƐŝƐĂǁĞůů-known dream-
genre ?  EŽĐŽŶƐŽůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?/ďŝĚ ? ) ?ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŶŐƉĞƌŚĂƉƐĂƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽĂůǇƌŝĐǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚ
pretend to find some transcendental consolation. The form of the poem is bipartite: the 
ƐĞĐŽŶĚŚĂůĨŝƐƐƵďƚŝƚůĞĚ ‘ZĞŵĂƌŬƐ ? ?ĂŶĚĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐŝŶĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨƉĂƌĂŐƌĂƉŚƐǁŚŝĐŚƌĞĨůĞĐƚďĂĐŬŽŶ
the language used in the more conventional stanza shapes of the first half of the poem. The 
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŽŶƐŽůĂƚŝŽŶĂƌŝƐĞƐĂŐĂŝŶŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌĂůůĞůƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ZĞŵĂƌŬƐ ? P
That gust of pulsing, wide and fast plunging crosswise push and change 
that made this mark, this / this \ like any brightness blown, any wing or leaf, 
I wanted to say it was Parnassius Mnemosyne (clouded Apollo) for its 
fancier name- ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐŶ ?ƚtrue. It was just a swallowtail in which the 
ǁŽƌĚ ‘ŵĞŵŽƌǇ ?ĚŝĚŶŽƚĂƉƉĞĂƌŶŽƌƚŚĞƚŽƵĐŚŽĨ ‘ƉŽĞƚƌǇ ? ?It was just 
ordinary, not endangered, no more than anything.   (Ibid., 24) 
Here DuPlessis reflects on the process by which the Swallowtail was arrived at ?  making clear 
that a desire to resist a sense of reading the poetic in objects, rather than the reverse. This 
discloses the process of the poet having followed etymology and dismissed its rigours in 
favour of an attempt to measure its movement, its velocity in flight. The mythic origin, 
ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐǁĂůůŽǁƚĂŝůĂƐĂƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞŽĨ ‘ŵĞŵŽƌǇ ? ?ŝƐƐŝŵƉůǇŶŽƚƚƌƵĞ ? “It was just 
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ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ? ?dŚĞĚĞŝǆŝƐŝƐƐƚŝůůƐĞǀĞƌĞ ?ĂƐǁŚĞŶƵWůĞƐƐŝƐƐƚĂƚĞƐ P “dŚĞ ‘ŝƚ ?ĞŵĞƌŐĞĚĂůŵŽƐƚ
ƵŶƐĞĞŶ ? ?ůƵƌŬŝŶŐ ? ?/ďŝĚ ? ? ? ? ) ?/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ƐŚĞĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĞƐƐĂǇ ‘KŶƌĂĨƚƐ ?ƚŚĂƚ “tŚĂƚ/
ůĞĂƌŶĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƌĂĨƚƐǁĂƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂůŽƚŽĨ ‘ŝƚ ?ŽƵƚƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐĂůů ‘ŝƚ ? ?
(2006, 213).  
 
Conclusion 
/Ŷ ‘,ĂŝďƵŶ PƌĂǁzŽƵƌKǁŶƌĂĨƚ ? ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚƐŚĞŚĂƐ “ĂĐƵůƚƵƌĂůresponsibility to 
ƚŚĞĂďƐĞŶƚǁŽŵĂŶ ? ?/ďŝĚ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?  whilst clearly home to a variety 
of structural and linguistic indeterminacies ?  has a clear orientation in terms of its ethical 
ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ?dŚĞƐĞĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƐĂƌĞŶ ?ƚŵĞƌĞůǇĞǆƉůŽƌed in the long poem, but, in 
ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ǀŝĞǁ ?ĂƌĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐof ƚŚĞůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵ ? ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ? P&ůĂƐŚĂĐŬ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƐŝƚƵĂƚĞĚŽŶ
the line-of-ƚǁŽďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐǁŝƚŚ ‘^ŚĞ ? ?ƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐŽŶĂĐƚƐŽĨ “ĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐǁŽŵĞŶŽǀĞƌ ?ǁŝƚŚŐŝŐĂŶƚŝĐ
ĐůŽƚŚƐ ?ŽĨƐŶĂŐŐŝŶŐƚŚĞŵŝŶŶĞƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ) ?DƵĐŚŽĨƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ǁŽƌŬ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶŚĞƌ
ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůƉƌŽƐĞ ?ƐĞĞŬƐƚŽƵŶƚĂŶŐůĞƚŚĞƐĞŶĞƚƐĂŶĚƵŶĨŽůĚƚŚĞƐĞĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐƐŽǀĞƌ ?/Ŷ ‘DĂƌďůĞ
WĂƉĞƌ PdŽǁĂƌĚƐ&ĞŵŝŶŝƐƚ,ŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨWŽĞƚƌǇ ? ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞƐƚŚŝƐĂŶǆŝĞƚǇĂƐĂĚĞƐŝƌĞ
ĂŶĚŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇƚŽ “ƌĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝƐĞ ? “ĂůůĐƵůƚƵƌĞĂŶĚĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ ? P  
/ĂŵƚŚĞŐŚŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞ ?ƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞƌƵďƌŝĐ ‘ĨĞŵŝŶŝƐƚ ?ĂůůĐƵůƚƵƌĞĂŶĚĂůů
cultural products would have to be reconceptualised. In particular, it is time 
for a totally different History of Poetry talking ĂďŽƵƚ “ǁŽŵĂŶ ?ǁŽŵĞŶ ? ?
 “ŵĂŶ ?ŵĞŶ ? ?ĨĞŵŝŶŝŶŝƚǇ ?ŵĂƐĐƵůŝŶŝƚǇ ?ƐĞǆƵĂůŝƚǇ ?ĞĨĨĞŵŝŶĂĐǇ ?ĨĞŵĂůĞŵĂƐĐƵůŝŶŝƚǇ ?
and queerness, torqueing and resisting binaries. (2002, 101) 
ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐƐĞĞŬƐƚŽŽƌŝĞŶƚƚŚĞ ‘,ŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨWŽĞƚƌǇ ?ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐŶŽƚŽŶůǇƚŚĞ
spĞĐŝĨŝĐďŝŶĂƌŝĞƐŽĨŵĂůĞ ?ĨĞŵĂůĞďƵƚĂůƐŽďŝŶĂƌŝĞƐŵŽƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ?dŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?
ĨĞŵĂůĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝĂůǀŽŝĐĞ ‘ŐŚŽƐƚƐ ?ƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂů ‘,ŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨ
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WŽĞƚƌǇ ?ŝƐŝƚƐĞůĨŚĂƵŶƚĞĚďǇŝƚƐŽŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐŽĨĨĞŵĂůĞĂŶĚĨĞŵŝŶŝŶĞǀŽŝces. Again, the double-
ƉůĂǇŽĨ ‘ŐĞŶĚĞƌ ?ŐĞŶƌĞ ?ĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ ?ĨŽƌƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ĂĨĞŵŝŶŝƐƚ
project is necessarily textual, and involves a task of redressing the development of poetic 
forms themselves as well as individual acts of poetry. As such, she continues: 
Poetic traditions, genres of poems, poetic authority as textual manifested, 
representations of subjectivity and social location, discussions of relationships 
including romance, love, desire, inspiration, and repulsion ?  all elements 
deeply constitute of poetic texts ?  can reveal gender assumptions that open 
ƚŚĞ ‘ĨŝĞůĚ ?ŽĨƉŽĞƚƌǇƚŽŶĞǁǁĂǇƐŽĨĞŶǀŝƐŝŽŶŝŶŐŝƚƐƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ ?ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐŽĨ
representation and meanings. (2002, 102) 
Here, DuPlessis articulates her feminist project as pertaining not only to the emancipation of 
women but also to the emancipation of meaning, as the former is inextricably bound with the 
latter. This relationship is articulated in terms of voice. DuPlessis writes:  
Oh, the poet! Some of her, in or for any given poem, is the subjectivity of the 
enunciation. However, there is something left over, left out. This involves 
ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉŚĂůĨƚĞǆƚƵĂůĂŶĚŚĂůĨŝŶ ‘ďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ? ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐ ?ŝŶŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?ŝŶ
ƚĞŵƉŽƌĂůŝƚǇ )ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŽĨĂŶǇƉŽĞŵ ?ƐĞŶƵŶĐŝĂƚŝŽŶand the 
historically existing writer. (2006, 103) 
ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐŝŶƐŝƐƚƐŽŶƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚŝĂůďĂƐŝƐŽĨĨĞŵŝŶŝƐƚĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĐůĂƌŝĨǇǁŚĂƚŝƐ ‘ůĞĨƚ
ŽǀĞƌ ?ůĞĨƚŽƵƚ ?ĂƐƉĞƌƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?
ƉŚƌĂƐĞ ‘ƚŚĞ ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĞŶƵŶĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐĂƐƐƵĐŚƵƐĞĨƵůŝŶĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚŝŶŐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ
 ‘ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐǁƌŝƚĞƌ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐďǇǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞĨĞŵĂůĞWŽĞƚŝƐĨŽƌŵĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĂĐƚŽĨ
ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ?/Ŷ ‘&ŽƌdŚĞƚƌƵƐĐĂŶƐ ? ?ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐĚĞĨŝŶĞƐƚŚŝƐ ‘&ĞŵĂůĞĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ ?ĂƐ P  “ƚŚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ
formal, epistemological, and thematic strategies of the group Woman, strategies born in 
struggle with much of already existing culture, and overdetermined by two elements of 




DuPlessis assembles in her project. dŚĞŝƌĐŽĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ŐƌŝĚ ?ŽĨDrafts establishes a 
sense of the whole work as an encyclopaedic inquiry, adopting and manipulating a range of 
traditional poetic forms and bringing them together under the auspices of a provisionality 
ǁŚŝĐŚ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚƌŝĨĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?ŝƐŶŽƚ ‘ƚŽƚĂůŝƐŝŶŐ ? ?dŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?ƐƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŽĨƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ
ďƌŝŶŐƐƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?ĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌes of poetic extension to a likewise provisional end. It remains in 
the conclusion that follows to bring together these observations concerning idiosyncrasy and 
extension and to seek to underscore precisely what my argument has offered to the 
discourse surrounding American poetics, the long poem and the relationship between poetry 
and phenomenology. DuPlessis will as such remain a prominent figure in this discussion, as 
her Drafts and critical prose constitute what is arguably the most sustained and developed 





8    An ever-renewed experience of its own beginning  





/ƚǁŽƵůĚďĞŝŶĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞŝŶĐůŽƐŝŶŐƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐƚŽƐĞĞŬƚŽ ‘ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞ ?ŝŶĂŶǇĨŝŶĂůƐĞŶƐĞ ?ĂƐ
though I had settled a debate or solved a problem once and for all. To make such a move at 
ƚŚĞĞŶĚǁŽƵůĚďĞĂƉƚƚŽƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞƚŚĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ?ƐŐƵŝĚŝŶŐĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƚhe work performed 
by the individual chapters. It is still necessary, however, to re-affirm the principles with which 
this thesis set out and to indicate where they have taken us. Most importantly, it is crucial 
that I reframe the model of extended poetics espoused in my introduction in the light of my 
observations of Oppen, Schuyler, Blaser, Hejinian, Scalapino, Howe and DuPlessis. In this 
ƌĞŐĂƌĚ/ĂŵƐĞĞŬŝŶŐƚŽĞŵƵůĂƚĞƚŚĞŝŶĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝǀĞĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶŽĨ>ǇŶ<ĞůůĞƌ ?ƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚǁŽƌŬ
Forms of Expansion: Recent Long Poems by Women ?/ŶĐůŽƐŝŶŐ ?<ĞůůĞƌǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “KŶĞŽĨŵǇ
primary aims in bringing together into a single book readings of eight very different long 
poems by contemporary women has been to convey a sense of the amazing variety ?  and 
vitality ?  ŽĨǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ŝŶĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚĨŽƌŵƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )ƐŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚĂƚƚŚĞŽƵƚƐĞ  ?/
favour this embrace of difference as opposed to models of criticism (for example, those of 
Rosenthal and Gall, Stephen Fender, Margaret Dickie, Burton Hatlen and Peter Middleton) 
which have sought to command coherence in the form of historical narratives and lineages of 
influence.  
  Furthermore, it is characteristic of phenomenological practice ?  in the hands of 
Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, the two most prominent theoretical figures throughout this 
work ?  to embrace provisionality, inconclusiveness and open-endedness as not only valuable 
rhetorical devices but as fundamentally authentic aspects of the writing of criticism and 
philosophy. In many ways, it is this ambition of phenomenology which is most relevant to my 
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ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?tŚĂƚ/ŚĂǀĞƐŽƵŐŚƚƚŽƌĞĚƌĞƐƐŝŶƚŚĞĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨ ‘dŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ>ŽŶŐWŽĞŵ ?ŝƐ
similar to what Merleau-Ponty saw as the crucial mistakes of scientism and psychologism in 
the early 20th century; namely, the insistence on erasing contingency from intellectual inquiry 
in favour of  cohesion. In the process of characterising extended poetics as a series of 
idiosyncratic acts, I have in each instance by necessity worked from the poems themselves 
and the terms they employ, rather than seeking to impose an external agenda informed by 
ƚŚĞĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽŵĂŬĞƚŚĞǁŽƌŬƐĐŽŶĨŽƌŵƚŽĂƐŝŶŐůĞŵŽĚĞůŽĨƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?/Ŷ ‘tŚĂƚ/Ɛ
WŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ ? ? ?DĞƌůĞĂƵ-Ponty articulates the basis of this ambition:  
To return to the things themselves is to return to that world which precedes 
knowledge, of which knowledge always speaks and in relation to which 
scientific determination is abstract, significative and dependent, as is 
geography in relation to the countryside in which we have learnt first what a 
forest, a prairie, or a river is. (2012, 57) 
Following this metaphor, to seek now to draw a map of American extended poetics based on 
my journey through them as sites of inquiry would abstract the features to which I have 
borne witness, would misrepresent the contexts in which these features were encountered. 
This is not to claim that maps are useless ?  but rather that the landscape remains the initial 
point at which, in a contingent and undetermined manner, meaning is first encountered. 
What is at stake here is a nuanced appreciation of what it means to overlook. A point of 
vantage ?  such as that offered after a long period of research ?  allows one at once to look 
over a range of things, but also risks overlooking these things in favour of the abstraction of 
their assembled parts. Again, Merleau-Ponty articulates this concern:  
All of what I know of the world, even through science, I know on the basis of a 
view, which is mine, or on the basis of an experience of the world without 
which the symbols of science would be meaningless. (Ibid., 56) 
dŚŝƐŝƐŶŽƚƚŽƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚƐƚƵĚŝĞƐŽĨ ‘dŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ>ŽŶŐWŽĞŵ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐŝƚǇ
ĂŶĚŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƐŽĨŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĂƌĞƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ‘ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐůĞƐƐ ? ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇƌŝƐŬ
meaninglessness if they lose sight of the experience of the poems from which these concepts 
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ĚĞǀĞůŽƉ ?ƌƵĐŝĂůůǇ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨǁŽƌŬƐŽĨƉŽĞƚŝĐĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ ?ǁŚĂƚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐƚŚĞ ‘ƉŽĞŵ ?ŝƐ
itself subject to structural, formal, thematic, generic and temporal ruptures. It is specifically 
for this reason that a phenomenological methodology has allowed me to address 
ŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐǇŝŶĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ “ƚŽƌĞƚƵƌŶƚŽƚŚĞƚŚŝŶŐƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ
means to return to the individual acts of inquiry from which the larger structures of long 
poems develop. To be clear: not only is this a question of how one ought to go about 
research in poetics generally, it is also a specific question of how one can best retain the 
quality of idiosyncrasy when exploring a form of intellectual practice that is inherently highly 
specialised and site-specific.  
   A further difficulty exists in that my emphasis on idiosyncrasy throughout this thesis 
would be threatened by an attempt to impose artificial cohesion at this point. This is not to 
say, however, that similarities do not exist, nor to deny that it might be possible to find 
common ground between these poets as a means of bringing this thesis to a close. There 
might be a strong temptation, for example, to suggest that my readings have illuminated the 
fundamentally intersubjective nature of many 20th century American works of poetic 
extension. This, to my mind, would be an accurate statement, but it would also undermine 
the very nature of the intersubjective inquiries at hand. This is because in order for an 
engagement with an Other to be ethical, it must not appropriate nor generalise. This follows 
>ĞǀŝŶĂƐ ?ƐĞŶƐĞŽĨĞƚŚŝĐƐ ?ǁŚĞƌĞŝŶĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞKƚŚĞƌŵƵƐƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇŝŶǀŽůǀĞĂ
negotiation of that which is absolutely other, an entity which cannot be comprehended in 
terms of the Same. One vital question, then, remains. Has an insistence on idiosyncrasy, 
extension and the poem-as-inquiry successfully circumvented the problems associated with 
the historicist narratives of Fender, Rosenthal, Gall and Gardner which I addressed at the 
outset of the work? 
  The answer to this lies in the importance of taxonomical distinctions. In addition to 
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my own three guiding terms ?  extension, idiosyncrasy and inquiry ?  I have been able to add 
to these the specifŝĐƚĞƌŵƐŽĨĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚďǇƚŚĞƉŽĞƚƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ?KƉƉĞŶ ?Ɛ
 ‘ŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ? ?^ĐŚƵǇůĞƌ ?Ɛ ‘ůŝĨĞ ? ?ůĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ ‘ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ? ?^ĐĂůĂƉŝŶŽĂŶĚ,ĞũŝŶŝĂŶ ?Ɛ ‘ƐŝŐŚƚ ? ?,ŽǁĞ ?Ɛ
 ‘ŵĂƌŐŝŶ ?ĂŶĚƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ? ‘ĚƌĂĨƚ ?ŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĐƌƵĐŝĂůŝŶĂůůŽǁŝŶŐŵĞƚŽĨƌĂŵĞĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŝŶ
American poetics. By dealing with poets in their own terms, it has been possible to articulate 
a variety of divergent poetics whilst retaining an intense focus on idiosyncrasy. My use of the 
ƚĞƌŵ ‘ŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐǇ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚŝƐǁŽƌŬŚĂƐďĞĞŶĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝŶŵǇĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽ re-conceptualise 
the long poem as a work of extension rather than as a cohesive generic category. Perhaps 
most importantly, what has come to light in the disclosure of the six poets in this work is the 
fact that idiosyncrasy can itself function as a way of framing compositional practice. By this I 
mean to make clear the fact that in each of my readings, it has not been my intention to 
emphasise oddity or peculiarity, but rather to develop idiosyncrasy as a measure of the way 
in which individual poets organise their acts of extension. In this case, then, idiosyncrasy is 
primarily a matter of compositional form, of how a poet inaugurates their poetics across a 
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƐƉĂŶ ?dŚĞůŝŵŝƚƐŽĨƚŚŝƐ ‘ƐƉĂŶ ?ĂƌĞŶŽƚĞĂƐŝůǇĞŶƵŵĞƌĂƚĞĚ ?ƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁŽƌŬƐ
of poetic extension are inherently idiosyncratic ?  which is to say, subject to their own 
internal logics which can only be arrived at with close-reading of their parts in tandem with 
an engagement with the structural organisation of these parts. That is to say, there are as 
many modes and means of extension as there are poets who have written works of poetic 
extension. 
  Of course, it could reasonably be argued that poetic idiosyncrasy is not necessarily 
limited to works of extension. The counter to this is that the complex arrangements and 
multiple temporalities of extended poems allow the reader to witness the poetics implicit in 
shorter works writ large, in increasingly complicated, complex and self-referential structures. 
This is to say that extended poems are ĂůǁĂǇƐŝŶƐŽŵĞǁĂǇĂĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨ ‘ƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ? ?ƚŚĞ
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thought about poetry as opposed to poetry itself. Indeed, one way of characterising the 
extensive practices in this thesis together is that they each adopt strategies in order to 
maintain the momentum of their works. In some instances, this might appear a 
fundamentally formal matter ?  ĂƐŝŶZĂĐŚĞůůĂƵƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?Drafts Žƌ'ĞŽƌŐĞKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐOf 
Being Numerous ?  where it could be argued that the quantity of the poem comes about 
through the development of a structure into which the poem fits. In both instances, 
however, the wider structures of the work are arrived at in response first and foremost to 
ethical questions. Similar ethical questions arise in the far more aleatoric works of Robin 
Blaser and James Schuyler as a reaction to proximate social relations, rather than an explicitly 
stated intellectual project, while for Susan Howe, Leslie Scalapino and Lyn Hejinian, 
collaboration with present and absent voices allows poetic discourse to extend into the 
margins and into the lives of others. 
  For these reasons, /ŚĂǀĞĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚƚŚŝƐďƌŝĞĨĨŝŶĂůĐŚĂƉƚĞƌŽĨŵǇƚŚĞƐŝƐ ‘/ŶĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ?ŝŶ
order to gesture at the fact that what has been presented over the previous seven chapters 
argues first and foremost that it is openneƐƐĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽ ‘ĐůŽƐƵƌĞ ?ǁŝƚŚǁŚŝĐŚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ
extended poetics are concerned ?  openness of form and of compositional process, but also 
openness manifested as the articulation of exteriority, of what lies beyond subjectivity and 
the text. 
  In closing, I will now briefly turn to this sense of generative poetic and 
ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ‘ŽƉĞŶŶĞƐƐ ?ďǇĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƚǁŽƉŽĞƚƐǁŚŽďŽŽŬĞŶĚŵǇƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?  George 
Oppen and Rachel Blau DuPlessis. It seems appropriate that this final encounter with 
extended poetics should involve close reading of two poets both well-versed in 
phenomenology who collaborated closely and wrote major works of poetic extension. 
ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ? ‘ƌĂĨƚ ? ? P,ĂƌĚŽƉǇ ?ŝƐĂƉŽĞŵǁŚŝĐŚŝƐ ‘ŵĂƉƉĞĚŽŶƚŽ ? ? ‘ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƐƚŽ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚŝŶŬƐ
ĂďŽƵƚ ?KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐOf Being Numerous ?/ƚŝƐ ?ĨŽƌ>ŝďďŝĞZŝĨŬŝŶ ? “ĂĐƌƵĐŝĂůũƵŶĐƚƵƌĞĨŽƌŚĞƌůŽŶŐ
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ƉŽĞŵ ?ŝŶƚŚĂƚŝƚĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞƐ “KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚƌĞƐƉĞĐƚƚŽƐŽĐŝĂůĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? ? ?ŶƉ )ŐĂŝŶ ?ŝƚŝƐ
important to underscore the sense in which I am aware that it is a contrivance to bring the 
disparate materials of this study under the auspices of a single closing gesture, but Oppen 
ĂŶĚƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ďƌŽƵŐŚƚƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌŝŶ ‘,ĂƌĚŽƉǇ ? ?ƐƚĂŶĚĂƐĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĐŽŵƉĞůůŝŶŐŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ
within the nexus of poets and poems I have brought together here. The following comments 
ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ǁŽƌŬŽĨƉŽĞƚŝĐĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶĂƐĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽĐŽŶƐŽůŝĚĂƚĞƚŚĞ
methodology I have developed throughout this thesis, with a view to clarifying, in closing the 
advantages of re-ĐŽŶĐĞŝǀŝŶŐ ‘dŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ>ŽŶŐWŽĞŵ ?as a range of diverse acts of 
extended inquiry.  
  Of Being Numerous opens by placing a profound emphasis on what is at stake when 
ǁĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐƚŚŝŶŐƐŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨ ‘ǁĞ-ŶĞƐƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŽƵƌ-ŶĞƐƐ ? ?KƉƉĞŶďĞŐŝŶƐ P 
There are things 
tĞůŝǀĞĂŵŽŶŐ ‘ĂŶĚƚŽƐĞĞƚŚĞŵ 
Is to kŶŽǁŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ? 
 
Occurrence, a part 
Of an infinite series, 
 
The sad marvels; 
 
Of this was told 
A tale of our wickedness. 
It is not our wickedness.    (Oppen 2003, 163) 
 
dŚĞ ‘ƚĂůĞŽĨŽƵƌǁŝĐŬĞĚŶĞƐƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ŝƐŶŽƚŽƵƌǁŝĐŬĞĚŶĞƐƐ ? ? KƉƉĞŶ ?ƐĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ the 
early 20th century ?  ďĞĐŽŵĞƐ ?ŝŶƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ƉŽĞŵ ?ĂŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨ “ĚŝƐƚŽƌƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ ĞůŽŶŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶ
ǁŚŝĐŚǁĞĂƌĞ “ŚĞůĚŚŽƐƚĂŐĞƚŽŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ?^ŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
To refuse this "we" ?  
in one sense easy, and already done, 
in another sense 
seems almost impossible.    (2010, 62) 
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ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐƌĞĨƌĂŵĞƐƚŚĞĂƉŽƌŝĂŽĨKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐŽƉĞŶŝŶŐůŝŶĞƐ ?ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞĨƵƐĂůŽĨ ‘ŽƵƌ-ŶĞƐƐ ?
ĂƐďŽƚŚƚŚĞĐĂƵƐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨ ‘ǁŝĐŬĞĚŶĞƐƐ ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐƌĞŵŝŶŝƐĐĞŶƚŽĨKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐŽǁŶ
bewildered obsession with the bind of singularity and numerousness. It also has clear 
politico-ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐZŝĨŬŝŶƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ? ‘,ĂƌĚŽƉǇ ?ǁĂƐ “ǁƌŝƚƚĞŶĂƚƚŚĞŵŽŵĞŶƚ
ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞĐŽƐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ/ƌĂƋtĂƌǁĞƌĞƉŽŝƐĞĚƚŽĞǆĐĞĞĚsŝĞƚŶĂŵ ? ? ?ŶƉ )dŚĞĐƌƵĐŝĂůĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ
in the perceptive stances of Oppen and DuPlessis has tŽĚŽǁŝƚŚ ?ƚŽƵƐĞƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ ?ƐƚĞƌŵ ?
plethora. In this regard, DuPlessis writes: 
It's a question of "among" or some 
shatter of the reflection 
"to see them"  
and "to know ourselves." 
The distortion and elongation, 
the stupor.      (2010, 62) 
 
We do not simply see ourselves in the things we live among; this reflection, for DuPlessis, has 
become shattered, distorted and elongated. This seems closely related to what DuPlessis 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐĂƐKƉƉĞŶ ?Ɛ “ƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞůǇ ?ĂƐŵŽǀŝŶŐĂŵŽŶŐĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?and 
propos[ing] that vectored movement as veridical ?  ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŶŐƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶĂůƚƌƵƚŚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
189)  
  Contextually, a number of features can be enumerated from the relationship 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶKƉƉĞŶĂŶĚƵWůĞƐƐŝƐŝŶ ‘,ĂƌĚŽƉǇ ? ?ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐŵŽƐƚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇŝŶƚŚĞƐĞnse that 
ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐĨƌĂŵĞƐKƉƉĞŶ ?Ɛ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ?ĂƐƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌĂĐƚŽĨĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƉŽĞƚŝĐŝŶƋƵŝƌǇŽĨ
the 20th ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ?ŶŽƚŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƋƵĂŶƚŝƚǇďƵƚĐƌƵĐŝĂůůǇŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐŝŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽŶƚŚĞ
intertwined relationship between the poetic, the perceptual, the singular and the numerous. 
It remains true, however, that Oppen is never explicitly conclusive on the question of what it 
is we have chosen the meaning of being numerous to be. Rather, he leaves this question 
open in the sense that if to see the numerous things of existence is to know ourselves, it is an 
ĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶƚĞǆƚǁŚŝĐŚƌĞǀĞĂůƐǁŚĂƚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐ ‘ŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?KƉƉĞŶ
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ŝŶƐŝƐƚƐƵƉŽŶƚŚĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚǇŽĨƵƐŝŶŐƚŚŝƐƚĞƌŵ ‘ŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ?ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚĂƐƐŽŽŶ
as one seeŬƐƚŽĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞ ‘ŽƵƌ-ŶĞƐƐ ? ?ƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞĚŝƚƐŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚ ?
ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ĞǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĂĐƚŽĨƐĞĞŝŶŐŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐŝŶƚŚŝŶŐƐĂƐĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨĚŝƐƚŽƌƚŝŽŶ
ƵŶĚĞƌƐĐŽƌĞƐƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚďŽƚŚKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐĂŶĚƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ƉŽĞƚŝĐƐĂƌĞŐƌŽƵŶĚĞĚŶŽƚŽŶly 
on an ambition to describe phenomenal, communal and poetic numerousness but to do so 
sincerely, with an intense scrutiny directed towards those who would seek to curtail 
 ‘ŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽĂƐŝŶŐůĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ? 
  dŚŝƐƚŚĞŵĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŽƉĞŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚKƉƉĞŶ ?ƐƉŽĞƚƌǇĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞƐŽĐĐƵƉŝĞƐƚŚĞĐůŽƐŝŶŐ
section of DuPlessis poem. dŚĞĨŝŶĂůǁŽƌĚŝŶ ‘,ĂƌĚŽƉǇ ? ?ĂƐŝŶ ‘KĨĞŝŶŐEƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ? ?ŝƐ
tŚŝƚŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ‘ĐƵƌŝŽƵƐ ? ?^ŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
Lack of a door labeled "door." 
And then the lack was a door. 
 
The poem  
being archive of feelings to come ?  
 
And of what else we don't know.  
It is really "quite curious . . ."     (2010, 66) 
  
dŚĞ ‘ůĂĐŬŽĨĂĚŽŽƌůĂďĞůĞĚ “ĚŽŽƌ ? ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƚƐĞůĨĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐĂĚŽŽƌ ?ŝƐďŽƚŚĂŶĞŶƚƌĂŶĐĞĂŶĚ
exit, an indeterminate way in and way out. This is likeneĚƚŽ “ƚŚĞƉŽĞŵ ?ďĞŝŶŐĂƌĐŚŝǀĞŽĨ
ĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐƚŽĐŽŵĞ ? ?ĂƐĞĞŵŝŶŐůǇĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŽƌǇĞǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĞƚŝĐĂƐĂƌĞƉŽƐŝƚŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĂƚ
which has not yet been. This recalls Merleau-WŽŶƚǇ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇĂƐ “ĂŶ
ever-renewed experience of its own beginniŶŐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚ “ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐǁŚŽůůǇŝŶƚŚĞĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ƚŚŝƐďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? )dŚŝƐ ‘ĞǀĞƌ-ƌĞŶ ǁĞĚ ?ďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐƐĞĞŵƐĐůŽƐĞůǇƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽǁŚĂƚKƉƉĞŶĂŶĚ
ƵWůĞƐƐŝƐƐĞĞĂƐtŚŝƚŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ‘ĐƵƌŝŽƐŝƚǇ ? ?I am aware, of course, that it is ironic that I should end 
this thesis with the words of Walt Whitman, given my reservations at the outset concerning 
ŚŝƐƌŽůĞŝŶƚŚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨ ‘dŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ>ŽŶŐWŽĞŵ ? ?/ƚŝƐKƉƉĞŶĂŶĚƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ǁŚŽ
ůŽĐĂƚĞŝŶtŚŝƚŵĂŶĂŶŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƚŝĐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĐƵƌŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞůŽŶŐƉŽĞŵĂƐĞǆƚĞŶded 
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ƉŽĞƚŝĐƐ ?ŽƚŚƉŽĞƚƐĞŶĚƚŚĞŝƌƉŽĞŵƐǁŝƚŚĂĐƵƌŝŽƵƐŐĞƐƚƵƌĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐtŚŝƚŵĂŶ ?ƐĐƵƌŝŽƐŝƚǇ ?Ă
curiosity which for them stands as the foundation from which the meaning of being 
numerous can be explored, interrogated, defended and addressed ?  but never finally 
settled.   
  tŚĂƚ ‘,ĂƌĚŽƉǇ ?ŽĨĨĞƌƐƵƐďǇǁĂǇŽĨĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶŝƐĂŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨǁŚĂƚƉŽĞƚŝĐ
extension in the American 20th century has achieved. DuPlessis has not settled the question 
of the meaning of being numerous. Even so she proves powerfully and profoundly that this 
question remains fundamentally open, not only to those who ask it but also to those it is 
asked of. If I were to condense my claims in this thesis to a single term it would probably be 
KƉƉĞŶĂŶĚƵWůĞƐƐŝƐ ?ƚĞƌŵ ‘ŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ? ?EŽƚŽŶůǇĂƌĞ acts of poetic extension numerous 
in their volume, their methods of composition and their varieties of inquiry, but they are 
numerous also in their preoccupations with the simultaneous and the intersubjective. To 
which it should be added that idiosyncrasy, the etymological basis of which derives from the 
Greek Idios-Sun-Krasis, Žƌ ‘ŽǁŶ-with-ŵŝǆƚƵƌĞ ? ?ŚĂƐĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĞĚĂƐĂǀŝƚĂůŵĞĂŶƐŽĨĐŽŵŝŶŐƚŽ
terms with these varying denotations of numerousness in and of extended poetics.  
  In answer to the question of whether my proposed reorientation of critical approach 
ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ‘dŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ>ŽŶŐWŽĞŵ ?ŚĂƐƐƵĐĐĞĞĚĞĚŝŶĐŝƌƵŵǀĞŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐŽĨ
oversimplification inherent to historicist narratives, I certainly cannot claim finally to have 
settled anything through the idiosyncratic method. It was never my intention, however, to 
solve the critical problems surrounding the long poem once and for all. Instead, in the course 
of this thesis, I have been able to loosen and unfasten the strict binary oppositions and 
determŝŶŝƐƚŝĐŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƐƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ ‘dŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ>ŽŶŐWŽĞŵ ?ŝŶƉƌĞ-existing works of 
ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚĂůƐŽďƌŝŶŐŝŶŐƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞƌĞĐĞŶƚĞǆƉĂŶƐŝǀĞĂŶĚ ‘ŽƉĞŶ ?ĂƉƉƌĂŝƐĂůƐďǇƚŚĞ
likes of Lyn Keller, Rachel Blau DuPlessis, Peter Baker and Joseph Conte. By virtue of a 
phenomenological taxonomy and praxis, and a desire throughout to engage with the poets 
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and poems with and on their own terms, this thesis has made the claim that idiosyncrasy is a 
means through which works of substantial volume, ambition and extension can be 
encountered. The act of poetic extension is, without doubt, the most ambitious form of 
Twentieth Century Poetics in America. In addressing such acts of extension through the 
medium of idiosyncrasy, this thesis has captured the relation between self and others that, 
for all their differences, is the shaping concern of the exemplary poets in whose work this 
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